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
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




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THE
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VOL. XXIX.



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BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1880.

ART. I.—*Richard Baxter.*

THERE is a strong drift of thought at the present day towards a revival of ecclesiastical differences, with an almost pathetic longing for wider religious fellowship. At such a time, and in such a mood, men recall with honour the names of those Divines, who, in the old stormy days, shunned extreme positions, and advocated, no matter with how little success, a forbearing and reconciling policy. No wonder then that Richard Baxter has been rising out of the neglect into which his memory at one time fell; for he was one of those very rare men who, even in the thick of debate and controversy, preserve an elevation of soul above the battle, and when they fight, contend not for victory so much as for peace.

Many thanks to worthy Matthew Sylvester for having "faithfully published from his original manuscript" the "*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*." The old folio (1696) lies before us, and wonderfully rich it is in "fine confused reading." As Sylvester says, it was written *sparsim et raptim*, and never revised; so much the better—spoil it not by abridgment. It is naïve as the Diaries of Pepys and of Evelyn, frank and almost garrulous as Burnet's History of his Times, and yet grave and self-searching like the autobiographies of Halyburton and Boston.

There is no pretence of perfect consistency; though, indeed, Baxter was more consistent than most men are who lead a long public life. But his consistency was not that of a wooden pole, always the same till it decays, but that of a tree which, however it grows and spreads, is always true to itself. Perhaps the most useful, and certainly the most fascinating, passage in the whole book is that in which Baxter reviews himself, and shows with equal candour and humility to what extent and effect he had learned to enlarge or correct some of the more confident opinions of his youth. It occurs not at the end of the volume, as one might naturally expect, but at the close of the first part. It was a very favourite passage with the late Sir James Stephen. Dean Stanley has told how Sir James pointed it out to him and said, "Lose not a day in reading it, you will never repent of it." "That very night," adds the Dean, "I followed his advice, and have ever since, publicly and privately, advised every theological student to do the same."¹ We venture to say that there is nothing to be found in the whole range of autobiographical literature to surpass this unpretending, unaffected self-criticism. It has something in it of both the "Confessiones" and the "Retractationes" of Augustine.

Alas for the "good old times" in Shropshire, when Richard Baxter was a boy (born A.D. 1615). Both pastors and people were generally ignorant and irreligious. There was no clergyman in or near the village where the Baxters lived. The schoolmaster "read common prayer on Sundays and holidays, and taught school, and tippled on the week-days." A few of the villagers (Richard's father among them) were stigmatised as Puritans and Precisians, because they would not join in the rough sports and dancing in the open air, to which the people betook themselves on the Lord's Day, so soon as common prayer was said. But as yet those early Puritans had raised no scruple about the Prayer-Book or Church ceremonies. Richard Baxter was quite grown up before he even heard any one pray "without a book."

At such schools as were within his reach, the young Richard greatly distinguished himself; but he never enjoyed the advantage of a University education; in this unlike the great Puritan leaders with whom he was afterwards on a par—as

¹ Address at the inauguration of Baxter's Statue at Kidderminster, 1875.

Howe, Goodwin, Manton, and Owen—all of whom were University men. But Baxter, by great application, acquired a wide, if somewhat undisciplined erudition, and gathered such materials as his quick and ingenious mind knew well how to employ. Deficient in classical accuracy, he delighted in logic and scholastic metaphysics. "I read all the Schoolmen I could get; for, next to practical Divinity, no books so suited with my disposition as Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, Ockham, and their disciples, because I thought that they narrowly searched after truth, and brought things out of the darkness of confusion, for I could never from my first studies endure confusion. Till Equivocals were explained, and Definition and Distinction led the way, I had rather hold my tongue than speak, and was never more weary of learned men's discourses, than when I heard them long wrangling about unexpounded words or things, and vehemently asserting modes, and consequences, and adjuncts, before they considered of the *Quod sit*, the *Quid sit*, or the *Quotuplex*." This combination of a fervent spirit, with a keen logical faculty revelling in the subtle dialectic of the schoolmen, reminds us of Samuel Rutherford, who, with all his glowing piety, was one of the sharpest logicians and disputers of his time.

But the fervent spirit was Baxter's strongest characteristic. It was not caught from any great preacher touching his heart, or kindling his enthusiasm. He heard no such preacher in his youth, and his religious convictions were due to books that pedlars brought to his father's door, and not least to a book originally composed by a Jesuit, with which Baxter fell in at the age of fifteen. The tone of seriousness which his mind then assumed was deepened by his extreme feebleness, inducing a constant expectation of death. Who that had seen that young man with his "violent cough," and "spitting of blood," and "bleeding at the nose, many times half a pint or a pint a day," and all his ailments aggravated by the absurd prescriptions of his physicians, could have expected him to live and labour as very few men have laboured up to the age of seventy-six? One physician advised him to take "flour of brimstone, which took off most of the remainder of my cough, but increased the acrimony of my blood." Another persuaded him that he "had a hectick." So he betook himself to "much milk from the cow, and other pituitous cooling things." A

third "was confident that scurvy was my chief distemper, and thereupon prescribed me more acrimonious medicaments, scurvy-grass, horse-radish, mustard, wormwood, etc., which abundantly increased my bleeding at the nose!" It is pitiful to read of the maltreatment which a life so valuable to the Church of God had to suffer. But all the suffering was borne with a wonderfully cheerful and intrepid spirit. In Baxter, as in Calvin and William of Orange, some secret resource of strength lay hidden in an apparently weak and insufficient frame; and lofty purpose triumphed over bodily infirmity.

Baxter never allowed his illnesses to hinder his studies. Expecting to die young, he nevertheless zealously addressed himself to preparation for public usefulness. His ardent wish was to spend his uncertain life in the Christian ministry, conscious as he was (the language is his own, and worthy of him) "of a thirsty desire of men's conversion and salvation, and of some competent persuading faculty of expression which fervent affections might help to actuate." The Bishop of Worcester ordained him at the age of twenty-three. In the early days of his ministry, though he would not himself wear the surplice, or make the sign of the cross in baptism, he tried to be content with the Church system in which he had been brought up, and "disputed daily against the Nonconformists" in his neighbourhood, blaming them for "ensoriousness and inclinations towards separation." "But I found," he quaintly adds, "that their sufferings from the Bishops were the great impediment of my success; and that to persecute men, and then call them to charity, is like whipping children to make them give over crying."

Serious scruples on ecclesiastical matters seem to have been first excited in the mind of Baxter by the imposition on the clergy of what was commonly called the "et cetera" oath, binding them "never to consent to the alteration of the present government of the Church by Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Archdeacons, etc." Baxter at once condemned and refused such an obligation, and the majority of the clergy in the neighbourhood was of one mind with him. With all due gravity, he argued "that it was intolerable to swear to a blind et cetera." The officers of the ecclesiastical court exercised church-government. Must he swear never to change "lay chancellors, surrogates, commissaries," and all that "anomalous

rabble?" These disputes led Mr. Baxter into a serious examination of ecclesiastical government; and he came to a firm conclusion against "the English Diocesan frame." He was eclectic in his ideas, and saw good and evil in all systems, but to the end of his life he continued a firm anti-Prelatist.

The strength of his mind, however, was by no means expended on ecclesiastical questions. From the beginning of his course, Baxter was above all things, a godly preacher and winner of souls. At Dudley, at Bridgnorth, and then at Kidderminster, he "laboured much in the Lord," visited, prayed, catechised, and preached "as a dying man to dying men." He seems to have neglected nothing that should engage the attention of a good minister of Jesus Christ. He watched over the moral tone of the community; stirred up neighbouring clergy to greater diligence; cared for the poor, spending on them no small part of his income of £60; picked out deserving pupils from schools, and contrived to send them on to the Universities; gave away vast numbers of Bibles and edifying books. A more fervent preacher, a more self-denying and useful pastor, England has never seen.

When the Civil War broke out, Baxter, as might be expected, took the side of the Parliament, though he had no wish whatever to see the monarchy overthrown. All he desired was to have a constitutional and not a despotic king; and in his opinion the real traitors of that time were those evil advisers who fomented the rupture between King Charles and the Parliament of England. He spent two years with the army of Fairfax and Cromwell as a chaplain; but apparently in a perpetual controversy. The multiplication of "the sectaries," and the growing revolutionary tendency of the army greatly disturbed him. He set himself with characteristic ardour to "discourse and dispute the soldiers out of their mistakes, both religious and political." They talked of State democracy, Church democracy, of forms of prayer and infant baptism, of free grace and free will, of Antinomianism and Arminianism. Alas! one of the chief heresies in Baxter's eyes was liberty of conscience. The good man feared it as a source of endless vagaries.

Distrusting Cromwell, the Presbyterian chaplains left the army, and the English Revolution of the seventeenth century

had full swing. Baxter went back to Kidderminster, already a famous man, though only in his thirty-first year, and resumed the proper work of his ministry, combining with it a constantly growing literary activity. At this period, his powers as a preacher reached their highest point. When he went up to London, the parish churches could not hold the crowds that hung upon his lips; and Westminster Abbey and the old Gothic cathedral of St. Paul's often resounded to his eloquence.

So he lived and laboured during the protectorate. When Richard Cromwell fell from his father's seat, Baxter at once recognised the critical situation of public affairs, and repaired to the metropolis. He was not among the Presbyterian ministers who went over to Holland to confer with Charles II.; but on the proclamation of the King, 8th May 1660, it was he who preached before the Lord Mayor and Corporation in St. Paul's. The sermon was on "Right Rejoicing," and is extant. "The moderate were pleased with it; the fanaticks were offended; the diocesan party thought I did suppress their joy."

On the arrival of the King, ten or twelve of the leading Presbyterian ministers were designated chaplains in ordinary to His Majesty. "But never any of them," says Baxter, "was called to preach at Court, saving Mr. Calamy, Dr. Reynolds, myself, and Dr. Spurston, each of us once; and I suppose never a man of them all ever received or expected a penny of salary." It is easy to understand that one sermon of such grave and searching preachers was quite enough for Charles II. and his Court. That "merry monarch" is credited with the saying, that Presbyterianism is no religion for a gentleman; and we may admit that it is not congenial to gentlemen like Charles II. It could never be induced to describe a heartless libertine as "our most religious king."

Baxter now came to the front as practically, if not formally, a Presbyterian leader. His anxiety, after the Restoration, was to secure the undisturbed continuance in their parishes of the more devout clergy who had been settled during the time of the Commonwealth, on which subject he spoke earnestly to the King; to prevent the recovery of power by the bigoted prelatial party; and to bring about an adjustment of differences by such a combination of Episcopacy and Presbytery as Archbishop Usher had sketched twenty years before. He did

not succeed in any one of these objects; but his wisdom is none the less to be esteemed that it was not recognised in a confused and passionate age.

In the negotiations which followed at Sion College, and at the Savoy, Baxter and his comrades specified the ceremonies in Divine worship which their consciences would not permit them to observe, and pleaded that these should not be made imperative, so that there might be a comprehension of good men of all parties within the National Church. Those English Presbyterians took very different ground from their Scottish brethren, for they made no objection, either to liturgical service or to the Royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical. They gained nothing by their extreme moderation. The restored prelates took advantage of the occasion to represent them as pertinacious men who were full of scruples and crotchets against harmless ceremonies, and raised captious exceptions to the Book of Common Prayer. To weaken their influence still more, an attempt was made to gain over the leaders to Prelacy by offers of preferment. Bishoprics were tendered by the Lord Chancellor to Reynolds, Calamy, and Baxter. After a little delay, Dr. Reynolds, who held that the form of Church polity is left undetermined in the New Testament, accepted the offer made to him, and became Bishop of Norwich. Baxter refused, and Calamy followed his example. Manton and Bates also declined the deaneries to which they were designated.

The negotiations failed. A great opportunity was miserably lost; and matters grew worse and worse for what was now the weaker party. Scarcely had a year passed from the sitting of the Savoy Conference, professedly with a view to reconciliation and concord, when the Act of Uniformity was passed by the new Parliament (1662) called by King Charles, and the Puritans, whether Presbyterians or Independents, being denied concession or forbearance in regard to jot or tittle of Church ceremonies, were compelled to leave the Church of England. Presbyterian ordination was for the first time pronounced invalid. The Prayer-Book was revised by Convocation, and changes made in the very opposite direction from that which had been sought. Its minutest forms and rubrics were imposed with greater strictness than ever, with the

express purpose of thoroughly alienating the Puritans. The designs of the dominant party were entirely successful; but what a success! What a piece of consummate folly and injustice to make, for the sake of forms and ceremonies, a deep and permanent rift all through the religious life of England!

It must have been a sore trial to so pronounced a churchman as Baxter to cast in his lot with the Nonconformists; and a deep vexation to see, at the age of forty-seven, all his negotiations and expostulations fail, and all his hopes for charity and comprehension roughly trodden under foot. But he showed no hesitation about the path of duty, and accepted his new position with a quite pathetic cheerfulness.

During his residence at Kidderminster, he had thought it conducive to his usefulness that he led a single life, and was not impeded by family cares; but after his ejection he married Margaret Charlton of Apley Castle, in Shropshire. In this he was much more happy than his great contemporary Richard Hooker, who in his connubial arrangements was certainly not "the judicious." Isaac Walton says that the blessing of a good wife "was denied to patient Job, to meek Moses, and to our as meek and patient, Mr. Hooker." Mr. Baxter escaped this trial, and had nineteen years of sympathy and affection.

He lived for a time at Acton, then at Barnet; and endeavoured indomitably as ever to fight against High Prelacy on the one hand, and separatism on the other. His temper was not soured by all the wrong which he and his brethren had endured, and the old love of "pacification" was strong within him. So he wrote in every form and in all directions on possible adjustments of ecclesiastical differences, used every opportunity to treat with nobles and bishops of toleration and comprehension, and conferred earnestly with Dr. Owen regarding an agreement between the Presbyterians and Independents. Owen moved too slowly for his energetic correspondent, and their intentions, which were good on both sides, came to no result.

It was at Acton that Baxter won the friendship of that righteous judge and admirable man, Sir Matthew Hale, then Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. They delighted to converse of philosophical and theological points, and Baxter pays

his friend the fine compliment of saying, "His very questions and objections did help me to more light than other men's solutions." On the ecclesiastical troubles of the age the two worthies were thoroughly agreed. Hale "was a great lamenter of the extremities of the times, and the violence and foolishness of the predominant clergy, and a great desirer of such abatements as might restore us all to serviceableness and unity."

In that intolerant time, neither his own blameless life nor the friendship of good men could protect a notable Nonconformist from ill-treatment. Dr. Calamy had been in Newgate. Many others of like spirit were shut up in provincial jails; and Baxter's turn came to be arrested, and taken to Clerkenwell prison. He was soon released on the ground of an illegality in the mittimus. But his adversaries did not leave him long unmolested.

His health, too, was pitiful. At Barnet (or more precisely, at Totteridge) he lived in obscure lodgings, for he had now no professional income whatever. The rooms were smoky, and the place was cold; and such a complication of diseases tormented poor Mr. Baxter, that we wonder how he lived, much more how he laboured. Every part of his body seems to have had its ailment, not excepting a grievous attack of sciatica. He speaks of "vertiginous or stupefying conquests of the brain, so that I rarely have one hour's or quarter of an hour's ease. Yet, through God's mercy, I was never one hour melancholy, and not many times in a week disabled utterly from my work, save that I lost time in the morning, for want of being able to rise early." What a strong and healthy soul did that broken vessel contain!

A rumour having been spread that Baxter was willing to conform—a rumour which he could not publicly contradict, because the law forbade unlicensed printing, and no licence would be granted to him—the Earl of Lauderdale, on behalf of the King, proposed to him to settle in Scotland, and offered him any position he liked, "either a church, or a college in the university, or a bishoprick." The offer was at once declined. As to the care of a church, or an important post in a university, Baxter's state of health put it out of the question; and as for the third position tendered to him, a man who had refused a See in England, was not likely to begin to play prelate on a

soil so uncongenial to such dignitaries as stern Caledonia had been. It is touching, and yet it is amusing, to find Baxter in his letter of declinature earnestly requesting that he might be let alone to follow his studies, and might have his books about him again, for they had lain for ten years at Kidderminster, "where they are eaten by worms and rats;" and that if he were to be arrested again "for preaching Christ's Gospel," he might be sent, not to Newgate, but to a better prison, where he might "walk and write."

In and around London he seems to have preached as he found opportunity, till the year 1682; not with such fire perhaps as in his youth, but with the weight of one who had seen and considered much, and with the tenderness of one who had been much afflicted. Preachers who are growing old will read with interest what Baxter himself has said on this point:—"The temper of my mind hath somewhat altered with the temper of my body. When I was young I was more vigorous, affectionate, and fervent in preaching, conference, and prayer, than (ordinarily) I can be now: my style was more extemporate and lax, but by the advantage of affection and a very familiar moving voice and utterance, my preaching then did more affect the auditory, than in many of the last years before I gave over preaching; but yet what I delivered was much more raw, and had more passages in it would not bear the trial of accurate judgments; and my discourses had both less substance and less judgment than of late."

The chief occupation of Baxter at this period of his life was literary; and so soon as the restrictions on the Press were removed, he published many works, great and small, but never insignificant. The versatility of his mind is quite marvellous. He would handle hard questions, and write a "Method of Theology," then turn straightway to pen some plain book for the poor, or catechism for households. He could fence in controversy with all parties round the circle of religious diversity, and then take up his pen to write counsels to young men, or half-sheets of saving truth for those who were sick or in danger of the plague.

He was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned under the infamous Five-Mile and Conventicle Acts. And the persecution to which he was subjected culminated in the monstrous

trial before Chief-Justice Jeffreys, of which Lord Macaulay has given such a graphic account in his History. The brutal judge roared out insults at the venerable divine, would listen to no evidence or argument in his behalf, and obtained from a packed and servile jury a verdict that Baxter was guilty of having made reflections on the clergy. The sentence passed was one of eighteen months' imprisonment. It is said that Jeffreys wished to have Mr. Baxter whipped through London at the cart's tail, but was overruled by his three colleagues on the bench. One has a grim satisfaction in remembering that this ermined ruffian, a very few years after, had to hide from the fury of the London mob, was himself committed to the Tower, and died there in dejection and disgrace.

It proved to be the last time of imprisonment for Baxter. He was confined at Southwark, whither his friends flocked to show respect and sympathy. Pleasant to know that one of those visitors was Matthew Henry, then a young Presbyterian minister. Baxter survived those grievous times when many apparently stronger men succumbed and died. He was destined to see an end of those false Stuart kings, the beginning of a more constitutional monarchy, and the passing of the Act of Toleration. His closing years were spent in comparative peace at his house in Charterhouse Yard. At last that piercing eye of his grew dim, that ready tongue spoke its last pious words, and was still. "On Thursday morning, about four of the clock, 8th December 1691," Richard Baxter accomplished his warfare, and went to that of which he had written so well—the saint's everlasting rest.

Thus closed a career of much vicissitude—thus passed from the earth a spirit of wonderful vitality and force. From the fine portrait in Dr. Williams' library, and the *Vera Effigies* prefixed to the first edition of the "Narrative," we can imagine the outer man: a rather tall figure, slender and wasted; a full clear eye; a lean face capable of a very grave, but also of a very sweet expression; the strongly-bridged nose, and firmly-set chin, which mark resolution; a short moustache and beard, long hair covered with the black cap which divines and scholars used to wear, the whole head full-sized and well-proportioned; costume, grave and clerical; a man of simple, perhaps austere habits of life, tasking body and mind to the

utmost, a copious reader, a keen reasoner, above all, a good and loving Christian.

The place of Baxter in our religious literature is a high one, and must so continue. Of his voluminous writings, many, no doubt, are now forgotten by all but the few who make a special study of such authors. They only share a common fate; and it can be truly said that there is not one—not even the most hasty of this author's works—but bears the impress of a powerful mind. His literary reputation might have been higher still if he had written more sparingly, and with deliberation. He was quite aware of this, but could not or would not let his pen rest, feeling a pressure on his spirit to mingle in every discussion, and take advantage of every opportunity to assert and diffuse what he held to be right and true. His own observations on a retrospect of his writings are very characteristic. "My own judgment is, that fewer well-studied and polished had been better, but the reader who can safely censure the books is not fit to censure the author, unless he had been upon the place, and acquainted with all the occasions and circumstances. Indeed, for the *Saints' Rest*, I had four months' vacancy to write it (but in the midst of continual languishing and medicine); but for the rest, I wrote them in the crowd of all my other employments, which would allow me no great leisure for polishing and exactness, or any ornament, so that I scarce ever wrote one sheet twice over, nor stayed to make any blots or interlinings, but was fain to let it go as it was first conceived." Have we any writer, who, composing so much and so rapidly, has, on the whole, written so vigorously and well? Archbishop Trench¹ attributes to him "a robust and masculine eloquence, and from time to time rare and unsought felicities of language which, once heard, can scarcely be forgotten."

The strong tendency of Baxter's mind to middle courses led him to walk between Arminianism and Calvinism on some questions, as also between Episcopacy and Presbytery; but this sprang from no irresolution or timidity, far less from any disposition to trim in order to please both sides. He was a most independent and fearless thinker; and his refusal to take as

¹ In Lecture at St. James's, Piccadilly,—"*Companions to the Devout Life.*"

final the dogmatic positions and controversial distinctions of his time was largely due to the inconvenient width of his mind which embraced every point of view, and the generous desire to reduce differences which, to a large extent, were grounded, in his opinion, on "mutual mistakes," and to find common ground on which Christian men might stand. The disposition grew within him. He tells that in his youth he was inclined "to go with the highest in controversies, as with Dr. Twisse and Mr. Rutherford, and Spanhemius, and to despise the conciliators;" but he came to be convinced that "the Reconcilers" had not only a more amiable spirit, but "greater light and stronger judgment than either of the contending parties." He indicates as reconcilers, "Davenant, Hall, Usher, Cameron, etc."

It seems a pity that Baxter was not a member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. On the whole, he would have agreed with George Gillespie and Samuel Rutherford; but at some points he would have had a skirmish with them, as well as with Goodwin, or Lightfoot, or Selden—all in the approved old logical fashion, denying, now the *major*, now the *minor*—and interposing many a sharp *distinguo*. After all, perhaps it is better that he was not there, for with his distributive habits of investigation, and boundless faculty of expression, he would to a serious extent have protracted the debates. Probably it was on account of his comparative youth that he was not among those "learned and godly divines," whom Parliament invited to meet at Westminster—for he was only twenty-eight years of age when the assembly sat—"to be consulted with by the Parliament, for the settling of the government and liturgy of the Church of England, and for vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the said Church from false aspersions and interpretations."¹ But Baxter refers to the Assembly in a quite genial and respectful manner in his narrative. "The Prolocutor or Moderator was Dr. William Twisse (a man very famous for his scholastical wit and writings in a very smooth triumphant style): the divines there congregate were men of eminent earning and godliness, and ministerial abilities and fidelity." But he proceeds frankly to say that he was "not of their mind in every point of the government which they would

¹ Title of the Ordinance of Parliament, 12th June 1643. How different the result has been from the original intention!

have set up." He wished "some words in the Catechism made more clear," but does not mention what they were; and he was vexed that they had not done more to "heal the breaches," and establish a "universal concord." He had quite a passion for concord, and nothing would make him believe it impossible. What Baxter would have thought of the use now made of the Doctrinal Standards of Westminster as tests of fitness for office in the British, Colonial, and American Presbyterian Churches, does not appear; but he repudiated the imposition of them as a test of communion. "I hope the Assembly intended not all in that long Confession and those Catechisms to be imposed as a test of Christian communion, nor to disown all that scrupled any word therein."

It is evident that in his more mature years Baxter became a sort of Presbyterian Broad-Churchman; not at all in that style of breadth which goes with vagueness of belief and what the Scotch call "moderatism," but in a style more rare and very precious, which co-exists and combines with earnest faith and a fervent spirit. He grew weary of "controversies and curiosities," professed his regret for having used language too keen and provoking in his own controversial writings, deplored all harsh usage and censure of men in religion, and more and more wished to lay the stress of study and of life on "the essential doctrines of Christianity and godliness." On the last point he uses a capital illustration—"As the stock of the tree affordeth timber to build houses and cities, when the small though higher multifarious branches are but to make a crow's nest or a blaze; so the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ, of heaven and holiness, doth build up the soul to endless blessedness, and affordeth it solid peace and comfort, when a multitude of school niceties serve but for vain janglings and hurtful divisions and contentions."

Let Baxter then be described as a devoutly believing Broad-Churchman. It by no means follows that the English Unitarians may claim him as their "spiritual progenitor." Yet they do so; and Dean Stanley, in a public address already referred to, has set this forth in a marked manner, and (strange language in one who has in other places shown respect to the Presbyterian Church) has described the Presbyterians and Independents of England as "diverging lines of saint-like men—Priestley and Channing on the one side, Watts and Doddridge

on the other!" The only ground on which, so far as we can learn, Unitarians allege a filial relation to Baxter is that he grew in liberality and charity, and longed for simpler terms of Christian fellowship. But if this makes one a Unitarian, who will refuse the name? No, we cannot allow that every liberal or charitable Christian is a Unitarian, or even a quasi-Unitarian. He is a Unitarian who denies the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and who, denying the Deity united to the humanity of Christ, (usually) refuses the truth of atonement for our sins through His death. Now Baxter was as firm on these doctrines to the last day of his life as any English divine that can be named. And while it is quite true that he wished to emphasise "fundamentals" only, it is equally true that among those fundamentals were the very doctrines which Unitarians impugn. We cite his own words—"I believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost expresseth all the essentials intelligibly to him that hath learned truly to understand the meaning of these words. But as to the use of public professions of faith to satisfy the Church for the admittance of members, or to satisfy other Churches to hold communion with any particular Church, a form of words which is neither obscure by too much conciseness, nor tedious and tautological by a needless multiplication of words, I take to be the fittest." He proceeds to say that he would be content for the purpose with "the ancient Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments." When the objection was made—"A Socinian or a Papist will subscribe this"—Baxter replied, "So much the better, and so much the fitter it is to be the matter of our concord." On this Unitarians have fastened as though it proved that Baxter thought a Socinian not far wrong. But if they will read the whole passage they will find the speaker to have meant that it was useless to keep out either Socinians or Papists by a test; that they should rather be kept in to be instructed, but "called to account (by the Government) whenever in preaching or writing they contradict or abuse the truth to which they have subscribed." Certainly this would not suit Unitarians.

We have no wish to write hard things of the Unitarians of England. Among them are virtuous and exemplary men and women not a few. In the struggles of past days for liberty and for education they have borne a distinguished part. But why do they keep up the farce of calling themselves Presby-

terians, when they have no feature whatever of Presbyterianism, and are strongly at variance with all the Presbyterian Churches in the empire? Why claim Richard Baxter as their father? They might as well claim Thomas Chalmers as their brother. Their rise synchronised with the sad decline of all that Baxter had held dear. Their origin was in the rationalising temper which in the last century fell on the desultory congregations called Presbyterian, but having none of the securities for doctrine or discipline which are essential to a Presbyterian Church. That the congregations which had been formed by orthodox Presbyterian ministers were left in this helpless condition was partly the fault, no doubt, of the Presbyterian leaders of the seventeenth century, Baxter among them, but more largely the fault of that intolerant government in Church and State which did not permit English Presbyteries to be organised.¹

The published treatises of Baxter's prolific pen are 168 in number, more or less. The three which are best known are, we need hardly say, *The Saints' Rest*, *The Call to the Unconverted*, and *The Reformed Pastor*. The first of these, one somehow fancies, must have been the solemn task of his old age; but it was really the production of his early manhood, and the second that he sent to press. It was written in a time of weakness, and bears these words on its title-page:—"Written by the Author for his own use in the time of his languishing when God took him off all public employment." In composing it he had no books but his English Bible and Concordance; and so much the better, as it saved the treatise from those decorative quotations which were so much in vogue at the period. But the author afterwards inserted as many as he could in the margin. For modern use the book is too discursive, and bears judicious abridgment very well. In its original form, it at once obtained an immense circulation; and if we consider that it appeals to no passion or controversy of the period, the fact speaks much for the serious piety that was diffused through England even in the very throes of civil war. The second work to which we have referred was written at the urgent request of Archbishop Usher. The author thought little of

¹ "Presbyterians durst not meet synodically unless in a jail."—*Rel. Baxt.* part 3, p. 43.

it, and was astonished at its success. In little more than a year 20,000 copies of *The Call to the Unconverted* were published,—a prodigious number if we consider what was the probable reading population of the country at the time. In the author's lifetime, it was translated and published in France and Germany ; and the missionary John Eliot rendered it into one of the languages of the American Indians. Who can tell in how many copies and how many languages its earnest pleadings have, since those days, been poured out upon the world ! *The Reformed Pastor* is a treatise which grew out of a sermon prepared by Baxter for delivery before an assembly of the clergy at Worcester, and in some respects seems to us unrivalled as a heart-warming book on the Christian ministry. On a revival of ministerial fidelity and efficiency the author's mind was bent most ardently. "All Churches," he said, "rise or fall as the ministry doth rise or fall, not in riches and worldly grandeur, but in knowledge, zeal, and ability for their work. But since Bishops were restored this book is useless, and that work not meddled with." In that last sentence is there just a little tinge of pique ?

Next to the love of God and of truth, the strongest feeling in Baxter's mind was the desire of concord in the Church. Accordingly, he was never weary of writing books with such titles as these—*Catholic Unity ; Christian Concord ; A Friendly Accommodation ; Five Disputations about Church Government in order to the Reconciliation of the differing Parties ; An end of Doctrinal Controversies by reconciling Explication*. It is easy to smile, and call such efforts Quixotic, but it was at all events the Quixotism of a warm heart and a big brain. The charity of Baxter was not that easy virtue which agrees to differ without taking any trouble to understand the ground and nature of those variances which it is so kind as to ignore. On the contrary, he examined and tried to estimate all the ecclesiastical diversities, and even all the party crotchets of his own and former times. But he did so that he might the better see how to adjust and reconcile them, not that he might set one in triumph over all the rest. He avowed himself always a Catholic Christian, and shrank from every imputation of being a sectary. In his eyes a sectary was one who sought the advancement of a faction rather than the common interest.

of Christianity. "And if," said he, "men can but get to be of a sect which they think the holiest (as the Anabaptists and Separatists), or which is the largest (as the Greeks and Papists), they then think that they are sufficiently warranted to deny others to be of God's Church, or at least to deny them Christian love and communion." In his enthusiasm for a Catholic concord, which he would not regard as a forlorn hope even in the worst days he ever saw, Baxter had to maintain a middle position, striking at controversial adversaries on the right hand and the left. On one side he assailed both sectaryism on account of its disintegration of Christian society, and the extreme assertion, whether of the Presbyterian or the Prelatic system, as tending to alienate and not reconcile objectors. On the other side, he struck heavy blows at the fallacious and arrogant Catholicism of the Church of Rome. His *Key for Catholics* is a really formidable dissection of the Roman claim and not unworthy to be read along with the masterpieces of Chillingworth and Stillingfleet in the same controversy.

In the present day, the thoughts and sympathies of many Christians have happily become too wide for their inherited systems; and many minds are musing over possible approximations, reconciliations, and even amalgamations of cognate religious communities. At such a time Richard Baxter's lifelong ardour for comprehension may hope for an appreciation such as the mere hacks of particular systems have never been willing to yield. We do not say that he was able to sketch out the very solutions of religious and ecclesiastical complications which are likely to be realised. The thoughts of men need to be still more "widened with the process of the suns" before any solution worthy of the name can be reached. But it does seem to us, that Baxter has inculcated lessons which all who would form a Liberal Evangelical School should lay to heart, *e.g.* (1) to discourage most strongly any attempt to make new sects or parties—implying of course the duty so to administer existing churches, and improve them where the need of improvement is confessed, that there may be no provocation to create new divisions; (2) to study carefully the *rationale* of each important division that now exists, not so much heeding the surface aspects as going down to the roots of separate church systems, especially of the three which virtually divide

Protestant Christendom between them—Prelacy, Presbytery, and Independency; (3) while endeavouring to bring about some better adjustment of Christian communion *at the roots*, a work of time and patience, but one which should not be impossible, if we do not repeat the error of our fathers in over minuteness, and exacting too many points of agreement; to alleviate the evils of ecclesiastical separation as far as possible by hearty fraternal conference and co-operation on the ground of our common Christianity; (4) to take up no extravagant positions on questions of form and Church service. Baxter deplored the narrow spirit which counted men as in or out of the Church according as they accepted or refused certain ceremonies. "They that make their unstable forms and ceremonies essential to the Church," said he, "make a ceremony of the Church itself." But, on the other hand, he had no sympathy with those pedants of nonconformity who would make a church rest on a number of scruples, as on the points of pins. He would have scorned to make a church-principle of the refusal of a form of prayer, or the exclusion of instrumental music. In his mature life he wrote, "I do not lay so great a stress upon the external modes and forms of worship as many young professors do. I cannot be of their opinion that think God will not accept him that prayeth by the Common Prayer-book, and that such forms are a self-invented worship which God rejecteth; nor yet can I be of their mind that say the like of extemporary Prayers."

On other subjects, too, Baxter was in advance of his time. Take, for instance, what we call Foreign Missions. Some interesting letters are preserved, which passed between Baxter and John Eliot, "the Apostle of the Indians in New England," which show the warm and enlightened interest felt by the busy English divine in the remote labours of the missionary. "There is no man on earth," he wrote, "whose work I think more honourable and comfortable than yours." In that review of himself from which we have repeatedly quoted, he repeats his tribute to Eliot, and all who had "laboured in such work," and tells how the case of the heathen world more and more deeply affected him, though he was not "inclined to pass a peremptory sentence of damnation upon all that never heard of Christ." A consideration of "the method of the Lord's

Prayer," had much conduced to this. "No part of my prayers are so deeply serious as that for the conversion of the infidel and ungodly world, that God's name may be sanctified, and His kingdom come, and His will be done on earth as it is in heaven." It is justly told, as one of Baxter's great claims on the gratitude of posterity, that he was chiefly influential in obtaining the charter of our oldest, though not wisest, missionary organisation—"The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel."

We do not represent Baxter as a consummate ecclesiastical statesman, though he had largeness of view, courage, readiness, and a definite reasonable policy. He had difficult materials to work upon. He grew up among a clergy whose ecclesiastical convictions were wonderfully vague and undetermined; and when his own views took shape, he was balked in the days of the Commonwealth by Cromwell's dislike to Presbytery, and after the Restoration by the severity of the Government against all who demurred to the Prelatic *régime*. And then he was hampered, as we have said, by his acceptance of that which Scottish Presbyterians always refused, the Royal Supremacy over ecclesiastical affairs. We do not affirm that he was always an easy man to work with. In the pages of his own *Reliquiæ*, we can see that he could be rather tart with even the great Dr. John Owen, and that he often differed from his own friends. But when we think of his constant vexations and pains, and of the calumnies with which he was assailed, we really wonder that he retained so much kindness as he did. He grew in patience and sweetness in his later years; and he has left on record a beautiful expression of regret for any words in his controversial writings "which are too keen and apt to provoke." "I wish all over-sharp passages were expunged from my writings, and desire forgiveness of God and man." Baxter might have been pragmatistical and contentious. It was the constant devoutness of his spirit which saved him from this, and cast a sacred fragrance over all his words and works. One who knew him well has said—"When he spoke of weighty soul concerns, you might find his very spirit drenched therein." Success is a sharp test of a man's spirit: and when our worthy was at the height of his public influence, we find him never boasting of his party, but always pressing

on men of every degree the necessity of a spiritual life. In grand old Westminster Abbey, thus he preached to the House of Commons—"Men that differ about bishops, ceremonies, and forms of prayer, may be all true Christians, and dear to one another and to Christ, if they be practically agreed in the life of godliness, and join in a holy heavenly conversation. But if you agree in all your opinions and formalities, and yet were never sanctified through the truth, you do but agree to delude your own souls, and none of you will be saved for all your agreement."

Well and truly said, O rare old Baxter!

D. FRASER.

ART. II.—*Evolution in Religion.*

The Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religions of India.
By F. MAX MÜLLER.

IN this work, which we propose to review, we have the first-fruits of the Hibbert Lecture. The seven lectures of which it consists were delivered by their distinguished author in Westminster Abbey in the year 1878. They awakened so deep and general an interest, that, to satisfy public curiosity, each lecture had to be repeated to a different audience in the same place. A book so heralded has doubtless had a wide circulation, and the views expounded in it will be regarded by many as the best results of the latest investigations of the important subject which it discusses. The author does not undertake to present a synoptical view of the development of religion among the various nations of the earth. He confines his attention to a field with which no living scholar could be presumed to be more familiar than the editor of the Rig-Veda and the historian of Sanskrit literature, namely, the ancient religion of the Hindu Aryans. But an accurate exposition of the development of religious thought in that influential branch of the Indo-Germanic family must prove a weighty contribution to the general philosophy of religion; and they who agree with the lecturer in his main conclusions will not be in doubt as to

what they should think regarding the existence of a divine supernatural revelation, or as to the highest form of religion which man can attain by the exercise of his reasoning powers. At the close of his last lecture he gives expression to a hope that a time will come when the deepest foundations of all the religions of the world will be laid free and restored; and then Christianity will not be considered to be the one absolute universal religion; but the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Moham-medan, the Jew, and the Christian will form one Church, by each retaining of their respective systems some great principle, their pearl of great price, after "they have learnt to put away childish things, call them genealogies, legends, miracles, or oracles." This is the avowal of a view of religion so comprehensive and unexclusive that even a man of the wide sympathies of the present Dean of Westminster might well shrink from homologating it.

Our author begins by determining what we are to understand by religion; for if we put too much into our conception of the term we shall unduly restrict its application. There are people in our day who make it an easy matter to claim to have a religion. We are becoming accustomed to the idea of an "untheological religion." It is not necessary to believe in a personal God in order to be religious. Our author will make Dr. D. F. Strauss a religious man in spite of himself. For did he not believe in order and law, reason and goodness, a Cosmos full of life and reason? He is therefore reproached for not decidedly claiming to have a religion. He committed a great blunder in thinking that true religion must "manifest itself in prayer," whereas religion can be either with or without worship. The indications are that a profession of religion is about to become quite fashionable among a class of thinkers who would formerly have thought it a reproach to have religion imputed to them. Now they have a weakness for the designation. There is nothing new under the sun. Human nature is continually repeating its old ways with variations. The Buddhists reasoned themselves out of a belief in a Creator and a Providence. But they had still a craving for an object of worship, and so, contrary to their own principles, they made a god out of the founder of their system. And John Stuart Mill could not bring himself to believe in theism. But after his wife's death

he was not in doubt like Strauss as to whether he had a religion. For he could say of his deceased wife: "Her memory is to me a religion, and her approbation the standard by which, summing up as it does all worthiness, I endeavour to regulate my life." It is to Mill that our author alludes when he says: "Nor should we hesitate to recognise the last glimmerings of religion when we see a recent philosopher, after declaring both God and gods obsolete, falling down before a beloved memory, and dedicating all his powers to the service of humanity." So a definition of religion must be found wide enough to embrace all these phases of thought, for "all this is religion." We might go even further than our author, and include Ludwig Feuerbach among the men of religion; for he had a religion, the mystery of which he thus expounds at the close of his work *Das Wesen des Christenthums*: "Life is God; the enjoyment of life is the enjoyment of God; the true pleasure of life is true religion."

Professor Tiele,¹ in writing the history of religion, thought that he might define religion to be "the relation between man and the superhuman powers." But there are obvious objections to this definition, as he himself allows; and Max Müller is forced to deplore that "there seem to be almost as many definitions of religion as there are religions in the world, and there is almost the same hostility between those who maintain these different definitions of religion as there is between believers in different religions." We will refrain, therefore, from attempting a new definition of what has been found by those who have tried it so hard to define to the satisfaction of all. But in regard to the derivation of the term we think that *religio* is best connected with *religare*, and not with *relegere*, as is done by our author after Cicero. The idea of binding, fastening, restraining is more germane to the meaning attached by the Romans to the term *religio* than the idea of considering, pondering. We could suppose the Greeks to attach to religion the primary notion of reflection, but we should rather expect to find in the term in the view of the Romans the original conception of obligation. It is to no purpose to say that we should have from the verb *religare* the normal form *religatio*, and not *religio*. For have we not *optio*

¹ *Outlines*, p. 2.

related to *optare*, *rebellio* to *bellare*, *opinio* to *opinari*? In ascribing to *religio* the radical notion of binding, we have the support of such names as Servius, Lactantius, and Augustine. It is admitted that "the sense of duty in ancient times had always a religious character"—(Müller, p. 47.) And why should not the same connection between religion and duty be still recognised? We hold Kant to express a fundamental truth when he states in his *Metaphysik der Tugendlehre* that we cannot represent to ourselves that *obligation* which is involved in the feeling of duty without connecting with it the idea of *another*, namely, God, and of his will.

Nothing said by our author is more fitted to arrest attention than the manner in which he deals with the objection of the positive philosophy that men cannot apprehend the infinite, and that, therefore, religion is impossible, inasmuch as the objects of every religion transcend the apprehensive and comprehensive powers of our senses and reason. By infinite he understands what might be expressed by the terms "indefinite, invisible, supersensuous, supernatural, absolute, or divine." It is, in short, "the characteristic qualification of the objects of that class of knowledge which constitutes what we call religion" (p. 26). He formally joins issue with the positivist on this point, and maintains that the concept of the infinite as he has defined it is supplied by the senses. In what way? we inquire. He thus explains: A man sees, he sees to a certain point, and then his eyesight breaks down. But exactly where his sight breaks down, there presses upon him the perception of the unlimited or the infinite. Thus we get our concept of the infinitely great. "There never is, or can be, to our senses, a horizon, unless as standing between the visible and finite on one side, and the invisible and infinite on the other. The infinite, therefore, instead of being merely a late abstraction, is really implied in the earliest manifestations of our sensuous knowledge" (p. 36). From the very first act of touch we are brought in contact not only with a visible but also at the same time with an invisible universe. This is very true and simple, and will be allowed on all hands. Does this, however, make religion, so far from being impossible, inevitable, as he contends? (p. 30.) Is the idea of the infinite thus obtained sufficient to form the foundation of all religion? Is

the infinite thus apprehended identical with the divine? Are the two concepts interchangeable? We trow not. The infinite or indefinite which we are forced to regard as lying beyond the apprehended finite is what?—is just an extension of that finite which we behold, and is not, and cannot be, conceived by us as essentially differing from it. Our impression is that if we could only see what lies beyond our field of vision we should find it material and sensible, not supersensuous and divine. We do not think of it as of another substance than that which actually falls within our range of view. What is beyond our apprehension in a sense-perception is to us of the same nature with what we actually perceive. Through sense, or, as a suggestion accompanying a sense-perception, we can get the idea of something beyond our horizon; but this is not the idea of the “divine,” or of anything differing in nature from what we actually see and touch. It is not, then, in the way pointed out by our author that we obtain the idea of the divine. When we change our view-point we find out that what lay beyond our horizon is visible and sensible like what lay within it.

Our author claims to be the decided antagonist of the positivist; yet he is confident of being able to demonstrate the possibility of religion even in accepting the principles of the materialist. But the advocate of religion is not bound to admit the principles of a false philosophy. What is incumbent on him is to vindicate the necessary postulates of a genuine theism. *Contra principia negantem non est disputandum.* We could never obtain the conception of a real being radically different from external nature in the way in which our author tries to show that we apprehend the infinite. It is a strange delusion, which we must call in the Hindu doctrine of *Mâyâ* to account for, if it is not a juggle with words, to make that infinite which is apprehended in a sense-perception mean the same thing with the supersensuous, supernatural, absolute, or divine.

But let us mark how our author traces the growth of religion in the Aryan race, after he had ascertained its origin in the above explained necessary apprehension of the infinite: “After we have seen how it is possible for man to gain a presentiment of something beyond the finite, we shall watch him

looking for the infinite in mountains, trees, and rivers, in the storm and lightning, in the moon and the sun, in the sky and what is beyond the sky, trying name after name to comprehend it, calling it thunder, bringer of light, wielder of the thunder-bolt, giver of rain, bestower of food and life ; and, after a time, speaking of it as maker, ruler, and preserver, king and father, lord of lords, god of gods, cause of causes, the eternal, the unknown, the unknowable" (p. 46). If this is the true philosophy of religion, then God is only a disguised nature, an elaboration or modification of the dark perception of the infinite given to us in the use of our senses of sight, touch, and hearing. We confess ourselves amazed at this attempt to explain the origin and rise of religion among any people. And perhaps our author will, on further examination, see its insufficiency, and discard it, just as he has recently cast aside that "faculty of faith" which he contended for in his lectures on the Science of Religion, delivered in 1873.

If we would ascertain the sources of our idea of a divine being, we must study our own nature ; *Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva*. We have a consciousness of intelligence, and thus we can rise to the conception of a higher Intelligence out of us. We are conscious of producing effects by the exercise of our will, and hence we can form the idea of a Supreme Cause. And from our own moral nature by which we approve the right and condemn evil, we can ascend to the conception of the First Good, First Perfect, and First Fair.

The conditions which our author accepts are fatal to the cause of religion. That there may be no mistake, let us quote his own account of the position which he consents to take : "Before we commit ourselves to the struggle for life or death, let us inspect once more the battle-field, as it is measured out for us, and survey what is the common ground on which both parties have agreed to stand or to fall. What is granted to us is that all consciousness begins with sensuous perception, with what we feel, hear, and see. This gives us sensuous knowledge. What is likewise granted is that out of this we can construct what may be called conceptual knowledge. . . . Conceptual knowledge differs from sensuous knowledge, not in substance, but in form only. As far as the material is con-

cerned, nothing exists in the intellect except what existed before in the senses" (pp. 29, 30). This is the old philosophy of Lucretius, who is now again in honour:—

"Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri."

We know the result to which it leads.

We could not at first suppress the conjecture that Professor Müller had mistaken what he had read regarding the two original sources of all knowledge,—sense-perception and reflection. We are no longer disposed to charge him with this mistake. But we may here observe that when *reflection* is declared to be an original source of knowledge, it is equivalent to *self-consciousness*, and does not mean simply comparing, adding, and subtracting our sense-percepts. By reflection I am not only able to revolve in mind what I have apprehended by my senses, but I can know myself as thinking and feeling, and I can be aware of certain original intuitions, primary beliefs, or *common notions*, as they were once called, which are not empirical, not the product of experience or outward observation. The principle of causation, the inherent and irrepressible conviction that every event must have a cause, I could not derive from sense-perceptions or any modification of them. So, too, the belief in a permanent substance underlying all phenomena, the belief in free-will, and in the essential distinction between right and wrong, and in personal responsibility, could not be furnished to the mind by the senses, though the senses might present the occasions for these intuitions to reveal themselves *in actu*. But without these common notions, which differ not in form only, but in substance, from all sensuous knowledge, man would be incapable of anything deserving the name of religion.

Our author is at home in the science of language; but his discussion of the metaphysics of religion is very shallow and superficial. For a professed advocate of religion to adopt the dictum *nihil in fide quod non ante fuerit in sensu* is to betray the cause which he engaged to defend. We do not feel under a debt of gratitude to him for his demonstration that "religion is inevitable if only we are left in possession of our senses." This inevitable religion is a palpable delusion. Our author

was once regarded as espousing the theory of an original monotheism. It was not only Christian Apologists, eager for some support for a favourite theory, who ascribed to him this opinion. So antibiblical a historian as Tiele understood him to defend the view that the Hindu-Germanic races began with monotheism or henotheism. But now he roundly declares that the "whole controversy whether the human race began with monotheism or polytheism hardly deserves a serious discussion, at least so far as the Indians, or even the Indo-Europeans, are concerned" (p. 245). He is now able to show the growth of religion among them from a low beginning, and the way in which they ascended to polytheism, to henotheism, till the final solution of the search after the Infinite, the Invisible, the Unknown, the Divine, was reached in their finding their true Self in the Eternal Self, the One without a Second, who is the only real existence. He had discovered in the perception of the infinite the root of the whole historical development of human faith. In tracing that development he begins well. We see him proceeding to overturn the whole fabric of positivism as applied to religion, while he shows, by an appeal to facts, that fetichism cannot be regarded as the primary religion of man. It might be thought by those who read only his second lecture, in which he discusses the question, Is fetichism a primitive form of religion? and answers it in the negative, that he means to supply us with a formidable argument against the materialist. The Christian theist might rejoice as one that findeth great spoil over the facts and statements contained in that very interesting lecture. But a rude disappointment awaits him. Would it be believed? Our author afterwards elaborately endeavours to establish that the primitive form of the religion of the Hindu Aryans, of the men who first used the hymns of the Rig-Veda, was fetichism, only he will not call it by that name. The objects which they first worshipped were, according to him, not stocks and stones, petty trifling objects. That would have been fetichism. But they commenced, he maintains, with worshipping trees and mountains, and such worship he will not permit to be called fetichism. He might as well have found the first manifestation of religion among the Hindus in the worship of lower objects than those which he has chosen to

specify. Plants and Soma-juice, an intoxicating liquor, are invoked in the Rig-Veda, as well as majestic trees. If praying to Soma-juice, which is a favourite object of worship in the Veda, is not fetichism, what, we may ask, deserves the name? We give two examples of the worship of objects lower than those which our author assumes to be the first and lowest worshipped by the Hindu Aryans. We quote from the Rig-Veda (vii. 34. 23): "May the mountains, the waters, the generous *plants* and heaven, may the earth with the trees and the two worlds, protect our wealth." Again, Rig-Veda (x. 35. 2): "May the Soma-juice bring us health and wealth to-day!" It is, however, of little consequence whether we hold that the primary form of religion manifested itself in the worship of insignificant things, such as stones, shells, and bones, purely finite objects, as he calls them; or in the worship of trees, mountains, rivers, the sea, the earth, or semi-tangible objects, according to his nomenclature. The positive philosophy can accommodate itself equally well to either theory. Comte might make the first stage of religion begin with the worship of trees, mountains, and rivers, rather than the worship of stones, and shells, and bones, and such meaner things. And whichever starting-point he assumed, his system suffers no substantial modification. It can still retain the succeeding gradations of polytheism, monotheism, the metaphysical period, or the period of doubt, till the ultimate goal of thought is reached in the positive philosophy. Against Comte's doctrine of fetichism being the original form of religion Max Müller uses very decided language. He tells us that there is no evidence of it. It is a pure invention. He will not admit "that any writer has proved, or ever attempted to prove, that what they call fetichism is a primitive form of religion. It may be admitted to be a low form, but that is very different from a primitive form of religion" (p. 93). He tells us, too, that tribes in Africa who believe in fetiches have at the same time comparatively high conceptions of the Divine Being. Careful investigation has established that those who have been described as fetich-worshippers believe either in gods or in one Supreme God. It strikingly displays the arbitrary dogmatism of Comte that he starts with the unsupported assertion that fetichism was the original form of religion, and that, to exhibit the development of the religious

idea, he confines his study to what he calls the vanguard of the human race, which with him means Western Europe, or, more particularly, the nations of Italy, France, England, Germany, and Spain. Such a limitation of the field of observation precludes the consideration of the nations that possess the earliest religious records, and of the documents which throw most light on the actual development of human thought. Professor Müller confesses that he himself held for a long time the theory of fetichism, and was first led to doubt its truth by failing to find any clear traces of fetichism in the earliest accessible documents of religion, while they are more apparent in the latter stages of religious development. In particular, he affirms that these traces are certainly more visible in the later corruptions of the Indian religion than in the earliest hymns of the Rig-Veda. The designation fetichism, he affirms, was first employed by De Broses in a book published in the year 1760. This does not mean that the name *fetich* was not previously known in Europe as an object of worship, for we could point to various writers on religion, such as Mosheim and Broughton, not to speak of travellers, who had employed the word fetich at an earlier date. It is but justice to De Broses to state that he excepted the Jews from the list of fetich-worshippers, and that he held that all other nations first received a primeval divine revelation, then forgot it, and then began again from the beginning, viz. with fetichism.

Webster describes fetichism as "consisting in the worship of some material object, as a stone, a tree, or an animal, often casually selected." But our author insists on unduly narrowing the definition of fetichism, just as he made the definition of religion too comprehensive. He rightly distinguishes fetichism from idolatry or the worship of images, for the idol originally represented a higher unseen existence, though the object which it stood for might be lost sight of. But he was not warranted to draw a sharp line of demarcation between fetichism and zoolatry. The tiger, the serpent, and the bear are all well-known fetiches. Yet is not the worship of them zoolatry? Nor was he justified in discriminating carefully as he does between fetichism and physiolatry, or the worship of the more striking objects of nature, such as trees and mountains. For these objects are described as fetiches by writers previous to De Broses, and by modern travellers.

Yet De Brosses is sharply censured by him for including zoolatry and physiolatry under fetichism. We may leave our author to understand as fetichism the superstitious veneration paid to such meaner objects as stones, shells, and bones; though the restriction is not justifiable. It is of importance, however, to know that those tribes who are addicted to this lowest type of worship are not destitute of ideas of super-sensible gods, or even of a Supreme Being. Our author emphatically declares his conviction that it has not been proved that fetichism, as he defines it, was ever in any sense of the word a primary form of religion, or that it constituted anywhere the whole of a people's religion (p. 101); and he adopts the statement of another, that "no tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of belief in any higher beings, and travellers who asserted their existence have been afterwards refuted by facts. It is legitimate, therefore, to call religion in its most general sense an universal phenomenon of humanity."

We come under the guidance of our author to learn what the ancient literature of the Hindus teaches regarding the development of religion. Many, as Geiger, suppose that we can find in the old Hindu religion the key to explain the belief in a God or in gods worshipped throughout the world. And however we may demur to so extravagant a view, we must acknowledge its exceeding value for the light which it casts on the early religion of man, and on the course of religious thought. But it is easy to make an improper use of the Hindu sacred literature. It is singular how philosophers who pretend to the most thorough study of their subject, when they avail themselves of the labours of Sanskrit scholars, can make the grossest mistakes. A striking instance is pointed out by our author in Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempting to prove that semi-civilised races have been forbidden to pronounce the names of their gods by alleging that the Hindus avoid uttering the sacred name *Om*; the truth being that the Brâhmans constantly utter the word, as is known to every one who is acquainted with their daily devotions. We fear that the extracts given by our author from the Veda in the present and in former works may be misleading. He writes as if they sufficiently indicated the general spirit and tendency of the most ancient sacred writings of the Hindus. The study of selections made for a special purpose gives one but a poor idea

of the real character of the Old Aryan literature. The great bulk of it is very absurd and uninteresting; and intelligent Hindus of the present day are ashamed of that Veda which they had been taught to regard with the utmost reverence.

The vastness and variety of the Hindu scriptures, and the mode of the preservation of the most ancient parts of them, are fitted to excite astonishment. It is not surprising that our author's statements relating to these subjects were received with incredulity. The ancient literature of Greece is meagre and modern when compared with that of India. There are actually manuscripts extant of about 10,000 separate works in Sanskrit. The question arises: How can we determine the oldest of these works and ascertain their age? This can be decided partly by a regard to their language, and partly by marking references in succeeding authors. The language of the hymns of the Rig-Veda is unmistakably archaic. The rise of Buddhism is now commonly considered as fixing an epoch in Indian history, and as separating the earlier sacred literature from the later. According to the Cingalese Buddhist books the death of the founder of Buddhism took place 543 B.C. And this date has been accepted by most scholars. Max Müller, however, places it somewhat later, 477 B.C., and some critics contend for a still more modern date. Buddha unquestionably lived before the time of Alexander the Great, and his expedition to India enables us to fix an important chronological limit in Indian archæology. Buddhism supposes the religion of the Veda, and is, in fact, a protest against it. But we can mark several distinct stages of religious development in the pre-Buddhistic period. Four successive strata of literature are distinguished by our author. There is the period of the Sûtras, which contain in the most concise form, beside the rules of sacrifice, treatises on grammar, prosody, and philosophy. But the Sûtras refer to older writings, the Brâhmanas, as their authority. These Brâhmanas relate to the sacrificial ritual, and have appended to them the oldest treatises on Hindu philosophy, which are called the Upanishads. But still earlier is the Mantra period, when the ancient Vedic hymns were arranged as a liturgy for the priests. And as earliest of all we must esteem the period of the growth of the hymns of the Rig-Veda. They could not, it is generally conceded, have been composed later than 1000 B.C., and some of them belong

to a more remote antiquity. There are no compositions in the whole Indo-European world so old as the hymns of the Rig-Veda, and therefore the study of them is so important as illustrating the early religion of man. It is not pretended that the hymns of the Rig-Veda are absolutely the oldest religious documents extant, but only that they are the most ancient productions of Aryan or Indo-Germanic thought which we possess. And what an affluence of religious poetry we have in them, even more than one thousand hymns, each on an average consisting of ten verses!

Professor Müller has come to the contemplation of the religion of the Veda with certain prepossessions which he does not care to conceal. He looks upon religion as a purely natural growth of the human mind. He rejects with contempt the idea of a primordial revelation, just as he professes to reject the doctrine of a primitive fetichism. He has his own theory of the rise and progress of religion, which he finds confirmed by a study of the Vedic hymns. When he wrote his *History of Sanskrit Literature*, he found the idea of one God expressed in the Rig-Veda, x. 121, with such power and decision as to make us "hesitate before we deny to the Aryan nations an instinctive monotheism." He contended then that there is "a monotheism that precedes the polytheism of the Veda, and even in the invocations of their innumerable gods the remembrance of a god, one and infinite, breaks through the mist of an idolatrous phraseology like the blue sky that is hidden by passing clouds."—(*History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 559.) But in his latest work he takes credit for having shown "a real transition from the visible to the invisible, from the bright beings, the Devas, that could be touched like the rivers, that could be heard like the thunder, that could be seen like the sun, to the Devas or gods that could no longer be touched, or heard, or seen." The Vedic Aryans, he now maintains, took "the right road;" and that road led them from the visible to the invisible, from the finite to the infinite. It led them on "to polytheism, monotheism, and to atheism; but after the denial of the old Devas or gods they did not rest till they found what was higher than the gods, the true Self of the world, and, at the same time, their own true Self" (pp. 207-8). This was "the right road, and though we may never here on

earth reach the end of it, we may trust it, because there is no other road for us." We hope there is a more excellent way made known to us. We would not willingly misrepresent Professor Müller; but his words convey to us no other meaning than this: that in his view atheism and pantheism are an advance on monotheism. But we shall refer to this subject afterwards.

We have seen how our author energetically repudiates the doctrine of a primitive fetichism. Let us examine whether he does not after all make fetichism to be the primitive religion of the Hindus according to the Veda. There is no order in the Veda. It does not profess to set forth an ascending or a descending scale of worship. Its hymns are addressed not to idols, nor to stocks or stones, but to rivers, mountains, living trees, Soma-juice, heaven, earth, the sun, fire, the dawn, thunder, the winds, the rain, and the gods of several of the elements. These different objects are indiscriminately invoked. It is for the student of the Veda to decide for himself which of all the forms of worship mentioned in it has the best claim to be considered the most original and primitive. Our author now represents the Hindus as ascending from the lower and tangible objects of nature, such as trees and mountains and rivers, to the higher and visible; next to the invisible elements; and then to polytheism, monotheism, atheism, and pantheism. But let us examine if the first steps taken by the Hindus in religion were indeed such as he describes them. "The Hindu mind in its search after the infinite had been satisfied for a time by resting on the mountains and rivers, by asking their protection, praising their endless grandeur. . . . Our Aryan ancestors [say rather the Hindu Aryans] had then learnt to look up to the sky, the sun, and the dawn, and there to see the presence of a living power. . . . They went further still. In the bright sky they perceived an illuminator; in the all-encircling firmament an embracer; in the roar of thunder and in the violence of the storm they felt the presence of a shouter and of furious strikers; and out of the rain they created an Indra or giver of rain" (p. 287). We do not think that any advocate of positivism would have much reason to quarrel with this representation. But the question is—Did the Hindu Aryans begin with the worship of tangible, or, as our author

pleases to phrase them, semi-tangible objects ? Of this there is no proof offered, and there can be none. But there is evidence that before they settled on the banks of the Indus, that is, before the Vedic hymns were composed, they worshipped the illuminator of heaven, either the bright sky, or the sun, or the invisible cause of light. We appeal to the name *Deva*, which was in existence in the signification of God before the Indo-Germanic races separated and were scattered in different directions. *Deva* is the Sanskrit word for God. It appears in the Zend *daeva*, in the Greek *theos*, in the Latin *deus*, in the Lithuanian *dievas*, in the Keltic *dia*, and in other languages. This name for God is the common property of the various branches of the great Aryan family, and it proves that before their partition they had a religion which rose above the worship of tangible or semi-tangible objects. The root of *Deva* is *div*, to shine. The connection between the name for God and *Shining* appears also in the relation observable between *Deus*, God, and *dies*, a day, in Latin. In the language of the Veda *deva* is still used in the sense of shining. Professor Lassen contends (*Indische Alterthumskunde*, i. 756) that this term for God, which is common to the Indo-Germanic peoples, proves that the conception of the divine among them was formed from that of light, and that the objects of their *oldest* religious worship were the appearances and effects of light. Even Max Müller tells us (p. 13) that the "*oldest prayer of the world*" is the Gâyatri, a prayer addressed to the sun, and contained in the Rig-Veda. We may not accept these statements of Lassen and Müller without modification ; but they contain enough of indubitable truth to refute the notion that the oldest prayers of the Veda must be those addressed to terrestrial objects with which man comes in contact. When Max Müller acknowledges (p. 5) that he "cannot doubt that something beyond the meaning of brightness had attached itself to the word *deva* before the ancestors of the Indians and Italians broke up from their common home," this single consideration might have sufficed to keep him from trying to show from the Veda that the Hindu Aryans received their first religious impressions from trees, mountains, rivers, and the earth. Before the composition of the Veda they had the idea of a divinity. They had not, after settling in the region of the

seven rivers, to begin to find objects of worship which they found first in terrestrial things. If we have any knowledge in regard to the earliest form of nature-worship, it is that the first forces of nature that were deified were the phenomena and powers of the shining heavens (comp. Job xxxi. 26-28). This, too, is the voice of antiquity, as we might show by many testimonies. The heavenly bodies were the first objects worshipped by those who turned to serve the creature rather than the Creator. Our author is then fundamentally wrong in regard to the origin and growth of religion as illustrated by the Veda. The concept and name of deity, if we may borrow his way of speaking, had passed through their first stages of evolution before the rise of the Vedic hymns. The study of the Veda does not let us see the gradual growth of higher forms of religion; but it makes known to us that the old *rishis*, or Vedic poets, were in possession of lofty conceptions of divine attributes which they perversely applied to lifeless, inanimate objects. The prayers of the Veda indicate clearly a descent in the objects of worship. They associate with material things ideas which must have been primarily connected with a higher, invisible Power. As an illustration take the prayer in the Rig-Veda, x. 35. 2: "We choose the protection of heaven and earth; we pray to the rivers, the mothers, and to the grassy mountains, to the sun and the dawn, to keep us from guilt." Would anything that could be known of simple mountains and rivers lead men to think originally of having recourse to them to keep them from guilt? And it is *grassy* mountains that are thus prayed to, not towering heights that might inspire awe and wonderment. Is it not natural to suppose that such a prayer was first addressed to a moral Being, and that, when He was forgotten or neglected, it was directed to objects to which it seems absurd to address such a supplication? The Rig-Veda can be used for explaining the growth of polytheism and mythology, or the corruption of religion; but our author signally fails to show from it the origin of religion among the Hindus or any other people. In contending against the lowest form of the fetich theory, he argues triumphantly against the supposition that the first impulse to religion came from petty insignificant objects, such as stones, shells, and bones. There is not, he maintains, the slightest evidence to show that the

negroes were fetich-worshippers only, and nothing else. They have an idea of an invisible Power beyond the contemptible fetich before which they perform a religious ceremony. And, similarly, we can affirm that the old Hindu Aryans, when they invoked rivers and mountains, had an idea of a higher, moral Power, whose attributes they ascribed to natural objects on which they felt dependent. We are not left to draw this conclusion simply from the character of the prayers addressed to these natural objects, as necessarily supposing a Being superior to the things invoked. There are in the Veda some prayers of a comparatively high order addressed to a personal God. The truth is, that the Veda, instead of illustrating the *progress* of religious thought, illustrates the contrary, furnishes clear indications of its depravation. It has passages which embody the idea of a supreme God above nature, and which may be fairly appealed to as relics of a primitive monotheism. The Vedic hymns are full of inconsistencies. We can detect contradictions in them. Sometimes the gods are addressed as the great and the small, the young and the old. Indra, in particular, is described as greater than all. Yet again we read (Rig-Veda, viii. 30), "Among you, ye gods, is none little, none young; ye all are great." Nay more, Agni (*ignis*), the god of fire, is said to be Indra, and Vishnu, Savitri, Pushan, Rudra, and Aditi.—(Müller, p. 280.) This means that the god of fire is also the rain-giver, the god of the sun under his various aspects, the thunderer, and the Infinite, the mother of all the gods. The hymns addressed to Varuna (connected with *οὐρανός*), the god of the firmament, represent him as a holy being, omniscient, the punisher of sin, and as lord of all, of heaven and of earth. We are tempted to quote some very remarkable hymns addressed to Varuna. But we must content ourselves with giving a hymn to Prajâpati, the lord of all creatures, which sounds like the utterance of a genuine monotheism. It is taken from the Rig-Veda, x. 121 :—

"In the beginning there arose Hiranyagarbha (the golden germ); he was the one born lord of all this. He established the earth and this sky :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (1.)

"He who gives breath, he who gives strength; whose command all the bright gods revere; whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (2.)

“He who through his power became the sole king of the breathing and slumbering world, he who governs all, man and beast :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (3.)

“He through whose power these snowy mountains are, and the sea, they say, with the distant river (the Rasâ), he of whom these regions are the two arms :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice (4.)

“He through whom the sky is bright and the earth firm, he through whom the heaven was established, nay, the highest heaven ; he who measured the space in the sky :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (5.)

“He to whom heaven and earth, standing firm by his will, look up, trembling in their mind ; he over whom the rising sun shines forth :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (6.)

“When the great waters went everywhere, holding the seed, and generating the fire, thence arose he who is the sole life of the gods :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (7.)

“He who by his might looked even over the waters which held power and generated the sacrificial fire, he who *alone is God above all gods* :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (8.)

“May he not hurt us, he who is the creator of the earth, or he, the righteous, who created the heaven ; he who also created the bright and mighty waters :—Who is the god to whom we shall offer our sacrifice ? (9.)

“Prajâpati, no other than thou, embraces all these created things. May that be ours which we desire when sacrificing to thee : may we be lords of wealth !” (10.)

If we quoted only a part of this hymn, it might be regarded as setting forth a worthy doctrine of the one living and true God. Prajâpati is represented as alone god above all gods ; he is righteous, the creator of heaven and earth, and of the bright and mighty waters ; and by his will heaven and earth stand firm. But Prajâpati is not conceived as eternal. He was not in the beginning, but then arose, came into being. Yet how high is the conception of this divinity, though he is not eternal ! How low, we may add, is the petition which closes this hymn to praise : “May we be lords of wealth !”

Max Müller has called special attention to a phase of Vedic religion, which he calls henotheism, a designation which he has originated to describe the worship of single gods. It is to be distinguished from monotheism, which is the worship of one god to the exclusion of all other gods, and from polytheism, which is the worship of many deities under the control and government of one Supreme God. The henotheist addicts himself to the worship of one god, while not denying the existence of

other deities, and he will ascribe to the god who is the object of his devotion the highest attributes, and sing his praise in the loftiest language. While worshipping some particular god the henotheist is virtually a monotheist. He seems to acknowledge no god but the one whom he is honouring at the time. Our author thinks that this peculiar phase of religion would hardly have been known to us but for the Veda (p. 251). But, so far from this being the case, henotheism has often struck us as one of the most prominent features of the prevalent modern Hinduism. A Hindu professes to believe that there are many gods ; but he feels that he cannot worship them all, just as (to use his own words) he cannot grasp ten branches of a tree together. He is obliged to cling to one, leaving the others neglected. This is an illustration commonly applied to the matter in hand. As the worship of many gods would prove distracting, and would hardly admit of being equitably carried out in practice, the Hindu fixes his mind on one divinity, Krishna for instance, as his *ishta deva*, his chosen god. We use the expression current in Gujarat. For this god no ascription of praise is too lofty. He is the one god of his worshipper, who extols him as lord of all. Henotheism is, in fact, a pronounced phase of Hinduism at the present time. We see it, too, illustrated in the eighteen Purânas in which we find the deity whose name a particular Purâna bears identified with the Supreme God. Thus in the Shiva Purâna Shiva is the Supreme Deity, in the Vishnu Purâna, Narâyana, in the Linga Purâna, the Linga.

It is difficult to conceive how when men had the conception of a Supreme Being, and had that conception embodied in a definite name, such as Varuna, they should yet address other gods, as Indra and Agni, in terms of equal praise, and make of each of them also the Supreme Being. But so it is. "While Agni is invoked, Indra is forgotten." He is not condemned as a false god, but he is simply ignored, and the mind of the worshipper is exclusively fixed on the god before him, who is to all intents and purposes the One Supreme God for the time. Ebrard (*Apologetik*, Theil ii. p. 15) contends that those gods, each of which was in turn worshipped as Supreme, "were not thought of as separate individuals existing together, but as the *πρόσωπα* of the one invisible, holy God, as different modes of

his self-revelation, in which the One manifests the infiniteness of his nature, and in each of which he is again the highest—the one God.” In confirmation of this view he appeals to the Rig-Veda, i. 164. 46, where we read that Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni, Garutmat are only different names of *that which is one*. We may hardly be able to give a satisfactory explanation of this strange phenomenon of henotheism. Müller is astonished that it did not lead in the way of natural development to a pure monotheism (p. 286). He is disappointed that this result was not reached in the time of the composition of the Veda. It was not reached in the succeeding period of the Brâhmanas. The tendency towards Atheism followed. Then the philosophical schools arose. And we know how finally the people of India embraced the most degrading idolatry to which they are addicted at the present day.

A study of the Veda does not let us see the origin of religion, but it strongly supports the belief of a primitive monotheism. The doctrine of one Supreme Being had not been altogether forgotten by the *rishis* who composed the Vedic hymns. It shines forth amid their predominant nature-worship. Before the deification of natural objects there was the idea of God. Excellently does our author say: “Writers on religion speak of primitive men deifying the grand natural objects by which they were surrounded. They might as well speak of primitive men mummifying their dead before they had *mûm*, or wax to embalm them with.” Now the fact is, the authors of the Vedic hymns had ideas more or less correct of a god or gods who had power over them. They could deify natural objects. They had the predicate God, and could and did make abusive applications of it. And we contend that when we find in the earliest records of Hindu religious thought, amid the rubbish of nature-worship, the idea of a Supreme Being, the maker and lord of all, the conclusion that this idea should be ascribed to a primordial revelation is the most reasonable that can be drawn. A German commentator, Professor Reiche, who rejects the notion of a primitive revelation, in opposing boldly the doctrine contained in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, vers. 18-28, that the race of men first possessed the true knowledge of God, which they afterwards corrupted, makes the following objection: “The

consciousness of the idea of a Supreme Intelligence, who created and governs all things, supposes an abstraction from what is subjective, an insight into the connection of existing things, and a fulness of moral and intellectual conceptions and views which the first generations of men could not possibly possess so long as man was struggling for existence with want and with the hostile forces of nature." This objection is conclusive against the opinion that primeval man could in the way of reasoning and generalisation have acquired the idea of God such as we find it in the earliest record of our race in the Book of Genesis, but it is of no force against the doctrine that God originally made an immediate revelation of Himself to man. The Book of Genesis proceeds on the supposition that a pure monotheism was the primitive religion obtained in the way of immediate Divine revelation; and the apostle Paul distinctly teaches that men knew God in the beginning, but fell from this knowledge. A study of the religion of the Veda, so far from furnishing anything to contradict this doctrine, confirms it in a striking manner.

Our author pours ridicule on the idea of an external revelation having been communicated by God to man. Yet it is an idea which we find prevailing among the most degraded and the most civilised races. The fact that an Ashanti priest might claim an external revelation for his wretched superstition is a poor argument to urge against the reality of a primeval revelation from God. We confess that we fail to see any presumption against the knowledge of religion having been imparted originally by God himself in the common saying among African tribes that, "formerly heaven was nearer to men than it is now, that the highest god, the creator himself, gave formerly lessons of wisdom to human beings; but that afterwards he withdrew from them, and dwells now far from them in heaven." On the contrary, we believe that there is more truth in this tradition than in many disquisitions of philosophers. That man might be able to know and worship his Creator, a primeval revelation was necessary. It might be shown, too, that man received originally lessons of wisdom from his Creator to teach him how to live and to avail himself of the productions of the earth. Man was not gradually evolved from a lower type of being. There is no evidence of anthropological development. There

is no proof of the approximation of the ape to man. Man came as a fully developed man from the hand of God. He could not have been left by his Maker in the condition of an ignorant savage. This supposition encounters insuperable difficulties. We are necessitated to believe that man must have been taught in the beginning some knowledge of agriculture by a superior Intelligence. In the volume of *Good Words* for 1861, p. 478, there is an instructive article by Professor Harvey, on "The Cerealia, a Standing Miracle!" He shows that the Cerealia, or corn-plants, comprising wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, rice, and millet are the proper food of civilised man. But they do not grow anywhere as *wild* plants. Left to themselves, they die out and become extinct. They must be sown in ground carefully prepared for them. "The character and the conditions of existence of the cereals being such, and man's natural ignorance of their use and value being such as the history of the savage tribes demonstrates, it surely needs no argument to prove, that not only must these plants have been *specially* created by God for man, and created, too, at the time when He brought man into the world, but that man himself must have been *directly taught* of God, as well the use and the exceeding value of them, as the way to grow them." If the Creator himself had not given lessons of wisdom to man in regard to the use of the cereals and the way to cultivate them, we should not at this day have bread made of grain, the food of civilised man. So far, then, from there being any antecedent presumption against a primordial revelation, a careful consideration of the past and present condition of man as a civilised and religious being forces on us the supposition that one was actually given.

One thing which the history of the Israelites might teach the most sceptical is the difficulty of preserving pure and uncorrupted the knowledge and worship of God. Even Lessing, in his treatise *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, takes this position: "Even if the first man was immediately furnished with a conception of the one true God, this conception, which was communicated and not acquired, could not possibly remain long in its purity. As soon as human reason left to itself began to work upon this conception, it dissected the one Infinite Being into many finite ones, and gave a characteristic

to each of these parts. Thus polytheism and idolatry naturally arose."

Before passing from the question of a primitive monotheism, we would quote words which show that at least one writer of the New Testament was not of opinion that mankind was left to find out God after ages of inquiry. "That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." From the creation of the world, from the time of man's existence on the earth, the knowledge of an eternal invisible almighty God was possible.

But we must hasten to consider the last and highest result of Hindu religious thought. After the Sanhitâs or collections of the Vedic hymns come the Brâhmanas, which were intended for the use of the Brâhmanas to set forth the ritual which they should observe. Appended to these Brâhmanas are the Upanishads, the date of whose composition cannot be precisely fixed. These contain religious philosophy, the Vedânta or end of the Veda as it is usually but improperly called. The Upanishads are commonly spoken of as the third division of the Veda; but the doctrine which they teach is very different from that contained in the original Veda. There is, indeed, one hymn in the Rig-Veda (x. 90), the celebrated Purusha-Sûkta, which might be considered an anticipation of the Vedantic philosophy. But this hymn is, besides its pantheistic tone, remarkable for its distinct reference to the four castes of the Hindus; and it is justly regarded as of much later origin than the great bulk of the Vedic hymns. But what is the philosophical system of these Upanishads, which our author pronounces "unrivalled in the literature of the world"? "The key-note of the old Upanishads is 'Know thyself,' but with a much deeper meaning than that of the *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν* of the Delphic oracle. The 'Know thyself' of the Upanishads means, know thy true self, that which underlies thine Ego, and find it and know it in the highest, the eternal Self, the One without a Second, which underlies the whole world" (p. 306). This, it is added, "was the final solution of the search after the Infinite, the Invisible, the Unknown, the Divine; a search begun in the simplest

hymns of the Veda, and ended in the Upanishads, or, as they were afterwards called, the Vedânta, the end or the highest object of the Veda." It would really seem as if our author himself accepted this final solution of the search after the Infinite. We have sought in vain to discover any expression of his dissent from it, and he certainly describes it as the highest philosophy, and "the highest expression of the truth" as seen by the gymnosophists of India. And the great essential doctrine of this philosophy is that there is only one real existence in the world, the one Spirit with whom we are to recognise our identity; for our notion of distinct personalities is simply illusive. A sage knows himself when he knows his oneness with the *one without a second*. "There is one eternal thinker, thinking non-eternal thoughts; he, though one, fulfils the desires of many. The wise who perceive him within their Self, to them belongs eternal peace." This is the language of the best known of the Upanishads, the Katha Upanishad. It was first introduced to the notice of European scholars by the celebrated Ram Mohun Roy. And he is extolled by our author as "one of the most enlightened benefactors of his own country, and, it may turn out, one of the most enlightened benefactors of mankind." Such a man must have understood the doctrine of the Vedânta; he may be regarded as a fair exponent of what it really teaches. We give, therefore, the following extract, which is sufficiently explicit, from Ram Mohun Roy's abridgment of the Vedânta, p. 15 :—

"God is the efficient cause of the universe, as a potter is of the earthen pots; and he is also the material cause of it, the same as the earth is the material cause of the different earthen pots, or as a rope at an inadvertent view taken for a snake is the material cause of the conceived existence of the snake which appears to be true by the support of the real existence of the rope. So says the Vedânta."

We might quote from the Upanishads and the treatises founded on them any number of passages to the same purport. God, or Brahm, is the sole reality. It is owing to ignorance that anything else is supposed to exist. But if God, or the Supreme Spirit, is the only real existence, how is ignorance or delusion possible? The divine philosophy of the Vedânta does not think this difficulty a knot too hard for it to loosen. We

will give the explanation, which it supplies, in the words of Monier Williams, Professor of Sanskrit in Oxford :—"The Supreme Spirit is represented as ignoring himself by a sort of self-imposed ignorance, in order to draw out from himself, for his own amusement, the separate individual souls and various appearances which, although really parts of his own essence, constitute the apparent phenomena of the universe. Hence the external world, individual souls, and even the personal God, are all described as created by a power which the Vedântist is obliged, for want of a better solution of his difficulty, to call *Avidya*, generally translated Ignorance, but perhaps better rendered by False Knowledge, or False Notion. Of this power there are two distinct forms of operation, that of envelopment (*âvarana*), and that of projection (*vikshepa*); which last projects on the soul the appearance of a world, producing first the five subtle elements," etc.

"By reason of *Avidya* (Ignorance, or False Notion), then, the *Jivâtman*, or living soul of every individual, mistakes the world as well as its own body and mind for realities, just as a rope in a dark night might be mistaken for a snake. The moment the personal soul is set free from this self-imposed ignorance by a proper understanding of the truth, through the Vedânta philosophy, all the illusion vanishes, and the identity of the soul of the individual and of the whole phenomenal universe with the Paramâtman, or Supreme Soul, is re-established."—*Hinduism*, pp. 205-6.

Some of our readers not familiar with Indian studies may be disposed to think that no man who is *compos mentis* would actually avow his adherence to this religious philosophy, which appears so profane and absurd. They may imagine it to be a speculation not intended to be seriously understood, but sportively indulged in by an irreverent lover of the fantastic and paradoxical. To correct such an impression, and to make it manifest that the doctrine that has been briefly stated is really held and avowed by men who are not to be taken as fools or triflers, we shall relate a conversation which we had some years ago in India with a Vedântist, and which we deemed interesting enough to write down immediately afterwards :—

"I have been visited by one of the most learned Brâhmans in Ahmedabad. He had a volume of the Upanishads in his hand. We began to converse in

Gujarati on the subject of religion. Suddenly, and with great gravity and solemnity, he made this wonderful statement, which he uttered in English that it might sink more deeply into my mind, 'God is sound asleep.' What he meant was, that God is somehow under an illusion similar to what men are in when dreaming. I endeavoured to show him the absurdity of the statement he had made. He asked me: 'Don't you admit that God is everywhere?' He thought this admission sufficient to establish his point; and that the omnipresence of God could not be acknowledged without conceding also that he must be everything existing in the universe. But as God does not recognise himself as such, and as men believe in their distinct existence, he thought it the most reasonable thing to say that God was sound asleep, and that these thoughts of separate souls and distinct personalities were as dreams to the one universal Spirit. 'Don't you admit,' he continued, 'that God is almighty? Well,' said he, 'if he's almighty he does everything.' I pointed out the inconsequence of such reasoning. A child was present. 'See,' said I, 'my strength is far superior to this child's. I could move his arms if I pleased; but I do not choose to do so. So God, though almighty, leaves us to the exercise of our natural freedom. I move my own arms. He could do so; but he does not choose to do it.' Appeals to consciousness and common sense were made to no purpose. The Vedântist persisted in maintaining that there was no agent or object but God in the world. I almost thought of resorting to the *argumentum baculinum* to bring him to reason. He wanted a book, and I gave him a portion of the New Testament and a little work on Pantheism. He requested me to write in one of the books that I had given it to him. After doing so, I handed it to him with the remark, 'What! has God given this book to himself?' He smiled, and returned the never-failing answer, 'All is Mâyâ, pure illusion. Our senses are not to be trusted.'"

It is this doctrine of the Upanishads of which Max Müller is the zealous apologist. It is, of course, the most decided Pantheism, a term which he is careful not to employ once in these lectures. The adherent of it thinks that he has attained the perfection of wisdom when he can bring himself to say, "I am God; there is no Second." Yet a lecturer in Westminster Abbey can now speak of such a system in terms of unqualified approval! We should greatly prefer the atheism of J. S. Mill, in conjunction with his high morality (we do not now inquire where he got the latter), to the doctrine of the Vedânta; because the Vedânta formally discountenances the practice of virtue. Max Müller states the object of the Upanishads to be "to show the utter uselessness, nay, the mischievousness, of all ritual performances; to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or hope of reward" (p. 328). This is not a statement of the whole truth. Not merely ritual per-

formances, but good works of every kind, as well as bad works, are represented in the Vedânta as causing the bondage of the soul and preventing its absorption into the Supreme. For the fruit of every kind of work must necessarily be partaken of. This is assumed as an axiom. Hence the doing of any kind of work delays the time of the soul's emancipation. What must be the influence of such a system? To the extent to which it is imbibed, it paralyses all virtuous exertion. Lest we should be considered too severe we give Monier Williams's account of the aim of Brâhmanical philosophy, an account which can be confirmed by authoritative texts or by consulting any well-informed Brâhman. "Its one great aim is to teach men to abstain from action of every kind, good or bad; as much from liking as from disliking; as much from loving as from hating, and even from indifference. Actions are the fetters of the embodied soul which, when it has shaken off, it will lose all sense of individual personality, and return to the condition of simple soul. This constitutes true knowledge; this is the *summum bonum* of Brâhmanism; this is the only real bliss—the loss of separate identity by complete absorption (*sâmyujya*) into the Supreme and only real existing Being, who is wholly unfettered by action."—*Hinduism*, p. 52.

We do not share Max Müller's admiration of the toleration which Vedântism inspires. The Vedântist from his sublime height can look down with contempt or pity on those above whom he is in imagination exalted as high as heaven is above the earth. He can view, too, with cold indifference the most shocking crimes. The burning of widows, infanticide, injustice, and oppression could not disturb his equanimity or excite him to generous indignation. He would not utter a word against the most lascivious rites, such as the once fearfully prevalent unutterable abominations of the Vâmachâris, perpetrated under the pretence of religion. Vedântism, we may add, is not confined to old men who have retired from the world and devote themselves to contemplation, an idea which some might take up from our author's representation. It is not without its influence on the masses of the people of India; and wretches who have been guilty of the most heinous offences will attempt to exculpate themselves by saying that it is God who does all things. This is not idle denunciation, the

drawing of an odious and unwarranted consequence from an obnoxious tenet. Every one who has lived among the Hindus, and who is conversant with their ways of thinking and speaking, can testify to the truth of what we affirm.

If we are to believe our author, the various phases of Hindu religious thought, from the worship of sensible objects to the soul's finding its true self in the One Supreme Spirit, followed naturally one upon the other, and "those who discovered them were guided by the sole love of truth, and spared no human effort to reach the truth" (p. 329). Our own opinion is that the pure love of truth, and the faithful, earnest search after it, are only too rare in every people in the world. The love of truth and truthfulness are intimately connected; and veracity is certainly not a virtue which pre-eminently distinguishes a Brâhman as he is now to be met with. Professor Tiele has no partiality for the religion of the Bible; yet he does not scruple to say (*Outlines*, p. 156) that the object of the Vedânta is *not* the search for truth; and he therefore holds that it deserves the designation of a philosophical system only in a limited sense. We think that we have a tolerable acquaintance with the mental characteristics of the Vedântist; and the last thing we should think of crediting him with is a pure love of truth. And is it not sheer trifling to talk of wretched polytheists "sparing no human effort to reach the truth"? Does Professor Müller really believe this even in regard to the authors of the Veda? We hardly think it.

We had intended to vindicate the Bible from various injurious and unjust reflections which our author in various places has uttered against it. But lack of time and space forbids the carrying out of this design; and we can refer only to the use which he makes of one text of Scripture. Toward the close of the last lecture, where he undertakes to justify the various forms of religion that have prevailed among men, and to show that none of them can be rejected by God, or be displeasing to Him, he employs two passages of the New Testament as confirmatory of this favourable view of all kinds of religion. The first is this: "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him" (Acts x. 34, 35). No one could think of seriously applying this description

of those whom God accepts to the idolater or the atheist. But are the words of the apostle Peter here quoted applicable to the Vedântist? Is he one that fears God and works righteousness? We should be surprised if a passage inculcating the fear or the love of God could be extracted from the Upanishads. Neither M. Müller nor any other scholar has brought to light such a passage. Those who have most carefully studied these writings declare that they have discovered no such duty taught in them as the fear of God. No Vedântist makes any profession of either fearing or loving God. There is no room in his system for the play of either affection. And we have already seen how it teaches the uselessness, nay, mischievousness, of attempting to work righteousness as necessarily retarding what is considered to be salvation. If, then, a man abstains on principle from fearing God and from working righteousness, can that man, nevertheless, be held according to the teaching of the apostle to be certain of the Divine acceptance? Many a false construction has been put on this famous passage, but surely no one ever warped it so violently from its intent as our author has done.

A study of the course of religious thought in India really discloses a constant deterioration of the conception of God and corruption of the religious sentiment, except where the influence of Christianity or Mohammedanism (which has borrowed its doctrine concerning God from the Jewish and Christian systems) can be clearly traced. The Hindu mind, when left to its own reasonings, did not go on advancing till it attained a religion which was beyond improvement. In this, as in every other case, "the only view of human nature, as left to itself, which is not incompatible with all experience, is not its perfectibility but its corruptibility." "Only through Christianity has a nation ever risen again: and it is solely on the operation of Christianity that we can ground anything like a reasonable hope of the perfectibility of mankind; a hope which has often been wrought in individuals, may also in the fulness of time be wrought by the same power in the race." —(*Guesses at Truth*, Second Series, pp. 16, 21.)

In the second part of his able work on *Apologetik*, which has not yet appeared in an English version, Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard examines the earliest records of the various religions of men,

availing himself gratefully of the labours of Max Müller among others. He shows how actual facts disprove the assumption of Pantheism and Materialism, both of which suppose that the human race gradually elevated itself from a state in which there was no moral law, first to a low fetichism, then gradually to mythological polytheism, then to abstract monotheism, then to Christianity, lastly to pantheism. So Hartmann teaches. We are sorry to be compelled to place Max Müller also among those who hold that the human race was originally in a state in which there was no moral law. What else does his language mean when he tells us (pp. 361, 362) that "even the ideas of law, virtue, infinitude, and immortality were abstracted, deduced, derived from sensuous impressons"? His genesis of virtue is as superficial and as radically wrong as his genesis of religion, and deprives moral obligation of its root and life. The idea of "oughtness" that is elaborated out of sensuous impressions is as illusive as the idea of the Divine, to which the same origin is ascribed. The object of Ebrard's work is to confute such theories by the actual history of religion. He claims to have established that "if we pursue the religious history of the civilised nations of antiquity by the help of the thorough researches of Max Müller, Spiegel, Lepsius, Ebers, Schrader, Duncker, and others, we find in all the civilised peoples of antiquity, in proportion as we ascend into the past, a greater approximation to the knowledge of the one, living, holy God, in conjunction with a more vivid ethical consciousness of the difference between good and evil, and a more ardent longing for an expected Redeemer; and that as we come down the course of time we mark a depravation of this primitive religion owing to the diminution of moral earnestness, so that the knowledge of God is corrupted into gross polytheism, which in some peoples passes over into pantheism; and along with this religious depravation we mark a growing moral degeneracy, notwithstanding all outward advances in the arts, in civilisation and culture. And when we engage in the investigation of savage nations, of their condition, languages, and traditions, we find here, too, where we possess any reliable data to proceed on, a constant sinking lower and lower, and at the same time almost everywhere reminiscences of an older and better state; and here and there we meet with visible monu-

ments which bear witness to this former higher condition.”— (Ebrard, *Apologetik*, ii. pp. 6, 7.) As the result of his examination, Ebrard can triumphantly affirm that in the ancient records of civilised and barbarous nations we have historical testimony to the *fact of man's apostasy from God*. The only people of antiquity in whom monotheism was kept pure and living was the people of Israel, and their history demonstrates that they did not raise themselves to the monotheistic religion by which they were of old distinguished from all other nations. Thus we are brought in the way of historic investigation to the conclusion that a primeval revelation was made by God to man. The chief cause of the corruption of religion, as was long ago pointed out, is not the imperfection of the human understanding, it is rather the corruption of man's heart. Man is fallen from his original holiness. This is the witness of history, and this doctrine reveals itself to those who sound the depths of man's moral nature. Tertullian profoundly remarked that the conscience of man is naturally Christian, and the human conscience and heart, when inquired of, concur in testifying to man's apostasy from his Maker, and to his present moral and religious degradation. It is no empty sentimentalism, but a deep truth, which St. Martin¹ utters in his *L'homme de désir* when he thus addresses man: “*Tu n'es pas à ta place ici-bas ; un seul de tes désirs moraux, une seule de tes inquiétudes, prouve plus la dégradation de notre espèce, que tous les argumens des philosophes ne prouvent le contraire.*”

DUNLOP MOORE.

ART. III.—*The Witness of St. Paul to Jesus Christ.*

THE earliest documents of primitive Christianity happen to be at the same time its most authentic and undoubted. At what date the four Gospels were drawn up in their present form, or by whom, will long remain a question open to controversy. Of the Acts of the Apostles the date is hardly less

¹ Quoted in Tholuck, *Von der Sünde*, 7 A., p. 216.

uncertain, the authorship no less traditional ; while to the first half of its contents at least many critics still refuse to accord any high degree of historical authority. But from the pen of the busiest, ablest, and most successful propagator of Christianity in the first century, we possess a bundle of letters, the genuineness of some of which is entirely beyond dispute, and the ascertained dates of which show them to be older than any other Christian writing now extant.

For the purposes of a candid historical inquiry into the greatest event of history—the rise of the Christian Church—the value of these letters is simply incalculable. They lay down just that basis of certain fact to start from, without which historical investigation would be impossible. They bring us face to face with the Christian churches of Asia and Europe within a quarter of a century after the crucifixion, at a time when the events in the career of Jesus were still fresh in the recollection of many living men. Incidentally they acquaint us with a crowd of details respecting certain of these churches, touching not only their creed and worship, but even their office-bearers, their membership, the disputes which agitated and the scandals which discredited them. From the tenor of these letters it is possible to infer with a high degree of confidence what were the accepted data concerning Jesus of Nazareth upon which reposed the faith of all His early followers of whatever school—the chief facts on which they were agreed. By this means they furnish to the apologist his veritable *πov στῶ*—a fixed fulcrum on which his argument for the historical truth of Christianity must turn. Finally, they bring us into the most unreserved intimacy with that remarkable man, who, more than any other, made Christianity a catholic religion for civilised mankind, and out of its primitive religious convictions built up a compact system of theology. Hitherto the doctrinal interest of Paul's Epistles has so obscured as nearly to obliterate or conceal their historical importance. To-day, historical criticism begins to discover that it is precisely upon these Epistles, as its safest no less than its oldest materials, it must initiate its inquiry into the *origines* of the Christian Faith.

Of the thirteen letters which bear the name of St. Paul, there are four which possess for our purpose the singular advantage of being accepted as authentic and genuine by every

modern scholar of eminence. So long ago as 1845, Dr. Baur of Tübingen wrote of them :—

“Against these four epistles there has not only never been raised the very slightest suspicion of being spurious, but they bear in themselves the mark of their Pauline origin so unmistakably that I am quite unable to imagine with what right a critical doubt could ever be maintained against them.”¹

To this judgment M. Renan added the weight of his great name in *Les Apôtres*, and in his more recent work on *St. Paul* he still adheres to it, classifying these four as “epistles indisputable and undisputed.”² Most recently of all, Professor Pfleiderer of Jena, in his important work entitled *Paulinismus*, accepts them without remark as “the four undisputed epistles.”³

It is a fortunate circumstance that these unimpeachable documents are for historical and even more for apologetic purposes the most valuable in the entire series. They are the Epistle to the Galatians, the two to Corinth, and the one to Rome: four letters which are not only the most considerable in point of length, but also the richest in personal and historical references. It follows from this circumstance that we can afford, if we choose, to stand upon these four alone. The testimony which St. Paul has to give to the origin and state of the Church of Christ, to the facts on which it rested, and to the person of its Founder, will not be seriously weakened, nor its extent materially reduced, if we throw out of reckoning all the suspected letters, even such as (like Philippians and First Thessalonians) are accepted by the best critics as certainly Pauline. I need hardly say that in narrowing so much the available materials, I am very far from rejecting any of the professed and canonical Epistles. I only push to its utmost the concession which, for argument's sake, every apologist must make to the spirit of scepticism, by refusing for the present to build upon any document over which the slightest breath of doubt has ever ventured to blow. The letters to Thessalonica, which form the earliest in the series, and those to Philippi and Philemon, which follow next after the undis-

¹ *Paulus der Apostel Jesu*, Engl. transl. p. 248.

² *Saint Paul*, par Ernest Renan, Introd. v. 1869.

³ *Paulinism* (Eng. transl.) p. 29. Williams and Norgate, 1877.

puted ones, are not exposed to any objection which in any other field of literature would occasion the slightest hesitation in accepting them. Still they are not essential to supplement, however useful to sustain, what we gather abundantly from the other four.

The value of these documents as a starting-point is vastly heightened by the fact that their dates are known. The earliest of the four, that to Galatia, is placed by M. Renan (*Saint Paul*, p. 314) in the year A.D. 54; the latest of the four, to Rome, in the year 58. For practical purposes we may accept this result without hesitation. The letters were all written within twenty and twenty-five years after the Prophet of Nazareth was crucified in Jerusalem. It is the Church and the faith of the first Christian generation into the midst of which we are plunged by the most vivid and trustworthy of possible monuments.

I call them "most vivid and trustworthy;" for there is nothing more precious to the historian than the correspondence of the men who make history. What Cromwell's letters are to the English Civil War, that, and more, Paul's letters must be to the rise of the Christian Church. The man of affairs, hot from the anxieties and collisions of his enterprise, who pens in haste a brief unstudied and unrevised communication, meant to serve some pressing need of the moment, is a witness of the first order. His words reflect the situation just as it stands. They are born of the actual facts, and must be true to them. Allowance, no doubt, may require to be made for the prepossessions of the writer. But, in any case, it is impossible in a letter to feign circumstances which one's correspondents are aware have no existence; to allude to past events as well ascertained and universally accepted which no one has heard of or believes in; to assume, in short, a state of matters which is found only in the writer's brain. So perfectly understood is this among investigators, that it might seem idle to insist upon it, were it not that people often appear to judge those authorities which the Church has termed "canonical" by a different standard from that which is applied to other ancient writings. Books are none the better as historical witnesses for being sacred to faith; also, they are none the worse for it. Strip Paul of his apostolic authority: he was at the least an actor in a great religious movement; and the missives by means

of which he expounded his teaching, defended his position, or exhorted his converts, must possess the very highest value as historical authorities. They are contemporary; they are incidental and impromptu; they passed as confidential instructions from teacher to taught; they give us access into the heart of the movement and of the chief mover in it.

To a large extent this value must attach to such a correspondence, no matter what the character of the writer may be. In the present case, the character of Paul, as recognised by every competent judge, is such as to enhance the confidence we repose in his letters. Few men have ever revealed themselves more fully to posterity; few letter-writers have been more autobiographical; few so eagerly frank and outspoken as he. I am very far from venturing on the attempt to delineate all the features in that strangely compacted and fascinating nature of his; with its ruggedness and volcanic passion covering exquisite tenderness, delicacy, and tact; its intense inwardness of spiritual experience, proper to his Hebrew blood, joined to a keenness of dialectic which cannot be wholly due to his Greek training; its shifting moods and excessive sensibility connected probably with an irritable nervous temperament; all ennobled by moral courage of the rarest quality, and such a power to sway men's hearts as drew support out of his very infirmities. I fancy we all of us know St. Paul a good deal better than any of us can describe him. But one trait at least none can mistake. It is the trait which renders his epistles especially trustworthy as evidence. He was a lover of truth, with not the least bit of mendacity, guile, or unreality in his whole being; one who could not so much as speak without letting the deeper workings of his own translucent nature shine through his mere words. The days are gone by when it was possible even for the most blind or unfair of controversialists to ascribe to St. Paul any sort or measure of insincerity. In these four Epistles, especially the three to his beloved converts at Corinth and in Galatia, he has unbosomed himself with a freedom so unrestrained that it is never found exhibited, save by men who are both very real and somewhat impetuous.

Such, then, being the character and value of our sources, let us turn to see what these indubitable four Epistles really tell us respecting primitive Christianity and its great Founder.

In the first place, they prove that between twenty and twenty-five years after the death of Jesus, communities of Christian disciples were already to be found scattered over a wide area, from Jerusalem on the east to Rome on the west. The evidence for this is copious and familiar to all. In Galatians (i. 22), the earliest of the four, Paul speaks of churches as having existed in Judea more than fourteen years at least before that Epistle was written. In the latest of the four, Romans (xv. 19), he claims to have himself preached the gospel from Jerusalem in a circuit which extended as far as Illyricum. Incidentally, we hear of his work at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11), and at Ephesus (1 Cor. xv. 32, xvi. 8 ; cf. 2 Cor. i. 8). There were churches in Asia Minor (1 Cor. xvi. 19), churches of Galatia (Gal. i. 2), and churches of Macedonia (2 Cor. viii. 1). There were "saints in all Achaia" (2 Cor. i. 1), including a church at Cenchrea (Rom. xvi. 1), as well as in the more important Corinth. The faith of the Roman church had already become spoken of (naturally amongst the Christians) "throughout the whole world" (Rom. i. 8). Nor is this the solitary occurrence of such a general phrase as this—a phrase which, after allowing for the rhetorical exaggeration natural to an ardent missionary, must infer a very wide-spread Christian community. The sound of the gospel when Paul wrote had gone out, he tells us, into all the world (Rom. x. 18). It was made known "to all nations" (Rom. xvi. 26). "In every place" there were those who "invoked the name of Jesus as their Lord" (1 Cor. i. 2).

It is not necessary to assume that these young congregations, although dispersed over many provinces, counted anywhere a very large body of converts. In these letters, Paul takes occasion to name a considerable number of his *collaborateurs*. Besides the older apostles, Peter, James, and John, we find such names as Barnabas, Timothy, and Titus, Aquila with his wife, Tertius, Sosthenes, Apollos, Stephanas, and Silvanus. With a band of propagandists so numerous as is implied by the casual mention of thirteen or more in the course of only four letters, and with the constant traffic from one part of the Mediterranean coast to another which characterised the Jews in that age of the Empire, it is quite conceivable how one short quarter of a century should have seen obscure handfuls of disciples collected

in almost every chief city and seaport. At the same time, each church may have been still small, as small as M. Renan is disposed to think. It was not the size of each church, it was their number and their diffusion over so many lands, with the variations in opinion, in tendency, and in sympathy, to which this diffusion gave rise, which makes their substantial agreement in the Christian faith so worthy of note.

Our four Epistles certainly show that already deep and serious divergences had appeared inside the apostolic Church. Three out of the four were expressly written to defend Paul's own position and teaching against assailants, and the severity or even bitterness of his language bears witness to the keenness of the strife. Immense advantage has been taken by modern critics of this divergence between Palestinian and Pauline Christianity. Every effort has naturally been made to exaggerate its amount. The authority of the apostles as messengers of a Divine religion will suffer, it is presumed, if it should appear that they disagreed so far among themselves that the Christianity of Paul and the Gentile West was a different thing from the Christianity of the original Twelve and the Jerusalem church. Into the merits of this debate I am scarcely called by my design to enter. But it does not seem to have been sufficiently observed on either side that the divergence (so far as it was more than a personal question) was one of inference, and did not touch the main body of Christian fact and belief which was common to both the disputants. The two points on which St. Paul contended with the antagonistic party were these: 1st, Was his authority as an apostle equal or inferior to that of the original Twelve? and 2d, Was the Mosaic law to be regarded as still binding on the conscience of the Christian believer, or as abrogated by the gospel? It was the latter question, of course, which lent to the former one its chief interest. Undoubtedly, the relation of Christianity to Mosaism was a matter of cardinal consequence. According as it should be decided would Christianity either shrivel into a Hebrew sect or expand into a catholic and spiritual religion. To make the gospel of grace an appendix to the law was in effect to make it no gospel of grace at all. The memorable merit and service of St. Paul lay precisely in his grasping so firmly the gravity of the

principles which were at stake. Yet throughout the whole course of this first and greatest of Church controversies, it turned in no way whatever upon any new or disputed allegations on either side, but wholly on a correct understanding, in their religious bearing, of facts which both sides alike accepted. The controversy did not involve any difference as to the facts regarding the person, the mission, or the work of Jesus Christ. Hardly too great emphasis can be laid on this. The main argument by which St. Paul combated the Judaisers was, that on their theory the expiatory death of Jesus on the cross, and His resurrection from the dead, were emptied of their peculiar value: "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain" (Gal. ii. 21); "Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace" (Gal. v. 4). Manifestly this is an argument which had no point against men who either questioned the facts of Christ's death and resurrection or rejected the religious significance which Paul ascribed to these facts. It is certain that Paul's opponents did neither. There is not a single trace throughout the dispute that either historically or doctrinally the central Christian position respecting the person and work of Jesus Christ was so much as touched. On the contrary, appeal is constantly made, even in arguing with the extreme Judaisers, to those essential truths on which reposed the faith of a Christian, as to data which were perfectly well understood on all hands, and unimpeachable.

This was not the only difficulty, however, which troubled the infant community. In the church at Corinth differences had emerged on various points. Did these points affect the uniform acceptance by the Corinthians of evangelical fact or doctrine? By no means. A question had arisen, for example, regarding the relative value of the prophetic gift among other strange manifestations of spiritual power. To compose such rivalry, Paul could appeal to the unity of all believers in their one Head, Jesus Christ, and to the unity of the one Divine Spirit into whom they had been all baptized (1 Cor. xii. 4-13). Social complications and questions of conscience had also sprung up respecting mixed marriages and the free use of meat that had been slaughtered with heathen ceremonies. But Paul could found his advice to the Corinthian believers

on the common ground of Christ's authority, and reason from their common faith in one God, the Father, and in one Lord Jesus Christ, who died for all (see 1 Cor. vii. 10 and viii. 6, 11). Doubts had even arisen as to the possibility of a literal resurrection of the body. Yet so firmly was the fact of Jesus' resurrection accepted by all parties in that divided church, that Paul could adduce that fact as essential to Christian faith, and as carrying with it, by necessary consequence, the resurrection of the Christian dead (1 Cor. xv. 13-23). Even on mere secondary details, such as the order to be observed in public worship, Paul counted so far on the *solidarité* of sentiment which bound the scattered members of the Christian body, that he cut short the troublesome objector by the words, "If any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God" (1 Cor. xi. 16).

What, then, was the Church of Christ as it appears in these earliest of its extant documents, after a quarter of a century had passed away? A large group of probably small communities, spread over some of the chief provinces of the Empire, observing the two peculiar rites of Baptism and the Eucharist, and maintaining a most active and incessant intercourse with one another; yet founded by various teachers, composed of very discordant elements, distracted by serious differences of opinion, entangled in practical and speculative difficulties, such as cannot but arise where novel truths are fermenting in eager minds and revolutionising the beliefs and social habits of man. Notwithstanding, all these varied communities already cohere on the same broad platform of accepted fact and teaching respecting the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth.

It follows that the testimony of the Pauline Epistles to Jesus Christ is not simply his individual testimony, but the testimony of the entire Church in his day; not of the Pauline churches alone, but of the Judean churches as well: of the Roman church, for example, which he had not yet seen; of the Jerusalem church, from which proceeded the men who assailed his authority and undermined his work, not less than of Antioch, Ephesus, Thessalonica, or Corinth.

If, therefore, the actual facts respecting Jesus of Nazareth were distorted at all by His early followers; if legendary

accretions ever grew up around His historical person; if the supernatural element was imported by superstition or credulity into the ordinary life of a Jew; if His rising from the dead was a devout imagination invented by His followers; if His name came by degrees to be encircled with an unreal halo of Divinity in enthusiastic minds: then all these things must at least have happened within twenty years after His decease. Moreover, they must have happened in such a way as to sweep along into the very same delusion respecting a dead man the minds of a great many people over many remote lands. Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans; all over Western Asia and South-Western Europe,—men with widely opposed prepossessions, who fiercely contended over minor particulars,—must have enthusiastically accepted with one voice, and not one syllable of objection, precisely the same unhistorical figments concerning the crucified Jew, and been ready for these unhistorical figments not merely to change their manners but to lose their lives. Is that credible? Is such a perversion of facts possible within twenty years? Can legend grow so fast over so wide a field, yet present no variation anywhere? Is this the manner of a myth? My own judgment is that all such theories to account for the rise of Christianity, demanding as they do a long lapse of time and a slow dissemination from a single centre, must shatter against the evidence of the Pauline Epistles. Not from a single centre, but from several; not through the tradition of generations, but while a young man might grow to middle vigour; not within a solitary hotbed of feverish fanaticism, but all along the most frequented highways of European civilisation: did the uniform belief of Christians spread.

But I must go further still. History will not concede even these poor twenty years for the distortion of historical facts or for the growth and spread of a Christian legend. The letter to Galatia is an indubitable letter of the year 54, says M. Renan. What says St. Paul in that Epistle? He tells us that his own acquaintance with the gospel was not originally derived from intercourse with the earlier apostles or with any other disciples; that for at least fourteen (if not seventeen)¹ years after his con-

¹ Whether fourteen or seventeen depends of course on the reckoning Paul adopts in Gal. ii. 1; whether "fourteen years after" means after his conversion, named in i. 16, or after the "three years" named in i. 18.

version he went on preaching Christ in his own way before he even compared notes or exchanged any communication on the subject with those earlier apostles; that when at length he came to do so, the "pillars" of the Judean church recognised the gospel he had all these years been preaching among Gentiles as substantially their own gospel; that they "added nothing to him in conference," but gave him "the right hand of fellowship" in token that he was equally authenticated in his own sphere of ministry with themselves (Gal. i. 15—ii. 10). It is impossible to read this statement and not see that its practical effect is to throw back the substantial harmony of the Christian faith over all Christendom by at least fourteen years; and when we are moving within such narrow historical limits, to gain fourteen years is really to gain everything. If the same teaching about Jesus Christ and His mission, which is found in Paul's four Epistles, and was certainly accepted by all the churches when they were written, is just the teaching taught from the date of his conversion by Paul himself, and not less by Peter and James and John, then we are thrown back with an unchanged gospel at least to the year 40, possibly even to the year 37. What does this mean? It means that no more than from four to seven years are left at the outside for the growth of a Christian legend or the fabrication of a mythical Jesus. Is this a historical possibility? Is it historically possible that such a legend or myth could grow up within such a period in that age and land? The question is one which historical criticism is safe enough to answer truly in the long-run. In the eyes of most plain men the controversy will seem to be pretty well concluded when it is acknowledged as beyond dispute that the Christ whom Paul preached and all the churches believed in when he wrote Galatians or Romans was preached and believed in, just in the same way, within half a dozen years after His crucifixion.

What, then, was the creed that St. Paul taught and the churches believed concerning Jesus Christ when the four Epistles were composed?

It is time now to answer this question by setting forth in rough outline at least the evangelic tradition as it can be culled from these earliest sources. I still confine myself to the four undoubted letters. All I attempt is to set in order what

is said of Jesus Christ in one or other passage of these letters. The result I find is this :—

The "Jesus whom Paul preached," and whom all the churches accepted for the Messiah, was born a Jew and a lineal descendant of the royal house of David (Rom. i. 3, ix. 5). He was "made of a woman" in respect of His human birth; at the same time He was in some superior sense "the Son of God," sent forth from the Father in the likeness of fallen humanity for the purpose of human redemption (Gal. iv. 4; Rom. i. 4, viii. 3). He is the counterpart of our race's first Head, a second Adam, destined to restore the life forfeited in the lapse of the race (Rom. v. 12-21; 1 Cor. xv. 45-49). While on earth nevertheless He was placed (by circumcision?) under the Mosaic law (Gal. iv. 4), and was the member of a family which counted several brothers, of whom one was named James (1 Cor. ix. 5; Gal. i. 19). His personal ministry was restricted to the Hebrew people (Rom. xv. 8), although His gospel was destined ultimately to embrace all men (Rom. i. 16, iii. 29, 30, xv. 8-12). On a few subjects His teaching is expressly alluded to: such as marriage (1 Cor. vii. 10); the law of unclean meats (Rom. xiv. 14); the support of Christian teachers (1 Cor. ix. 14); and the love which fulfils all the law (Rom. xiii. 8, 9). Some who were afterwards His disciples were known to have enjoyed in His lifetime His personal acquaintance (2 Cor. v. 16). To the order of the apostles He delegated authority in His Church (2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10). He Himself was a poor man (2 Cor. viii. 9), and repudiated in the propagation of His cause the employment of physical force (2 Cor. x. 4). With this agreed the characteristic features of His conduct in which chiefly He became an example to His followers. These were gentleness and meekness of spirit (2 Cor. x. 1), self-renunciation and self-denial (Rom. xv. 3; 1 Cor. x. 33, xi. 1), forbearance toward those who abused Him (Rom. xv. 3). At length He was betrayed to death (1 Cor. xi. 23). On the eve of His betrayal He instituted a symbolical meal of bread and wine to be observed by His followers in memory of His passion (*ibid.*). He was put to death upon a cross—a mode of death esteemed accursed among His countrymen (Gal. iii. 13)—and this was done in ignorance by the lawful civil authorities (1 Cor. ii. 8). At the same

time, this great event was really a fulfilment of the Divine counsel for our redemption (Rom. iii. 25, v. 8, viii. 32) as foretold in the scriptures of the Old Testament (1 Cor. xv. 3). It is by the blood of His cross we have been redeemed from the curse of the Divine law on account of sin and reconciled to God, so that we obtain forgiveness of our sin and peace with God (Rom. iii. 24-26, v. 6-11 ; 2 Cor. v. 14-21 ; Gal. iii. 13). Of His Divine mission from the Father, as well as of the acceptance of His death as an expiation for sin, the supreme proof was afforded when by the power of God, on the third day after His crucifixion, He was raised again to life (Rom. i. 4, iv. 24, 25, viii. 31-34 ; 1 Cor. xv. 4, 17, etc., *passim*) out of the tomb in which He had been buried (1 Cor. xv. 4). He showed Himself alive after His resurrection on repeated occasions, five in number at least ; now to single disciples, again to the twelve apostles, and once to over five hundred persons (1 Cor. xv. 5-7). He ascended into heaven, where He is to be conceived of as seated at the right hand of His Father in glory, as Lord both of the living and the dead (Rom. viii. 34, xiv. 9). Through Him it had pleased God to bestow upon the disciples of Jesus a special supernatural gift—the gift of the Holy Spirit of God, who manifested His sacred indwelling in the members of the Church, both by acts of religious confidence, desire, and joy, and also by supernatural endowments of various kinds (Gal. iii. 2-5, 14, iv. 6, v. 22 ; 2 Cor. i. 21, 22, v. 5 ; 1 Cor. xii. 13, 14 ; Rom. viii. 9-16, 26 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19, etc.). Meanwhile Jesus Christ continued in His celestial absence to intercede for His disciples upon earth (Rom. viii. 34). These, when they die, go into His immediate presence (2 Cor. v. 8). Such as still remain on earth, absent from their Lord, are taught to await His future advent (1 Cor. i. 7), when He is to be the Judge of all mankind, before whom all secrets shall be disclosed, and at whose bar every one of us must give account of himself to God (Rom. ii. 16, xiv. 10-12 ; 1 Cor. iv. 5 ; 2 Cor. v. 10).

Such was the testimony of St. Paul to Jesus Christ. There is not one item in this full statement but can be verified by chapter and verse from these four Epistles alone. In part it is a record of naked historic facts, such as that Jesus came of the Davidic line, or that He was betrayed and crucified. In part, too, it goes far beyond bare history into the domain of

religious faith. It includes, for example, the Divine mission of Jesus as the Messiah, the forgiveness of sins, and the future judgment. But fact and dogma are in Paul's system too tightly intertwined to be separable. There is no attempt made sharply to sunder them. They live in one another. Take them together, and can any man doubt that we have before us the creed on which reposed the religious life of the entire Church, Gentile or Hebrew, twenty years after Christ's death? or that it is in substance the very gospel which, for more than fourteen years previously, Paul had been industriously circulating? or that it is the same gospel which, when "privately communicated" to the influential chiefs of the Jerusalem believers was acknowledged by them as their own? Here do we not lay a secure hand on the primitive and catholic form of the Christian faith as it sprang into new life immediately after the alleged resurrection of its Founder?

Two things about this witness of the apostle strike one at the first glance. The *first* is, that this earliest gospel according to St. Paul agrees so far as it goes with the four later gospels according to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. I say, "so far as it goes." Meagre, no doubt, are his allusions to the lessons and the incidents of the three years' ministry of our Lord; at the first blush surprisingly meagre. Yet this ceases to appear so surprising when one or two considerations are weighed. For one thing, Paul, unlike the other apostles, had never been a personal attendant on the ministry of Jesus. Discourses and events from that ministry reached him therefore at second-hand, and could hardly be expected to occupy in his thoughts or teaching so prominent a place as in the thoughts and teaching of the first disciples. In his case, just as in our own, the personal interest in the ministry which men like Peter or John must have felt, gave way before the religious, or even the theological, interest of the great Life. The facts which stood out before the eye of Paul were such as possessed overwhelming spiritual importance; the death for expiation of sin; the resurrection as a pledge of spiritual life. This is only what might have been looked for. At the same time, the whole tone in which St. Paul addresses the Christian congregations of his day implies that they were already pretty fully acquainted with the character, the example, and even what he terms "the mind"

of Christ (1 Cor. ii. 16 ; cf. Eph. iv. 20, 21 ; 1 Thess. iv. 2). He writes, not as one who for the first time would tell them about their Master, but as one who can rest his arguments and exhortations on what his readers already knew. Further, in the one instance where any exact comparison can be instituted—I mean in the detailed account he gives to the Corinthians of the institution of the Supper—we find a very close agreement indeed with the synoptic evangelists, even with those two (Matthew and Mark) which follow manifestly an independent tradition. Yet this detailed narrative in 1st Corinthians is avowedly no more than a repetition of what Paul had already “delivered” to his converts in that city, doubtless in the course of his oral instruction. On how many more incidents of the sacred ministry may he have imparted information no less minute? So far as they go, then, I repeat that Paul’s notices of his Master’s career tally perfectly with the traditions embodied in the four Gospels. At whatever date these latter may have assumed their present form, they contain amidst their manifold details nothing inconsistent with what Christians had been hearing and believing from the very beginning.

The other result, which appears on the surface, is that Paul’s teaching concerning Jesus Christ really embraced all the facts that are essential as an historical foundation to sustain the faith of a Christian. As nearly as possible, it covered the ground of the so-called “Apostles’ Creed ;” and the summary which that venerable symbol contains of evangelical fact has always been regarded as a sufficient foothold for individual faith as well as the necessary starting-point for every legitimate development of Christian theology. Explain it how you will, therefore, the universal belief of Christian men respecting Jesus Christ is proved to be as ancient as some six years at most after His decease.

In now reviewing, ere we close, the sum of our apostle’s testimony as lately given, what finally demands notice most sharply is this : that there is one point at which, before every other, the modern critical and scientific student stumbles, yet that is precisely the point which in the view of Paul himself forms the hinge of the whole :—I mean the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. In the brief space which yet remains to me I shall invite attention to the bearing of St. Paul’s testi-

mony upon this cardinal fact—a fact with which it is most certain the whole claim of Christianity stands or falls.

In the first place, the supernatural is throughout these letters spoken of as nothing remote or dubious or beyond experience—nothing of which contemporary men possessed (as we possess) no personal knowledge. On the contrary, it is a factor in the daily life of the Church with which both the writer and his readers were abundantly familiar. The full bearing of this must be kept in view. It is startling enough to find from every one of the letters that Paul speaks, not simply of revelations he had received, but of miracles as things he was in the habit of doing. To the Corinthians and Galatians he refers to this as a circumstance of which his correspondents were well aware.¹ He even appeals to it as something which his opponents would not question. Now if a circumstance like this stood alone, it would naturally enough beget a suspicion of self-deception. Judged by instances more or less parallel from the history of religion, a psychological explanation of it might be attempted. And of course if Paul turned out to be so much of a fanatic as falsely to believe himself a wonder-worker, then his evidence as to any other alleged wonder (such as the resurrection) would be seriously damaged. There are elements in the case, however, which forbid us this explanation. The belief in visions, tongues, wondrous cures, and the like marvels, may be explicable if confined to the morbid working of a single man's mind; it is less easy to see how whole companies of men here and there over the Empire could be the victims of the same delusion. The various forms which the miraculous gifts of the Spirit had assumed at Corinth are discussed at length as matters perfectly understood, about which no doubt could exist. They were in fact the occasion of difficulties which had broken out in that congregation. Is this credible, supposing the whole thing to be purely imaginary? Nor does Paul write upon this subject in the tone of a fanatic. Very much the contrary. He distinguishes carefully, even anxiously, between his own judgment and the revelations he had received (1 Cor. vii.; 2 Cor. xii.). He makes very little of the wonders he had wrought. Upon the manifestations in the church he imposes rules which are dictated by cool and sober

¹ Cf. 2 Cor. xii. 12; Gal. iii. 5.

sense (1 Cor. xiv.). He even undervalues the more sensational or striking of them in comparison with others. Their use and the test of their value he declares to be the religious profit of the Church. The virtue of love he extols above them all.

Such an absence of exaggeration, such a disparagement of the merely wonderful in comparison of the spiritually helpful, would astonish us in any fanatic; it does not astonish us in St. Paul. For it is to be observed that these strange phenomena were to Paul no more than subsidiary exhibitions of a novel and Divine Force, whose chief sphere of operation lay in the moral and spiritual region. Save where circumstances obliged him to appeal to them in his own defence, or to rectify abuses in their exercise, he never alludes to the miraculous gifts of the Spirit. Whereas the Divine Spirit in His ethical and religious gifts is never long absent from his pen. The Divine Agent in the Church is before all the Spirit of Holiness. It is He by whom men are turned from vice to virtue. He is the Enlightener and the Author of spiritual life. He inhabits the Christian, to purify him, to deliver him from fleshly desire, to make him a child of God (1 Cor. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16—vii. 1; Gal. v. 16-26; Rom. viii. 4-16, etc.); and the greatest miracle which the gospel was daily operating under the apostle's hand was in transforming such men as the Corinthian disciples had been, "fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, . . . thieves, covetous, drunkards, revilers, extortioners," into clean, pure, and devout men (1 Cor. vi. 9-11). No one can help feeling that Paul for his part cared infinitely more for the lovely fruits of the Spirit in a renewed character than for all the exorcisms, rapt effusions, or bodily cures which in himself or in others revealed the presence in humanity of a new Power.

But this new power, whose presence was so unmistakably revealed, both in physical and in moral changes, to what did Paul trace its advent? We must answer for Paul—To the mission into human life of Jesus Christ the Son of God. And we must not only answer in those weighty words, but take care to understand by them what St. Paul understood by them. For, so long as any miracle, be it speaking with tongues or the resurrection itself, is contemplated apart, as an isolated event, out of connection with the whole of that majestic intervention of Deity for the solution of human diffi-

culties in which lie the roots of all miracle, so long will it stumble us. It ceases to stumble us when we assume, as Paul taught, that God actually sent "His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin," in order to "condemn sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit" (Rom. viii. 3, 4). Jesus Christ Himself was, in Paul's teaching, the one supreme miracle by whose advent all lesser miracles grew credible and fell into their places. I know that the Christology of Paul is more fully worked out in those later Epistles, which the limitation of my plan forbids me to cite. Yet even in the four on which we are founding, it is lofty enough and wonderful enough to bear any superstructure. Jesus is the Lord from heaven (1 Cor. xv. 47). He is "the Lord of glory" (1 Cor. ii. 8). He "knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). Old Testament texts about the Jehovah of Israel are freely applied to Him (Rom. x. 13; 1 Cor. i. 13; cf. Gal. vi. 14; 1 Cor. ii. 16). Paul's own attitude to Jesus is that of reverential abasement, which to any fellow-mortal would be abject, and of such unbounded religious confidence as to any creature would be idolatrous. If Christ's proper Deity, therefore, is not expressly taught,¹ it is everywhere assumed. At all events, the utter separateness of this Son of God, who came in flesh to reconcile us to His Father, from all fallen salvable men sold under sin, and needing reconciliation, is the very key-note of the whole. Critics have felt surprised how St. Paul could omit all allusion to the miraculous acts ascribed to Jesus in our present Gospels. To a man who looked on Jesus as Himself the Divine Wonder in humanity, and who was daily doing or seeing done acts scarcely less startling than Christ's own, merely through a derived Power that came from the same Jesus, now absent in heaven, it could hardly seem worth while to descant, where he had no special call to do so, on the particular signs by which in Galilee the Messiah's mission had been attested.

Especially was this superfluous after all such earlier credentials had been, as it were, drowned and lost sight of in one last and crowning attestation. One sees how naturally, amid such a stupendous series of miracles, the resurrection fell into rank. It became indeed a necessary part of this appearance

¹ This depends on the interpretation of Romans ix. 5.

of the Divine upon earth. To Paul as a Christian theologian, its harmony with the entire gospel, its being demanded as a sequel to the expiatory death of a Divine Redeemer, served of course to recommend and to endear the resurrection of his Lord. But we must recollect that the day had been when the prepossession lay all on the other side. To Saul, the unconverted inquisitor, it was no recommendation, but the reverse, that the alleged resurrection sealed the whole pretension of the Nazarene as true. The resurrection was a good deal more than just one among many in a series of miraculous occurrences. It was the link from which the rest hung. Failure of proof here meant that all the chain was worthless. For the resurrection of Jesus—not His temporary reanimation as a mortal, but His resurrection to a new and glorified human life for ever—was that act of God upon the person of Jesus which “defined” beyond mistake His superhuman position as the Son of God with power (Rom. i. 4). If Jesus was not risen, Jesus was not Messiah; the Christian faith was vain; forgiveness of sins there was none (1 Cor. xv. 14-19). The knot of the whole scheme, the fulcrum which bore the enormous strain of such a faith, the testing fact which justified all that went before, and accounted for all that followed, was that rising on the third day. Its importance is indicated to the most casual reader by the frequency of Paul’s allusions to it. Some fifteen distinct references I have counted in the course of these four letters. But Paul did not need to become a Christian apostle in order to see that so much depended on the resurrection of a Claimant for Messiahship, whom the rulers had cut off. As a Jew, a Pharisee, and a persecutor, he must have been equally alive to it. In estimating, therefore, the worth of Paul’s evidence to the fact of the resurrection, it is only fair to reflect that his own conversion turned upon it. Before he could possibly accept of Christianity, Paul had to convince himself that Jesus was risen from the dead. At that stage everything turned on the evidence for that one fact. And there were good reasons why he should not receive the evidence for it. It is certain that he gained no material advantage by believing it. On the contrary, it meant to him (as he says in another of his letters) “the loss of all things” (Phil. iii. 8). To a rising Rabbi, the

hope of the Sanhedrim, the pupil of Gamaliel, there was every reason in the world why he should continue to disbelieve what Peter and the rest asserted—that the Crucified was alive.

Whether as Saul, the agent of the persecution, he had ever been at pains to collect evidence against the alleged fact, cannot be affirmed with certainty. The most recent critical theory which professes to explain the conversion of Paul—that of Pfleiderer—takes the incident near Damascus to have been the outcome of a painful inward struggle, during which Paul was “uncertain on the fundamental question,” whether after all the Christian belief might not be true, and the Crucified be risen, as His followers affirmed. If so, if this or anything like this be that “kicking against the pricks” to which Christ’s words referred, then it is incredible that he should not have investigated the facts at first from the standpoint of incredulity, and for the purpose of justifying his furious antagonism. He had every motive for investigation. He had every facility for conducting it. On the theory of the Hebrew authorities, the dead body was still in existence. To produce it was to expose the cheat. If he did not search for proof that the dead Man was still dead, he neglected the surest method of exploding the delusion. If he did search for it, his conversion is a demonstration that he did not find it.

But whether or not Paul sought evidence against the resurrection before his conversion, it is clear that at or after his conversion he must have found what satisfied him on the other side.

On what evidence, then, did he change his faith? The most easy reply to this question is, that St. Paul was convinced simply by the vision which he had, or supposed he had, of the risen Jesus on the way to Damascus. Now, it is certain that Paul himself believed to the last that what he then saw and spoke to was a living Man. This is not the place to discuss the three accounts of that occurrence which survive in the Book of Acts, with a view to test the probability of its having been a vision due to a heated brain. For my purpose it is enough that to Paul himself, both at the time and on reviewing the event long afterwards, the apparition was no mental vision. “Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?” he asks, in his first letter to Corinth (ix. 1). “Last of all He

was seen of me also" (*ibid.* xv. 8). At the same time, it is equally certain that Paul *did not rest the resurrection as a part of the public faith of the Church upon so narrow and precarious a basis*. Such an apparition, while it may conceivably suffice to establish a fact to him who is the subject of it, will, if it stand alone, be very unsatisfactory evidence to other people. St. Paul has too much good sense to base any important consequences on the unsupported evidence of his own interview with the Risen One. In one passage he appeals to his having seen Jesus in proof that he did not lack that qualification for the apostolate; but he is careful to couple with it other confirmatory evidence of his apostleship (1 Cor. ix. 1, 2). In another passage he adduces the same sight he had of his Master in proof of the resurrection. But he brings it in simply as the last in a long string of independent testimonies. The fact really rested, according to St. Paul, on repeated interviews which the risen Saviour had held with numerous witnesses,—with Cephas, with the Twelve, with five hundred brethren at once, with James, with the Twelve again, and finally "with me also, as one born out of due time" (1 Cor. xv. 5-8). The list is not a complete one, as the Four Gospels show, yet it is full enough to indicate that Paul regarded the crucial fact of Christianity as one which must ultimately claim credence on the ordinary principles of human witness-bearing. Had he taught Christ's return to life solely on the ground of his private vision on the Damascus road, that fact alone would have raised a suspicion that his sober judgment was for once overborne by the mysterious apparition which effected in himself so sudden and complete a change. He retained his sobriety of judgment: he rested his teaching on wider and more public evidence.

Since Paul, then, as a public teacher, claimed the belief of mankind in the resurrection, not because he had once beheld the Glorified on a strange and solitary occasion, but because of the weight of testimony in its behalf, it is inconceivable that he should not have verified that testimony. He needed to do this, possibly for his own confirmation, certainly for the satisfaction of others. If he was personally in error there, he owned himself the most miserable of mankind (1 Cor. xv. 19). If he misled multitudes of his fellows into a lying faith, he

was the most cruel of deceivers. How could he fail, having it in his power, to test the proofs and examine the witnesses? In some cases it is next to certain that he did so. He cites two of the apostles, James and Peter, as having held personal interviews with their risen Lord. Of these interviews one is mentioned in none of the Gospels; the other only in the Gospel of his own attendant, Luke (Luke xxiv. 34). The two apostles thus cited were precisely the two whom he could personally examine. With Peter he abode, on one occasion, fifteen days (Gal. i. 18). James was the only other one of the apostles whom he saw during that visit to Jerusalem (*ibid.* ver. 19). Is it doubtful that he took that opportunity of verifying from their own lips their recollection of so momentous an event? In his statement, it follows that we probably possess theirs at second-hand. And from the way in which he distinguishes those of the "five hundred" who survived from those who had "fallen asleep" in the interval, I infer that among that large number also there were some with whom he had personally conversed on the subject. It is clear that St. Paul did not leap with the premature confidence of a fanatic to his great conclusion, but held it like a sober believer on abundant evidence. I venture to think, then, that whenever the evidence for the resurrection of our Lord is to be weighed, the testimony of St. Paul must count for much. That he became satisfied of its reality against his prepossessions, to his own hurt, with ample means of inquiry, first among the hostile party and then among the original witnesses, ought of itself to carry considerable weight. It may not satisfy every one. Those who doubt have still to reckon with the fact, which these letters equally prove, that the whole body of Jesus' original disciples, who must have known the truth, came within a very brief time after His crucifixion to exchange their despair for boundless confidence and such spiritual energy that they set themselves to build up a church which has filled the world, on this delusion (if it was a delusion) for its corner-stone,—that God had raised from the dead His holy child Jesus.

Throughout this paper we have been occupied with the strictly historical value of St. Paul's testimony as furnished by his four unquestioned Epistles. In Christian evidence the

historical never stands alone. It cannot be divorced from the moral and the spiritual. One thing is certain: For Paul to have assured himself by ever so copious a collection of witnesses that the Prophet of Nazareth had been seen alive after His crucifixion would never of itself have made Paul the man he actually became. What was it that really gave to Jesus Christ such imperial, such divine sway over that noble manhood of Paul? What led Paul to glory in the shameful cross, and to say, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me"? (Gal. vi. 14; ii. 20.) What made the man "take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses, for Christ's sake"? (2 Cor. xii. 10.) It was the spiritual glory which, like the creation of a new sun, had looked out upon his spirit from the face of Christ (2 Cor. iv. 6). It was the "unspeakable gift" of His Son to die by which God had "commended His love" for sinful men (2 Cor. ix. 15; Rom. v. 8). It was because the unquenchable thirst of his conscience after righteousness before the law, which once made him a legalist and a Pharisee, had been satisfied by the righteousness of God which is by faith. It was because, through Jesus Christ, Paul "received the atonement" for sin, was "saved from wrath," and had "peace with God" (Rom. v. 1-11); because from Christ he obtained spiritual power to lead a nobler life, and knew in himself that he was become a son of God (Rom. viii. 1-17). It was because in Jesus Christ Paul found the true "liberty"—liberty from the necessity to sin (Rom. viii. 2); the true "equality"—the abolition of all spiritual privileges before the levelling grace of God to bond and free, to Jew and Greek alike (Rom. iii. 29, 30; x. 12); and the true "fraternity"—the blessed brotherhood of all redeemed men in the one family of our Father in heaven (1 Cor. viii. 12; vi. 1-8; xii. 12-27; Rom. xiv. 15). Well did the apostle recognise that religions, like plants, must be tested by their fruits (Gal. v. 18-25; vi. 7, 8). It was the Gospel which made that Paul whom we know so well as a Christian and an apostle, fearless, unselfish, tender-hearted; so high-toned as a gentleman, as a saint so fervid in devotion, as a confessor so constant amid "deaths oft." This witness to Jesus Christ is no peculiar privilege of his. There were saints in Christ Jesus before Paul (Rom. xvi. 7). After him what

multitudes have followed, treading in his steps even as he followed Christ! Happy they who carry such a witness in themselves! For to realise in one's-self that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing unto men their trespasses (2 Cor. v. 19),—to have within one's own bosom a spirit of life in Christ Jesus which sets one free from the law of sin and death (Rom. viii. 2),—this is indeed to know on better evidence even than the witness of apostles that "the gospel of Christ is the power of God unto salvation."

J. OSWALD DYKES.

ART. IV.—*The Unity of the Human Race, considered from an American Standpoint.*

THE doctrine of a multiplicity of human protoplasts, or of many Adams, which the Frenchman, Isaac de la Peyrère, first brought prominently before the Christian world in the middle of the seventeenth century, found great acceptance in America some years ago. This was due largely to the teaching of Professor Agassiz, himself a French Swiss, and a scholar highly honoured for his services in the cause of Natural Science. In his theory of Faunal Centres he included man, and, as no fewer than six such centres were found by him in America alone, it followed that the aboriginal American tribes were descended from six distinct progenitors. Reasoning in a similar way, Catlin, in his *North-American Indians*, saw no necessity for showing how the Americans came to America, or that they ever came there at all. And at a conference on American subjects held some three years ago, the President of the Anthropological Society of Paris found a warm reception for the statement "that the true solution of the problem concerning the peopling of America is, that the Americans are neither Hindoos, nor Phœnicians, nor Chinese, nor Europeans,—they are Americans." Agassiz was a firm believer in the permanence of species, and consequently a thorough opponent of the doctrine of Evolution. But Evolution has gained the upper hand in the minds of many who were once his disciples, and especially in the minds of

those who favoured the anti-scriptural notion of a multiplicity of human protoplasts. This new doctrine of the genesis of mankind does not necessarily contain within it that of the unity of the race, but simply develops man in general from lower forms of life. The archæologist, whose labours appear sometimes in their results to confirm and at others to oppose Evolution, has, on American as well as on European ground, discovered remains which he refers to the Glacial Period, and which he separates not only by a vast period of time, but by typical form, from the American-Indian of to-day. Philologists also have asserted that there is a radical diversity in the vocabularies and constructions of American languages from those exhibited in the forms of speech existing in any part of the Old World. In opposition to such views, Principal Dawson of Montreal makes the following statement in one of his Morse Lectures at New York: "The actual American race, though nearly allied in form and feature to Palæocosmic men, can make no pretension to great antiquity. Even its oldest remains, those of the Mound-Builders of the Ohio and Mississippi, though historically ancient, are on the modern alluvia of the rivers, and can claim no geological antiquity. Their languages, customs, and religions are allied to those of post-diluvian nations of the Old World, and though they indicate migrations at a time when the Turanian race was still dominant there, go no further back than this." Dr. Dawson is undoubtedly right in his statement, and so far as it relates to geology and kindred matters it will probably meet, as it deserves, with general acceptance; but one naturally demands proof in regard to such a controverted point as the relation of the languages, customs, and religions of the Indians to those of Old-World peoples. Messrs. Rivero and Tschudi in their work on *Peruvian Antiquities*, Mr. Hubert Bancroft in his *Native Races of the Pacific States*, and M. Lucien Adam before the Congrès des Américanistes at Nancy, cast ridicule upon connections which scholars professed to have established between the languages of the Western and those of the Eastern hemisphere. Some of these connections were indeed worthy of the ridicule they met with, so that, instead of attempting to defend them, the true course is to take a new and more scientific departure in the direction in which they failed.

A survey of the languages of Asia, which is the continent most likely to contribute a population to America, makes it apparent that two radically distinct grammatical systems are somewhat unequally shared among them. One prominent feature of this distinction appears in the position of the term denoting relation, which in the Indo-European and Semitic languages is rightly termed a preposition. It is also a preposition in the Chinese, in many of the monosyllabic languages in the Indo-Chinese area, in the various dialects of the Malay, and in the Polynesian tongues. But in the Ural-Altaic family, comprising the Finnic, Turkish or Tartar, Mongol and Tungus divisions, in the Dravidian languages of India, in Tibetan and some of the Indo-Chinese languages, as well as in the Japanese and allied forms of speech in North-Eastern Asia, the term denoting relation is a postposition. It is true that we meet with postpositions in Sanscrit, Latin, German, sometimes even in English, but these are exceptions, while in the great body of Turanian languages they are the rule. Case-endings in languages possessing declension may indeed be regarded as the remains of a former postpositional state of language, to which even the Semitic tongues were once subject, but it is remarkable that in the two oldest forms of speech known, the Accad of Chaldæa and the Egyptian, the distinction between a postponing and a preposing grammar appears, without any indication in either case of the existence of an earlier system. The inflection of the Celtic languages to denote case being medial rather than terminal furnishes little support to the doctrine that all speech was originally postponing; and the contrast between the Accad and Egyptian would seem to indicate that, at an early period, the human mind was led to give preference, in the one case, to the idea of existence, in the other, to that of relation. In America the same distinction appears. While most of the aboriginal languages postpone the term of relation, as in the Iroquois, which translates 'in the house' by *kanons-kon*, literally *house in*, and 'near the lake' by *kaniatar-akta*, or *lake near*, there are three important families of speech that employ prepositions. One of these, the Algonquin, occupies a large tract in North America, extending from Labrador to the Rocky Mountains, and from the Saskatchewan to the Carolinas. The Chippewas, Crees, and Delawares are the best-known tribes

of this family. The second, situated in Central America, comprises the Maya of Yucatan, the Quiché and Poconchi of Guatemala, and the Huastec and Totonac of Vera Cruz. The third family is found in the "Gran Chaco" in South America, lying between La Plata and Paraguay, and includes the Mbaya, Abipone, Mocobi, Payagua, Lengua, and other dialects. The Algonquin and Mbaya-Abipone languages occasionally employ postpositions, but the Maya-Quiché are exclusively prepositional. All of these languages are surrounded by tongues that are exclusively postpositional. What is more remarkable even is, that the Algonquin, Maya-Quiché, and Mbaya-Abipone languages strikingly contrast with the harsh forms of speech which surround them, by their soft vowel-sounds, recalling at once the peculiar characteristic of the Malay-Polynesian tongues.

The same psychological condition which led the Malay, the Algonquin, etc., to employ prepositions was the cause of other constructions that tend to separate them from the Turanian peoples. The Rev. Richard Garnett has shown that American verbs consist essentially of the same constituents as those of the Dravidian languages, namely, a verbal root, an index of time, and a mark of personality. But here also the order varies. The postpositional languages of Europe and Asia place the verbal root before the temporal index, and so do those of America. But the preposing Malay-Polynesian class sets the temporal index before the verbal root, and this is the order in Algonquin, Maya-Quiché, and Mbaya-Abipone. Thus those who give prominence to existence over relation also prefer action to time, while those who subordinate existence also subordinate action. Personality is not so well marked in the order of conception, for while the Finnic and Tartar divisions of the Ural-Altaic family, with the Dravidian, like the Latin, relegate it to the end of the verbal form, the Mongol, Tungus, Japanese, and other Turanian languages make it initial. In the Malay-Polynesian it is generally intermediate between the temporal index and verbal root, and this is the order in Maya-Quiché and Mbaya-Abipone to a large extent. In Algonquin, however, the personal pronoun precedes the temporal index; still, notwithstanding, it preserves consistency by appearing before the verbal root. Most of the postponing American

languages make the sign of personality initial like the Mongol, Tungus, and Japanese; but as the Buriat differs from other Mongol dialects by following the Finnic, Tartar, and Dravidian order of a pronominal suffix, so the Quichua of Peru differs from its cognate tongues by a similar procedure. Thus the Quichua *apa-n-y*, 'I carry,' *apa-ran-y*, 'I have carried,' as far as form is concerned correspond perfectly to the Tamil *sey-gind-en*, 'I do,' and *sey-d-en*, 'I have done,' the order in either case being *verbal root, temporal index, pronominal suffix*. Some other Peruvian dialects follow the order of the Quichua or Inca, as does also the Araucanian of Chili. But in New Granada the Muysca or Chilcha, another postponing language, translates 'I do' by *z-bquy-scua*, 'I have done' by *z-bquy-guy*, and 'I shall do' by *z-bquy-nga*, in which *bquy* is the verbal root, *scua*, *guy*, and *nga* the temporal indices, and *z* the pronominal prefix. This is precisely the order of the Mongol in *bi-ala-na*, 'I kill,' *bi-ala-ba*, 'I killed;' and of the Japanese in *mitakusigu-mi-ta*, 'I have seen;' where *bi* and *mitakusigu* are the pronoun I, *ala* and *mi* the verbal roots, and *na*, *ba*, *ta* the temporal indices. The same order is observed in the Iroquois and Dacotah or Sioux families lying within the Algonquin area. It is also, strange to say, well illustrated in the Abene, one of the dialects of the Circassian, as in *sarás-cris-ap*, 'I ride;' *sarás-cris-it*, 'I have ridden;' *sarás-cris-ast*, 'I shall ride;' *sarú* being the pronoun, *cris* the verbal root, and *ap*, *it*, *ast* the temporal indices. The Choctaw, which otherwise agrees in grammatical forms with the Iroquois and Dacotah, presents a slight variation in *takéti-ti-á*, 'I bind;' *takéti-ti-tok*, 'I have bound;' that, namely, of placing the pronoun *ti* between the verbal root *takéti* and the index *á* or *tok*, but this is confined to the first person, so that 'thou bindest' is *áti takéti-ti*, the pronoun *áti* taking its legitimate position as in Mongol proper and Japanese. Turning now to prepositional languages the Tongan, or speech of the Friendly Islanders which may be taken as typical of the Polynesian, renders 'thou goest' by *áti gáti-áti*, 'thou didst go' by *áti gáti-áti*, and 'thou wilt go' by *áti gáti-áti*. Here *gáti* is the pronoun and *áti* the verbal root, while *gáti*, *áti*, and *áti* are the indices of the present, past, and future respectively. Compare this with what happens in the postponing Quiche of Guatemala:

ca-nu-logoh, 'I love;' *xi-nu-logoh*, 'I have loved;' *chi-nu-logoh*, 'I shall love;' or in the similarly preposing Mbaya spoken on the eastern shore of the Paraguay: *ne-ya-enagui*, 'I have come;' *de-ya-enagui*, 'I shall come.' Take the Mbaya verb *yoeni* and the Tongan *gnahi*, each signifying 'to make;' and *ne-ya-yoeni*, *de-ya-yoeni*, are perfect analogues of *ne-oo-gnahi*, *te-oo-gnahi*. The perfect index *ne* coincides absolutely; the futures *de* and *te* are philologically one; the pronoun *ya* is almost identical with *oo*; and the very verbal forms *yoeni* and *gnahi* are far from discordant. This is not a mere matter of simple verbal coincidence, but of compound verbal agreement coupled with, what is more important, identity of grammatical construction. If the Mbaya and its allied preposing tongues be not of Polynesian derivation, there is no such thing as a Polynesian family of languages, and Comparative Philology may cease to exist. While the order of the Quiché of Guatemala has been shown to be identical with that of the Mbaya and the Tongan, some of its intimately allied languages, while preserving all the distinctive characteristics of preposing tongues, exhibit a transition towards Algonquin verbal forms, thus proving the latter to be of the same Polynesian parentage. The Algonquin says *ni-sakiha*, 'I love' or 'love him,' the present tense having no index; *nin-gi-sakiha*, 'I have loved;' *nin-ga-sakiha*, 'I will love.' Still the indices of time, *gi* and *ga*, are prefixed to the verbal root, but the pronoun, instead of occupying a medial position between the index and the root, as in Tongan, Mbaya, and Quiché, becomes initial. The same variation in the order of the idea of personality has already appeared in the Turanian verb, and notably, as has been shown by Dr. Edkins of Pekin, in the Mongol, in which the Buriat *alana-p*, 'kill I,' contrasts with the ordinary form, *bi-alana*, 'I kill.'

From a consideration of the preceding facts in language it is not too much to say that, while the Algonquin, Maya-Quiché, and Mbaya-Abipone families find their nearest Old-World relations in the class called Malay-Polynesian, those of the Araucanian, Peruvian, Muysca, Choctaw, Iroquois, and Dacotah are to be looked for among the Turanian tongues of Asia, and naturally of North-Eastern Asia. Already I have indicated the agreement between the Japanese and these Turanian American languages, as exhibited in postpositional and verbal

forms. In the Japanese and its allied dialects the position occupied by the genitive in relation to its governing noun is that which commonly occurs in English. Thus 'man's bone' is rendered word for word *otoko-no-fone*. This is not Greek nor Semitic. But we find it in Sanscrit, Latin, and German. It is not Malay-Polynesian, whose form is that of the Hebrew, Greek, and Romance languages. The Tongan would say *hooi-a-tangata*, 'the bone of the man.' But it is the order of the Turanian languages in general, whether Asiatic or American. Thus, in Choctaw, the Japanese *otoko-no-fone* is *hatak-in-foni*. This is a coincidence certainly, and a notable one. The Loochoo is a dialect of the Japanese, and renders 'the woman's finger' in the same way by *tackki-noo-eebee*; but this is American also, for the Choctaw still says "*tekchi-in-ibbak*. Even in South America, among the Aymaras of Peru, not only have we the same preposition of the genitive, but the same copula in *n*, and a general agreement in vocabulary. In Loochoo 'the boy's head' is *ickkeegee-noo-bosi*, in Choctaw *ushi-in-eebuk*, and in Aymara *jocca-na-ppেকে*. Then are the Choctaws descended from the Japanese? No, but they form part of the family to which the Japanese belong. The Japanese deity Jebisu is the Efeekeesa of the Muskogulges or Creeks, who are of the Choctaw stock; and Nitji, denoting at once the sun and the chief divinity of the Japanese, is the Choctaw and Muskogulge Neetahusa. But the name Choctaw is continental and pertains to the Koriaks who occupy the north-eastern corner of Asia, and are classified by Dr. Latham and other ethnologists with the Japanese. The Koriaks are divided into two branches, one of which designates itself Koraeki, and the other Tshekto, the latter being generally known as the nation of the Tchuktchis. The Tshekto are the original Choctaws, and the Koraeki are their relatives and near neighbours, the Cherokees. A glance at the grammatical forms and the vocabularies of the Choctaw-Cherokee and Iroquois families of speech will show that they have a common origin, which manifests itself also in the physical features, habits, customs, and religions of the tribes making use of them. It is no matter of surprise, therefore, to meet with Arioski, the Koriak god of war, in the Areskoui of the Iroquois, whose very name Iroquois is probably derived from that of their divinity. The Peruvian gods, Eruchi of the

Sapiboconos, and Huiracocha of the Quichuas, are forms of the same deity, just as the Araucanian Ngen is the South-American representative of another Koriak divinity Anggan, and as the Quichua Apachic and the Muysca Bochica reproduce the Muskogulge Eefeekeesa and the Japanese Jebisu. By the vocabulary and grammar of language, by religion and customs, it can be proved that the Dacotahs, Iroquois, Choctaws, Natchez, Muyscas, Peruvians, and Chilenos belong to the North-Eastern Asiatic stock, represented equally by the Japanese and the Koriaks, and including the Ainos, Coreans, and Kamtchatdales. Their course was by the Aleutan chain, for in the Aleutan and Kadiak languages the links which unite the American and Asiatic divisions are found. The worship of the sun in America, as exemplified in the religion of the Dacotahs, Mound-Builders, Natchez, Muyscas, and Peruvians, came from Asia, where the Ainos and aboriginal Japanese adore the same divinity; and the Araucanian *antu*, *antaigh*, the Quichua *inti*, the Choctaw *neetak*, the Iroquois *onteka*, and the Kadiak *madjshak*, denoting the solar orb, relate unmistakably to *nitji*, his name in Japanese, and to the Tchuktchi *matshak*. From Japan also must have come the use of the umbrella in Peru as a mark of dignity. The ancient Peruvians embalmed their dead, as did the Asiatic Ainos. Artificial compression of the head prevailed among the Dacotahs, Choctaws, Natchez, and Peruvian Chinchas, but also among the Koriaks. The Dacotahs, Iroquois, Choctaws, Cherokees, Muyscas and Peruvians preserved the tradition of a deluge, and so did the Kamtchatdales. In contributions recently made to the Canadian Institute, and published in its Journal of Transactions, I have embodied comparative vocabularies, which would be out of place in this Review, showing how intimate in point of vocabulary are the relations between the Japanese and its Asiatic allies and the Aleutan and Kadiak, Dacotah, Iroquois, Choctaw, Natchez, Muysca, Peruvian, Chileno, and other postpositional American languages. In the Quichua, or language of the Incas of Peru, *duro*, dust, is the Loochoo *turo*; *nahui*, eye, the Loochoo *ni*; *tayta*, father, the Japanese *teti*; *mati*, forehead, the Japanese *omote*; *soncco*, heart, the Japanese *sing*; *calhua*, knife, the Korean *khul*; *kkari*, man, the Kurile *guru*; *cenca*, nose, the Tchuktchi *chynga*; *unu*, water, the

Tchuktchi *nouna*; *huata*, year, the Tchuktchi *hiout*; *miski*, honey, the Japanese *mits*; *yachachi*, to learn, the Japanese *kicku*; *nana*, sister, the Japanese *ane*; *nunu*, breast, the Loochoo *mune*; *aycha*, flesh, the Loochoo *shishi*; *carhua*, yellow, the Loochoo *cheeroo*; *chanca*, leg, the Loochoo *shanna*; *casa*, ice, the Koriak *cigu*; *sirpi*, lip, the Loochoo *seeba*; *rutu*, break, the Loochoo *chireetee*; *canco*, bread, the Kamtchatdale *gamga*; *hauquey*, brother, the Loochoo *wiki*; *huahua*, child, the Loochoo *qua*; *huanghu*, die, the Loochoo *gang*; *nina*, fire, the Tchuktchi *annak*; *quilla*, moon, the Koriak *geiligen*; *kak*, stone, the Tchuktchi *wigak*; and so on indefinitely. The other American languages which I have associated with the Peruvian exhibit analogies still more striking. Taken alone these might be regarded as mere coincidences, but when grammatical forms, mythological nomenclature, and customs are found to present the same kind of agreement, the similarity of verbal forms is taken out of the category of accidental coincidence, and becomes an evidence of actual relationship. In respect to national character, we find the warlike Koriaks reproduced in the Dacotahs, Iroquois, Choctaws, and Araucanians, the bravest and most indomitable of the American Indians, while the ancient Mound-Builders, the Natchez, and the Peruvians exhibit the culture of the Japanese. The antiquity of the Asiatic stock is the measure of the American, and as the Japanese and allied peoples can be traced through Thibet and the Caucasus to a Mesopotamian or Accad home, it follows that their American colonies must be of comparatively recent date. In the case of the Peruvians, however, emigration must have taken place before the Japanese discarded pronominal suffixes, and when in this respect their language was in harmony with the Finnic, Tartar, and Dravidian construction.

In asserting that the Accadians, whose earliest historical centre was Chaldæa, must have been the ancestors of the Japanese and neighbouring peoples, and thus also of the American tribes which are of Northern Asiatic descent, I simply furnish the intermediate stages or missing links for a connection established some time ago between the Peruvians and the Accadians by Dr. Hyde Clarke, and illustrated by that distinguished philologist more recently in his treatise of *The Khita and Khita-Peruvian Epoch*. This union of two peoples

separated from one another *in situ* by more than half the circumference of the globe, and, as to means of comparison, by thousands of years, is one of the most brilliant and important discoveries ever made in Comparative Philology. Strong faith in the unity of the race and in the permanence of linguistic forms was the foundation of the comparisons, the result of which has so amply justified the philologist's confidence. In the Accad vocabularies, which, with their Assyrian equivalents, have been deciphered on the disinterred tablets from the valley of the Tigris, the names of several Accadian divinities appear. One of these, said to answer to the Assyrian Bel, is Hubisega. Now Hubisega is the Japanese Jebisu, the Choctaw Efeekeesa, the Muysca Pesca or Bochica, and the Peruvian Apachic. His name appears as a tribal one in Circassia, denoting the ancient Abasgi or Abasci, the present Abasech, a division of the Circassians proper, whose grammatical forms we have found to be Turanian, as are those of the Accad. But in the Assyrian period, midway between Chaldæa and the Caucasus, there appear among the records of Assyrian conquest countries called Hupuskia and Khupuskai, the peculiar form of whose name seems to link them with the Accadian divinity. While one of these countries, as pointed out by the Rev. A. H. Sayce, must have been situated in north-eastern Assyria towards Armenia, the other, judging from the states connected with it, should be looked for on the Euphrates, with Thapsacus for its centre. Whatever may be the value of the initial T in Thapsacus, it is evidently prosthetic, so that Thapsacus is no other word than Hupuskia. This city existed in the days of Solomon, and was a place of importance, such that the Assyrian monarchs, who carried their arms into all Mesopotamia and Syria, could not by any possibility pass over it in the records of their expeditions. Yet this they certainly did, if it be not one of their Hupuskias. Now the natural progress of a brave people loving independence, when encroached upon by a strong enemy from the south, would be towards the strongholds of the Caucasus, and thither the Assyro-Armenian Hupuskians seem to have fled, for we have already found them in the Abasech. The Hupuskian or Khupuskian form, however, appears more perfectly in the name of another clan of the Circassians proper, the Chapsoukes

or Shapsuch. The latter name is almost perfectly reproduced among the American Dacotahs, whose most cultivated tribe, the Mandans, bore the tribal designation Seepohskah. In the geography of Central and South America many Hupuskian forms are found, such as Tobasco in Yucatan, Pachuco in Mexico, with Pasco, Pisco, Posco, Pisagua, and Tapacocha in Peru. The latter bear the same relation to Apachic, the god, that Hupuskia and Thapsacus should sustain to the Accad Hubisega. The Muysca Pesca or Bochica, the hero of a deluge like Apachic, and a great teacher of the worship of the sun, is reputed to have been though presenting a different category of Hupuskian name.

There are those at the originals of ancient Bible in Accadian mythology and I wiser to speak of the Accadian original tradition, which, by Divine Providence preserved. Coincidences indeed but it is impossible for any side, to derive the Bible stories from Chaldæa. I have already Muyscas, Choctaws, Iroquois tribes, preserved traditions of these bear close resemblance to what says in his *Peruvian Antiquities* that he vented his wrath in a deluge. Peruvians a tradition analogous to the constructing of an ark. A portion of the human family tradition makes Pesca or Bochica he is universally allowed to be Pachacamac. Among the Dacotahs of Tungus descent, the central figure is Tschepiwi. The Mandans, whose tradition is very complete, regarded him who escaped the Flood, less from their ancestor, was the god of the Mandans. The Choctaws, Creeks, and Cherokees, whose god is Efekeessa, also retain a

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very perfect tradition of this great catastrophe. The diluvian hero of the Accadians was Hasisadra or Xisuthrus, and his name I have not found among the American tribes, but in Ezechous, who, according to Africanus and Eusebius, was the first Chaldaean king after the deluge, it is not hard to recognise the Accadian Hubisega, the Muskogulge Eefeekeesa, the Muysca Pesca or Bochica, and the Peruvian Apachic. A more striking Peruvian tradition is given by Montesinos in his *Peruvian Annals*, based upon the legendary history of the Incas. He says: "In the reign of Ayatarco-Cupo, giants having entered Peru, they populated Huaytara, Quinoa, etc., and built a sumptuous temple in Pachacamac, using instruments of iron. As they were given up to sodomy, divine wrath annihilated them with a rain of fire, although a part of them were enabled to escape by going to Cuzco. Ayatarco-Cupo went out to meet them and dispersed them about Lima-tambo." Were this story to appear in any collection of Old-World traditions, it would at once be referred to the Cities of the Plain. Should it turn up, as it probably will, among the Accadian legends, the relations of the Accadians and Elamites with these cities in the days of Chedorlaomer will be deemed sufficient to account for its origin. To assert the Eastern origin of the Peruvians on the ground of this tradition would be to build on too small a foundation, but when this origin has been established by language, the tradition becomes an important addition to its testimony. Dr. Hyde Clarke has shown the radical unity of the Peruvian and Accadian grammatical systems, and has also pointed out numerous and striking resemblances between these languages in point of vocabulary. To mention a few of them: the Accad *karra*, man, is the Peruvian *kkari*; *rak*, woman, the Peruvian *rakka*; *utuci*, sun, is *itoko*; *ul*, star, *sillo*; *ma*, earth, *mechi*; *ne*, fire, *nina*; *pak*, king, *capac*; *car*, fortress, *pucara*; *tak*, brick, *ticacuna*; *babbar*, silver, *levir*; *gan*, field, *cancha*; *kug*, black, *coca*; *amas*, dark, *amea*; *uknu*, white, *hancona*; *pak*, bird, *piscco*; *lig*, *liku*, dog, *alljo*, *locma*; *hal*, *khan*, fish, *challua*, *kanu*; *dara*, deer, *taruco*; *tsir*, serpent, *katari*; *suk*, plant, *kuka*; *si*, *sizi*, grass, *ichu*; *gu*, *gis*, tree, *hacha*, *khoka*; *sak*, *pir*, head, *echuja*, *abaracama*; *su*, hand, *suvi*; *sik*, *muz*, hair, *socco*, *musu*; *cagu*, *pi*, ear, *aike*, *puoki*; *essa*, foot, *ahet*, *cuchi*; *sir*, skin, *ccara*; *emi*, tongue,

ine; *gan*, to be, *can*; *khan*, to die, *huanhu*; *ca*, to drink, *acua*; *se*, to give, *chu*; *be*, to kill, *sipiy*; *ru*, to do, to make, *rura*; *tuk*, to have, *tausi*; *aca*, to lift, *haca*; *takh*, to strike, *takay*; *sic*, clothes, *acsu*; *khi*, good, *ccaya*; *su*, bad, *hucha*; etc. etc. I have already, however, sufficiently trespassed upon the reader's patience with these comparisons, and for proofs afforded by language of the relation borne to the Accadians by the Peruvians and other American and Asiatic families or tribes which I have associated with them, must refer him to Dr. Hyde Clarke's *Prehistoric Comparative Philology* and *Khita-Peruvian Epoch*, and to my papers on the subject in the *Canadian Journal*. From these it appears that the branch of the Accad stock which moved northwards into the Caucasus sent out a great colony to Thibet, where a division took place. A portion of the colony remained in Thibet, the language of which country exhibits well-marked Accadian features; another passed southward into the Indo-Chinese area, and is represented by the Cambodians, Kariens, and other tribes, the Karien tribe Passuko preserving intact the old Hupuskian name; and the third or largest section, driven by adverse forces into North-Eastern Asia, appears not only in the Koriaks, Kamtchatdales, Ainos, and Japanese, but in the transitional Aleutans, and in the Dacotahs, Iroquois, Choctaws, Mound-Builders, Natchez, Muyscas, Peruvians, and Araucanians of America.

The extension of the Accadians was not confined to regions east of the Tigris and Euphrates, but appears also in Africa and in the extreme west of Europe. The only way in which I can account for their presence in the west is on the hypothesis that they formed part of the Shepherd invasion of Egypt. Khita and Accad are now believed to be either identical or closely allied terms, and the Khita were the most prominent of the Shepherd tribes. Ashtar was the great god of the Khita, and he is undoubtedly the same divinity as the Accadian Hasisadra or Xisuthrus. Sir Henry Rawlinson and other Orientalists have found the word *Burbur*, meaning "high-lander," applied to the Accadians and the allied Armenians. Now the chief African families, who are connected as sun, or sun and serpent, worshippers, and by the vocabularies of their languages with the Accadians, are the Barabras of Nubia and

the Berbers of the Mediterranean coast. With the former, the Koldagi of Korodfan and the Furians of Darfur must be associated, and with the latter, the Haussas. The Berber family also includes the Guanches of the Canary Islands. As serpent-worshippers, the Barabras connect with the Tibetans, Cambodians, Dacotahs, Mound-Builders, Natchez, and Peruvians. As sun-worshippers the Berbers are linked with the Accadians, Ainos, Japanese, Dacotahs, etc. Although I have already referred to other sources for linguistic proofs of relationship, I cannot abstain from indicating the wonderful agreement in words, of languages so far removed as the Barabra dialects, and those of North-Eastern Asia and its American colonies. The Barabra *chundeka*, mouth, is the Tchuktchi *kandak*, and *agilk*, another Barabra word denoting the same thing, is the Aleutan *agilak*; *kehl*, tooth, is the Aleutan *aghalun*; *maschekka*, sun, is the Tchuktchi *matschak* and the Kadiak *madzshak*; *aly*, day, is the Koriak *allo*; *karag*, fish, is the Aino *karasacki*; *eka*, fire, is the Japanese *yoke*; *igh*, hand, is the Kadiak *aika*; *ogikh*, man, is the Aleutan *ugig*, and *itga*, the Japanese *otoko*; *enga*, woman, is the Loochoo *innago*; also *woussik*, star, is the Choctaw *phoutchick*; *kabakka*, bread, the Araucanian *copque*; *okera*, bird, the Iroquois *garioha*; *arykka*, earth, the Peruvian *urakke*; *ounatega*, moon, the Cherokee *anantoge*; *eget*, sheep, the Peruvian *chita*; *bayn*, speak, the Araucanian *pin*; *nyta*, tooth, the Choctaw *notch*; *tourouck*, wind, the Iroquois *tekawerakwa*; *bure* and *dimega*, ten, the Accad *pur*, Dacotah *peeraga*, Peruvian *bururuche* and *tunca*; *kemsou*, four, the Peruvian *kimsa* (three), etc. Similar analogies appear in the Furian, Hausa, and Berber. Prominent among the Berber tribes are the Zimuhr and Amor, whom some writers have regarded as descendants of Canaanitic Zemarites and Amorites. Gomera, the name of one of the Canary Islands, is a form answering to these. It is not a little remarkable to find Dr. von Tschudi saying: "There is a very striking conformity between the configuration of this race (the Aymaras of Peru) and that of the Guanches or inhabitants of the Canaries, who used also the same mode of preserving the bodies of their dead." The Guanches embalmed their dead, as did the Ainos and ancient Peruvians, a practice which they probably learned in Egypt. There is no ground for believing that the Guanches—who, like all the other members of the

large Accad family with which I have associated them, were not a maritime people—sent a colony to America, across the Atlantic. As the Peruvian represents the Accadian at the greatest eastward extension of his family, so does the Guanche at its most western limit. The Aymaras of Peru, with whom Dr. von Tschudi compares the Guanches, are by Dr. Hyde Clarke associated with the Sumerian branch of the Accad family, together with the Cambodians, who call themselves Kammer or Khmer. The Guanches of Gomera, and the Berber Zimuhr and Amor, should fall into the same division. Berber grammar, owing doubtless to Semitic influences, presents little in common with that of the Accad and those of its descendants, but the vocabulary coincides to a great extent with theirs. Such Berber words as *ikerri*, sheep, *ana*, lamb, *tararach*, nets, *hierro*, cistern, *faycay*, priest, *coran*, *oggue*, man, *t'amrau't*, woman, *elali*, good, *achicuca*, boy, *ahemon*, water, are easily identified with the Peruvian *ccaura*, *una*, *atarraya*, *huirca*, *pachacuc*, *kkari* and *hake*, *marmi*, *alli*, *jocca*, and *huma*. Strange to say, these words are also largely Celtic, so that the the terms Sumerian, Zimuhr, Gomera, Amor, and Aymara, may fitly be compared with Cymri. An ancient erection of the Peruvian Aymaras near Lake Titicaca, of which tradition says "that it was erected in a single night by invisible hands," has been fitly described by Mr. Bollaert as a kind of Peruvian Stonehenge. The same story is told of the Cymric Stonehenge, whose builder was Emrys. M. E. Pegot Ogier, in *The Fortunate Isles*, holds strongly the Celtic origin of the Berbers and Guanches, and cites a Guanche temple as corresponding perfectly to Celtic remains at Carnac. This writer also mentions the plaited hair of the Guanches, their use of the Peruvian oven, and their virgins of the sun, all of which serve to link them with the Aymaras. Some years ago I prepared a long list of Celtic and Peruvian common terms, exhibiting wonderful similarities, for the Société Américaine de France, a portion of which was published also by Dr. Hyde Clarke in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute as an appendix to an article by Mr. Hector M'Lean on "The Scottish Highland Language and People." These words were to a great extent Aymara, so that if Celts are to be found in America, it must be in connection with this branch of the Peruvian family. The

ther Turanian languages of the Western Continent have little in common with the Celtic, and are much nearer in point of vocabulary to the Barabra than to the Berber dialects.

There is yet another Western member of the Accad stock, and one of prime importance. This is the Basque, which, from the identity of its numerals with those of the Hausa, and of its vocabulary with the Barabra, and to a certain extent with the Berber, must be held to have reached its European home by way of Northern Africa. Guipuscoa, one of the Basque provinces, gives back again the Mesopotamian and Armenian Khupuskai and the Chapsoukes of Circassia, while Biscay tells the same story as the Karien Passuko, the Muysca Pesca, and the Peruvian Pisco. The Basques call themselves Euskara, a term which relates to Iscuria of Circassia and the Circassian god Achaicarus, to the Huascars, mythic ancestors of the Peruvians, and also to the Iroquois Tuscaroras and the Huron god Tawiscara. In the latter forms the prosthetic T has the same origin as that in Thapsacus and Tobasco. Their great god was Haitor, the eponym of the Astures, a name which recalls the Khitan Ashtar, the Accad Hasisadra, and the Peruvian Ayatarco. It is generally admitted that there are few languages in the Eastern Hemisphere so American in construction as the Basque, and, did space and the patience of the reader allow, it would be a simple matter to show that the vocabulary of that language is in harmony with the Accad and all the tongues that have been affiliated to it. The neighbourhood of the Basques as originally in proximity to a Celtic population, probably presents the same phenomenon that appears in Chaldæa, where Sumer and Accad dwelt together, in the Indo-Chinese area, where Accadian Passuko and Sumerian Khmer are found, and in Peru, where Accad Quichuas and Sumerian Aymaras shared the land.

That the Accad and Khita peoples, with those in Africa, Europe, Asia, and America who are of Accad and Khita descent, belong to the race of Ham, the Bible seems plainly to testify. Accad was a city of Nimrod the Cushite, and Heth or Khita were descendants of Canaan. But the Sumerians I identified with the Bible Zimri, who are spoken of in company with the Medes and Elamites, and these, with the posterity of Zimran, the eldest son of Abraham by Keturah,

in a paper on "The Ethnic relations of the Zimri," which was read before the Society of Biblical Archæology. The Sumerians, however, occupy but a small place in the ethnography of the American continent. Yet Cimmerians (Cymri or Sumerians) and Scyths were companions in the days of the father of history, who bears testimony to the scalping propensities of the latter. That the Scyths are our Khita or later Accadians there seems little doubt, but it is certainly remarkable that the old Irish and Scottish traditions give a Scythian original to Gaelic and Erse Celts. In such traditions we may find another testimony to the political union of two distinct peoples known originally as Sumer and Accad; and the common possession by the Celtic languages and those derived from the Accad of certain terms, may be accounted for by the federation of the ancestral stocks of the two distinct families in an ancient Chaldæan home. Some such union is necessary to account for the presence of the Gaelic *caora*, sheep, and *uan*, lamb, in the Aymara of Peru, where they appear as *ccaura* and *una*, as well as of scores of other common terms that find analogues as remarkable. Thus the statement of Rivero to the effect "that from between eight and nine thousand American words, *one* only could be found analogous in sense and sound to a word of any idiom of the ancient continent" is so far from the truth, that I question if there be any simple word spoken by the aborigines of America, which may not be traced to some language of the Old World; and the same is true of grammatical constructions, objects of worship, geographical and tribal names, manners and customs, and all else that may characterise a human family.

The languages of America which I have called Turanian and have affiliated to the Accad are harsh and strong in most cases. Some of them abound in gutturals, and in most the masculine sound of *r* prevails. Vowels are employed for the purpose of building consonants together, and not as a mere padding of speech. Such a harsh masculine form is that denoting "whiteness," in Basque *churia*, in Guanche *guarn*, in Loochoo *sheeroosa*, in Mohawk *kearagea*, in Quichua *yurac*. Such also is the word for fish, *karag* in Barabra, *araga* in Basque, *karasacki* in Aino, or the corresponding Accad *hal*, Tchuktchi *ikahlik*, Kadiak *ikalljuk*, Choctaw *kullo*, Cherokee

igaula, Peruvian *challua*, and Araucanian *khalloua*. There is no softness in the Accad *arik*, foot, leg, nor in the Furian *taroguro*, the Tibetan *ruko*, the Kadiak *irruhka*, and the Tuscarora *rusay*. But in the case of the preposing Malay-American languages it is altogether different. The softness of the Malay-Polynesian *wewina*, woman, is reflected in the Ojibbeway *wewan* and the Cree *wewimow*, of *bibigi*, child, in the New England *pappouse*, of *tahine*, girl, in the Illinois *tahana*, of *leeloo*, tongue, in the Penobscot *weelauloo*, of *makeu*, eat, *neenum*, drink, and *makee*, give, in the Cree *mechew*, the Menomeni *maynaan*, and the Cree *makew*. It is not rare in Canada to meet Algonquin Chippewas or Missisaguas in the same place with Iroquois belonging to one of the Six Nations, and those who have so met them could not but be impressed with the radical diversity in the sounds of their respective languages, as well as in their character and physical appearance. It has been a common thing to speak of the Indians of America, and especially of North America, as possessing or exhibiting a single type of character and feature. This has been the result of partial or superficial observation, combined with the fact that uncivilised tribes existing under common conditions nowhere manifest that distinctiveness of character and feature which marks even the individual in civilised communities. Mr. Wallace, in his *Malay Archipelago*, has well set forth the characteristics of Malay character and appearance. Every trait in his description, when applied to the Algonquin, will be found to correspond most minutely. He speaks of the Malay as impassive, reserved, taciturn, undemonstrative, "deliberate in speech and circuitous in introducing the subject he has come expressly to discuss," devoid of humour, and monotonous and plaintive in his songs. Such is not the Iroquois, nor the Dacotah, nor the Choctaw, nor the undignified and fun-loving Athabaskan. But the description answers perfectly in the case of the Algonquin. Last year a number of Chippewas, in their bark canoes, landed on the island in one of the northern lakes of Canada where I was spending my summer holidays. When I went to see them I met with no welcome; they withdrew behind the trees, their faces turned to the ground, while they whispered to each other to answer my questions, to which any one of

them could have replied ; and it was fully an hour before they were able to tell me that, having missed their way, they had landed to obtain information. When they found that they were six miles out of their course they manifested no surprise, and at last paddled off singing their plaintive and monotonous song. No Iroquois, Dacotah, or Choctaw would have acted in such a manner, but in a way at once more frank, straightforward and manly, and visibly appreciative of the situation. The Algonquin, again, is a lover of the water, and has simply changed the maritime habits of the Malay-Polynesian for the fluvial and lacustrine, while the Turanian tribes are essentially inland and land-loving peoples. Mr. Wallace thinks the Malay rather deficient in intellect, and it is undoubted that the Choctaws, Cherokees, and Iroquois are in mental vigour, powers of adaptation, and capacity for culture, immeasurably superior to the Algonquin tribes. The Dacotahs, Iroquois, and Choctaws are lovers of manly sports, as is testified by their ball-play, which has been popularised lately as the game of La Crosse. But the Algonquin, like the Malay, prefers to spend his leisure in idleness.

Turning, however, from the naturally uncivilised Algonquin to the Maya-Quiché family of Central America, we meet with facts which are without parallel in the north. True, the Shawnoes, an Algonquin tribe, gave to history Tecumseh, one of the wisest and bravest of Indian statesmen and warriors, but his was an exceptional case. The Mayas and Quichés, on the other hand, seem to have been a people of high cultivation. Both of these nations possessed a written alphabet, hieroglyphic in character, in which many inscriptions remain. The Quichés also had a sacred book containing their mythology and legendary history, called the *Popol Vuh*, which has been translated into French by the Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg. Extensive ruins, many of them consisting of hewn stones, are found throughout the Maya-Quiché area, some of which have been compared with similar structures in the islands of the Pacific. So far, however, I am not aware that any inscribed monument or trace of a written alphabet has been discovered in Polynesia. But the grammar and vocabulary of the Maya-Quiché tongues are Malay-Polynesian to a great extent, and Dr. Daniel Wilson of Toronto draws attention to "the soft

vocalic forms of the Maya, which strikingly contrast with the languages of the nations immediately to the north of its native area." The Maya-Quiché pantheon also is Polynesian. Their great god, Tockil or Tohil, is the Polynesian Tagala, Tangaloa, Taarou; Bitol is the Tagala Bathala; and Tepeu, the Tongan Tooboo. The Tagala account of the genesis of man is, that he sprang out of a large cane with two joints, "and the man came out of one joint and the woman out of the other." In the *Popol Vuh* of the Quichés we read that "man was made of a tree called *trits*, woman of the marrow of a reed called *sibac*." This un-Darwinian theory of evolution from vegetable forms is characteristic enough to serve as an important link of connection between the Maya-Quiché and Polynesian families, and on American ground is, so far as I know, peculiar to the former people and the Algonquins. The question naturally arises, at what point did the Polynesian emigrants effect a landing in America? This seems to be answered by Dr. Pickering in the following words:—"The Polynesian groups are everywhere separated from South America by a vast expanse of ocean, where rough waves and perpetually adverse winds and currents oppose access from the west. In attempting from any part of Polynesia to reach America, a canoe would naturally and almost necessarily be conveyed to the northern extreme of California; and this is precisely the limit where the second physical race of men makes its appearance. So well understood is this course of navigation that San Francisco, I am informed, is commonly regarded in Mexico as being on the route to Manilla." Dr. Pickering also says that "if any actual remnant of the Malay race exists in the eastern part of North America, it is probably to be looked for among the *Chippewas* and *Cherokees*." In regard to the *Cherokees*, language and tribal associations forbid the connection, but the *Chippewas*, as a representative Algonquin tribe, have been found fully to satisfy the conditions of Malay-Polynesian relationship which Dr. Pickering was disposed to found on physical appearance. In the *Kalapuya* and allied tribes, whose habitat is west of the Rocky Mountains in Oregon, and who have been regarded as presenting a closer resemblance than any other Indians of the Pacific slope to the Algonquins, I believe that I have found one of the connecting links between them and their

original landing-place. The Kalapuya dialects consist of words which are pure Malay, and which find their exact counterpart in the Moluccas group.

But it may be objected that the dress, implements, food, and, to a large extent, the habits of the Algonquin, are utterly unlike those of the Malay-Polynesian. This is necessarily the case, and arises from the transference of the stock from insular to continental scenes and productions, from a warm to a temperate and sometimes cold climate, from the midst of a homogeneous population to the neighbourhood of many foreign tribes possessing costumes, arts, and devices better adapted to the nature of the country. The Algonquin on American ground became perforce a learner. A fisherman he still remained, but to this he must add the pursuit of wild beasts unknown in Polynesia, and thus he became a hunter. His scanty clothing, which answered all purposes under a tropical sun, was found insufficient in his new northern home, so he assumed the skin dress of neighbouring tribes, and with all a Polynesian's love of finery did not disdain the ornamentation with the coloured quills of the porcupine, in which his Turanian brethren indulged. His dug-out canoe became too serious a burden to carry over river portages, and was discarded for the light and elegant shell of birch-bark, whose model had been brought from Northern Asia. No palms or bamboos appeared in the forests of America to furnish materials for house-building, so that once more he had recourse to the birch-tree, and coated his structure of saplings with its bark. He found the snow-shoe, the calumet, the scalping art, and many things besides in his new continental home. Thus he changed all the accidents of his condition with his change of sky, but, as "*cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*," so he preserved unalloyed his language and his character. The Iroquois and the Dacotah taught him the art of American warfare, but all the arts of peace he learned from the feebler Athabaskan in the north, for the skin dress, quill ornamentation, the bark canoe and lodge, the snow-shoe, and almost all the accessories of North America Indian life, seem to have been introduced by that originally Asiatic people.

In one of the contributions to the *Canadian Journal*, to

allusion has been made, I have shown that this Athabaskan is an American branch of the Tungusi of Siberia. The Athabaskan, which properly speaking designates only one of a very extensive family, has been superseded by that name, a term derived from the word for man, common to all its sections. The Tinneh are found on both sides of the Rocky Mountains, from the Esquimaux area in the far north to the Algonquin on the south, but also appear as an extensive population as far as Mexico, in the persons of the Aztecs, Apaches, and kindred tribes. In language, dress, arts, manners and customs, physical appearance, religious ceremonies and character, the Tinneh answer perfectly to the Asiatic Tungus. In certain social customs indicating the absence of property, in the practice of disposing of their dead in wooden coffins above ground, in their long and violent mournings, and innumerable other features of their life, they resemble the Tungus as perfectly as they differ from other American stocks. The very name for man, as it appears in the Kotchikotin *tengi*, the Tenan-Kutchin *tingi*, the Loucheux *ti*, etc., is the *tungus* and *donki* of the Tungus. In their Asiatic home they acquired all the arts necessary for a North-American mode of life, and brought with them all the implements and appliances that have been erroneously regarded as the exclusive property of the American Indian. One has but to read the narratives of Martin Sauer, Abernethy, and others, in order to see that birch-bark canoes, houses and sleds, skin dresses and lodges, snow-shoes and calumets, bow-work and mocassins, were, and are probably still, in use among the Tungus, who must have invented them ages before they appeared in the Western Continent. So also scalping, a practice unknown among Malays or any Old-World people at present day, was an accomplishment of the ancestors of the Asiatic Koriaks and American Iroquois in the far-off days of prehistory. There is nothing new under the sun, and certainly nothing in aboriginal America which has not appeared elsewhere. The most remarkable phenomenon which any of the Indian nations presents is the adaptation of the Eskimoes, an insular and sub-tropical people originally, to the arctic and northern modes of life, affording another

instance of the superiority of man over the brute creation as the world's sole cosmopolite.

The Tungus, of whom the Tinneh are a colony, belong to the Ural-Altaic family, of which the Finnic, Tartar, and Mongol tribes are also members. Their grammatical forms and their vocabulary in part resemble those of the Mongols, but although their grammar is also very like that of the Japanese, there is little in their vocabulary to associate them with that people or with any of the tribes related to them. If the Celtic be the type of the Sumerian, the Tungus dialects in point of lexicon are more Sumerian than Accad, and thus they exhibit some likeness to the Berber. The names Tinneh in America and Tungus in Asia, as at the same time terms denoting man, relate, distantly it may be but still truly, to the Gaelic *duine*, the Welsh *dyn*, and the Armorican *den*. It is Dr. Pritchard, I think, who has called attention to such Celtic forms as *aforo*, nose; *furdan*, road; *inni*, life; *nian*, heaven; *choun*, sun; *ookladai*, sleep; *ooklean*, dream, in Tungus, which correspond to the Welsh *ffri*, *fford*, *einoes*, *nen*, *huan*, the Erse *colladh*, and the Gaelic *aisling*.

The Malay-Polynesian and associated American languages are the very antipodes of the Asiatic and American Turanian tongues save in the characteristics of agglutination and polysynthesis, which are accidents that most languages are liable to, and which meet the philologist in Africa and Australia as well as in the area to which the forms of speech belong that have so far occupied our attention. These languages, both in grammatical forms and in actual words, have much in common with those of the Semitic family, and find their closest relations with the Bantu or Caffre tongues of South Africa, which rejoice in the possession of many Semitic roots. In former days, when people were not wise enough to know that the Lost Tribes of Israel were to be found in that complex nationality, the English people, it would have been easy for any student of Maya to locate them in Yucatan, for what better likeness could one demand at such a distance than the Maya *xibil*, a male, *okomolal*, grief, *tsipit*, a gem, *hatxpahal*, divide, *cimil*, die, *nacal*, ascend, and *ximbalni*, walk? These words, however, came to the Maya through the Polynesian. Where the Malay and Caffre languages originated I am not yet

in a position to state, but that it was at some point far west of the Malayan peninsula seems to be settled by the geographical position of the latter group, which has been definitely associated with the Polynesian tongues by more than one South-African scholar. We shall probably not be far astray in looking for their birthplace among the sub-Semitic languages in the eastern part of the Dark Continent, which seem to indicate that an original Cushite population submitted to physical and linguistic changes produced by the advent of a Semitic colony from Southern Arabia. The union of the two stocks may also have taken place in Arabia itself, whence population might easily pass to Africa on the one hand, and, on the other to India. But so far all is conjecture beyond the facts that Caffre and Malay-Polynesian, with Kalapuya, Algonquin, Maya-Quiché, and Mbaya-Abipone in America, are languages of one family which strikingly contrasts with the Turanian.

American man, therefore, is not an autochthon, nor a remnant of antediluvian days, nor the representative of the mythic Atlantidæ; nor, in spite of many apparent similarities, is there any typical American man. No new race is to be found in any part of the Western Continent, but old races under new conditions. Chief among these old races are the Tungus, the Japanese Koriak, and the Malay-Polynesian, whom language and character, religion and customs, identify in both hemispheres. God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation." For if it be true that the tribes of America are of Asiatic parentage, so, *a fortiori*, must be those of Africa and Australasia. Already, however, Nubians, Berbers, and other African families, have been connected with the Accad stock, and Caffres with the Malayan. A third African class, represented chiefly by the Agows in the neighbourhood of Abyssinia, has been shown by Dr. Hyde Clarke to connect intimately with the dominant Indian family of Brazil, the Guarani, including the Aguas or Omaguas, by language. The connecting link between the two widely separated peoples I have found in what Dr. Latham calls the Kelaenonesian stock, which embraces the Papuans and Australians. Thus we meet with

such Guarani terms as *couna*, woman, *quarasi*, sun, *cava*, *ig*, *iaca*, water, river, *tupan*, god, *pira*, blood, *juca*, kill, *ac tembe*, lip, *ibi*, *ibaca*, earth, in the Agow, *yehona*, *quorah*, *agho*, *daban*, *beri*, *kugha*, *fat*, *kambi*, and *biah*. But *tembe* better rendered by the Australian *tambamba*; the Agow *yuna*, appears in the Australian *ina* and Tasmanian *cua*; *quorah*, in *yarai*; and the Guarani *tenypa*, knee, *chueraca*, head, *yagua*, dog, and *membira*, boy, are reproduced in the Australian *tinbir*, *worra*, *ga*, *yuggi* and *birri*. The Agow word for a king, is identical with the New Caledonian *alikee*, a language which also furnishes *guinguai*, breast, *cata*, leaf, *gnouandane*, road, *highou*, thunder, *halo*, bird, as equivalent to the Agow *kingugu*, *khatsi*, *kani*, *gwidana*, *gwigwu*, and so on. The remarkable Agow words *shangobata*, a beard, and *khaka*, a finger, reappear, corrupted indeed, but still recognisable, first in the New Ireland *kambissek* and the Waygiou *gang*, and the second in the New Ireland *catchingliman* and the Waygiou *cantoulili*. These are but examples of hundreds of verbal resemblances of a similar character which attest, on one hand, the original unity of the Papuan and Australian classes with the African Agows, and on the other, a migration from the former to South America.

One remarkable custom of certain Old-World peoples, referred to by Professor Max Müller, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Tylor, reappears in the New. This is the Custom of the Bearn, South-Western China, Southern India, Congo, and Borneo, where it is practised by the Basques, Miautzes, Malays, Congoese, and Dyaks respectively. It was also, according to Apollonius Rhodius, a custom of the Tibareni in Asia Minor, and, according to Diodorus Siculus, of the Corsicans. In addition to the Miau-tze, we find Butler describing it in *Hudibras*:—

“Chineses go to bed,
And lie-in in their ladies' stead.”

In South America this peculiar practice, which is most unlikely to have originated in any common human instinct, is found among peoples utterly unrelated, as some of the writers who have alluded to it assert, appears in all its integrity among the Abipones of the Gran Chaco, and the Caribs of Guiana. As we find this custom among Congoese, Dyak

Abipones, whose relations are largely Malay-Polynesian, it is natural to suppose that it originated with the parent stock of that widespread family, and that the Basques, as belonging to a different branch of the human race, derived it from them at some remote period. From Borneo or some such point in the Eastern Archipelago it must have been transferred to South America. It is true that the Caribs cannot be classed as a people of pure Malay-Polynesian descent, like the Abipones, since their grammatical system is of a different type, but, did space permit, it could be proved that the Carib language originated in a union of the Malay with the Papuan, so common in the neighbourhood of Borneo, a union in which Papuan constructions predominated. That the Caribs are of the same stock as the Dyaks of Borneo appears further to be proved by the use among both peoples of the *sumpitan*, or blow-pipe, an offensive weapon of war for shooting with the breath small poisoned arrows, and, further, by the fact that both are in the habit of building their houses, which are constructed on the same model, upon piles over the water. Going further back, it may be possible at some future day to associate the Caribs, one of whose tribes is that of the Galibi, with the Chalybes of Pontus, the near neighbours and allies of those Tibareni, among whom Apollonius Rhodius found the Couvade; and, in the Koravans of Southern India, who have the same practice, to recognise the word Carib itself.

The facts stated in this article tend not only to demonstrate the unity of the human race, but also to indicate the place of its origin as well as to lower its claims to antiquity. Principal Dawson has asserted that the American Indian, as represented by the Iroquois Hochelaga, is nearly allied in form and feature to palæocosmic man, such as he appears in the Cromagnon and Neanderthal remains. Lake-dwellers were found by Herodotus in Thrace, and may yet be found in Borneo and South America. The age of stone still exists in many parts of the Western Continent, and thus sets at nought all attempts to found upon it an extravagant and anti-scriptural system of chronology, even if Dr. Schliemann had not discovered his treasury of Priam far below a palæolithic stratum. The whole question of man's antiquity lies at present with the geologist, and not till the chaos of conflicting opinions

among the devotees of his study has been reduced to a scientific cosmos can anything be formulated on the subject. As to the point at which man originated, and from which the race spread abroad till it gradually covered the whole earth, philology tells the same story as the Bible, and points unequivocally to the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates. With this all history agrees, and the researches which form the subject of this article, with subsequent studies in the same direction, must prove that there is no existing family of the human race which has not been at some period of its existence historical.

Finally, in regard to the American Indians, there is a matter of practical interest to all Christians who love their fellow-men to which I cannot but allude. It is the duty of American Churches to the despised outcasts from the Asiatic continent and islands of the sea, whom Divine Providence has led to their Western home. Missionaries leave the United States and Canada to labour in China, Japan, India, and many parts of Polynesia, while the souls of their Indian brethren of Japanese and Polynesian ancestry are perishing for lack of knowledge. And the defence offered is that the Indians are incorrigible savages, whose modes of life render the labour of the missionary difficult and comparatively unproductive. John Eliot did not think so, nor the Mayhews, nor David Brainerd, and happily there are still devoted teachers who follow in the footsteps of these apostles to the Red Men. The lowest Indian intellects have the capacity of the Polynesian, so that there can be nothing to object to on the score of intelligence. With the exception of the docile but unreliable Tinneh, they are, when not corrupted by their white neighbours, honourable in their dealings, generous in their hospitality, respectful to their teachers, and reverent in regard to religion. Many thousands in the United States have been civilised and Christianised, but in that country and in Canada many thousands still remain in heathen darkness. The American traders plunder them, and the American troops slaughter their defenceless old men and women, while the brave fellows, driven to desperation by a violation of sacred treaty-obligations repugnant to their principles of savage honour, sell their lives as dearly as they can. It is not so, happily, in Canada, where the savage has learned to respect the flag that is the symbol of a just and paternal

Indian policy. But the Church has not done its duty by them, largely for this reason, that it has failed to realise their position among the tribes of the human family, and has regarded the Indian as *sui generis*, both as regards race, language and manners, and capacity for receiving religious instruction. God "brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir;" and He also has led heathen Tungusi and Koriaks and Polynesians, with Christian Anglo-Saxons, into the broad North-American continent, that those who are nourished by the Bread of Life should with it feed the starving brethren at their doors.

JOHN CAMPBELL.

ART. V.—*Poetry of Edmund Spenser.*

EDMUND SPENSER is one of the greatest names in English literature. Charles Lamb called him "the poet's poet;" and Dr. Sewall has remarked that more poets have sprung from Spenser than from any of our other writers. Cowley, Browne, the two Fletchers, Butler, Prior, Pope, Thomson, Shenstone, Gray, Akenside, Beattie, Southey, Scott, Byron, Shelley, and Keats are all indebted to him. Milton acknowledged him as his original to Dryden; and Dryden says of himself that Virgil and Spenser were his masters.

He has written an immortal classic, and invented a stanza to which, as Worsley has remarked, no metre existing in the English language can bear comparison for the power of preserving the charms, while veiling the blemishes, of rhyme. "It is one of those peculiarly happy inventions which stand alone in the history of poetic literature." His works are characterised by an inexhaustible richness of fancy, great descriptive powers, melodious and stately versification, a wealth of allusion and citation rivalling that of Jeremy Taylor, and a tone of sentiment which embodies the loftiest morality united to all the grace, refinement, courtesy, and pious faith of chivalry. On the other hand, he yields too much to the fertility of his imagination, and is deficient in the concentration and development of his narra-

tives, and in dramatic energy. He can paint the deformity of Vice, but he cannot ridicule it. Wit, humour, and satire, except in one composition, are absent from his pages. The love of Beauty, moral and natural, which is his dominant characteristic, is perhaps incompatible with those qualities which derive their pungency from noting human weaknesses and follies, and ludicrous contrasts between what men prefigure and what they accomplish.

His chief work, the *Faery Queen*, is as it stands (according to Craik) equal in length to the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Æneid* combined, and contains about 35,000 lines. Courthope says it is three times the length of the *Iliad*, and half as long again as the *Orlando Furioso*. But we possess only one quarter of what was originally designed. The work was planned to consist of two divisions, each containing twelve books of twelve cantos each.

Spenser's intention was to write a work which "should fashion a gentleman or noble person," in, first, "virtuous and gentle discipline," *i.e.* in virtue, bravery, generosity, and courtesy; and, secondly, in political wisdom. The work was thus to embrace the highest excellence of Thought and Action, the art of governing well being then esteemed the noblest of all occupations. As the form of fiction in which he should set forth this idea, he chose what may be called the Gothic Romance, and constructed an intricate history, on the plan of the old romances, in which there is a unity of design, though not the classical unity of action. The poem has been very aptly likened to a cathedral as distinct from a Greek temple. In the latter, symmetry, proportion, and severe beauty reign supreme. In the former, luxuriant richness and bewildering variety overwhelm the beholder, and produce equal though different sentiments of admiration. As a Gothic pile includes buildings so elaborate in arrangement and so alien in construction that they seem rather extraneous adjuncts of the edifice than harmonising portions, so there are redundant episodes in the *Faery Queen* in which the poet has allowed his fancy to wander too far from the direct course of his narrative.

This is not all. Moral teaching is conveyed, not directly, but in the form of allegory. Virtues and vices are personified, and mental conflicts are painted as material struggles. Lastly,

in the circumstances of the fiction the poet has occasionally endeavoured to shadow forth the political events of his time.

We have therefore a threefold meaning in the poem—husk, fruit, and kernel. Outermost is a tale of chivalry; penetrate deeper, and historic events and persons are vaguely sketched; whilst at the core lies the primary meaning of the whole—the conflicts of the soul in the attainment of Goodness and Truth. This veiling of secret meanings, or “dark conceits,” was so much the fashion of the time, that Tasso, after having written his *Jerusalem* as a narrative poem, felt himself obliged to give it a spiritual meaning, and accordingly constructed an explanatory key, necessarily often far-fetched.

A very rough and inadequate exemplification of Spenser's primary design may be seen in Hawes's *Pastime of Pleasure*; but the history of Grandamour rather portrays the ordinary course of man's life. In his old age he falls in with Policy and Avarice, and accordingly deteriorates. The Spenserian idea is the Platonic one of the soul's advance towards Divine excellence.

In his prefatory letter to Raleigh he speaks of portraying the Aristotelian “twelve private virtues.” But those of which he has written differ from Aristotle's enumeration. Spenser's are Holiness, Temperance, Chastity, Friendship, Justice, Courtesy, and Constancy. In *Nennio, or a Treatise of True Nobility* (which contains among its prefatory sonnets one by Spenser), is sketched the same idea of true excellence as that presented by the poet, namely, piety conjoined with bravery, magnanimity, learning, and courtesy. The religious spirit of the *Faery Queen* breathes the fervour and purity of the Reformed faith. The doctrines of redemption through Christ, the fallibility of man, trust in God, and obedience to His decrees, appear in many noble passages. Romish doctrines are apprehended throughout, unless we except the well-known lines concerning the guardianship of angels. “Its moral tone is very captivating. A soul of nobleness, gentle and tender as the spirits of its own chivalry, modulates every cadence. . . .”

We are wont to apologise for the grossness of our favourite authors by saying that their age was to blame and not they. . . . Spenser needs no such extenuations. . . . He passes serenely abstracted and high.”—(Lowell.)

The first book forms a narrative complete in itself, and has more sustained action and development of plot. It has been called superior to the rest; but the other books have passages of equal beauty. In the fragment of Book VII. the poet takes a loftier flight, both in sentiment and word-painting, and rises to sublimity in his description of the Titaness and Nature.

We can in great measure trace the history of the composition of the poem. Aubrey, on the authority of Dryden, relates that at the College, on taking down the wainscot of Spenser's chamber, "they found an abundance of cards with stanzas of the *Fairy Queen* written on them." In the poet's letter of April 10, 1580, he writes to Harvey that "he wil in hande forthwith with my *Faery Queene* whyche I pray you hartily send me with al expedition, and your frendly Letters and long expected Judgment wythal, whyche let not be shorte, but in all points suche as you ordinarilye use and I extraordinarily desire." Harvey answers that he "had once again nigh forgotten your *Faerie Queene*, howbeit by good chaunce I have now sent hir home at the laste, neither in better nor worse case then I found hir." His "judgement" is that Spenser's Comedies are much superior and come nearer to Ariosto's than the *Faery Queen* does to the *Orlando*, which, he says, Spenser professed to emulate and hoped to overgo in one of his last letters. Dissuading him from continuance, he concludes, "fare you well till God or some good Aungell putte you into a better minde." It seems that Spenser laid it aside until his sojourn in Ireland, for the next extant notice of it is in the conversation in the cottage near Dublin, recorded by Bryskett, when Spenser excused himself from the desire of the company that he should discourse upon moral philosophy by saying he had "already undertaken a work tending to the same effect which is in heroicall verse under the title of a *Faerie Queene* to represent all the moral virtues, assigning to every virtue a knight to be the patron and defender of the same, in whose actions and feats of arms and chivalry the operations of that virtue whereof he is the protector are to be expressed, and the vices and unruly appetites that oppose themselves against the same to be beaten down and overcome." He adds, that he has already well entered into this work, and Bryskett mentions that "some parcels" of the *Faery Queen* had been seen by

some of the company. In Spenser's sonnet to Lord Grey he speaks of the poem as written "in savage soil." *Colin Clout*, 360, records that he read portions of it to the Queen. Finally, he mentions it in *Sonnets* 33, 80, and *Daph.* 225.

That it was written in comparative seclusion might almost be proved by internal evidence. The visions of pure imagination, the personification of abstractions, the minute allegorical elaborations, the philosophic myths of the Garden of Adonis and the Diapase (II. ix. 22), the idealised delineations of nature, all indicate retirement and meditation, and not the active bustle of a social life. Much, no doubt, is due to the poet's temperament and his Platonic studies, but we think it may be said that without Spenser's oft deplored banishment to Ireland, the *Faery Queen* would never have been written. Had he remained in England he would either have followed the manner of his contemporaries, or amidst the interruptions of social intercourse would have left only those minor poems, which, though beautiful and finished, show little of the powers displayed in his great work.

The word *Faery*, as might be abundantly illustrated from old writers, formerly had four meanings:—1. Illusion or enchantment. 2. Fairyland. 3. The denizens of fairyland collectively. 4. Individual beings. It is in the second sense that Spenser generally employs it.

His Queen of Faerie, for so we must understand his title, is not the diminutive being—the Queen Mab of Shakespeare, but the sovereign of the realm of spirit-world. She resembles the fairy queen of "Thomas the Rhymer" and "Young Tamlane." See I. ix. 13, and for the use of the word, *Son.* 33, v. xii. 43, vi. int. 1, II. xii. 32, II. ix. 4.

The *Faery Queen* is a faithful reflex of the prevailing thought and feeling of the age. We can trace in it all the enthusiasm of the revival of learning. At that time the study of the classics was thought essential not only to accomplished gentlemen, but to all "noble ladies." Spenser's allusions were therefore not pedantic. Patriotism and loyalty were ardent, quickened by the dread of foreign domination. Pageants and masques mingled with the serious business of life. New realms of thought and a new mental freedom were opened to scholars, whilst the unexplored lands of the West tempted

soldiers and statesmen. He has defended the form of his work. See his lines, "Let none then blame me," etc., v. int. 3, 4.

The only information we have concerning the allegory is from Ben Jonson's statements that Spenser had delivered the meaning in paper to Sir Walter Raleigh, and that "in that paper S. W. Roughly had of the Allegories of his Fayrie Queen by the Blating Beast the Puritans were understood, by the false Duessa, the queen of Scots." Sir W. Scott sees in Una not only an image of Truth in general, but of the Protestant Church. The historical allusions abound chiefly in Book v. *Burbon*, Henry IV. of France; *Pollente*, Charles IX.; *Guizor*, Guise; *Gergis*, Walsingham; *Trompart*, Simier; *Paridel*, Westmoreland; *Blandamour*, Northumberland; *Timias*, Raleigh; *Marinell*, Howard; *Arthegall*, Lord Grey; *Calidore*, Sidney; *Belge*, the Netherlands; *Satyrane*, Sir John Perrot; *the Seneschal*, Alva; *Geronyeo*, Spain; *Arthur*, Leicester; *Gloriana*, Elizabeth as queen, and *Belphæbe* as woman.

Spenser's most recondite allegories are the Castle of Alma and Garden of Adonis. In the first the seven ages of II. ix. 12, are the seven ages of the world; the ten steps, St. 44, the stages of life, which change every seven years; the twelve troops, the seven deadly sins and five vices. The famous Diapase, II. ix. 22, was explained in a letter written by Sir Kenelm Digby (printed 1644). The circle is the soul, the triangle the body, the quadrate the four humours (choler, blood, phlegm, melancholy); the Seven, the seven planets controlling the soul; and the Nine, the nine hierarchies of angels. Upton, in a copious note, differs so far as to understand by the quadrate the sacred quaternion, which comprehended all number, the elements, the virtues, and affections of man, and by the Nine, the ninth orb of the astrologers, *summus ipse Deus*. Joseph Hunter, F.S.A., who devoted much attention to this curious stanza, thought Upton's explanation better than Digby's, but was of opinion that Spenser indicated not soul and body, but the outward form of man. Albert Dürer had a notion that man was a geometrical figure, and the conceit is mentioned by Bacon (Hunterian MSS. Brit. Mus.). [Circle, quadrate, triangle.—*Hunter's Figure*.] The Garden of Adonis is the Universe, filled with the elements of all things and souls

in their pre-existent state. Upton has devoted himself chiefly to the allegorical interpretation of the *Faery Queen*, but he sometimes refines too far.

Some points of resemblance exist between a few of the incidents of the *Pilgrim's Progress* and Spenser's poem. Christian, in his journey, arrives at the House Beautiful, where he is entertained by Piety, Prudence, and Charity, three virgins. The next day they conduct him to the study (II. x. 59), where he is shown records of great antiquity. On the third day they show him from the housetop the Delectable Mountains, a pleasant country from which could be seen the Celestial City. The Redcross Knight is brought to the House of Holiness, belonging to Dame Coelia, mother of Fidelia, Speranza, and Charissa. They take him to the cell of the hermit Contemplation, who leads him to a pleasant mount, from which he sees in the distance the New Jerusalem. Bunyan has his Giant Despair, with the courtyard strewn with the bones of his victims, advising the pilgrims to end their days by knife, halter, or poison. Spenser in like manner has his Cave of Despair. The ideas of Alma's Castle with its five bulwarks, Mansoul with its five gates and the besieging armies, are also the same. But it is very improbable that Bunyan borrowed from Spenser; the Scriptures were doubtless the common source from which they drew.

Spenser's ancient authors are Virgil, Homer, Ovid, Hesiod, Horace, Statius, Claudian, Lucan, Phædrus, Apollonius Rhodius, Propertius, Juvenal, Plato, Aristotle, Herodotus, Seneca, Cicero, and Plutarch. His mythology seems taken from *Natalis Comes*. His classical allusions are always spontaneous and unconstrained, and he is familiar with the whole range of mythological fiction. It has been said that almost every simile in the *Faery Queen* is borrowed either from Virgil or Homer. The ideas of his House of Morpheus, his Descent into Hades, his Dream-sprites, his Acrasia, his Mermaids, are from Homer and Virgil, his Gryll and Talus from Plutarch, part of his legend of Britomart is borrowed from Virgil's Ceiris, and his Agape from Virgil's Feronia. His nymphs and fountains, fauns and satyrs, are suggested by Ovid, his Temple of Isis by Herodotus. But he has altered, enlarged, and described at his own pleasure, as when he speaks

of the silver stool in Proserpine's garden, the ghosts immersed in Cocytus, the centaurs and lapithæ fighting at the wedding of Theseus, and makes Tryphon a leech. He refers rather than borrows, and tells the story in his own manner. With regard to thoughts, phrases, and images, Jortin, Warton, and Upton have pointed out many drawn from the authors we have named. But "Christopher North" has wittily ridiculed the manner in which they have extended their investigations to the minutest particulars, and have instanced as borrowed many thoughts common to all poets.

His verse mingles curiously the spirit of the classics with the legends of chivalry and the Christian faith, as in his Visit of the Fay to the Fatal Sisters, Guyon in the Garden of Proserpine, Pilate with Tantalus in Hades, Phœdria quoting from the Sermon on the Mount, December rejoicing in his Saviour's birth, yet riding on Jupiter's goat and appearing in the assembly of the gods. The same intermingling may be seen abundantly in Jeremy Taylor, and to some extent in Bacon. He is seldom rigidly accurate. He has added to the deities of Neptune's court; he gives two different versions of the story of Hippolytus, of the descent of the Graces, and of the Muses. He confuses names, places, and histories, *e.g.* he attributes the Siren's contest to the Mermaids, he represents Socrates, instead of Theramenes, as drinking to Critias in the poisoned cup, he has Bisaltis for Theophane the daughter of Bisaltus, Debora for Jael, Lethe for Stygian, Citheron for Cythera, Stremona for Amydone; he confuses Chios and Coos; he speaks of Sthenobœa hanging herself, of the golden fruit of Acontius, of the rivers Xanthus and Scamander, when they are the same, of the Olympic games being held on Mount Olympus, of Mausolus erecting a monument, etc. Much of this is probably due to his want of books in Ireland; he may often have trusted to his memory, as he seems to have done in the "View." Some faults evidently arise from press mistakes, as Benone for Cœnone, and III. xi. 43 St., where a transposition would rectify the error. The commentators are unable to explain his "tree" (II. v. 31), his "mortal Samnitis," "brook Plexippus," "Egyptian Phao," and "Bocchus mindful of his old offence."

There is a certain archaic beauty diffused through the *Faery Queen*, often felicitously expressed in single lines. See II. ix.

56, 8; I. v. 22, 6; v. int. 8, 1; I. iii. 21, 5. He has frequently a Homeric simplicity and turn of thought, as in IV. ii. 51, 8, 9, and v. iv. 49. His description of Life and Death is Pagan in sentiment, VII. vii. 46. His Garden of Adonis, Hymns of Love and Beauty, and Speech of Despair, show Platonic studies. Bryskett mentions that Spenser "was not only perfect in the Greek tongue, but also very well read in philosophy, both moral and natural," and that he encouraged Bryskett to read Greek, and offered him his help to make him understand it.

From the old romances he has borrowed the plan of the twelve several adventures—the miraculous well, the monsters and giants, the dwarf's horn, the bridge, the tourneys, and the Blatant Beast. From Chaucer he quotes twice or thrice, and occasionally borrows a sentiment. His *Legend of Friendship* is not a conclusion of the *Squire's Tale*, but is evidently founded on Chaucer's reference to a combat of "two" brethren for Canace. Lydgate and Chaucer both seem to have drawn from an old tale now lost. His English history is from Geoffrey of Monmouth. He seems to have studied Olaus Magnus, Bohemus, and Gesner's Natural History. He alludes to Boccacio's tale of *Titus* and *Gesippus*. The adventures of his Britomart are closely copied from Ariosto's Bradamante, but he has added finer touches to the character of his heroine. His tales II. iv. 17, and III. vii. 53, are from the *Orlando Furioso*, and he has several passages and apostrophes translated from Ariosto and Berni. His Bower of Bliss is drawn almost entirely from Tasso; he has translated in some places and enlarged in others. His Speech of Melibœus is taken also from the *Jerusalem*. From Dante he has perhaps borrowed the idea of Fradubio, Error, and The House of Pain, and certainly the walk of Ignaro and the appearance of Forese (I. viii. 41).

He was evidently well read in the Scriptures. About ninety-one references have been pointed out in his works, and more might be discovered.

Milton's obligations to Spenser are numerous. His descriptions of the brightness of God's throne, of Satan's shield like the full moon, of sin, of the arch-fiend's massive form and huge strides, of the combat of Michael and Satan, of the artillery of hell, of the infernal artificers, of Satan in the form of a cherub, of the plain of Paradise, of its grapes and blossoms, of the moon

appearing to a traveller, of Sleep, of Beauty enhancing a fair scene, of half-darkness, of the nun in *Il Penseroso*, are drawn from Spenser, and many of his epithets are taken from the same source. "Impurpled with celestial roses smiled," "angelic squadrons bright," "broad and beaten way," "equipage of war," "proud crest," "high disdain," "unsunned heaps of miser's treasure," "world of waters," may be instanced, and others might be specified without noting those agreements which result from the use of epithets common to poets at the time. Milton has

"Then farewell, Hope, and with Hope, farewell, Fear,"

Spenser,

"Why fearest thou, that canst not hope for thing?"

Milton, "Virtue could see," etc. (*Comus*), Spenser, "Virtue gives herself light," etc. (I. i. 13); Milton, "Plain fishermen, no greater men them call," Spenser, "A shepherd's boy, no better do him call."

Dr. Grosart has ably discussed the relations of Spenser and the Fletchers. Although Giles Fletcher has borrowed two lines from Spenser's *Despair* in his description, and used his "oaten reed" and "trumpet" of *Introd. Faery Queen*, B. I., and a few more touches, yet his allegories are cast in another mould, and he paints in a different style. The poems of the Fletchers possess many beauties, and though showing Spenser's influence, can, no more than *Paradise Lost*, be called imitations.

Gray habitually read Spenser when he wished to frame his mind to composition. He has borrowed "the woodman's sturdy stroke," "tenor of his way," and the description of an eagle in *Progress of Poesy*. Coleridge has appropriated the line "But gently took that ungently came," and Byron's "She walks the waters like a thing of life" is Spenser's "Behold a huge great vessel," etc., in *Colin Clout*, 212. Thomson's *Castle of Indolence* is a well-known imitation. Some of its descriptive passages are not without beauty, but the poem has no real resemblance to its model. The archaic words are in most cases artificially introduced; there is a straining after an appearance of antiquity which contrasts harshly with the many eighteenth-century lines which are imbedded in the Spenserian stanza.

Spenser has not, like Chaucer, archaic grammatical inflexions, but only, (1) obsolete words, (2) words now used only in Scotland and the north of England, (3) Latinisms, (4) words borrowed from the French and Italian. Under the second head may be instanced greet, wite, lear, dool, sicker, ken, sib, fyle, skaith, herd, quean, gate, etc. Under the third such forms as nephews (grandchildren), expyre (send forth), table (picture), past (suffered), implies (folded), intended (stretched out), crime (reproach), contrive (wear out), sacred soil, sacred hunger (accursed), imply (wrap up), revolt (roll back), failed (cheated), insolence (fury), resolved (dissolved), defend (repel), invented (found), principle (beginning), succeed (approach), pretend (hold out), discourse (wandering). The sense of many passages seems obscure unless these meanings are remembered. Of words borrowed from the French about a hundred have been noted, from the Italian seventeen. A few words are the poet's own coinage, *e.g.* rulesse (lawless), cowardree, mercified (pitied), divinde (deified), griefful, fortunize.

He occasionally plays with words, as in his line, "like *dared lark* not *daring* up to *look*," "luckless lucky maid," and *Faery Queen* I. xi. 2, *Ruins of Time*, St. 37, line 7, and his pun on "fruit and fruitless," borrowed by Milton. In a "conceit" of this kind is doubtless to be found the true reading of the disputed passage, VII. viii. 2. It is consistent if we read—

"But thenceforth all shall *rest* eternally
With Him that is the God of *Sabbath* hight (Mark ii. 28),
O that *great Sabaoth* God, grant me that *Sabbath's* sight."

Otherwise we must infer that Spenser thought Sabaoth identical with Sabbath in meaning. Professor Hales would ingeniously read the Alexandrine optatively—

"O (may) that great Sabaoth God grant me that Sabaoth's sight,"

and suggests that "Sabaoth's sight" may be an allusion to the ancient interpretation of the word *Jerusalem*, *i.e.* visio pacis.

His versification is perhaps his greatest achievement.

The Spenserian stanza is a strophe of eight decasyllabic rhymes and an Alexandrine, and has a threefold rhyme: the 1st and 3d lines form one, the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 7th a second, and the 6th, 8th, and 9th a third.

"Boccacio, Ariosto, Tasso, and Chaucer had used the ottava rima, though Chaucer's is not strictly so. Tasso and Ariosto have in their rima only three similar endings alternately rhyming, the two last forming a distinct line. Spenser adds an Alexandrine as a 9th line, and repeats the second line four times, and the third thrice." "The nine-line stanza was his own invention. It is a kind of combination of the Italian ottava rima with the 'royal stanza' so frequently used by Chaucer. As far as the fifth line the Spenserian stanza resembles the latter, and as the fifth is the most important of the nine from the accentuation of feeling produced by the immediate repetition of rhyme, it is no doubt to this source we must trace a harmony which, after Milton's blank verse, is the most complex in our language. Spenser, however, gave a great development to the 'royal stanza,' by increasing the number of lines from seven to nine, and by carrying on the continuance of the second and fourth into the fifth and seventh. It is possible to describe the stanza as consisting of two waves, the second of which joins the first at the fifth line, while the Alexandrine closes the movement with the swiftness of the break and the prolonged echo on the shore. The type, however, admits all kind of variations, and as a matter of fact, in the most finished descriptive passages, the fifth line is generally employed to emphasise the beat of the rhyme in the fourth. Nothing testifies to the great qualities of Spenser more than this, that though he was the first to employ the stanza, yet, taken all in all, he has undeniably made a finer use of it any of his successors."—(COURTHOPE.)

He does not scruple to re-spell or to abbreviate words (*e.g.* *kaies*, *keys*, *keight*, *caught*, *husband's toyle*, for *husbandman*) when it suits his purpose, and his ellipses are numerous. There are only three rugged lines in the *Faery Queen*, III. i. 14, 9, v. ii. 30, 9, III. iv. 9, 4; four examples of a hemistich, II. iii. 26, II. viii. 55, III. iv. 39, III. ix. 37; and three needless Alexandrines, III. xii. 41, IV. xii. 34, II. iv. 41. His metrical skill is shown in the echoing song, *S. C.* viii., in his "corresponding verse," I. xi. 28, and his triptych stanzas, III. xii. 24, IV. ii. 42. He employs reduplication with happy effect, I. ii. 23, IV. ii. 41, IV. x. 51, IV. xii. 11.

He makes great use of alliteration, but with such ease that the reader's attention is never drawn to it. Perhaps his finest metrical stanza is, "Then woe and woe and everlasting woe," III. iii. 42. Courthope has pointed out the pathos of the pauses in the fourth and fifth lines, suggestive of suppressed sobs. Hazlitt remarks that "we are perhaps indebted to the very necessity (caused by the complexity of the stanza) of finding out new forms of expression, and to the occasional faults to which it led, for a poetical language rich, varied, and

magnificent beyond all former and almost beyond all later example." Lowell says the secret of Spenser's superiority in the stanza lies in his "making his verses by ear instead of on the finger-tips, and in valuing the stave more than any of the single verses that compose it." Worsley shows that "there are two good types of the Spenserian Alexandrine, the one,

‘Fierce wars and faithful loves shall moralize my song,’

and the other,

‘Wrapt in eternal silence, far from enemies.’

Byron has invariably rejected the latter in *Childe Harold*, notwithstanding its beauty. The variety in the *Faery Queen* affords sensible relief to the ear. . . . It effects all that can be done to combine the rolling amplitude of periods with the melody of individual lines." Hazlitt says, "His versification is at once the most smooth and the most sounding in the language. It is a labyrinth of sweet sounds, that would clog by their very sweetness but that the ear is constantly relieved and enchanted by their continued variety of modulation."

His works are little read, because they lack many elements of popular interest. The realism of Chaucer and Shakespeare is entirely deficient in Spenser. He is subjective, and impresses the tone of his own mind on all the pictures of his fancy. His poem has been well described as "vision after vision unrolled to the sound of endlessly varying music." Leigh Hunt points out that whoever looks for a story in Spenser will be disappointed, that his Trompart and Braggadochio (comic characters) are failures, and that the reason why men of business and the world do not like him is because he is so far removed from the ordinary cares and haunts of the world. Courthope ascribes his unpopularity to his deficiencies in the qualities requisite for the treatment of so long a story, the absence of that fervent belief which gives unity to allegory, and of that delight in incident which sustains the interest through a great number of adventures. Campbell attributes it to his want of consolidating power. These defects must be admitted, and it is to be feared that they render the *Faery Queen* a sealed book

to the majority of readers. They are only to be counter-balanced by the unrivalled music of Spenser's verse, the beauty of his pictures, and the spirituality of his thoughts. Few poets have equalled the Descent to Avernus, the Dance on Mount Acidale, the Midnight Masque, the Cave of Mammon, the Idle Lake, and the Palace of Pride. The character of Una has long since taken place as one of the finest creations of literature; and many noble sentiments are scattered through his works. The lines in which he paints the fervent piety and tender farewell of a dying saint are almost unsurpassed.¹ Wesley recommends his poems as one of the books to be studied in preparing for the ministry, and Southey has well spoken of him as

“ Sweet Spenser, sweetest bard, and not more sweet
Than pure, and not more pure than wise ;
High priest of all the Muses' mysteries.”

M. H. TOWRY.

ART. VI.—*Righteousness of Life ; being a Sequel to “ The Rule of Righteousness.”*

IN a former paper² Morality was affirmed to be an Ultimate Truth, and its nature Absolute and Eternal. It was, moreover, claimed for the Gospel that it was, before all things, a Righteousness-producing agency; its object being to bring men more and more into conformity with the Absolute Rule and Standard of Righteousness: that if it did not do that for them, it did nothing, and was no Gospel at all. And this because mere Happiness does not occupy the position in the Christian economy which it does in the Utilitarian philosophy. It is not the end, but, as it were, the accident of the life of Righteousness; or, to speak more accurately, it is a *correlation of growth*, in the nature of things connected with Goodness, but

¹ *Daphnida*.

² “The Rule of Righteousness,” *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, October 1879.

dependent upon it for existence, and therefore subordinate to it in intrinsic worth.

But it might be stated as an objection that the doctrine of Absolute Morality seems to have been most firmly held outside the pale of what is best known as "Evangelical" Christianity, or, in other words, that the value and importance attached to this doctrine appears to have borne no proportion to the value and importance attached to the Gospel records themselves. At the present day, at all events, it is not to the Evangelical school that we should turn did we wish to find the plainest statements on the foundation of morals. How, then, it may be asked, can we substantiate our claim for the Gospel that it is *par excellence* the moral "lifting power," or, as St. Paul has it, "the Power of GOD unto Salvation"?

It has not, however, been contended that the mission of the Gospel was the education of the human race in the first principles of moral science. Though itself a development from these principles, it is as a practical agent that its chief value consists. The Gospel is the lever rather than the primer: force, rather than dynamics: carpentry (to refer to the symbolism of a previous article) rather than geometry. CHRIST was not needed to teach us the rudiments of ethics. They were known to scientific thinkers before the Advent. What was needed was the reduction of theory to practice; its application to the art of virtuous living. And as in other departments of applied science, it is in the laboratory and the workshop that further discoveries are made, and that laws which were once regarded as of limited applicability are found to be capable of extended development, and ever farther reaching significance. Mere theory is never prolific of results. If the two must be separated, practical experiment, sustained by sufficient motive power, will always produce more satisfactory results than any amount of theory suspended in the air. And thus, if the two must be separated, the Gospel alone, rather than a correct theory of morals alone, is the strongest moral agent. Not that by any means the Gospel ignores theory; on the contrary, it implies an acquaintance with it throughout, for it is addressed (in that it is addressed to moral agents) to those who, whether intellectually conscious of the form of their knowledge or otherwise, are yet in-

instinctively aware of the existence of the great moral distinctions which constitute the basis of ethical science. And for all practical purposes this is enough.

But it may be argued—Has the event proved it to be enough? Have the lives of those who accept the religion of the New Testament afforded sufficient evidence of the supernaturally raising moral power the Gospel professes to exert? We maintain that they have, so far as they have been lived within the sphere of its operations. Professing Christians outside that sphere occupy the position of simple theorists.

And what is the order of things within which the Gospel becomes a “lifting power”? It is personal connection with the Source of all Virtue—GOD—by the new and living way inaugurated for us in CHRIST. Available spiritual power can be no more obtained without this connection than available electric force where there is break of contact with the battery. The connection may be feeble, or it may be strong, but where there is none at all there is no extraneous power to be made use of. The amount of spiritual force received will depend upon conditions which every true Christian may learn by experience. It was well said by Dr. Paterson, a few years since, at one of the Mildmay Park Conferences :—

“They say in mechanics that forces work along the line of least resistance; certainly it is so in the kingdom of grace. GOD uses most those who are most ready to be used; those who oppose the least resistance of self-will and perversity to the action of His mighty power. . . . In these days of marvellous scientific attainments our greatest triumphs are gained by observing and submitting to the laws of nature. We observe the power of steam, we prepare everything to allow that power to work unhindered, to move tremendous weights at extraordinary speed, to propel no end of machinery with unfailing force. We adapt our arrangements so as to secure its aid, and that with the least possible amount of friction and impediment. We gain our ends by falling in with the laws of nature. So we turn to account the sunbeam and the electric current. These things exist, and act according to certain laws; we may neglect them, we may oppose them, but we are in the road to glorious triumphs of mind over matter when we *submit* to them and use them. Oh, what wonderful things could not the Church do if she only *lay along the line* of GOD's *workings*, if she allowed the mighty current to flow through her on its wondrous errands of power! When we cease to resist, and yield ourselves to the will of GOD, we become

good conductors. The stream of Divine energy can make us its channel. But we must be always ready to allow God to work in us and by us, to will and to do of His own good pleasure."

But to make practical use of this power we must exert ourselves. To contract right habits discipline is needed, and a regular course of systematic training. It is not very long since teaching on the subject of "Holiness" was pressed on the attention of Evangelicals, which, under the new names of "Consecration" and the "Higher Christian life," was, in fact, with unimportant variations, a revival of the mysticism of Madame Guyon, which, in the seventeenth century, threw the Gallican Church into commotion, as well as of the "entire sanctification" of John Wesley. In spite of the errors mixed up with this teaching, it was matter of thankfulness that the question had been considered at all, and that so many people were no longer satisfied with not being holy. To many the old truth that the chief instrument in the attainment of holiness is faith, came with a new power, and was to their souls the very word of deliverance they needed. But probably every person who received real blessing from this movement has been one who from his youth upwards has desired to do right, so far as he knew how. To no others, probably, will these doctrines prove anything but a snare, because not morally adapted to their needs.

It is true, indeed, that it is God's Will that we should be holy, and that therefore we have Him altogether with us in our desire after Holiness. It is true that He is as "able to keep us from falling" as to "save our souls from death" (see Ps. lvi. 13). But faith must have a promise on which to rest, and there is none that God will give us a deliverance once for all from the power of sin within us independent of any effort of our own. And, after all, our efforts can only be said to be our own by our participation of the "Divine Nature" whence all Goodness flows. The way to attain to holiness is to *exercise* this divinely-implanted strength in the diligent use of every means, for there is no promise to those who despise them. Paul did not "keep under his body, and bring it into subjection" by one act of "consecration," but by discipline and abstinence, used with full faith in God's promises. He "would

not be brought under the power of any," even harmless, indulgence. He would be master of his body, not its slave. Those who fancy that such a conquest as this is wrought in a moment will find themselves terribly mistaken. "Old habits refuse to be mastered by a few enthusiastic sensations."¹ GOD *has* "given us, according to His Divine Power, all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him that hath called us to glory and virtue," nevertheless the life of godliness is one requiring "all diligence" to enable us to add to our faith the virtues which make up the fully-formed Christian character.

And here, with regard to the systematic training of our own and of our children's characters, many of the suggestions of High Church Christians are very valuable,² though perhaps for their full fructification they need to be grounded on Evangelical doctrine, and that again to be supported by the basis of common morals.

Indeed, owing to the severance of "religious" teaching from this foundation, a mist now hangs about the very term "holiness" which is confusing; and it requires to be translated into its moral equivalent, Goodness, before it can convey a very definite meaning to a simple and sincere mind seeking to know truth and practise righteousness.

Is there, then, no real distinction between Goodness and Holiness? or between Morality and Spirituality? Here, doubtless, we arrive at a crucial point. It has been observed with profound truth,³ that "the spiritual man is only the moral man at a higher level." He is one whose recognition of the Law of Right has led to an equally due regard to the claims of God and man—worshipping⁴ the Worthiest, and paying most honour where it is most due. To fall short of this is, and must be, imperfect morality. That is all. There is nothing *better* than Goodness. There is no esoteric, hazy, mystic Something about true Holiness, raising it above plain Righteousness. It exalts GOD, and puts His Glory into prominence simply because

¹ Rev. F. W. Robertson.

² As, for instance, a large number of those contained in *Instructions in the Devotional Life*, by the Rev. G. H. Wilkinson; *Thoughts on Personal Religion*, and *Pursuit of Holiness*, by Dean Goulburn, etc.

³ By Dora Greenwell.

⁴ As the construction of the word *worship* implies.

the Supreme Good He alone can be the Grand Object deserving universal homage. And although His Glory can never be dissociated from the good of men, yet to this all the events of His Providence must ultimately tend, and that He should be glorified must be His central design, not from the unworthy motives Christians are sometimes accused of imputing to Him—the very thought of which is blasphemy,—but because it is not *right* that that should be made a secondary, which is a primary, consideration. In admitting that “He is Worthy” of all Glory and Honour, we necessarily admit that He can claim no less.¹ Surely we may throw back the charge of “anthropomorphism” upon any Theists who imagine that it would be GOD-like for the Almighty, in a spirit of weak self-depreciation, to concede His claims, and although the absolutely Just, to countenance the miscarriage of Justice by permitting honour to be first paid where it was not due. The only intelligible distinction between such moral goodness as is, and such as is not the product of the supernatural element we call “grace,” appears to lie in the heart-felt acknowledgment of this claim. There is a difference, therefore, not only in degree, but in kind, between the goodness of the Christian and the non-Christian. Grace has raised the morality which was only concerned about the rights of man to that “higher level” which includes and bows before the superior claims of GOD—worshipping the Worthiest through His Revealer—CHRIST. It is to this full-embodied morality that we may fairly give the name of spirituality, because it is the outcome of direct contact (through the operation of the HOLY GHOST) with the Father of our spirits, the conditions which have been revealed as necessary to such result having been fulfilled, but it still remains Morality, and either more nor less.

But because this more complete Morality—let us call it holiness—is the higher Good, should we refuse to recognise as good the morality which has sometimes shone so brightly in the lower sphere? GOD forbid. Of what higher order of excellence this may have been the earnest in those who have veiled themselves of the light accorded is unrevealed, but

¹ As is exemplified in the construction of the order of the Decalogue, and the clauses of the Lord's Prayer, as well as in the *Gloria in Excelsis Deo*, Luke ii. 14.

right cannot but be right whoever does it, and of all righteousness the Source is GOD.

It is only when the Spiritual order is seen to be but perfection of the Moral order that we are able mentally to reduce to any sort of method the moral and intellectual confusion that prevails. It is true that no view of the subject can entirely remove our perplexities, but at least we need to increase them by avoidable confusions of thought. In the midst of the apparent gradations of everything within and around us—gradations of responsibility, of faith, of love, of goodness—any moral classification seems sometimes to be wellnigh impossible. But, after all, that does but point to the necessity of a Righteous Judge, whose Judgments must be “according to truth,” and to Whom all secrets, of nature and of grace, are naked and open. “He knoweth what is in the darkness, the light dwelleth with Him,” whilst for us to take His place upon the judgment-seat is the very thing He Himself cautioned us against. The Day shall declare every man the work of what sort it is.

It is therefore when considering Christianity in the aggregate that we are able to form the truest estimate of the efficacy of the Gospel as a scheme for the production of Righteousness, and, so considered, there can be no question of its triumph or success as compared with every other moral system that has ever stood on its trial. That CHRIST immeasurably raised the moral standard it seems almost absurd to point out, and all of us know quite well what sort of picture is conjured up even in the minds of the indifferent and ungodly, by such expressions as have become a commonplace—“a Christian character,” “a Christian spirit.” If this ideal were carried out, there would not be much left to be desired. And the Gospel should have presented such an ideal is sufficient to stamp it as of Divine origin.

It is rather when contrasting this ideal Christian with our own imperfect selves that we meet with disappointment. The practical success of the Gospel in the concrete too often is a failure. But whilst taking into account the power of the devil, and of the “sin that dwelleth in us,” the chief cause

¹ Even at this present time, and putting out of consideration the Christian life is but a prelude to an eternal sinlessness.

his failure may perhaps be traced to the vitiated theoretical morality on which it has been attempted to graft it. The Gospel, as God gave it, is specially adapted to fit a true theory of morals, but no other. It has no real correspondence with mere utilitarianism, and on such a basis, therefore, it can never flourish. It is addressed only to the conscience and the moral sense of mankind. In the measure in which it is dissociated from these, it fails in its object, though it is inaccurate to say "it" fails, for, separated altogether from its correlative, it is no longer the Gospel at all.

Now it is one of the anomalies of the present day, that the antecedent principles on which the Gospel should be based, cast off (speaking generally) by Evangelical Christians, have been seized by others who perhaps hardly consider themselves Christians at all, but whose theoretical morality is therefore of considerably higher character than that of the Christians whose religion has thus lost its support. As an instance of this, let us contrast the ideal heaven of the well-known hymn, where souls sit," as Mr. Baldwin Brown has not unhappily expressed it, "mooning on a mount," with that of Mr. Morris, and say candidly which is the nobler of the two :—

" There, on a flowery mount,
Our weary souls shall sit,
And with transporting joys recount
The labours of our feet."

" Nor sang he of unfading bowers,
Where they a tearless, painless age fulfil ;
In fields Elysian spending blissful hours,
Remote from every ill ;
But of pure goodness found in temperance high,
In duty owned and revered with awe,
Of man's true freedom, that may only lie
In servitude to law."

And this acknowledgment of the paramount claim of duty is an element of modern thought which is rapidly gaining ground. These very lines of Mr. Morris' are an example of this. It is significant that they make their appearance for the first time in the last edition of his *Life and Death of Jason*. In the second edition (revised, 1868) Orpheus sings a very

different song. There, his line of argument with the Argonauts is no advance whatever on the morality of the Sirens, whom he is trying to sing down. They promise sensual enjoyment and repose; he still more *piquant* sensual enjoyment + applause and fame. Orpheus has been converted into a moral philosopher since this last wave of modern theory has overtaken Mr. Morris.

With even such thinkers as Professors Tyndall, Huxley, and Clifford, as George Eliot and the Positivists, morality is now the grand theme. And it is interesting to observe in their case the struggling effort of the awakened conscience to make a channel for itself through the heavy bank of materialistic mud with which they have choked its way; the latter even inventing a "Religion of Humanity," as a vent for their higher instincts. And although with all of them no system of morals can be anything but an absurdity, yet on many points of isolated morality they have a clearer view of right than many Christians. The brief and remarkable career of Professor Clifford has supplied pathetic evidence of this, and not to speak of the personal examples of the living, we may at least say that their public utterances afford maxims of practical morality (chiefly intellectual), which, if they were only acted upon by Christians, would produce a glorious revolution in the Church.

But intellectual morality has not been a characteristic virtue of theologians. Not only is a controversial atmosphere unfavourable to its development, but a sense of the importance of subjects regarded as involving their own eternal destiny is so overwhelming as to render all suspense of judgment intolerable. Thus the craving for certainty, for sharply defined doctrine, for infallible authority, has, in a greater or less degree overpowered the love of truth for its own sake, and discouraged the cultivation of such virtues as candour, fairness, impartiality, fearlessness of inquiry, and absolute integrity when dealing with the opinions of opponents, or with the Bible. It by no means follows that infidels are patterns of these virtues, or follow out their own maxims, but latterly they have more than theologians come under the influences of science. For the most part the leaders of free thought in this country have been eminent as scientists, and their researches have engendered in

not only a just appreciation of the value of such facts as come under the scope of their investigations, but also a ciation, if not a denial, of the existence of other classes of which have not been brought within their cognisance. as been observed by Mr. S. T. Yamasaki, in an admirable ss delivered at the Kioto Training School, Japan, of a institution he is teacher of Science :—

e tendency of modern education is to produce in every department of dge *specialists*,—men, one set of whose faculties is highly and ex-ly cultivated, to the disparagement and utter neglect of others—men re strong in one point, but weak in others ; men who are perfectly orthy¹ in matters pertaining to their own special department, but e apt to despise, misunderstand, and misrepresent things belonging r departments. Such has been the case with many Christian theo-, and with most of the scientific men. Christians ignored and de-science, and scientists ignored and despised Christianity. Christians d upon applying their standards and their way of thinking to science, ientists in turn insisted upon seeing God with their eye, hearing ith their ear, and measuring spiritual things by material instruments.”

d although the improvement on the side of theologians ese respects is immense, yet there is still much which party might with advantage learn from the other ; and it rand thing to have attained, as have the modern rational-o an admiration, though it may not yet be much more, ellectual morality in the abstract. At present they are re, partly from the rankling recollection of past injustice gnorant prejudice on the part of religious teachers, and from the restlessness of their own consciences, to be le of real fairness to theologians. We see this in Mr. . Lecky's generally admirable work on *European Morals*. instructive to contrast his indignant denunciation of -doing, when stated in his own terms, with the light and ray in which he treats the theological conception of sin. is a singularly weak point in such a powerful book. s his animosity against theologians, that he would palliate -doing when called “sin,” simply because the word has ological flavour about it, and for no better reason at all apparent. He argues that if indeed “sin” were the real hristian divines conceive it to be, nothing ought ever to dertaken which would increase the amount of it ; and

¹ “ Perfectly trustworthy ” is too strong an expression.

then he foolishly instances war, saying that on the theological hypothesis no reasons could be strong enough to justify a government in engaging in any war at all, as an immense increase of sin cannot fail to be its accompaniment. But this quiet assumption that more wickedness invariably results from war than peace is groundless. It is probable that the moral evil arising from the luxury and extravagance associated with long periods of prosperity is by far the greater evil of the two, whilst there can be no question that war, horrible as of course it is, gives occasion for the exercise of virtues which could hardly be called out at any other time. But Mr. Lecky, assuming the reverse, yet appears to think that war is not only justifiable, but so evidently justifiable as to supply a *reductio ad absurdum* against the heinousness of sin. This sort of reasoning is not only puerile, but in the present case, if it means anything, it positively destroys the whole moral force of the book. Only it probably means nothing more than a little ebullition of temper on the part of the writer.

But if this practical disregard of sin is in opposition to the highest morality, still more so is the doctrinal obliviousness of its guilt evinced by those who deny the necessity of Atonement. The definitions of the orthodox may have often been too strict, too purely logical in their form, and too regardless of obvious flaws and failures in their construction. They have not always been consistent with moral facts, and they have frequently lowered the conception of Atonement to that of a contrivance. But notwithstanding all this, and notwithstanding also the apparent impossibility (in our present state of knowledge, and whilst the data are not all accessible) of any logical formula of the doctrine being intellectually satisfactory, we may yet feel morally convinced of the necessity of some adequate recognition of the guilt of "sins that are past," and which, if sin has any reality, cannot be quietly ignored by Supreme Justice. Wrong has been done, and we cannot undo it. Even if the future should be sinless, the past is irrevocable, and our consciences tell us, as well as Revelation, that GOD is not likely to leave the matter so, and like a careless and easy-going parent, say, Never mind! Neither can we believe, without doing some violence to our sense of Right, that the punishment we meet here, or may have to endure hereafter in

the way of loss, can be in any sense the *equivalent* which our moral instincts tell us must be found if sinners are to be justified, and past sin be clean washed out. The only conceivable method of righting the wrong past is that partially revealed in the Sacrifice of CHRIST. To attempt to understand it baffles our intellect, but to dispense with it confounds our moral sense. Those who refuse to shut their eyes to the reality of iniquity, and who in faithful dependence upon GOD accept the fact of the Death of His SON as His response to a crying need of the human conscience, are acting as the truest moralists.

So also are those theologians who see in the much abused tenet of "Imputed Righteousness" a deep moral truth. They may indeed hesitate to speak of such Imputation as an end in itself, but as a preliminary to the Impartation of Righteousness they are unable to dispense with it. They feel, and cannot but feel, that they are in themselves too defiled by transgression to be able to enter into the Presence of the All-Pure, either here or hereafter, without such an identification with their Head as practically amounts to an imputation of His merits. GOD "begins His work of mercy and of grace by counting those righteous whom He will make perfectly righteous. . . . Thus all that would hinder the sinful fallen creature from drawing near to GOD to receive righteousness from Him is taken out of the way; he is not counted as a sinner, though he is one . . . he is justified by his faith, and is counted among the friends, and no longer among the enemies. And the imputation of righteousness does not cease all through the process of his being *made* righteous . . . yea, and after that his faith shall be imputed to him for righteousness for ever,"¹ through his union with the only Source of all Righteousness. The doctrine may involve difficulties which are "darkness to our intellect," but for all that it is "sunshine to the heart" of those conscious of their own depravity. It may be to the point to notice how, in the case of one who cared so little for religious orthodoxy as James Hinton, this instinctive sense of inability to appear before GOD "unclothed" was keenly felt. He says: "This one great advantage I find even from the least attempt at prayer, viz., a new evidence of the fact of the Atonement. It seems to

¹ *The Purpose of God in Creation and Redemption.* Edinburgh, Thomas Laurie, 1866.

me impossible to pray fervently, continually, and trustfully, without feeling that we could not so pray unless we were first forgiven and accepted without any reference whatever to our own deserts or deeds. The conscience would recoil from any such approach to GOD unless we could say at the same time, 'Not for my sake.'"

This same want of consistency distinguishes the tacit encouragement given to more than questionable amusements by many writers, who nevertheless contend that morality is all in all. They may not openly advocate them, but they ridicule as groundless prejudice, or narrow scrupulosity, the objections that are made to them. In these respects Evangelicals act in far more exact accordance with moral principles than any other class of people, whatever their theories may be. Many of them, no doubt, frame their conduct by the commandment "received by tradition from their fathers," and condemn things which are not wrong in themselves, and have ceased to be so even by implication. But in so far as they refuse to amuse themselves at what they believe to be the price of sin, they act as the truest moralists. Where they have erred it has been on the right side. Even the games which they may have appeared foolishly to condemn were the occasions of undoubted evil in the days when the Methodists raised their protest against them, and are so still, as any game may be when made the occasion of gambling. For to those whose moral sense has been "exercised to know good and evil," gambling is seen to be immoral in principle, because, as has been well pointed out by George Eliot, the gambler is deliberately making his gain by others' loss. From this point of view every game should be regarded as wrong if we gamble over it, and no game (not otherwise objectionable) as wrong if we do not.

But if with regard to these matters people have been accustomed to act and think in accordance with the lines laid down for them by their grandfathers, or by the leaders of their religious party, instead of bringing their own conscience and common sense to bear upon the question before them, it is no wonder if they fall into some confusion of thought when attempting to give reasons for their decisions. For rules which were admirably adapted to meet the exigencies of other days may be quite unsuited to our own. It is very possible that

and the Evangelical Revival been postponed until the present time, total abstinence from alcoholic stimulant, rather than from card-playing, would have been made by John Wesley a condition of membership in his Society. And can any one in his senses doubt which is the real evil of our day? Neither is evil in itself, but the time may soon come, if, as some think, it has not already come, when it will be *wrong* to partake, simply for one's own gratification, in that which is ruining the souls and bodies of a vast multitude of our fellow-countrymen, and is bringing disgrace and misery upon our land.

At present, however, we still often hear it said by certain persons, when pressed for a reason why they consider such and such amusements to be wrong,—“Oh, I don't say they are *wrong*—that is a very low ground to take—but they are inconsistent for a Christian.” Now what is the plain meaning of that? What can a straightforward boy or girl, really wanting

to know what it is right to do, make of such an answer? Do none of us remember into what perplexity such statements have thrown ourselves in our young days? What, except sin, “inconsistent” with a Christian profession? A thing must be either right or wrong. And if it is intrinsically wrong, it is wrong for everybody who knows it to be so. Other things, different in themselves, may prove an occasion of sin, as has been observed above, but we should then be careful not to confuse in our minds the *sin* with the *occasion*, as their alliance is purely accidental. Thus it may be wrong in a man to go out in cabs, or for a woman to spend a certain sum on a silk gown, but only because it is a greater expense than they can honestly and morally afford, taking into due consideration the prior claims upon their money. The evil is, therefore, not the travelling in cabs rather than on omnibuses, nor the wearing of a silk gown rather than a worsted one, but it lies in the sin of extravagance, which is equally wrong for all. In such cases, of course, we must exercise our judgment, and be guided by circumstances.

Similarly unreasonable is the appeal to the imagination,—“Supposing CHRIST were to come, how would you like to be found at a theatre?” Now this is too childish. The argument is worth nothing except on the assumption that we are not always in GOD's presence. And even then a thing is right

or it isn't. If it is, why should we *not* be doing it if the Lord were to come? What possible difference could it make? And if it is wrong—well, the suggestion certainly seems to lurk in the words that it would be worse if we were caught in the act—which is not a highly moral suggestion, nor is it very sound theology. Far more sensible was the view taken by S. Carlo Borromeo, who, when asked what he would do if whilst he was engaged in a game of billiards it was announced to him that the Lord was at hand, replied, "Play as steadily as I could for a canon." There was, no doubt, some levity in the answer, but the principle that prompted it was a sound one. And when the same sensational suggestion was made to John Wesley, in the form of "How would he spend to-morrow if he knew it would be his last day upon earth?" he calmly referred to his pocket-book, and read the list of engagements he had already made for the day. Still, such startling appeals may not be without some value in the way of showing by a sort of flash, to children, or to the very ignorant, that CHRIST and sin are antagonistic; but they cannot be depended on, as their effect is to terrorise rather than to teach.

Again, it is of its own nature immoral to tell a lie, to beat your servant so hard that he dies of it, or to have several wives. Yet Rahab, a heathen woman, was not blamed for telling a lie (nor indeed for something worse), and the Israelites were allowed by GOD to commit these other immoralities, not because they were *right* for any one, heathen, Jew, or Christian, but because the Israelites were then in their moral childhood, and were being very gradually led from darkness to light. To have forced their development by premature instruction in the details of a higher morality than they were in a position to conform to, was not the manner in which GOD in His Wisdom saw it best to carry on their education, though the Absolute Standard of Right remained the same—"That which is altogether just shalt thou follow." In the heathen still greater ignorance was allowed for, and they were held guilty in the proportion that they were acquainted with positive evil. And they are in the same condition still. A missionary, acting on the Divine plan, would now "wink" at many moral delinquencies in his newly-made converts. And it is on the same method that we should act, even in our own country, although none of us can plead

the ignorance of the half-educated Jews or wholly uneducated heathen. Thus when an Englishman is asked why he does not go to the theatre, and he answers, "Because I believe theatres to be at present vile, bad places, and as I cannot mend them I will keep away from them"—any one can understand that. The same may be said with greater force of a race-course, the scene of all sorts of moral abomination. It is wrong for *any one knowingly* to countenance sin; and by hesitating to say that it is, we are encouraging in men the notion that if only they abstain from making professions of superior saintliness they may do wrong with some measure of impunity.

There is much greater difficulty in deciding what course to adopt with regard to such amusements as are wrong only in degree. But even here the same rule holds good, and we should be careful to remember, that not being evil in themselves, it can never be the amusements that are wrong, but, where they are too freely indulged in, the waste of time, money, health, and strength, that is so. It is a sin to fritter away our lives. We cannot "redeem the time" when we are unfitted for our morning's work by our night's dissipation. And if we bring up our children, as the children in the 'fashionable world' are brought up, to regard *sport* as the serious business of life, if we set them the example of treating any sort of moral evil with levity, we are not only sinning ourselves, but we are sinning against those specially committed to our charge, and starting them on the road to certain demoralisation, and probable ruin. These things are something more than "inconsistent"—they are wrong, bad, wicked, whoever does them. If Evangelicals keep themselves clear of such complicity with evil, they act as the truest moralists. And probably no other set of people have done so with greater consistency. The plea that to frequent race-courses, English theatres (as at present conducted—except possibly in some very exceptional case), and other places of entertainment which might be specified, is not incompatible with an enlightened morality, can be only made by the ignorant, or by such as do not intend to be convinced of the contrary. They like the things, and they mean to do them. All honour to those who (as the Bishop of Manchester) attempt the cleansing

of any of our Augean stables. Even if the task prove impossible, such efforts will not be fruitless.

But without "swallowing camels" there may yet be some danger of a waste of time and energy in straining out microscopic "gnats." It has been remarked by Mr. Lecky that there exists "a frequent disposition on the part of moralists to single out some new form of luxury, or some trivial custom which they regard as indecorous, for the most extravagant denunciations." He gives some amusing instances of this in the case of heathen moralists, and proceeds:—"If we were to measure the degree of criminality of the different customs of the time by the vehemence of the patristic denunciations, we might almost conclude that the most atrocious offence of their day was the custom of wearing false hair, or dyeing natural hair. Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian [inveighed in most grotesque terms against these customs]. Centuries rolled away. The Roman Empire tottered to its fall, and floods of vice and sorrow overspread the world; but still the denunciations of the Fathers were unabated. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and St. Gregory Nazianzen continued with uncompromising vehemence the war against false hair." And this at a time when Roman society, and even the Christian Church, had sunk into a condition of the most complete depravity and degradation.

Perhaps this tendency to attach a ludicrous importance to trifles has not been sufficiently guarded against in some modern Christian sects and parties. A measure of immorality might conceivably be associated with the wearing of false hair; but there are some female adornments, apparently of a most innocent character, which are notwithstanding selected as objects of especial abhorrence by at least one religious body. And in this some occult religious principle is held to be involved.

But leaving the department of "mint, anise, and cumin," let us return to the "weightier matters of the law." Our reflections seem then to have led us to the conclusion that in Evangelical ethics theory and practice have to a great extent been separated; that the basis of Eternal and Immutable Morality, on which the intuitive moralists of the two past centuries founded their systems, has been (roughly speaking)

left outside the pale, and appropriated by those who seem not to have recognised its correspondence with the Evangelical interpretation of the Gospel. The result has been that where the theory has risen no higher than Natural Religion,¹ it has borne but small fruit, hardly even aiming at more than a partial fulfilment of man's duty to his neighbour, and excluding, except in this indirect sense, his duty towards God.² Whilst with Evangelical Christians of all denominations, the belief in the Sovereignty of God, personal attachment to their Saviour, and a diligent study of the Holy Scriptures, have often produced, without any particular theory beyond a sense of the duty of obedience to the commands of God, and of the becomingness of right conduct on the part of His children, a very high order of Christian character. The sense of gratitude for a personal salvation, and of the beauty of holiness, has led to an earnest desire to "copy Him they love," and by putting themselves into direct communication with God, and thus becoming the recipients of His Grace, they have acquired the power requisite for "bringing forth the fruits of good living, to the glory of His Holy Name."

With such results, it may be asked, what is left to be desired? What more could profounder moral theories have done for such Christians than has been produced in default of them? But the above describes not all Evangelicals, but the select spirits amongst them, and even in their case their influence for good would have been more extensive had they not been deprived, by their exclusion of all considerations derived from natural religion, of that sympathy with Humanity as such which would have materially increased their influence. Where they had it, it was felt to be inconsistent with a theology which dated only from the fall, and thus practically ignored the congenital relations of man to God, and made direct appeals to his moral nature wellnigh impossible. Religion could no longer address itself, as it was meant to do, to the

¹ The relation of the doctrine to *Catholic* thought is too large a subject to be taken into consideration in this article.

² Mr. Lecky's remarks on suicide are a good example of this. He seems to consider it as generally "criminal" only on the ground that a man, by killing himself, may possibly do an injury to his family; otherwise it is to be regarded simply as "emigration," about which one may please one's-self.

conscience, to the *heart*, to that "Divine element of self-sacrifice, which is latent in every soul." Instead of this, its appeals were mainly to self-interest, and to the emotions. And although, as has been observed in a previous paper, all the motives are wanted, and even the most purely selfish are sometimes the only ones that can be roused into activity, still teachers who are *limited* to appeals to the lower motives have very seriously crippled their resources, and where they are not able to show that Right is right in the very nature of things, and wrong, wrong, moral distinctions must be more or less obliterated, and therefore the main object of the Gospel unattained.

And surely it is to this defective teaching, which has lost its moral support, that may in great measure be attributed the woful antinomian results so continually to be seen around us. Is it so rare a thing for people to be singing—ay, and *feeling*—rapturously about "Jesus," who are yet ignorant of, or perhaps wilfully blind to, their own patent immoralities? (Just as they would have been adoring Adonis, or "weeping for Tammuz," had time and place been different.) Is it so uncommon to find great zeal for "God," as they believe, and for "the truth," combined with "evangelistic" ardour, amongst those who appear to have no conception that the object of CHRIST'S Coming was man's moral restoration, and whose religious fervour seems but to have created new channels in which their natural love of domineering, vanity, ill-temper, and uncharitable judgments may flow along unchecked? And looking into our own hearts, and reviewing our own lives, are there no lessons to be learnt which tend to strengthen in us the conviction that some elements requisite to our moral development have been derived, if we possess them, from sources extraneous to what may be described as typical evangelicalism? Even in the case of those we know to be immeasurably above ourselves in Christian attainment, but who have kept strictly within these lines, may we not venture so far to criticise them as to say that their development would have been healthier, their character more robust, their sympathies more enlarged, had their spirituality been grafted upon the stock of common morals? Spirituality, not being adapted to flourish upon any other root, grows sickly without

this support, and what may be called an essentially feminine religion is very often the result.

And by a feminine religion is meant chiefly one in which a personal affection predominates to the extent of almost paralyzing the reasoning powers. The imagination of women, as is well known, individualises more than that of men. To Christian women JESUS is all in all. To Him, the Personal Object of their affections, they give their hearts and consecrate their lives. His cause is sacred because it is *His*; they love Holiness for His Sake. They long to see Him and to be like Him, but their highest and sublimest conception is that of giving Him Joy. This is feminine religion at its best. But touching and beautiful as is this personal devotion to our Blessed Lord—would we all had more of it!—does this phase of religion possess *all* the requisite elements for the “perfecting” of the Church of God, and for its “thorough furnishing unto all good works”? Is not more of vigour and reasonableness required, not only for the edification of the saints, but for the adaptation of the Gospel of God’s Grace to the true needs of mankind? Of such support as dogma can give there may be enough and to spare. Without implying the slightest disrespect to a ‘form of sound words,’ it may be safely affirmed that feminine religion has seldom been wanting in dogmatism. Whatever may be the effect of the “Higher Education of Women” upon the rising generation, so far, acceptance of the creed of the party in which they have received the deepest religious impression has been easy enough for most women, not one in a thousand in this country having been in a position to appreciate either the critical or scientific difficulties of belief, whilst their great emotional susceptibility has rendered any suspense of judgment not only intolerable to them, but almost impossible.

And in more than one religious party these characteristics are not confined to women. Wherever it is attempted to isolate Christianity, and divorce it from the foundation to which it is adapted, a non-natural religion is the result (I risk the perversion of this expression), producing what may be called abnormalities of character. And if it is subject of regret that women should be deficient in intelligence and moral power, far more is it deplorable that men, the leaders of thought, should be so.

“Holiness” has been admirably defined as “harmony with the sympathies and antipathies of GOD;” and it can be hardly said to exist without some intelligent appreciation of His Character. It may be sufficient as a beginning to love Righteousness because GOD is Righteous. It is better so to love the Cause of Righteousness that our deepest, strongest, and intensest love of GOD is grounded on the fact of His being the All-Righteous: to love Him *most* not because He has “delivered us from all our fears,” but because He is GOOD. So, indeed, to enter into His sympathies, as not even to regard His happiness as the sublimest possible conception, as the ultimate in morals, for this is after all but an exalted Utilitarianism, but to have learnt that His Highest Glory can alone consist in His perfect identification with the Absolute Law of Right, and that upon this alone can His Happiness be contingent. So “giving thanks at the remembrance of His Holiness” are we most closely united to Him in spirit. And although as yet this may be in large measure in imagination only, still to have the imagination thus sanctified and directed to the worthiest ends is of itself a “lifting power.”

Besides, if we have much lower conceptions of GOD, can it be properly said that it is GOD that we adore? And here we confront a solemn enough inquiry—Are we worshipping the CHRIST of GOD? Is the “Jesus” of popular religion always to be identified with the JESUS of the Gospels? That there are numbers of emotional religionists worshipping their own ideal, under that sacred name, there can hardly be a doubt when we consider the moral character that too often accompanies such worship. And it is quite possible that they believe in their religion, and are not carelessly to be classed as hypocrites. Some hypocrisy there may be about them, but there may also be a very considerable admixture of true zeal, perhaps even of a sentiment of almost passionate attachment towards their (shall we say?) Adonis. They endow him with every quality they would like him to possess, and by a strange, but perhaps not uncommon, perversion of the Gospel, they are well assured not only of his love, but of his *approval* of them “just as they are.” Many, it may be, find in the adoration of this ideal some satisfaction to the craving for sympathy, for loving, and being beloved, to which no human object has ever fully responded; whilst others

are looking for a realisation in heaven of all the happiness which has been denied them here. The religious sentiment involved may indeed be more profound than in its Hellenic analogue, because there is so much more pathos in the Story of the Cross than any mythology could supply ; but the difference is only one of degree. This may be called, and it *is*, an awful travesty of true religion, but there are many shades of it, and is not for us to judge our fellow-men. Maybe some of these Adonis-worshippers are being led by Him they know not, or hardly know, into a clearer light, whilst even the most benighted amongst them might have been much worse without their religion. How do we know they would not ? Can we possibly say to what lengths of crime their vices might not have led them had they not been, as they must have been, in some measure deterred by the better influences surrounding them ? Even where their strongest motive for decency of conduct was only the esteem of those better than themselves, that is a degree above trying to outvie their evil associates in brutality and pestilent iniquity. It has yet to be proved that the most antinomian perversion of the Gospel ever preached has been *utterly* devoid of all moral "lifting power." Still, let us not under-estimate the overwhelming solemnity of the words to be spoken to "many" at "that Day" :—"I," the *real* JESUS, "never knew you."

That these pseudo-Christians have often been unfortunate in their teachers can hardly be denied. The anxiety to maintain a logical and intellectual satisfaction with regard to doctrines concerning the Atonement has led to much theoretic (which must be emphatically distinguished from practical) antinomianism on the part of a certain school of preachers ; and the impression left upon the minds of their hearers is too often that the "Gospel" is a contrivance by which particular evil-doers may escape punishment. They are of course at the same time exhorted to "adorn the doctrine" of their Saviour, but the manner in which this is done encourages the idea that Goodness is *but* an adornment—an ornament, beautiful, no doubt, and seemly, but after all merely decorative. That to "love Righteousness and hate iniquity" is the quality which distinguishes a child of God, and marks the difference between the Church and the world, and that the Gospel is but a means to

this end, is not even suggested. The argument too for right conduct seldom rises higher than the supposed effect produced on outsiders when they see professing Christians no better than themselves,—what they “will say,” etc. But the unbelievers present are much less acute than they are represented if they do not draw the conclusion that if to “appear approved” of them is the main consideration, the greatest sin is to be found out.

That Sin is Sin whoever does it, and that Right is the invariable and absolute principle which establishes even the throne of God—these truths are seldom put forward in evangelical discourses. Instead of this, “mere morality” is too often made the subject of the strongest condemnation, instead of being presented as the all in all of religion. The impressions thus made must be more or less disastrous. It is not long since I heard a sermon preached before a large body of militia, by an excellent Christian minister—Christian in spirit, in character, and in conduct,—but this is what he told them. He spoke chiefly to the younger men, and he said some of them had perhaps been leading vicious lives, and indulging freely every evil propensity. Then some trial—some sorrow or bereavement—might have been the means of awakening in them an earnest desire of amendment. Perhaps as they stood by the grave of a mother, and remembered her counsels and her prayers, they had made a resolution to give up their drink and their bad companions, and lead a different and a better life. And they had done so; they had become steady, respectable men—church-goers it might be—and good husbands and fathers. And now, what was the result of all this? Why, they were worse than ever they were, for they had now become hypocrites; they were, in fact, exactly in the position of the man out of whom one devil had departed only to make room for seven more, and their latter end was worse than their first. That is every word of the encouragement the respectable men got that day. Not even an excuse was made for their reformation; nor, on the other hand, was the faintest reason assigned for the charge of hypocrisy.

Now there seems to be but one antidote for this sort of thing, and it is the proclaiming of the Impersonal Law of Right. Would not this raise us, if we believe in it, whatever

may be our position in the moral scale? GOD and GOODNESS should never have been separated, but they have been separated. The Person—"God," or "Jesus"—has been everything;—the Goodness of which GOD is the focus, and which was but personified in JESUS, comparatively nothing. The remark of Mr. Dale when the Birmingham School Board resolved to banish the Bible, and GOD, and "religion" from the Board Schools, and teach "morality" only, may have been startling, but it may also well be that it was prompted by a deep insight. He said in effect (I forget his words), that perhaps in the end this movement might prove a beneficial one, for that the supernatural having been so often taught without morality, it might be necessary that morality should for a while be taught without the supernatural, to restore the balance. Ultimately he hoped to see the proper union of the two in the Gospel of CHRIST. Still, the less startling and the more obvious course is to proclaim both, now—the impersonal love of Right, *and* its Impersonisation, GOD, worthy of all love, and honour, and glory, and power: GOD, bringing man to a knowledge of Himself, which is Eternal Life, by the Way which He saw (in spite of man's perversions of It) to be the surest and the best,—the Gift and Sacrifice of His SON. Without the cord of Love, no sinner could be drawn to God, but Love is the constraining element without which Morality would never rise beyond the stage of mere incipency.

"There is a point," wrote Mr. Erskine of Linlathen,¹ "which I have often wished to see more illustrated and enforced than it is generally, and that is the adaptation of the Christian dogma (when believed) to produce the Christian character. Paul speaks of the Gospel as being *THE POWER of God unto salvation*, that is, as containing the *dynamics*, so to speak, the spiritual lever, and ropes, and pulleys, and wheels by which the human spirit may be lifted out of the horrible pit and miry clay of sin and selfishness into a harmony with the mind of God." This is the Object of the Christian scheme, of the Plan of Salvation. There can be no other the importance of which is, comparatively, worth considering. Therefore, whatever of less importance we may not be quite sure of, let us at least cleave to this, and, securing the main point, let us leave our difficulties to be

¹ To Lady Augusta Stanley (*Letters of Thomas Erskine*, vol. ii. p. 151).

settled for us, or not, as our Father sees best. We need be in no hurry about this, really. It may not be necessary for us to square many theological problems we should dearly love to square, nor to understand many mysteries at present out of our sight, but it is necessary for us to be brought into, and led along, and perfected in the way of Righteousness. For the rest, may God give us patience, which we sorely need!

“The very core and essence of our faith in God is our faith in Righteousness. On that point Revelation hinges; from that centre all revealed truth proceeds. It is therefore quite allowable and natural to be more certain of the heart of the matter, than of the less ultimate and far more mysterious truths which are more or less derivative. . . . If we do not know what Righteousness is, even better than we know what God is, we do not know God at all. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a deeper certainty concerning Righteousness than concerning those truths about God which go beyond the assumption of His Righteousness.”¹

“For the grace of God was manifested bringing salvation to all men, disciplining us, in order that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, and justly, and godly, in the present world; looking for that blessed hope, and the manifestation of the glory of the great God and of our Saviour JESUS CHRIST; Who gave Himself for us that He might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto Himself a peculiar people zealous of good works. These things speak, and exhort.”²

One more point must be touched upon, namely, the necessity still remaining, in order to these results, of minute teaching on the details of practical morality. We have been accustomed to despise the somewhat dull, and also somewhat heathenish discourses of a bygone generation, and to describe them with contemptuous exhaustiveness as “moral essays.” But however clearly we may perceive their insufficiency, yet from the bare fact that these divines preached about duties, and about virtue and vice, many more “spiritual” preachers may learn a lesson, for more practical preaching is urgently needed. Men, women, and children, perplexed by the difficulties of daily life, require simple instruction as to what they ought to do in given circumstances. We want more of the old-fashioned teaching of the Homilies on distinct sins—Pride, Selfishness, Worldliness, Extravagance, Dishonesty, Evil-speaking, Lying, and Slandering. We want to hear the Virtues which we must “add” to our

¹ *Spectator*, Jan. 11, 1879.

² Titus ii. 11-15. Alford's Translation.

separately enlarged upon, and set before us as attainable. want the duties connected with our various relationships considered, and more practical conclusions arrived at. For aaps we hardly realise the ignorance that prevails as to what right and wrong, honourable and dishonourable, in the common transactions of daily life. There has been much metaphysical, transcendental preaching in all the churches, but the meantime thousands in our congregations are waiting to be told—This is wrong, That is cruel, The other is unjust. All the reasons for these statements should be explained clearly and patiently. It has been far too generally taken for granted that a knowledge of moral details will somehow come of itself, if doctrinal instruction is but “sound.” Unfortunately it is not so. These lessons are not miraculously taught; as things are, they are generally only learnt after bitter experience of error. Much cruelty, too, is simply the result of ignorance, and teaching on this subject is wanted, and from the pulpit; for with the classes most requiring it this is the only opportunity of receiving such instruction. The sympathies need cultivating, that kinder judgments may be formed and pronounced, and that animals should be treated with fairness and tender consideration. All this does not come untaught, and comparatively few people have that ready acquaintance with the Bible which will make such lessons superfluous, however we may wish that they had it. Even in the upper classes, amongst Christians inclined to regard such instructions as “paltry,” it is painful to find the low standard of morality that prevails with regard to such matters as accuracy of statement, strict observance of the regulations of the Post-Office, and integrity in dealing with Railway Companies. Half-price tickets are taken for children over age, and notes inserted in tickets sent by book-post, by persons who would never dream of cheating an individual, and who, as likely as not, possess what Canon Ryle has described as a “keen nose for heresy.” All this, and many more such “little” failures of morality are the result of imperfect education, and stunted development of moral sense.

But whilst higher instruction in Righteousness is urgently required, it is still important to remember that after all, being grounded, we shall best attain to the great object of our

existence, not so much by a self-conscious trying to be good, and making our improvement our chief aim, as by an enthusiasm for GOD and Goodness, and Humanity, and a consequent desire for service which can only come directly from our Heavenly FATHER. Happiness, it has been said, is more certainly found, when not directly sought; we find it in seeking something else. So it may be with our personal Goodness. If our hearts are fixed upon the Sun of Righteousness, we shall be "changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Lord the Spirit." C. C. C.

ART. VII.—*The Formal and the Vital in the Bible.*¹

THE object of this Article is to furnish a contribution towards a review of the Scriptures which shall be a common ground on which those who accept the results of sound advanced criticism and those who wish to retain the whole Bible in their confidence may stand.

From the necessity of the case, if there was to be a revelation from God to man in a book, and if that revelation is in the Bible, there must be in the Bible an ideal, authoritative, vital element, and a structural, formal element. If in any proper sense the book had a supernatural origin, the Divine Author, in bringing it into being, must have caused his agency to enter as really into the structural element as into the vital; as the care of a painter is as really directed to the means by which he expresses his idea as to the idea itself. But now that the book has been long written and passed among the active forces in shaping the world's thought and life, it becomes an important question to discriminate between the two elements.

It is the want of this discrimination which leads to not a little mistake and confusion. Many look on the Bible as a crystallised whole, solid, inflexible, all its parts and elements inseparable in authority and claims, and not rather as a spiritual power, a divine message, made up of principles, truths, duties, vital facts and forces, lodged in a structural, formal support.

¹ From the *New Englander*.

its enemies, by this misapprehension, assuming that all its parts are equally authoritative and valuable, or equally worthless, and finding that some things in it are obviously not pertinent to our times, pronounce it all outgrown, and have no faith in it. If they realised that the formal parts, even the portions now apparently obsolete, existed necessarily at first for the purpose of putting the vital part into the world of thought and action, and may be necessary now for the purpose of retaining it there, and that, while the vital is the part which the world now principally needs, it cannot have that without having that on which it rests also, most of their objections would cease. In like manner, a class of semi-believers in Scripture, not understanding the interdependent relations of the formal and the vital elements, are led to treat the volume with disparagement. They go through it as an expert through a collection of brilliants, saying nothing of the diamonds but decrying the less valuable stones as paste. They adopt a harsh tone towards the book, as if it were guilty of practising deception and making an unnatural alliance between the good and the bad, and needed to be thoroughly exposed. So they ruthlessly attempt to tear asunder the two parts, accept the one, and reject the other. If they took a deeper and juster view, they would see that the two parts are structurally and necessarily interwoven, and that a book revelation could not be made or perpetuated without such a union. And the friends of the Bible, not consciously recognising the two elements, and their necessity and relation, are often perplexed and bewildered, sometimes trying to give to the one the importance and faith due only to the other, and sometimes questioning if even the ideal and vital element may not, after all, be more or less struck with the imperfection and weakness of the more unimportant things associated with it. If they understood the nature of revelation, and how the supernatural things in it rest necessarily on a basis of common human things, while these common human things by this use are taken up into a divine service and become sacred, they would be saved from much anxious thought and perplexity.

Thus, the sooner we come up out of the bewildering notion that the Bible in all its aspects is equally full of divine meaning and authoritative to us, the better it will be for all parties ; and the sooner we apprehend that the formal and structural and

seemingly transient elements were all necessary in bringing the vital part into effective use and retaining it there, the better also. All parties need to grasp the fact that we have in the blessed book a Bible within the Bible, a spiritual, ever-living Bible in the visible, tangible, outward Bible—and both of God—the one as really as the other, though in different senses and with different uses. In both God's thought is passed into the human mould—he using the spirit, conceptions, and inspirational faculty of man, in putting the inner Bible in the human intelligence, in the first place, and then using human language, human facts and personality, in giving the inner Bible form, and so shaping the outer Bible. The former, the ideal parts, however, were no more truly chosen by him than the latter, the formal, by which they were expressed. In every portion of Scripture from Genesis to Revelation, we find time-marks, race-marks, human personality-marks, betraying its human relationship; but none the less there are God-marks there also, showing that in both elements, the formal and the vital, it is the Book of God. He chose to give it through man, and in a way to put it in a living union with man at the time. His thought seemed to lay itself down on an elect mind, here and there, now and then, during the inspirational ages, grasp it, qualify it, co-work with it, enter into vital oneness with it; and so these two agencies, the divine and the human, took together the desired step in advance in giving that section of revelation to mankind. Thus man is in the inner and outer Bible; God also is there, from centre to circumference. Dual as the book is in its nature, its duality is not mechanical but vital, like that of other vital things. The two portions are not joined together like dead branches and a living tree, but more as soul and body. You cannot travel through it, and mechanically toss asunder the two interblended elements, any more than you can pass through it and say, These portions are put here by inspiration, and those without it. We like that view of inspiration according to which two spirits are regarded as having been present and active when all the parts, all the sentences and words, too, if you please, were born into the record,—God's and man's—in dynamic union, each in its freedom and integrity, neither overlaid and crushed nor crowded out by the other. So, in the blending of the formal and the vital in

Scripture, each in a sense rests on the other, yet neither over-rows the other, and neither can be spared from the other. They hold each other up, and so constitute the indivisible and imperishable Word to mankind—the letter and the spirit. Such is the intimacy of the union in the one creative work that the problem of their exact demarcation, analytically and critically, is one of great delicacy and difficulty, perhaps never to be fully solved—needful as it is to recognise the distinction of a thought, and hold the book on this basis theoretically.

This difficulty is greatly increased by the fact that God had a view, in giving all the Scriptures but the later portions, a double object,—to give mankind religious instruction suitable to their wants at the time, and prepare their successors for higher instruction. He was sighting at the same moment the existing good and the future education of the race. He blended ends and means. He was giving man a revelation and getting him ready to receive a revelation. And these two processes went on simultaneously. The Bible, in form, in one view of it, may be regarded as a record of the educational system God adopted for the religious instruction of the race, beginning at the alphabet and going on to the end of the course, embracing the temporary illustrations and applications and rough sketches adapted to rude learners, as well as the interblended or supplementary principles, ideas, and fundamental facts, designed for permanent use. Of course it can be no easy matter to feel out and detect the permanent thus running in a sliding scale for many centuries through such an educational course, to disentangle the living and authoritative from the structural and transient, to raise the Bible out of the Bible. Indeed, this never can be perfectly done; and though it is important to have the conception and to hold and defend Scripture on this basis, it is doubtful whether, for educational and moral reasons, its Author would ever have it actually done.

But while, from the nature of the case, the boundaries of these two elements are subtle and evasive, there is something in experience that points, in a general way, to the reality of this distinction. A large part of the living truths of the word seem to have a special fitness for the conscience, moral nature, and spirit of man, so that when welcomed and practised they maintain their position in the faith by a self-evidencing light

and authority. The vital in them and the vital in the soul recognise each other, in the act of spiritual experience, as if they were old acquaintances, and the two consent together in a divine wedlock. The living things from above have come to their own, and their own received them. They who do the will of God know of the doctrine. They inwardly test it, measure it, feel it, and know it to be of God. Thus in experience the soul recognises portions of the higher elements of Scripture—as many as it comes in actual spiritual contact with and can appropriate,—and holds them; as quicksilver agitated among crushed ore seeks out the particles of gold, seizes and holds them, till the limit of its capacity is reached or there is no more gold accessible.

The formal, on the other hand, finds no such inward recognition. It remains something outside and foreign. It may be a support around which spiritual experience crystallises; it is not a part of it. It may furnish the arena of the race, not the elements which enter into the spirit and mettle of the race itself. The soul cannot test the formal by its own powers and know it to be true or divine, or feel, if it were varied, it would itself suffer by the change.

Thus individual Christians in every age are unconsciously feeling out portions of these distinctive elements, the formal and the vital, and finding in the mass of Scripture the inlaid divine meanings specially adapted to them. They are ever seeking, under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, portions of the living waters needed by their souls, and are not content to linger at channels of revelation whose streams have dried up or whose waters are not now suited to their needs. This does not imply that some of the overlooked or neglected portions may not be equally significant in themselves or precious to others. By no means; but it shows that spiritual instincts lead them, the moment they begin to read and welcome Scripture, to discriminate between the portions which enter into their experience and become a part of it, and those which remain outside.

In like manner the Church, acting on a larger scale and taking a broader survey, is ever feeling out, under the guidance of the Spirit, the special living truths, most needful for it in its time, about which its heart warms and its life crystallises. It

oes through the book, and leaves it with illuminated and nilluminated portions, just as it has an eye to see and a heart o feel the Divine message. In different ages the volume lights p differently under its gaze and use. But it may require all e different ages, all the varied circumstances, conditions, and ants of the centuries, for the Church to slowly spell out all e vital meanings in the book. How absurd, then, for an in- ividual to make his spiritual consciousness the test of all of :! Individual experience only points in the direction of the uth for which we plead, it does not exhaust it. How foolish r any class of Christians to presume on recognising all of it! heir aggregated experience only goes a little further. How oreign from the fact to suppose that even the whole Church of hrist in any one age can have an experience broad enough nd deep enough to compass all the truth of revelation! We ust look to the collective godly experience of all the ages, to overtake and use all the vital things stored away in the vondrous volume, capable of the test of experience.

Now this unconscious process, which goes on in the experi- ence of individual Christians and of the Church, points to the deeper and more real and extended distinction between the formal and the vital, which exists in the very substance of the book itself. This does not depend on personal or ecclesiastical moods or wants, or on localities, circumstances, or ages. It enters into the very nature and structure of the word. It places on the side of the vital all the principles, truths, facts, instructions, requirements, and warnings, which are intended to abide through the Christian ages, whether they are all in any one age consciously felt out and welcomed, or not, or whether they are all ever grasped in experience, or not, and which are packed away in the word for the furnishing of the Church in the different exigencies of its history. Some of these may remain long unused, as a well-stocked locker may be thought- fully supplied by a master mind with tools and articles for any emergency in the voyage, the use of some of which may not be known to those on board till the occasion arises when they are needed and are brought out. On the side of the formal it classes those elements which are simply structural, and those parts which, after the completion of the canon, fall into subordinate

and relatively unimportant positions, and are valuable rather for their relation to the other parts than their own sake.

But the two are blended in a living inseparable union. The vital has grown up into the formal, and brings out its bloom and fruit from it; and the formal upholds and embodies the vital. The formal is for the sake of the vital, and the vital touches, hallows, glorifies the formal. The Bible, made up of the two, is thus a vital whole—a creation of divine genius, in which it is impossible to draw out the soul and have it live and command respect and authority, leaving the other a mass of worthless matter—as impossible as to tear asunder a statue and separate the idea from the marble, and yet retain the idea as an expressed fact. Both perish from the world of reality by the reckless attempt.

After this general survey of the two elements of revelation,—their necessity, nature, and interrelation,—let us now approach them more closely, as we find them side by side, or blended, in the Bible.

Of course, as already stated, we do not expect to reach positive and final results. We do not expect to untwist the threads of light and shade which God has woven together, and place each colour by itself. All we hope to do is to point in a general way to the direction in which they may be found and distinguished. And this we deem necessary, in order that the Scriptures may not be undervalued, on the one hand, by those who think that if they are of supernatural origin no apparently imperfect or unimportant matters shall have place in them; nor misvalued, on the other hand, by those who encumber their faith by overtaxing and misdirecting it in trying to honour equally all their contents.

Looking at the formal and beginning at the exterior of this, we find that *human language itself*, employed by the sacred writers, falls into this class. The words as words are not the revelation or the message. They are human; that floats around them, lies back of them, and comes out into them only more or less imperfectly. Christ says: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." Back of the poor human words he was compelled to use was a wreath of spiritual truth and life which could only imperfectly be expressed in them, and he points to that as the real aim of his utterance.

So human language in the Bible is extraneous to the ideas which God caused to be lodged in it for man's use, and is itself a part of the structural element.

Little significance, also, is to be attached to *the rhetorical structure or the special tongue* adopted. No spiritual importance lies in the fact that particular writers used words of Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Chaldaic, Aramaic, or Persian; or wrote in prose or poetry; or used parable, simile, apostrophe, assertion, interrogation, alliteration, or acrostic; or indulged occasionally in playfulness, irony, or sarcasm. All this belongs to the costume, and not to the vitalities; and yet this or similar costume is necessary for the vitalities.

We find, also, more or less of the formal in the *common modes of speech and thought on common subjects*, which the sacred writers adopted from those around them. There must always be something assumed as a basis of instruction, intellectual tools to work with. A teacher finding these tools, language and popular conceptions on ordinary subjects, will not stop to create new ones, but will adopt those at hand, as far as consistent with his object, and go right on with his special instructions. Inspired men stand on the common ground of their countrymen in these subsidiary matters, and use the popular conceptions of their age on common subjects as the only tools they have to work with for their special object. These conceptions, right or wrong, belong to the formal part of revelation; and no importance is to be attached to them. Assumed from the necessities of the higher instruction, they are no more a vital part of the authoritative revelation to us, than the kind of writing materials that were used by them in doing the work. If a sculptor had poor tools to work with, and he left them scattered about the statue he had carved, we should not think of criticising the statue or his workmanship, if in other respects it was good, for the imperfection of the tools. A writer employed in giving a revelation must leave his tools—his language and the popular conceptions he is compelled to use—in his work; but if he selects the best of his country and age, the creation, which rises in beauty and grandeur about them, ought not to be condemned for their presence.

It is well to bear in mind the distinction between these

two elements of Scripture, moreover, when we come to *side-thoughts, subsidiary expressions, quotations*. There is a sense in which these are a part of the vital word; but taken out of their connection, interpreted absolutely, and not in harmony with the main thought of the writer in giving them, they are certain to lead astray. In literal aspect they are formal. We must look beyond that to find their significance. They must be put in their setting, to have them give light. The sentences of the Bible are not made to be torn out of place, and held up separately as a light for mankind. The permanent, complete, divine thing, when we get it, in any part of the Word of God, is the blended light, the resultant light, that comes from the consensus of the whole connected passage; nay, more, the agreeing light of all the related passages that should enter into its interpretation, for revelation is a grand interconnected system of complementaries.

There is much of this element, further, in the *historical records*. Of course, there are in the sacred history, both national and individual, great living principles, permanent lessons, revelations of God's methods, gleams of the divine government; and there are vital central facts designed to enter into human faith and control it through all the ages. But enclosing these are portions of narrative, essential to the existence of a historical revelation—*i.e.* a revelation interblended with the historical development of a people—which are not freighted with special meaning for mankind. They are a part of the framework on which the higher truth rests. Hence in the use of these portions of Scripture we instinctively distinguish between what is merely framework and the higher truth, and seek to have the latter stand out in the record to our faith. This we may appropriate, and it will be our help. Yet we must not despise that which is merely framework; for that is necessary, is there by the will of God, and has a divine mission.

If we make this distinction, it will not trouble us if we find that, in the blending of the two forces—the divine and the human—which make up the narrative, the formal part is tinged, now and then, with the predominance of the human factor, even to the extent, sometimes, of possible imperfections of statement. The stains in such cases, if stains there be, are

found in the drapery, not in the body of revelation, or if even on the body, not on the soul. They do not touch the part intended to be a permanent light to men, and to shape the living faith of the world. They are not spots on the sun, but spots on the observatory supporting the glass, by means of which we see the sun.

There are, besides, instructions, *designed and applied to conditions of society and life no longer existing*, which are now obsolete. They are a part of the great record of the religious training of the world ; but they have served their day. The circumstances which called them forth are entirely changed. The instructions, accordingly, retire henceforth to a subordinate place. Among these may be placed the requirements relating to the rites and ceremonial of the temple service under the old economy ; the special directions to the Jews for the treatment of particular cities, tribes, and individuals, for reasons and under circumstances peculiar and never to recur ; the requirements of Judaism, as distinct from Christianity, which ceased with the changed condition of the world when Christianity came in ; and even certain rules given by Christ and the Apostles, growing out of social conditions existing in their day but existing no longer,—as those relating to washing the disciples' feet, and, where slavery no longer exists, the duties of masters and slaves to one another. These instructions, having their whole force in the peculiar circumstances which called them forth, and which can never recur, now drop down to a secondary plane. If we still find, back of them, as we may, great moral principles, lasting lessons of encouragement, or warning, or wisdom, or hints in relation to God's educational methods, that is another matter ; and their value in these respects must be fully recognised. But the instructions themselves in their direct use have faded with their opportunity, like the directions of the head of a fire department to those under him when the fire is put out. Yet while these are now, compared with their original use, retired Scriptures, they are still monumental Scriptures,—monumental of a former vitality ; and we cannot spare them from the book as in their time a necessary part of the training of the race.

Again, there is another portion of the Bible containing *adaptations of truth and duty to the race when on a lower*

moral plane, which the world has since outgrown, that falls into this class. To understand this, we must remember that there are in the divine teachings, especially in the earlier portions, traces of two great distinct moral systems, not so much different in kind as degree—the one a system of high ideal morality, gleaming out here and there all through the Bible, even in the Old Testament, and revealing the absolute requirement, the perfect law; the other an educational system adapted to the practical wants of men at the time, expressing the best moral regimen for that day, and designed to prepare the way for a higher every-day standard. The one is like the rays and flashes of sunlight which might here and there find their way through cracks and fissures into the dark abode of the cave-dwellers before they came up into the regions of day; the other like the smoking and flickering light of the fagots and lamps which, meanwhile, might admirably serve their turn till they had worked their way out or were prepared for something better. The ideal morality, wherever we find it, is of course a part of the perennial light; but the educational morality, taking its tone from the moral culture of those on whom it was enjoined as the regulative precept, is liable to be outgrown, lose its pertinency and force, and give place at a later age to a higher practical ethical standard.

Accordingly, it is to be expected that we should find, now and then, as we go through the Bible, stubs of fagots and exhausted lamps which gave light when the race was back in that historical period, but are now gone out. Christ formally put the extinguisher on several of these lights that were waning in his day, saying, "It hath been said by them of old time," *so and so*; "but I say unto you,"—*This henceforth is the ethical rule*. And may it not be that there are instances, now going on, of a slow retirement of some of the educational requisitions made by the inspired writers in the New Testament on those of their age, who were just emerging from paganism, and a gradual introduction, under the teachings of the Divine Spirit, of a higher application of the ideal law as the practical standard for Christians in our day? This admission would not disparage God's wisdom in giving the Bible just as he gave it, nor the worth of the gift to us. Rather, it would emphasise both; for God did not give the book to be

used mechanically, but to be an instrument of moral training, and at the same time a record of that training. Besides, the same principle of educational adaptation which led him to adopt, throughout the whole period covered by the Scriptures, a progressive system of morals with the advancing standard of practical requirements, raising it from time to time himself in the written word, would lead his Spirit, whose office it is to bring the ideal things in the teachings of Christ to the minds of his disciples, to suggest to them, as they were prepared to hear it, and as they needed it, a higher rule of daily living, and lead them up to it. All recognise the fact of the advancement of the current code when we pass from the Old to the New Testament times, whether they recognise the principle that it was because the religious world had outgrown the old code and was prepared for a higher, or not. There was a "dis-annulling of the commandment going before for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Among the things then left behind was the toleration of polygamy, of voluntary divorce, of the *lex talionis*, of private oaths and the obligation to perform them, it was thought, even when ethically wrong, the practical restriction of love to one's own nation, the centralisation of the most acceptable worship about the temple, and the *priestly* office of the ministry. Now as the earlier regulations in relation to these things are, in our day, deserted mile-posts marking the moral progress of those trained under revelation, so may there not be some things in the New Testament which were shaped and phrased to meet immature and crude moral conditions, and which the more advanced state of Christianity in modern times is slowly making obsolescent, because the Holy Spirit is bringing down more of the high ideal teachings of the word into practical supremacy? For example, may there not be some things pertaining to the duties of subjects to civil rulers, to the use of wine and the rule of temperance, and the duties and privileges of women in the church, which suited the moral cultus and circumstances of the first century, but do not suit so exactly those of the nineteenth, and were not designed so expressly for those of the nineteenth? ¹ Are we to

¹ Perhaps! But even if we make these admissions, do we not still find in the New Testament somewhere the definite living principles by which alone we can safely guide our conduct up to the present hour?—ED. B. and F. *Evang. Review.*

consider that the Palestinian Jews, and the Greeks and Romans, when just converted and rising from the nightmare of their old religions, were necessarily ripe for the highest moral teachings on such topics, and that they received them in the instructions shaped to their current wants? What presumption is there in supposing that what inspired men said to voluptuous Corinthians, heady Hebrews, arrogant Italians, in their urgent conditions, were not in all cases designed to be a Procrustean code in its very letter for all time, in very different practical urgencies; and that the colour of those early times still lingers on their words in some cases?

If we must, in order to be true and honest, concede something here to the formal in our Scriptures, what goes with the concession does not lessen their value or make them less instructive to us. It simply shows that we need to look more closely into those instructions which had a special application to earlier times, to find the divine meaning in them for us, and must make allowance for the changed conditions. They are valuable, also, as marking the educational stages up which the Divine Love has carried those accepting his training. Moreover, they often suggest the sublime principles of ideal goodness, righteousness, and justice lying back of them, seeking to announce themselves, as it were, only the times were not ready for them.

Here the question may arise as to the position of *miracles* in our classification. Miracles are not the suspension or the breaking of the laws of nature, but the incoming of God's interposition along the laws of nature, fresh from his own personality, revealing his presence, and bearing a testimony from him. In working miracles we may suppose God uses nature as man uses nature to make it serve him, only with immeasurably greater skill and success, bringing it into entire obedience to his will through its own laws. Hence miracles have, primarily, a moral aspect; they are "signs." They are used for a purpose. They are designed, first of all, to be helps to put revelation in position. Hence when Christian people were educated up to the revelation, and the revelation was fairly lodged in human acceptance, there was no further call for the performance of miracles. In this sense the world has now passed beyond the need of them, and the record of them

belongs to the past. To the unbelieving and sceptical they rather strain than help the book ; for to persons in that state of mind it is the witnessing of miracles, and not the record of them, that is a “sign.” To such persons the signs of Christianity are now the miracles of its history, its truth, its spirit, and the transformations of character wrought under its influence, these miracles interpreted to them by the Divine Spirit. But in another sense, to all sympathetic and believing minds, the miracles recorded in the word are a part of its living power. They are the natural symptoms, the expected pulses and heart-beats, in the narrative, of the presence of that Higher Mind with which they are holding companionship, faith changes the narration to them from records to deeds, and they become “signs” once more.

Here, also, we meet the question whether there may not be something of the formal in the *doctrinal* teachings of Scripture. May not some of the announced doctrines be due to the doctrinal prepossessions of the time, or the sluggishness and weakness of the early learners to grasp the pure truth ?

To answer this question we must recur to the distinction which we have already made, between what the writers intended to teach, and what they incidentally took up to aid their teachings. We must, also, distinguish between the final doctrines and the previous approximations, the anticipative symbols, the forecast statements, the slow approaches to them, which are now of secondary importance and derive their interest from the light of the developed doctrine thrown back on them. There may, also, be germs of doctrine dimly stated in the New Testament which the Holy Spirit may have since caused to open out to Christian consciousness in full bloom, and we now rejoice in the bloom, not in the germs.¹ So far, there may be something of the formal in the doctrinal teachings. But the doctrinal teachings themselves, when they reach full statement, must be regarded as a part of the living word, for, in relation to doctrine, which appeals to the spiritual understanding, there is no need of a halting, progressive, educational method, such as is necessary in legislating morals.

¹ There may be truth in this statement taken with the explanations which the writer adds ; but we must guard against such a perverse application of it as we find in John Henry Newman’s *Development of Doctrine*.—Ed. B. and F. *Evang. Review*.

In training man morally, absolute morality cannot be the practical standard enjoined by the lawgiver. God said, in reference to the best system he could give the Jews in the wilderness: "I gave them statutes that were not *good*." In instructing men doctrinally, there is no such difficulty. The teacher may, indeed, find his pupils unable to receive at once the full blaze of his message, and he may be obliged to instruct them gradually, as Christ at one time said to his disciples: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now;" but as far as he does teach, the law and method of doctrinal teaching require that the quality of his doctrine should be, as far as their intellectual and spiritual faculties will allow, in the direction of the full truth. It must look towards *that* though it do not express it. It may dally in symbols and prefigurations and clumsy draughts and imperfect sketches, adapted to slow intellects. But the attempts must be aimed at the truth; and as far as they reach dogma, doctrine, and take settled statements, they must not be contrary to it. Unless we admit this, the distinction between inspired and uninspired writings falls to the ground, and we take our position outside of revelation, and not in it.

Thus, to develop the idea of the incarnation and lodge it in human faith, it may be necessary first to familiarise the mind to a series of theophanies, manifestations of the Angel of the Covenant, and Messianic prophecies, continued through many generations; but when the doctrine fairly blossoms out in the record of the coming and mission of Christ as given and interpreted by the sacred writers, this must be regarded as the consummate truth. So it may take a long time to develop the sacrificial principle. The attempt may lead through centuries of training by the use of the blood of beasts, costly offerings, and sacrificial symbols; but when it ripens in the teachings of Christ and the Apostles in the doctrine of the atonement by the offering of the Son of God, this must be accepted as the ultimate truth, the impregnable reality. The figurative, the symbolical, the educational, may precede, but the full and final doctrine is the rounded New Testament statement, and from this there is no appeal.

In like manner, in the development of the doctrine of salva-

tion by faith, the first statement may be one requiring simple trust in God, with an obedient spirit. This may be followed by one adding the use of propitiatory rites ; and this, after centuries of training, may be crowned by the designation of Christ as the one specific object of faith. But after the doctrine has received its announcement, it must be regarded as final, and the prefigurations of the earlier economy take their place under it. So, in reference to retribution, the full principle may be announced after a long preliminary training under the earthly government of God with earthly penalties alone, without any distinct statement of immortality and future awards, but when the broader and larger announcement is made in the New Testament, and the range of retributions is lifted up and shown to extend to the other world and have its principal seat there, this must be accepted as a finality, and the previous teachings be regarded as preparations.

It may be a slow process, also, to put the Zion idea in just expression. Hence, as one passes from the Old to the New Testament, he may find a transference and enlargement of the idea from an elect nationality to an elect disposition and character in all nationalities. But when the idea of a godly people is reached in Scripture, it stands for all coming time, and the anticipations are to be interpreted under it.

The same is true of the priestly office, which had its fore-shadowings in the Levitical priesthood, and its fulfilment in the priesthood of Christ, in which it ends, or rather, continues till there is no further need of intercession.

So, in respect to the doctrines of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, regeneration, worship, prayer, the prevalence of the kingdom of Christ, the last things, heaven, hell, the Christian exposition, which we find in the New Testament, is the regulative exposition, and must control faith, while the approaches to it take a subordinate place.

On no other theory can we suppose that God had any purpose in the doctrinal training of the race extending through ages, or that there was any continuous development of doctrine among God's people recorded in Scripture.

We have had occasion, while considering the formal element, to indicate more or less of the vital, so that, in now proceeding

to the latter, our examination may be more rapid. We shall consider the more obvious groups here also, first.

Certainly, then, the revelation which God makes of *himself*, his *nature*, *character*, and *disposition* towards man, in his word, must fall into this class. This revelation is made through anthropomorphic, metaphoric and direct and explicit endeavour continued through long ages; but having been made, the Scriptures which help to give the high spiritual conception are for ever radiant with the light of God. Such passages shine throughout the Bible, and light up almost every page.

We are to look for this element in the *moral and spiritual principles* which are announced. Principles are undying, and the Scriptures which reveal them are always fresh. Man can never progress beyond them or the need of them.

We find it, also, in the *religious and doctrinal instruction* which God designs for man *as man*, not for man as a Jew or Greek or Roman, or man of a particular age, but timeless and raceless man. And we must not imagine, because much of this instruction was first given to particular persons, that its design was limited to them. In most cases, God sighted mankind through individuals, and this fact lifts these Scriptures up in unfading lustre.

We find it in the portrayal of *human nature and human need*. What man is as a spiritual being,—the light that flashes through this enigma of enigmas and makes it a transparency as to origin, character, possibilities, and wants—this makes a large luminous section of revelation, extending from Genesis to the Apocalypse.

We find it in the record of *the life, mission, and work of Christ*, and the intertwined redemptive truth and history. This lifts up into prominence and permanent influence, around him who is “the Light of the World,” all the involved central lines of Scripture, in prophecy, type, fulfilment, doctrine, and duty; as, when one raises a net spread over a large area by lifting it at the middle, all the parts rise with it.

We find it in the revealed *conditions* on which man is to come into possession of the blessings which Christ came to bring. These conditions are made for man as man, not for man as rich or poor or of one age or nation or colour rather than another. These Scriptures are fixed stars in the Biblical firmament.

We find it in the *elements and graces of Christian character* made known as the standard of piety. God having prepared internal Christianity—or Christianity as a spiritual life—for the race, and the race for Christianity, the expression of this remains in its essential spirit a part of the vital revelation and law for mankind. If Christ is the Light of the world, this is the lighthouse in which the light shines, and it can never grow dim till that goes out.

It appears, moreover, in the *promises*. These open a sight of the way in which God comes to the yearnings of his children. They reveal the gracious disposition of the unchangeable One. Hence they remain ever the same. It comes out in the expressions of *representative experience*. There are in the Bible experiences of struggling men, torn by the deepest passions, trials, sorrows, to which human nature is subject, who are yet trying to lead devout lives, and turn to God for help, and there are experiences of those lifted up to the highest joy and trust and faith. These are the song or chant or wail of the godly in similar moods in all ages. When needed and sought, they answer to the largest drafts of the desire of sympathy or utterance; as heart answers to heart, or face to face in water. To others not needing them, or not seeking them, they may be no more than mirrors curtained behind thick folds, or mummies in whose wrappings are hidden living seeds. Such Scriptures as the Psalms live evermore; they only wait for those to live and come along who can recognise the supply of their wants in them.

It is manifest in the *lessons of sacred history*. Through this run as lines of light principles and methods of the divine government which can never cease to be instructive to mankind. In one sense, history is special, once for all, and never repeats itself. But even in secular history, there is a philosophy of history, an undercurrent of principles running through it which constitute its rationale; and these principles live and repeat themselves in many forms and places and combinations. The discovery of them furnishes instruction and wisdom for after ages. In sacred history this philosophy of history is portrayed by inspired pens, and we can see its springs and principles on every page. Sacred history is live history, transparent history, a permanent fountain of wisdom. Even those

portions of the narrative that fall into the category of the formal lead the way to the grand and significant portions, as the walls extending from ancient Piræus led the traveller up to Athens.

Still further, there is inlaid in the word of God a *wealth of meaning that does not come specifically into sight* in any of these classes, and defies enumeration. There are latent meanings which spring out of their hiding-places and confront the devout. The Bible differs from other books in having unexpected adaptations, in being loaded, when supposed to be empty, with effective charges, which the Spirit discharges when the proper object is in range. It is pervaded as with a divine electricity; and, ever and again as one traverses it, led by the Spirit, he draws the spark and feels the effect. Exegetically, logically, in the letter, these meanings may not be there, any more than the light stored up in certain precious stones does not reveal its presence on previous examination, but when the stones are carried into a dark room they shine nevertheless. Shall we say that this effect, in either case—in the former more than in the latter—is accidental, or dependent on the mood of the observer, and no part of the divine intent, no part of a subtle divine inlay of use and possibility? Very well; say it. Nevertheless the fact remains; and that is all that concerns us here. The fact is, the Bible is vital in many parts and places to susceptible spirits, where it appears merely formal.

Such are the elements—the formal and the vital—which make up the wondrous word of God. We do not expect to have said anything to enable one to go through the Bible and label every passage with its appropriate designation. We have had no such object in view. The attempt would indicate an entire misapprehension of the nature and object of the book. It is given to furnish man light, but to furnish it in a way that shall make it an instrument of spiritual training. If it were capable of being thus at once and unmistakably separated into two parts—a fiery column of light, however grand, on the one hand, and a heap of ashes, however small, on the other—calling for no discriminations, instantly confronting one with the living divine message, and at the same time disclosing the unimportant elements sifted away from it—it would cease to be the book of moral testing and education it was designed to

be. As it is, it is a vast sacred region full of wondrous truths and disclosures for the seeking, sympathetic mind, but veiling its blessings from averted and repellent natures. Those who traverse it to find for themselves the good in it are put on their seekings. The divine help therein to them, like God himself in nature, is near, but not an obtrusive presence. The law is, that they should seek, if haply they might feel after and find it, though it be not far from every one of us.

In this way, the necessity of reaching the wealth of the vital through the formal, and feeling out the real divine meaning of the word, makes the book one of extreme educational value, morally. The difficulty is with us. The meanings almost come out in our faces. But our eyes and hearts are holden that we cannot perceive them. We must be ever weighing, sifting, searching, to find the fulness of the divine thought. We are put to feeling after the deep spiritual teachings and aims. We must throw ourselves on the leadings of the gracious Spirit. We must use the helps of prayer, study, thought, to reach the significant depths. It is a question of spiritual discernment and sympathy, and ability to be led by the Spirit having guardianship over the mysteries recorded. It is not an affair of double senses in the sacred pages; or of esoteric instruction for the initiated—save as the grace of God initiates; or, prominently, of scholarship and learning—except as the devout learn of Jesus. But when we are in sympathy with the book, inwardly susceptible and responsive and led, messages flash from unexpected places—messages of light, duty, privilege, support, cheer. The Divine Spirit in us and the Divine Spirit in the word find each other in a thrill of recognition. Apparently barren and unprofitable portions—dull history, abandoned ritualism, obsolete requirements—may be the scene of these glad surprises.

It may be objected to the view we have presented, that it introduces an element of uncertainty and difficulty into the interpretation of Scripture,—leaves us, in reference to some things, still in doubt whether they are authoritative to us, and compels us to search for the truth through labyrinthine retreats with great painstaking and mortal risks. But uncertainty and peril are incidents, perhaps conditions, of moral training everywhere. Doubtless it would save trouble if the Bible were to

hand out to us its truth in a compact solid mass, like a sledge-hammer, with which instantly to strike down all doubt or gainsaying; or if it caused it to rise before us in one exact definite column of light, with no intermingling of light and shade, no gradations towards darkness. But this would be contrary to all God's methods of conducting moral training in other departments. It would save trouble if conscience always led us magisterially, like a sheriff taking one by the collar and conducting him through the street. Doubtless it would be easier for parents always to be told authoritatively the best way of dealing with their children. Doubtless it would greatly abridge our inquiries and anxieties if full divine intimations were flashed on all questions of social duty. But God nowhere trains us in that way, the way of spiritual dwarfage. He leads us along dizzy heights overhanging bottomless abysses, where we must be on the alert. His method is to provide enough light for those who seek and accept it, but in a measure to veil it from others. Is it strange, then, that we find the Bible in harmony with this style of training? Is it strange that it must be studied and interpreted as from within itself, by a mind in sympathy with it; that many of its meanings gradually dawn on the soul, as they are needed and welcomed; and that, all the way along, it is at once a test and an instrument of moral training? Is it strange that, while most of its central and practical teachings are plain enough, taking it as a book no one can put his mind on the exact living messages of God in it in their fulness, only as he is spiritually led and enlightened in a process of grand moral awakening and enlargement? At any rate, whatever may be our theories on the subject, this, historically, is the nature of the book; and it is not a question of choices with us what kind of a Bible we would like, but what kind we have, and of duty to recognise the fact, and harmonise our beliefs, habits, and defences with it.

It may be objected, further, that this view leaves the impression that the exterior and structural element is the prominent one, and that the valuable part lurks vaguely somewhere in diminutive and intangible places in the book. Just the opposite is true.

It must be remembered that in products that spring up from an inner principle, giving it support and body, the formal is

the prominent part, while the energy which makes that what it is, pervading and animating it, remains out of sight. It must be felt out and divined by the seeing spirit, rather than seen by the bodily eye. Take the marvellous Divine Word himself. To many minds all that is to be seen of him is the outward man, the historic Jesus, the visible dweller in Palestine. The external details cover and exhaust the conception. But to a deeper insight there appears, back of that outward life, back of that phenomenal humanity, a fulness of Divine Energy, Love, Personality, that pervades, saturates, and overflows every step, act, and moment of the historic career and the visible personage. When we see the Being and the life, interiorly, not outwardly alone, we discover that the spiritual and Divine not only vitalises the external in every part, but infinitely transcends it in worth and glory. So, at first sight, the outward element of Scripture may seem, to persons of little spiritual insight, as they make the distinction and glance over the subject, to be the more prominent; but when we come in true sympathy to weigh the permeating truths, relating to the wondrous redemption, God's being and government, man's nature, needs, possibilities, and perils; the outlook into moral and spiritual principles; the horoscope of the future of humanity here and beyond, in the volume; when we take in the interior living element, the Bible within the Bible, and see these grand, wide-reaching, fadeless realities pervading and outreaching the book, as the Divine pervades and outreaches the apparent in the life of Christ; when our vision is anointed to grasp and estimate the spiritual side,—we realise that the formal retires to an obscure and inconsiderable position, and that the vital rises in a halo of glory above and crowns it.

I. E. DWINELL.

ART. VIII.—*The Lord's Supper.*¹

IN the remarks which we propose to make upon this subject, we have in our view the needs of the great body of private members of the Church rather than the needs of the ministers

¹ From the *Southern Presbyterian Review*.

of the gospel ; although we are not without hope of being able to say something which may serve to impart additional clearness to the views of some ministers who have not made the subject a matter of special study. Observation and experience have convinced us that there is not a little confusion, if not some error, in the notions entertained by many intelligent Presbyterians in regard to the nature and design of this ordinance, and to the mode in which it conduces to the sanctification of believers. Fatal errors in regard to it were taught in the Church for ages ; and so inveterate have these errors become, so thoroughly had they poisoned the life of Christians, that even the great men who were raised up by Divine Providence and employed as its instruments in the work of reform in the sixteenth century, failed to reach any harmony of views among themselves concerning it ; and an ordinance which had been established by the Saviour as the most impressive symbol of the union and communion of his people, became the occasion of bitter contentions and divisions. Its mission, like the mission of the Redeemer himself, seemed to be that of bringing a sword, not peace, on the earth. The history of the Church scarcely records anything better suited to humble us and make us distrustful of our unaided understandings, than the debates at the colloquy of Marburg, and especially the obstinate weakness of Luther in defending a position as utterly untenable as that of the Papists themselves. The cask preserves the odour of the first liquor that is put into it ; and the error of Luther still lingers in the noble Church which has been called by his name. But are Presbyterians free from error in regard to this ordinance ? Their doctrinal standards are, as we believe ; but we also believe that the ghosts of the departed errors of Popery still linger about the Communion-table even in our own Church. This is our apology, if apology be needed, for the present writing.

We have in the New Testament four several accounts of the institution of the Supper. The last of these is found in the eleventh chapter of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians ; and being the last in the order of time, as well as the most complete, it was doubtless designed by the Saviour to be the chief directory for the Church in celebrating this ordinance.

So the instinct of the Church seems to have decided ; and we shall be guided in what follows by this directory.

I. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that this ordinance was instituted by the Lord himself. “For I have received of the Lord,” says the apostle, “that which also I delivered unto you” (verse 23). It is no ordinance of man, but an ordinance of God in Christ. It is a *positive* institution, not *moral* ; that is, the obligation to observe it rests not upon “the nature of things”—the nature of God, the nature of man, or the relations of God and man as modified by the gospel—but upon the sovereign appointment of God. Given a knowledge of the gospel and of those new relations which the death of our Lord Jesus Christ has constituted betwixt him and us redeemed sinners, then the obligation to remember his death, with the liveliest emotions of gratitude, faith, and repentance, immediately arises and suggests itself. The relations cannot be recognised, without feeling the obligation. This is the *moral* side of the matter. But to remember him and commemorate his death in this particular method, to wit, by assembling before a table, and eating bread and drinking wine together, would never have suggested itself to us in the way of duty. No obligation would have been felt, and none would have existed. But the moment the command is given—“Do this in remembrance of me”—the obligation arises. It is created by the command. This is the *positive* side of the matter.

There are some inferences of immense importance to be drawn from this fact, that our Lord by his own sovereign will ordained this feast.

1. If it be an expression of his sovereign will, and no reason exists for celebrating the Supper but the bare command, then a refusal to go to the Lord’s table involves the guilt of *rebellion*. Rebellion differs from other crimes in this, that while other crimes are transgressions of particular laws or commandments, this crime is aimed at the very source of all law, the authority itself upon which all law rests and by which alone it can be enforced. Murder may be committed by one who is thinking of nothing but the gratification of a private purpose or impulse of cupidity, lust, ambition, or revenge ; but rebellion is always an attempt to subvert the government itself,

or, at the very least, a denial of allegiance to it. Such was the crime of our first father in Eden. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was of the nature of a positive institution. The prohibition, "Thou shalt not eat of it," and that alone, created the difference between it and the other trees of the garden, as to man's right of enjoyment. It was the expression and the symbol of God's sovereign right to control his creature. To eat of the fruit of that tree, therefore, was to deny that sovereign right, and to say as plainly as an act could say, "I will not have this God to rule over me." It was not the transgression of a single commandment; but a comprehensive repudiation of man's whole allegiance, an exhaustive denial of God's right to issue any command at all. So here: the refusal to obey this command, "Do this in remembrance of me," on the part of any one who understands the case, is equivalent to a rejection of the whole authority of Jesus Christ. It is a very solemn and emphatic way of saying, "I will not have this man to reign over me." Let this be pondered by those who say that they can be as good Christians out of the visible Church as in it.

2. If this ordinance be a symbol of Christ's supreme authority in the Church, and there is no valid reason for observing it but his command, it will follow that he who goes to the Lord's table, with the consciousness of being impelled, only or mainly, by the desire to obey him, to remember him and his death, in the way that he himself has appointed, has good reason to look for a blessing. His obedience, as such, will be rewarded. We do not mean that a mere mechanical compliance with the law of this ordinance, or of any other, will entitle a man to receive a blessing; much less are we believers in what has been called in the Papacy the *opus operatum*, that the sacraments produce their appropriate effects whenever administered, unless some bar is opposed to prevent their operation. Our meaning is, that beside the effects which an ordinance is adapted in its own nature to produce, a special manifestation of God's favour may be expected to follow the essential spirit of obedience itself; and that where the spirit of obedience exists, the other effects, which have been alluded to, may be more confidently expected to take place. To illustrate: the memorials of a Saviour's broken body and of his blood shed, are

adapted by a law of our nature to awaken certain emotions and to call into exercise certain spiritual faculties or habits, such as love, gratitude, faith, repentance, etc.; and this awakening and exercise might take place in the heart of a sincere believer (a Quaker, for instance), when the divine institution of the ordinance was not clear to his own mind, or even when it was clear to him that it was not of divine institution, but was only a pleasant ceremony of purely human origin. What we contend for is that such a believer would not be entitled to expect as large a blessing as another who should come with a full assurance that it was Christ's own ordinance he was coming to, and that he was coming because he believed it to be Christ's.

3. This view is important, further, as helping to settle the question, in a given case, whether a person ought to go to the Communion. If it were a mere question of privilege, one ought perhaps to wait for absolute assurance of his right. But if it be a question of duty, then a lower degree of evidence ought to convince him that he is bound to perform it.

II. It is a *teaching* ordinance: it is designed to set forth some fundamental doctrines of the gospel. All teaching is by signs. The two kinds of signs which God chiefly employs in teaching us are words and symbols. Words, indeed, are symbols in a certain sense; but they are here distinguished as a class of signs differing from symbols. Words are, in their origin, signs addressed to the sense of hearing. A word is a *vox*; and if it be not a sign also, it is a *vox et præterea nihil*. The written word is simply the record of these signs as written, appealing no doubt to the sense of sight, but appealing remotely to the ear. Symbols appeal to the eye mainly. In the sixth chapter of John's Gospel, we have the record of a discourse of our Saviour, in which he announced to the people the same great truths which are set forth in the Lord's Supper (see especially verses 35, 48-58). The comparison of that discourse with 1 Cor. xi. 24-26 will give us a clear idea of the difference between teaching by words and by symbols. In the one, the Lord appears as describing the sacrifice which he was to offer for the sins of the world, and the method by which that sacrifice should become effectual for the life of the sinner. In the other, the Lord appears as actually presenting his flesh to his

people under the symbol of bread, and they appear as actually receiving and eating it. (Compare John vi. 51-58 with 1 Cor. xi. 24.) It is the same truth in both ; but, in the one case, conveyed in the language of words—words in the highest degree figurative, but still words ; in the other, conveyed in the form of symbolical elements and actions. Considering the Supper as a system of signs, its whole value lies in the truths which it presents and exhibits.¹

Now note one or two important inferences from this view:—

1. There is no special mystery about this ordinance. It began to be called a “mystery,” a “tremendous mystery,” in the Church so early as the middle of the second century ; and as words react mightily on thought, men began to think that there must be a mystery in it ; and as they could not find any, it became necessary to put some into it. Hence the very word “Sacrament,” which meant mystery :² hence the doctrine of the “Real Presence” in all its forms. If this simple memorial of Christ’s death could not be made a miracle for the senses, it must at least become a mystery for faith. Something must be put into it, to justify the extravagant language which was commonly employed in regard to it.

The mystery is not in the ordinance. How men can be taught by the use of visible signs and symbols, it is not harder to understand than how they can be taught by words. Not as hard perhaps. The mystery is in the truth, not in the vehicle ; the mystery of the incarnation, of “God manifest in the flesh ;” the mystery of grace, condescension, and love in the Saviour’s death ; the mystery of the believer’s vital union with his Saviour ; the mystery of glory, when that life which is now “hid with Christ in God” shall be revealed in the revelation of Christ “our life ;” all these mysteries are real and ineffable.

¹ We have taken for granted, it will be observed, the common Protestant interpretation of the words, “This is my body ;” this is the sign of, or this represents, my body. This is not the place for exposing the absurdities of the Papal doctrine of transubstantiation—a doctrine fatal to all rational belief in the Bible as the word of God, and the mother of the most desolating scepticism.

² The Latin version of the Bible which goes under the name of “The Vulgate” commonly uses the word *sacramentum* to represent the Greek word *mystery* ; and the English reader by substituting “sacrament” for “mystery” in Ephesians v. 32, will understand how ignorant people might be made to believe that the Bible makes marriage a sacrament.

But they may be and are set forth in the preaching of the word as well as in the Supper. Is there any mystery in preaching?

2. This view furnishes an answer to the question, how the Lord's Supper conduces to the sanctification of believers. The answer is, By the truth it sets forth. Its operation is not physical. Men ate the manna in the wilderness, and died the death of the body. Men have eaten the bread of the Supper, and have died the death both of the body and of the soul. Its operation is not magical; its effects are not like those ascribed to the wizard; the words of institution are not an incantation. All such notions are the dreams of drivelling superstition, or the devices of an ambitious and avaricious priesthood, unsupported by any evidence and in the highest degree insulting to God. There is too much reason to fear that there are remains of this superstition lingering in the minds of some Christians who are far from deserving to be described as superstitious.

The truth is the only instrument that God uses for the sanctification of his people (John xvii. 17; 2 Thess. ii. 13; James i. 18; 1 Pet. i. 22-25; ii. 1, 2); while his Holy Spirit is the only sanctifier. Peter, in the passage just cited, compares the word of God to the seed which determines the nature of the life and all its manifestations. Paul uses (Rom. vi. 17) the figure of a mould or type to express the relation of the life of a believer to the truth—"that form of doctrine whereto ye were delivered" (see the rendering in the margin). The metal must be fused in order to take the impression of the mould; the wax must be softened in order to take the impression of the seal. This softening and fusing of the heart is the work of the Holy Spirit alone. He alone gives the life, and he alone invigorates and develops it; but he imparts it and develops it according to the truth as recorded in the Scriptures and symbolised in the sacraments. It is as easily understood, therefore, how the sacraments conduce to our sanctification as how the reading or preaching of the word does. There is a great mystery in the Spirit's operations (John iii. 8) both by word and sacraments; but the mystery is not greater when he works by the latter than when he works by the former.

There are two circumstantial differences, however, which it may be well to note in passing—

(1.) The truths presented in the sacraments, especially in

the Lord's Supper, are presented in a more condensed form than in the word. The light in the old creation, to borrow an illustration from Owen, was sufficient to illuminate the world while it was diffused everywhere before the work of the fourth day ; but it was more glorious and penetrating when reduced and contracted into the body of the sun. So the truth concerning Christ scattered up and down the Bible is sufficient for the illumination of the Church ; but it is far more glorious when reduced and contracted into the Lord's Supper. All the rays of Christ's glory are here converged, as it were, into one burning focus, and consequently better suited to set the soul of the believer on fire.

(2.) The other difference is that, in the Supper, the power of the truth is increased by the active part which the communicant takes in the celebration of the ordinance. There are symbolical actions as well as symbolical elements used in the Lord's Supper. The action of the administrator in offering the elements to the communicants is symbolical of the free offer of Jesus and all the benefits of his redemption to those who will truly receive them. "Take, eat," etc. The action of the communicants in taking the elements and in eating and drinking them is symbolical of their reception of Jesus and the benefits of his redemption. In reading or hearing the word, there is no profession made as to the state of mind and heart of the reader or hearer. In the act of communicating, there is a profession made of receiving and resting upon him whose body and blood are symbolically offered to them ; and by a law of human nature, when such a profession is sincerely made, the truth is brought nearer to the soul of him who makes it, and is in more favourable conditions for making an impression.

We come now to consider more particularly what the truth is which is symbolised in the Supper. "My body broken for you" (verse 24); "this is my blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many, for the remission of sins" (Matt. xxvi. 28. Compare Mark xiv. 25 ; Luke xxii. 20). The fundamental truth here set forth is the substitution of Jesus for the sinner, of his life for the sinner's. This was the theory of the bleeding sacrifice under the Mosaic law. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood ; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement (Hebrew, *covering*) for your lives ; for it is

the blood that maketh a covering by the life that is in it" (Fairbairn's rendering: see his *Typology*). Life is substituted for life; the life of the victim for the life of the sinner which has been forfeited to the law; the life of the victim becoming, thereby, a covering for the forfeited life of the sinner, and hence an at-one-ment,¹ a bringing-into-one, a reconciliation, of God and the sinner—these are the great ideas set forth in this precious ordinance of the Church, ideas without which the gospel is but "the play of Hamlet without the part of Hamlet."

The great purpose of the ordinance is to set forth the death of Christ. "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew (announce, proclaim) the Lord's death till he come" (verse 26).

We are so familiar with this simple rite that we are not as much impressed as we should otherwise be with the strangeness of it. Men are accustomed to celebrate the birth-days of great benefactors of their country or their race. Their death-days have been lamented and deplored as putting a permanent arrest upon their beneficent career. "In that very day their thoughts perish." The death-days of the Christian martyrs were celebrated by their brethren with appropriate ceremonies; but they were celebrated as their *natalitia*, their birth-days, upon which they entered into glory, honour, and immortality. It must be borne in mind also that these days of martyrdom could never have been celebrated if Jesus had not died; that his death alone made them birth-days into glory. The death of Manes was celebrated by the Manichæans; but it was no doubt an impious imitation of the Church's festival.

But the death of Jesus is not only celebrated by the Church, that vast communion of his worshippers, but celebrated as a festival, as a feast of thanksgiving, as a Eucharist. How strange! There must be something very unique about this death; some quality or feature in which it refuses to communicate with any other death which has ever occurred amongst

¹ Atonement is here used in its proper etymological sense of *reconciliation*, expressing the result of an expiatory offering rather than the process of expiation itself. This last is the ordinary acceptation of the word, and that in which our authorised version of the Bible uses both noun and verb, with rare exceptions. One of these exceptions is in Romans v. 11, where the Greek word rendered "atonement" means *reconciliation*, and is so rendered by our translators in the margin.

men. What is it? The answer is, that the death of Jesus was to him what the death of no other man could ever be to that man—the very end and purpose of his birth. Jesus was born for the express purpose of dying. His body was prepared (Psalm xl. 6; Heb. x. 5) in order that it might be broken; his blood was made to flow in its channels, in order that it might be shed. It is indeed “appointed unto all men once to die;” but this is not the end for which they were created. But the body of Jesus was created for this end (see John x. 18). This was the commandment or commission of the Father, that the Son should come into the world and take a human life, in order that he might lay it down, and then take it again. Upon the supposition that Jesus was a mere man and a mere martyr, this passage of John is utterly unintelligible. If he came into this world, as some monk of St. Bernard might go out among the snows of the Alps, not for the purpose of offering up his life, but only at the risk of losing it, in the prosecution of his benevolent mission, then the gospel history is an insoluble riddle. No! No! He was indeed the wisest of all teachers, the most illustrious of all the martyrs of philanthropy; but he was infinitely more: the great High Priest, performing a sublime and noble act of worship in the offering up of himself a sacrifice to divine justice for the glory of the Father and the salvation of the lost. The Unitarian would place him in the same class with Paul. Paul is indignant at the outrage done to his Master. “Was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul?” In the esteem of that great apostle, Jesus stood alone, in solitary glory, the Saviour of sinners. The only glory Paul claimed was that of preaching the unsearchable riches of this Saviour “without charge” to his fellow-sinners (1 Cor. ix. 15-23).

The death of Jesus, then, was not a mere incident in his history which might or might not have taken place, and yet the religion he taught have remained the same. It constitutes, together with his resurrection from the dead, the very *essence* of his religion. So Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, sums up the religion which he preached; and it is a true instinct which has led the Church to regard the Supper as her most significant symbol and ensign. Around it her fiercest battles have been fought both with avowed enemies and with pretended friends.

This view explains the impotence, the confessed impotence, of the Papacy to give peace to its deluded votaries. It has taken away from the laity the cup, the symbol of the blood, and it virtually denies the efficacy of the Saviour's death by the *repetition* of his sacrifice (Heb. x. 1-4, 11-14) in the abomination of the Mass. Compare now the views of one of its "saints" who died more than a century before transubstantiation became the established dogma within its domain, and more than three centuries before the "communion in one kind" became the established dogma. In a direction for the visitation of the sick which is ascribed to St. Anselm of Canterbury, we have the following :¹—

"Dost thou believe that thou canst not be saved but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, Yes; then let it be said to him, Go to then, and whilst thy soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment; and otherwise I will not contend nor enter into judgment with thee. And if he shall say unto thee that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and my sins. If he shall say unto thee, that thou hast deserved damnation; say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits for my own, which I should have, and have not. If he say that he is angry with thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger."

He who by an unction from the Holy One (1 John ii. 20) knows this death, can afford to despise the "extreme unction" administered by a juggling priest *in articulo mortis*.

The peculiar efficacy of the blood of Jesus is indicated by calling it "the blood of the new covenant." The new covenant suggests an old. Blood was the life of all the covenants before Christ, from Abel down. With which of these old covenants does the Saviour tacitly compare the covenant sealed with his own blood when he calls it the "new" covenant? Evidently the covenant of redemption which was sealed with the blood of the Paschal lamb, as recorded in the twelfth chapter of Exodus. This is the most natural supposition under the circumstances. The Saviour was at this very time celebrating

¹ Cited by John Owen, *Treatise on Justification*.—*Works* (Goold's edition, Edinburgh, 1850-55, T. and T. Clark), vol. v. p. 17.

the feast of the Passover with his disciples. The Passover covenant was that which then occupied their thoughts. The Sinaitic covenant was more a covenant with the Church as redeemed than a covenant for its redemption; a covenant for the nurture and sanctification of pardoned sinners rather than a covenant for the pardon of sins; although the fact that it also was sealed and ratified with blood shows that the great idea of expiation was not suffered to drop out of the memory. A bloody sacrifice for expiation must continue for ever to be the ground of all communion of even redeemed sinners with God. That the Passover covenant is referred to by the Saviour is further manifest from 1 Cor. v. 7, "Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us."

Such being the reference, the blood being the blood of redemption, the people of God are reminded of the great truths, (1) That they needed to be redeemed. All Israel by nature were in the same condemnation with the Egyptians. The sovereign election of God and the blood made the only difference. (2) That this redemption was to be accomplished—(a) by a work of righteous judgment upon the serpent's seed (compare Ezek. xxix. 3 ff.; Rev. xii. 3; xiii. 1, 2; 1 John iii. 8); and (b) by the suffering of the woman's seed typified in the lamb. (3) That the efficacy of the expiation for the salvation of the seed of God depended upon its being "sprinkled," which could only be done by *faith*.

All this may be readily applied to the redemption achieved by Jesus. There is one important difference, however, between the blood of the Paschal lamb and the blood of "the Lamb of God" with regard to their efficacy. There was no intrinsic power in the blood of the Paschal lamb to protect the house of an Israelite. The life of no mere animal is an equivalent for the life of man. The efficacy, therefore, was due only to the sovereign appointment of God. Far different is the efficacy of the blood of him "who through the eternal Spirit (or, by an eternal Spirit, *i.e.* by means of a divine nature—compare Rom. i. 4) offered himself without spot to God." It is real and intrinsic, so that if we could separate (which is not possible) the offering of Jesus from the appointment of God, it would still be efficacious to "purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God," in the case of every sinner who

should trust in it. (See the argument of the apostle in Heb. ix. 13, 14, where the whole force of the "how much more" lies in the fact of the intrinsic efficacy of the blood of Christ.) It is impossible that the soul which has been sprinkled with his blood should ever be lost, not only because God says it shall not be, but because "the nature of things" forbids it, the nature of God, the nature of Jesus, the nature of his priesthood, the nature of his sacrifice. Truly we have strong consolation who have fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before us (Heb. vi. 18). All this is confirmed by the fact that the believer is made a partaker of the life of Christ. The Israelites ate the flesh of the Paschal lamb; but there was no community of life between them and the lamb. But there is a real community of life between the believer and his Lord. He lives in the believer by his Spirit, and the believer lives in him by faith; is a member "of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones" (Eph. v. 30, and compare John vi. 53-58). This is a great mystery; as real and glorious as it is incomprehensible—the union of Christ and his Church.

Another comforting inference to be drawn from this reference to the covenant for redemption out of Egypt, is that the safety of the believer depends wholly upon the sprinkled blood, and not upon his personal character; though it is true that the believer has been sanctified also. We are strongly tempted here to quote, in illustration of this point, more than one eloquent paragraph from Dr. Stuart Robinson's *Discourses on Redemption*, Discourse 5. But as we take pleasure in believing that this precious volume is very widely circulated, we shall content ourselves with a single paragraph:—

"Here is a genuine child of faithful Abraham, who has sometimes obtained a glimpse of the great truth involved in the shed blood, and experienced, in view of it, inexpressible comfort and peace. But the weakness of the flesh, and the temptations of sin, and the harassing cares of life, have overshadowed his spiritual vision, and hidden the light from his view. The remembrance of many a sin returns and sits heavily upon his conscience, and thereby darkens his views of the great doctrine of the atonement for sin. But still, at the command of Jehovah, through Moses and the elders, he prepares the lamb, and sprinkles the blood. Yet as the shades of night thicken and all are waiting in anxious suspense for the blow of vengeance and of deliverance, imagination is busy, and fears and terrors, as dark spirits, rise from the depths of his soul. And now unbelief suggests in

view of the array of past sins which memory ~~passes~~ before him, 'Can a little blood, sprinkled on the door-post, blot out *such* sins?' Can the mere acceptance of such a call and command from Jehovah purge the conscience of such guilt? However this blood might avail for the sins of the poor wretch who under the burden of transgression cries out, for the first time, to Jehovah in his distress—yet can it avail for one who hath proved faithless to vows, and buried out of sight his very covenant, under a multitude of transgressions? O thou of little faith! hast thou not listened to the promise? He said not—'When I find a tenement wherein there is no sin, I will pass over.' Nor—'When I find one who has, on the whole, not gone far astray, I will pass over.' Nor—'When I find a strong and active faith like Abraham's, I will pass over'—but, 'When I SEE THE BLOOD, I WILL PASS OVER.'"

Here a difficulty may be raised. We can understand, it may be said, how all the Israelites could be "passed over" if they had the blood upon the door-posts, no matter what their personal character might be; how Korah, Dathan, and Abiram could be as safe as Moses himself; for this was a redemption from mere temporal death. But surely we cannot assert that the blood of Jesus confers safety from the stroke of eternal death in the same way. We answer, that the bondage from which the blood of Jesus delivers is the bondage of sin, the bondage of its curse and of its dominion in the soul; and wherever there is true faith in his blood, there is deliverance from the dominion as well as from the guilt of sin. The deliverance from its guilt is absolute and perfect, and is the same in all believers, and the same at the moment they first believe, in degree and in kind, as at the bar of God when they shall be "openly acknowledged and acquitted." There are, and from the nature of the case can be, no degrees in justification; for the meritorious ground thereof is the righteousness of Christ imputed. To that glorious righteousness nothing can be added, and he who is clothed with it is as fully justified as the Saviour himself is. But in sanctification there are degrees—all degrees from the first blush of dawn to the splendours of the noonday. Our *title* to the heavenly inheritance, if we be true believers, is absolutely perfect from the moment we believe; our *fitness* for the inheritance is a thing of growth. The two, however, cannot be separated. Wherever there is any true faith in a sinner, there we find a man who is both justified and sanctified.

Still, the safety of the man is found in his justification, and that depends upon the blood (Rom. iii. 24, 25 ; v. 9) ; and as all believers are equally justified, they are all equally safe. The sensible evidence of the justification may and does vary according to a variety of circumstances, and, among these circumstances, the degree of sanctification ; but the justification is the same in all, and, consequently, the safety from the stroke of death. Hence, when the question is, Are we safe from the stroke of the destroyer ? let our eye be fixed upon the blood ! Let us "take ten looks at Christ for one at ourselves !"

III. The Supper is a *sealing* ordinance. By this is not meant that it makes an impression upon the soul as the seal upon the wax. This belongs to it as a sign or system of signs, as presenting the truth to our minds. This has been already explained and guarded ; and the sovereign agency of the Holy Ghost as the only Sanctifier and Comforter has been emphatically asserted. The meaning is that this sacrament, like that of baptism, is a seal appended to the gospel, the charter of our salvation, for the purpose of confirming to our weak faith the promises of God (see Rom. iv. 11 ; Acts ii. 38, 39 ; Heb. vi. 16-18). We are all familiar with the use of seals for a similar purpose among men (Gen. xxxviii. 18, 25 ; Jer. xxxii. 10, 11, 12, 14, 44).¹ God has given us his word, his oath, his visible seals ; so that it would seem to be impossible to doubt. When we handle the elements of the Lord's Supper, we hold, as it were, Christ and his salvation in our hands ; we see them, we feel them ; we incorporate them with our very selves. If we believe the evidence of our senses, why should we doubt that Jesus and his salvation are ours ?

On the other hand, by partaking of the Lord's Supper, the communicants seal their engagement to be the Lord's (*Shorter Catechism*, Question 94). This engagement is first made in baptism, and then solemnly renewed from time to time in the other sacrament (*Confession of Faith*, chap. xxix. § 1). In

¹ A peculiar and almost mysterious importance has always been ascribed by jurists to the great seal of England. "It is held that, if the keeper of the seal should affix it, without taking the royal pleasure, to a patent of peerage or a pardon, though he may be guilty of a high offence, the instrument cannot be questioned by any court of law, and can be annulled only by an Act of Parliament."—Macaulay's *History of England*, vol. ii.

every celebration of this ordinance there is an exchange of seals between God and the believer (John iii. 33); a fresh ratification of the covenant of grace, in which God promises to be the Father and God of the believer, and the believer promises to be his son and to render to him the obedience of a son. It is a fresh pledge of God's faithfulness to us, and a fresh pledge of our faithfulness to him.

It follows from this view of the Supper as a seal, that it is valuable and valid only so long as it is appended to the gospel charter. Cut off the seal from a human covenant or deed of conveyance, and it becomes utterly worthless. It conveys nothing, it confirms nothing. Hence the worthlessness of the sacraments, so-called, in the Papacy, which has virtually denied the fundamental doctrines of the gospel; and has so far laid aside the gospel as to make the sacraments the whole of religion.¹ According to its teaching, a sinner may be saved without knowing anything of the gospel, if he will only submit to the manipulations of the priest. It teaches that the sacraments not only signify grace, but convey it in every case in which a bar is not opposed to its operation. The sacraments, therefore, in the Papacy, do all that the gospel can do, and a great deal more: they save the soul, which the gospel never does without them. The Bible teaches that the sacraments (with the exception of baptism in its application to infants) are intended for the confirmation of faith in believers; Rome teaches that "by them all grace begins." Hence, no preaching is done, worth speaking of, in the Papacy, where it is the exclusive religion. In Mexico and Colombia, the pulpit is almost as silent as the grave. They have cut off the seals, and thrown away the charter; and with the seals, as magical charms, they pretend to work wonders which no eye can see. Let us guard against their fatal delusions, and bear in mind that the sacraments are only appendages to the gospel, and are utterly worthless without it. The sacraments are monuments without inscriptions, and their meaning and intent can only be known by the record.

IV. The Supper is a *commemorative* ordinance. "Do this

¹ "By these (the sacraments) all true righteousness begins, or being begun is increased, or being lost is restored."—*Concil. Trident. Decretum de Sacramentis*, Sess. 7. Proœmium.

in remembrance of me." The idea of a commemoration is implied in a great deal of what has already been said in explaining the significance of the rite. We here consider it only as the commemoration of a great event, the death of Jesus Christ. In this relation, it belongs to the mass of proofs by which the facts of the gospel history are authenticated to us. The celebration of this festival can be traced back through all the centuries to the time when Jesus is affirmed to have died, and no further. The Church has always professed to celebrate it in commemoration of his death. The reality of that death is therefore indisputably established. A similar argument might be used to establish the reality of his resurrection from the observance of the first day of the week (Sunday) as a commemorative ordinance: though, for obvious reasons, this argument is not of equal strength with the other. But we may take this occasion to remark that the death and resurrection of the Founder of Christianity are the only events in his history which God has commanded to be commemorated by the celebration of certain ordinances. All other commemorations are without authority, and tend only to impair the sense of obligation as to the observance of these two. In point of fact, the day of Christ's birth was not commemorated by a Christmas for nearly four centuries after his birth. Further, the *anniversary* celebration even of the death and resurrection of Jesus is without authority; and seems inconsistent with the proprieties of the case as acknowledged by those branches of the Church which observe these anniversaries. Why celebrate once a year, on Good Friday, an event which they celebrate once a month, and even daily? Why celebrate once a year, on Easter, an event which they celebrate every week?

Again, the commemorative character of this ordinance furnishes an answer to the objection which is often felt without being uttered, that it is a bald and simple ceremony. Even in our ordinary human life, no other than a simple memento is needed of a dead or absent friend; a ring or a lock of hair is sufficient. We cannot help observing the difference in this respect between the Jewish economy and the Christian. If we have never seen and conversed with one whose character and office we have been taught to respect and love, we need a minute and circumstantial description of his person, his

voice, his features, his gait, in order to recognise him when we see him. But having seen him and conversed with him, a very simple memorial is sufficient to recall his image and to evoke from the depths of the heart the emotions which he was accustomed to inspire when actually present. So to the Church before his advent, a very minute description of the Christ was needful ; and accordingly we find a complex system of symbols and types foreshadowing him, his priestly, kingly, and prophetic offices, and the leading events of his history. But to the Church since his advent in the flesh, these things are not needed ; and the multiplication of ceremonies in the Christian Church is a melancholy proof of the decline of love to him and of an eclipse of faith. We have indeed not seen the Saviour with our bodily eyes, but we have what is better (see John xvi. 7), the presence of the Holy Ghost, the " Paraclete," whose office it is to reveal him to us, to take of his things and show them to us, and so to glorify him (John xvi. 14). Where the Church has a large measure of the Spirit it will feel that the simple memorial which Jesus instituted is enough ; when the Spirit withdraws, and in proportion as he withdraws, the attempt will be made to compensate for his absence by ceremonial symbols which appeal to the senses and the imagination. We must walk either by faith or by sight. A life in the Spirit is a life of faith ; a life without the Spirit is a life of sense. Hence the horrible perversion of the Supper in the Papacy. Jesus is not known by faith through the Spirit ; and his very flesh and blood must be brought down under the " species " of bread and wine. Nominal Christians worship a wafer as their God !—an idolatry as brutal and senseless as that of the Israelites who worshipped a golden calf, which their own hands had made, as the God who had brought them out of Egypt.

The simplicity of the Supper is its recommendation. If it had a great intrinsic value, if it had any quality so charming or imposing as to fix the attention upon itself, there would be danger of its significance, Christ and his salvation, dropping out of sight ; the symbol would be in danger of usurping the place of the thing symbolised. The victors in the Grecian games were content with a wreath of laurel : the glory was not in the crown, but in the victory. The instinct of patriotism has

chosen as the flag of a country a worthless piece of bunting, or, at the most, a piece of silk ; and when the flag is given to the breeze, it is not the beauty of the cloth or of its folds which makes the heart of the patriot swell and throb, but the thought of the country it represents, the institutions, the laws, the wisdom of the cabinet, the prowess of the field of battle, the blessings of home and fireside,—in a word, the glory of the country and of its history. So the Christian of lively faith looks upon this simple ordinance of the Supper, the banner of the Church, and remembers with exultation the death by which death itself was slain and the principalities and powers of darkness spoiled ; he remembers the storms of fire and blood through which that banner has passed, and in which it has been held steadily and heroically aloft. He remembers the many instances in which he has himself conquered by this sign, or rather, the many instances in which the Saviour whose death is there represented has, by the power of that death, given him the victory. He looks upon it as the sure and certain pledge of final victory for the Church and for himself.

V. This leads us to note the relation of the Supper to the second coming of our Lord, as suggested in the 26th verse : “ For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord’s death *till he come.*” This is not designed merely to fix the limit in point of time, beyond which the ordinance is no longer to be observed. It does this ; but why is the celebration to cease ? Because then the whole work of redemption will have been accomplished ; that which was virtually done when Jesus upon the cross cried “ It is finished ” will have been actually done ; the whole body of the redeemed will then be complete—complete as to its number and complete as to all the parts and effects of redemption, the glorified spirit united with the glorified body, and the ransomed Church received with songs and everlasting joy upon its head into the marriage supper of the Lamb. Meantime, until the Church shall be blessed with that vision of her Lord, she is to celebrate and show forth his death in the observance of the Supper as the pledge and earnest of his coming. As this ordinance is a proof that he did come once “ to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself,” so it is a pledge, that, having put away sin, “ he shall appear the second time without sin unto salvation

unto them that look for him." There is a parallel here again between the Paschal supper and this. The Passover was a commemorative ordinance, commemorative of a redemption; but it was also prospective in its character. It looked back to the redemption of the Church out of Egypt: it looked forward to the redemption achieved upon the cross, and further still to that which Paul denominates "the redemption of the body." It is but one redemption throughout, in different instalments, as there is but one Church in different stages and different forms of manifestation. Hence every earlier instance of redemption is a pledge and earnest of the later and of the last. Hence the exodus out of Egypt, the death of the Lamb of God upon the cross, the advent of that Lamb again in glory, are all connected by an internal, moral, spiritual, and indissoluble bond. They constitute a golden chain like that in Rom. viii. 30. We need not be surprised therefore to find, in the vision of the rapt Seer of Patmos (Rev. xv.), "the song of Moses the servant of God," as well as "the song of the Lamb," sung by the harpers on the glassy sea. The victories are the victories of the same Redeemer and for the same Church; and it is meet that the whole body of the redeemed should sing both songs.

The principles upon which this connection of the different parts and stages of redemption rests are obvious enough. They are the immutability of God's nature, the immutability of his purposes and plan, and the necessary harmony and consistency of the parts of his plan. What he begins, he will complete (Phil. i. 6), and he must always act like himself. The apostles Peter and Jude use the same kind of argument to prove, against the Universalists and scoffers, that there must be a final judicial discrimination between the righteous and the wicked (2 Peter ii. 4-9; Jude 7). There has been; therefore there shall be. The arguments (many of them at least) used against the possibility of eternal punishment, if valid, would prove that God has never punished the wicked. But God has punished the wicked. Therefore the arguments are not valid. They are dashed in pieces against the mountains of *facts*. So redemption is an accomplished fact, and the believer in Jesus may argue, with perfect assurance, from the beginnings of redemption to its ultimate and glorious completion. The worthy communicant who sits down, with

fear and trembling perhaps, at the Lord's table, shall as certainly sit down at the marriage supper of the Lamb as it is certain that he lives.

VI. The mention of a "worthy" communicant suggests the last topic upon which the reader will be detained,—the qualifications for communion. Read 1 Cor. xi. 27-32. (*a*) It is plain that there is a worthy and an unworthy eating and drinking in this ordinance, and hence that it is not for all persons. It is not a mere exhibition of the truth, as in the preaching of the word. It is a setting forth of the covenant with its seal; and those alone are entitled to communicate who are in covenant with God and cordially accept its promises and its conditions. (*b*) The worthiness does not consist in being perfectly free from sin. The table is spread for those who are still encompassed with bodies of sin and death, and who sigh for deliverance. (*c*) Nor does it consist in a strong faith. Faith which is as a grain of mustard-seed, if it be indeed faith, may say to the mountain of sin, "Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea," and it shall be done. The feeblest faith has its hold upon Christ, and therefore upon salvation; and the seals of salvation belong to it. The Lord has babes in his family as well as adults; and Christ is the food for both—milk for the one, strong meat for the other. This is an ordinance for the nourishing of the weak as well as of the strong. The father is pleased with the stammering, inarticulate speech of the child in the arms, which is not yet able distinctly to recognise its filial relation to him, as well as with the clear manly address of the full-grown son who rejoices in that relation. Given the adoption, whether clearly recognised or not, and the right to this ordinance exists. (*d*) Nor does it consist in entire freedom from doubt as to "being in Christ, or as to due preparation" for the ordinance. The Larger Catechism of our Church says (Question 172): "One who doubteth of his being in Christ, or of his due preparation to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, may have true interest in Christ, though he is not yet assured thereof; and in God's account hath it, if he be duly affected with the apprehension of the want of it, and unfeignedly desires to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity: in which case (because promises are made, and this sacrament is appointed,

for the relief even of weak and doubting Christians), he is to bewail his unbelief, and labour to have his doubt resolved; and so doing, he may and ought to come to the Lord's Supper, that he may be further strengthened." (See the whole of the elaborate and admirable exposition in this Catechism, Questions 168-175.) (e) It consists in a knowledge of the Lord's body, an ability to discern, and an actual discerning of that body (see verse 29). The word "discern" and its related words are several times used by the apostle in this context. Thus exactly the same word occurs again in verse 31, and is rendered in our version "judge." So also the simple verb in verse 32, and the corresponding noun in verse 29 (unhappily rendered "damnation" in our version: as the reading is "judgment," which is given in the margin. Compare the corresponding verse in the first clause of verse 32). The dominant idea in verses 27-32 is that of judging and discerning or discriminating. This process is twofold, so far as the determination of our right to the Lord's table is concerned—(1) A judgment as to the Lord's body (verse 29); that this feast is no common meal, at which men are to satisfy their natural hunger, much less to drink themselves drunk (see verse 21); that it is a solemn act of worship; that this body of Jesus is to be "discriminated" from every other human body that was ever made in this, that it was made for the express purpose of being offered in sacrifice to God, for expiation and propitiation (see the exposition given in the preceding part of this Article). (2) A judgment of ourselves (verse 31, and compare verse 28 and 2 Cor. xiii. 5): "of our being in Christ; of our sins and wants; of the truth and measure of our knowledge, faith, repentance, love to God and the brethren, charity to all men; of our desires after Christ, and of our new obedience" (*Larger Catechism*, Question 171). As the observance of the Lord's Supper is a reasonable service, nothing less can be demanded of a communicant than a state of mind and heart corresponding with the truth exhibited in its elements and actions—a state of mind and heart which may be comprehensively described as one of faith. A worthy eating and drinking is an eating and drinking by faith. Faith is the mouth by which the flesh and blood of the Saviour are received (John vi. 35, 40,

3-57; *Confession of Faith*, chap. xxix. Art. vii.). He must be received as he is exhibited and offered, and in no other way. If he is exhibited and offered as a perfect satisfaction to divine justice for human guilt, as an expiatory sacrifice which has met all the demands of law; as an exemplary sacrifice also, illustrating the spirit of true obedience to the Father, a spirit of absolute self-renunciation for the glory of God and the good of man; then, in order to be worthy communicants, it is indispensable that we should have some apprehension of the justice of God, of the malignity of our guilt as sinners, of the necessity of satisfaction; that we should have some sympathy with the Spirit of Jesus, some readiness to deny ourselves for the glory of God and the good of men. He does not feel himself to be guilty of death, and who does not long to be holy, cannot be a worthy communicant.

Saving faith in Jesus Christ receives and rests upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel. He is offered to us as our King, as well as our Priest, and we cannot truly receive him without receiving him in both offices. It is a fatal error of the Papacy, and of its imitators among so-called Protestants, to disregard the interests of personal holiness, and to attempt to put God off with a ceremonial service which would be despised if offered to themselves by their fellow-men. Holiness in his Church is the very end and purpose for which Jesus gave his body to be broken, and no man can be said "to discern" that body who does not feel this to be true. He may not be able to formulate, after the fashion of the theologians, this and other truths set forth in the Supper; but there will be a spontaneous and unreflective recognition of them. If Jesus, the holy, harmless, and undefiled One, did not die for the purpose of bringing his redeemed into the likeness of himself, then the Bible, the Church, the Sacraments, have all alike been given in vain. To be left to the corruption of our nature is to be left to the worm that never dies.

THOMAS E. PECK.

ART. IX.—*Current Literature.*

THE anonymous author of *Supernatural Religion* (1) has issued the complete work in a revised form, guided, to some extent, by the criticisms and replies that have been evoked by previous editions. We may assume that it now stands substantially as a full embodiment of such thoughts and arguments as are best adapted, in the judgment of the writer, to invalidate the common belief in the reality of a Divine Revelation. We have no wish to lessen the impression of research and logical skill which a perusal of these three volumes undoubtedly excites. But we would be false to our own convictions if we did not acknowledge that, in our own reading of them, we missed the impartial examination of evidence that ought to characterise the summing-up of a judge; and that we were never for a moment allowed to forget that we were attending to the one-sided, though elaborate, plea of a partisan advocate. To this, however, we are not inclined to offer any strong objection. In the end, the interests of truth are served by the ablest and most exhaustive statements that are producible on both sides of a question. And although we cannot shut our eyes to the mischief that may result from "partial counsel," we have learned from past controversies that the most violent attacks on any truth have only resulted in its more secure defence and establishment.

Already this book has called forth the noteworthy animadversions of Canon Lightfoot (now Bishop of Durham), Professor Westcott, and Mr. Sanday. While we do not care to say that the discussion has been finally closed by their replies, we are fully entitled to contend that the pleadings advanced in *Supernatural Religion* have been in many instances nullified, and, for the most part, essentially modified. One lesson we certainly learn, and it is by no means a valueless one, that the difficulties of historical criticism, especially when that criticism deals with the precise form and acceptance of documents some

(1) *Supernatural Religion: An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.* In Three Volumes. Complete Edition. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1879.

eighteen hundred years old, are neither slight nor few. To our mind, however, there are two facts, superficial enough we confess, but on that very account all the more weighty and intelligible, that go very far indeed to settle the trustworthiness of the disputed documents:—1st, These books that we call canonical (with unimportant exceptions) were generally received by the various Christian communities from the earliest times; and, notwithstanding the many controversies that separated earnest men, there has been wonderful unanimity in appeal to these documents as the *fontes solutionis*. 2d, These books are confessedly *sui generis*. Whether we compare them with the apocryphal Gospels and Histories, or with the genuine writings of post-apostolic Fathers, we find in them a dignity, a sterling worth, a calm reticence and resolve begotten of profoundest confidence, that mark them out emphatically as unsullied by the passions and prejudices of the time. No obscurities of origin and doubtful references can weaken in the slightest degree the force of these facts.

We are surprised that while so much attention has been given to the second part of this treatise, the first part, which discusses and endeavours to discredit Miracle, should have been almost entirely overlooked. In this section our author displays considerable subtlety and skill. He has made himself familiar with the most telling objections to the miraculous, and he marshals them with a keen knowledge of the most effective order of battle. On the whole, we are inclined to regard this as the most formidable part of his special pleading. We venture to say that his arguments *may* be met, and met triumphantly; and we venture to add they *must* be met. There is here a noble opportunity for good service offered to our learned apologetes. Off-handedly, it may be asserted, and we have here the concurrence even of John Stuart Mill, that the denial of miracle is the denial of God; still, if we are to settle the question satisfactorily, we must be prepared to discuss it on grounds of history, philosophy, and science. At all events, if it be so discussed we have no fear of the issue; and we honestly think that the necessity for discussion, however much we might be inclined to deprecate it for very appreciable reasons, will tend greatly to the emancipation and confirmation of faith.

For some reason or other, the laws and limits of Christian excellence have not received that amount of attention and study to which they are entitled. The definition of dogma must necessarily claim much thought and care; still, a due proportion ought to be observed and a fair amount of consideration devoted to the possibilities of Christian attainment and practice. A very suggestive book on this subject, with a peculiar title (2), has reached us. The author of it, who withholds his name, enters upon a very large, interesting, and, in some respects, novel field. He discusses the question, Can we become men as great and commanding as the Apostles? and he leaves us in no doubt as to the answer. While we cannot agree with all the reasoning, oftentimes cogent, and always clear, we heartily admit what the author mainly contends for, viz., the unlimited possibilities implied in the gift of the Holy Ghost, and the paramount importance of faith. The book is fresh and stimulating.

Dr. Phelps is already known in this country by his little books on Prayer (*The Still Hour*) and the New Birth. He has recently published a volume of graphic sermons on texts from the Old Testament (3). Our American brethren are very outspoken. There is a happy quaintness and force in their discourses which seem mainly due to their frankness and directness. Speaking of Daniel as true to his early education, he proceeds:—

“Young men sometimes break away from the temperate principles and habits of their youth, on the plea of personal independence. They boast that they have attained to greater breadth of view than the fathers had. *Broad views*, I have observed, are but the gilded gateway to the *broad road*. They remind me of the young man of whom I have somewhere read, who would no longer read the Bible which he had been taught to revere, ‘because,’ he said, ‘it had such a mess of Presbyterian bigotry in it.’”

Many of Dr. Phelps’ texts are taken from the historical books, and they form the natural basis of sermons that are eminently pungent and practical. We are tempted to extract two or three sentences more, that will characterise the book

(2) *Ecce Christianus; or Christ's Idea of the Christian Life*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(3) *The Old Testament, a living Book for all Ages*. By Austin Phelps, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

better than any description. Speaking of Christians who make worldly alliances, he says:—

“They are Samsons : mighty it may be in resources of worldly prowess ; great against foxes, lions, bears ; but weaker than an infant in the lap of Delilah, and blind captives in the prison-house of Philistines.”—P. 63.

“I have no more reason for rejecting the Christian faith of my father because I have not investigated everything about it, than I have for going back to the Ptolemaic theory of the stars because I am not an expert in the Copernican astronomy.”—P. 93.

“The testimony of the Book and the testimony of the rocks agree to such marvellous extent, that unchristian scientists are beginning to inquire *where Moses got his information*. Moses somehow knew what it has taken science four thousand years to discover.”—P. 150.

“A Cornish proverb says, ‘He that will not be ruled by the rudder must be ruled by the rock.’ This is the rock on which haughty and defiant guilt is wrecked. It is simply *left to itself*, to become what it has chosen to be—such a demon of iniquity as to be abhorred of God and man. God save us from ourselves !”

The valuable series of commentaries on the Old and New Testament prepared under the superintendence of Dr. Lange has been completed by the issue of the volume on Numbers and Deuteronomy (4). In the English translation, as our readers are aware, these volumes have been enriched by the notes of the American editor (Dr. Schaff) and his coadjutors. In the introductory part of the commentary on Deuteronomy, there is a reasonably full statement of the objections to its Mosaic authorship, and, on the whole, a satisfactory refutation of them. It would be easy to take exception to these volumes in detail, but we have no hesitation in expressing our conviction that, for practical service and value, they form the best collection of comments accessible to students of Scripture.

A Presbyterian minister in Chicago has published twelve lectures on the Book of Genesis (5). They are broad in the best sense ; and while carefully adapted to the requirements of an ordinary congregation, they give ample evidence of wide reading and exact study. In the third lecture on “The Genesis” Dr. Gibson indicates his own preference for the vision-theory so eloquently advocated by Hugh Miller. Acknowledg-

(4) *Numbers* : by Dr. Lange. *Deuteronomy* : by M. Schröder, B.D. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark.

(5) *The Ages before Moses*. By John Monroe Gibson, D.D. Edinburgh : William Oliphant and Co.

ing the *difficulties* that have been found in the narrative of Creation, he calls attention to the *harmonies*. Of these he specially mentions seven:—1st, The fact of a beginning. 2d, The order: not the earth and the heavens, but the “heavens and the earth.” 3d, The original chaos. 4th, The work of creation is not a simultaneous, but an extended one. 5th, Progressive development, and yet not a continuous progression without any drawbacks. 6th, The progression is from the lower to the higher. 7th, Harmony in details, such as in the fact of light appearing on the first day. We think that more use might be made by Christian apologists of the evident harmonies that exist. On the other hand, we have a great and growing dislike to rash schemes of reconciliation. And while the uncertainties of Science are so numerous, any present attempts to reconcile the record with current hypotheses must be rash.

This work does not profess to be an exposition of Genesis, and if any one takes it up in the expectation of finding suggestions for the settlement of the various questions which are raised in that book he is sure to be disappointed. Nevertheless, it is a careful and wise treatment of many subjects, by no means the least interesting, which we meet on the threshold of revelation: and it is an excellent example of a method of handling scriptural subjects that might be more largely followed with great advantage to the Christian people who frequent our churches.

We are unwilling to offer any opinion on the theory of prophetic interpretation advanced by Mr. Guinness, in *The Approaching End of the Age* (6). We are inclined to think that hitherto sufficient attention has not been given to the *function* of prophecy, and the illustrations of that function to be found in the record of prophecies that have already been admittedly fulfilled. There can be no satisfactory investigation of prophetic problems unless we follow the broad lines that are indicated by a collation of the forecasts in the Old Testament and the fulfilments in the New. The study of predictions that

(6) *The Approaching End of the Age viewed in the light of History, Prophecy, and Science.* By H. Grattan Guinness. Second Edition. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

have become history has none of the fascination or romance that prove so attractive to those who interest themselves in discovering future events by an absorbing devotion to the metaphors and symbols of the Book of Revelation. We dare not deprecate the study of that book ; for there is a blessedness promised to those who comprehend it ; but we do think that freedom from forced and fanciful guesses would be more probable if we could determine beforehand the laws and limits of prophecy. Mr. Guinness has written this volume fully appreciating the value of this principle ; and whether we accept or reject his method, he has painstakingly amassed a large amount of material that cannot fail to prove serviceable in future inquiries.

Of course, as the title of the book implies, Mr. Guinness believes that the time of the end is at hand. He also believes that the rapture of the Saints will precede the establishment of the Kingdom. But, unlike many who have done their worst to degrade prophecy, he does not profess to fix any definite date either for the translation of the Church or the close of this dispensation. He thinks that

“this wholesome and divinely-appointed ignorance of the exact period is perfectly consistent with an intelligent apprehension of the true chronological character of the days in which we live, and a profound conviction that they are emphatically and literally the last days. An approximate knowledge of the truth on this great subject is all we can gain, and it is *all that we require* ; anything further would be injurious. SUCH A KNOWLEDGE WAS ALL THAT WAS EVER GRANTED TO THE SAINTS OF GOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FULFILMENT OF OTHER CHRONOLOGICAL PROPHECIES IN OTHER DAYS ; FOR PROPHECY IS NOT GIVEN TO GRATIFY CURIOSITY, OR TO MINISTER TO MERE EXCITEMENT, BUT TO SERVE HIGH AND HOLY MORAL ENDS.”—P. 488.

We ought to add that a leading feature in this book is the discussion of Time-cycles, astronomical and scriptural, suggested by a statement of M. de Cheseaux, “ that the leading prophetic periods of Scripture are demonstrably *celestial cycles* ; that is, periods *as definitely marked off as such* by celestial revolutions, as are our ordinary years or days.”

Some time ago Captain Palmer delivered a series of lectures on the “ Migrations of the Human Race,” to working men in a schoolroom at Cavers, Roxburghshire. These lectures, the

fruit of many years' careful study, are now submitted to a larger circle, in an enlarged and revised form (7). Captain Palmer adduces evidence from language, customs, traditions, arts, to prove that the various races of men (special attention being given to the peopling of the American continent) are of one family, and that they were dispersed over the face of the earth at a date subsequent to the Noachic deluge. In chapters iii. and iv. there is a very convenient *résumé* of what is known and conjectured about early migrations to America, and in chaps. v. and vi. we have an assemblage of interesting facts (with quotation of authorities) concerning the ancient inhabitants of Mexico and Peru. The monumental history of America (North and South) has not yet received the attention it deserves. We hear occasionally of the mound-builders of the Mississippi, and the remains of an ancient civilisation in Central America; but, so far as we know, there has not been any formal attempt to collect the facts and to interpret their meaning. In chapter vii. we have some interesting and valuable statements relative to the cranial peculiarities of the American nations. While not professing to have made any original investigations, Captain Palmer writes as an intelligent student of the subject which he discusses, and he has had many opportunities of personal observation during eight years' professional service on the Pacific and Australian stations. His lectures are well fitted to awaken interest and to suggest further inquiries.

We are glad to find that Prebendary Row's Bampton Lecture has reached a second edition (8). On its first appearance very emphatic testimony was given to its value and seasonableness in the pages of this *Review* (July 1879, p. 487). In the present edition the alterations are exclusively verbal. We have, however, in the preface, some interesting extracts from a correspondence between the author and Dr. W. B. Carpenter. In his seventh lecture, and in the second supplement to it, Mr. Row had examined certain positions taken by Dr. Car-

(7) *The Migration from Shinar; or the Earliest Links between the New and Old Continents.* By Captain George Palmer, R.N., F.R.G.S. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(8) *Christian Evidences viewed in relation to Modern Thought.* Bampton Lecture. By the Rev. C. A. Row, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral. Second Edition. London: Frederic Norgate.

penter in his *Mental Physiology*, and also in an article published by him in the *Contemporary Review* for January 1876. Dr. Carpenter requests Mr. Row to state in this preface that "the resurrection of our Lord was not intended by him to be referred to in the article in question." In compliance with this request, Mr. Row quotes these words from one of his letters :—

"I shall be glad if you will state in your new preface that I regard the historical evidence of that event as standing on a far wider basis than the historical evidence of any single miracle of the New Testament."

Again :—

"I regard the historical evidence of the Resurrection of our Lord as of quite a different character from that of (*e.g.*) the raising of Lazarus or of the widow's son at Nain. Looking *simply* at the narratives in the Gospels, and comparing them with the narratives of similar miracles in the writings of the early Fathers, I see no more ground for trusting the former as historically true than I do for accepting the latter. But, on the other hand, looking at the unquestionable fact—for such it appears to me—that the Resurrection of our Lord was the foundation of the preaching of Paul, and (as far as we know) of the other Apostles, and was universally accepted by the early Church as the cardinal doctrine of Christianity ('if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain'), the gospel narrative derives from that fact a support that is given to none other of the miracles either of Christ or of his followers."

And again :—

"I regard the Life and Teachings of Christ as the highest *moral* revelation of the Divine Mind that we possess,—Nature being the highest intellectual revelation."

Mr. Row adds :—

"I feel great pleasure in inserting these extracts as defining Dr. Carpenter's views with respect to Christianity, especially as they seem to afford a very strong vindication of the first great position maintained in these Lectures, viz., that the moral evidences must be placed in the front of the Christian argument ; as well as of my second position, viz., the importance of the Pauline Epistles as forming the very sheet-anchor of our historical evidence. I by no means wish to affirm that the proof of the fact of our Lord's Resurrection necessarily establishes the truth of any other of the miracles recorded in the Gospels ; but it certainly removes all the *à priori* difficulties with which they are attended ; and taken in conjunction with the moral evidence adduced in the second, third, and fourth Lectures, renders it far more probable that such a person as Jesus Christ performed miracles than that he did not ; and enables us to accept those recorded in the Gospels on evidence similar to that on which we accept the facts of ordinary history."

Mr. Geden has published fifteen discourses preached in the Wesleyan College Chapel, Didsbury (9). They are purpose-like and practical, evidently adapted to meet the requirements of thoughtful minds. We can best justify and illustrate this statement by a brief analysis of the sixth sermon, on the "Blessedness of Faith." The words discussed are those of Jesus to Thomas: "Because thou hast seen me thou hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." The introduction naturally explains the circumstances in which the words were spoken. He speaks of the night-time that followed the crucifixion, and aptly says that "the third day was the resurrection alike of the Master and the disciples." Reasons are suggested, founded on character, for the absence of Thomas on the occasion of our Lord's first appearance to the disciples, and thus we are led to consider the implied rebuke of unbelief in the words of the text. Mr. Geden begins with this first general statement: "The religious privilege falling to the lot of such of mankind as have the common grace of the gospel is abundantly larger than that possessed by those otherwise most favoured of our race, the men who saw and companied with Jesus in the flesh." This he exhibits in reference to the evidence for our Saviour's Godhead and Apostolate—the substance of Christian truth—the knowledge of salvation by the remission of sins—and the comparative means for obtaining a perfect preparation for eternal life. His second general statement is: "In accordance with the general principles on which God is wont to govern the creatures, it is better that we be called to live for a while by faith and not by sight." In support of this we are reminded that, other things being equal, the inward satisfaction and gladness belonging to the service of God are in proportion to the difficulties of the service; faith is fitted to produce a perfection of Christian character which can scarcely be reached by a less trying process, ultimate rewards are determined by the severity of the ordeal we undergo in moral probation, and heavenly blessedness is enhanced by the foregoing exercises of a life of faith. In conclusion, he indicates these other significant aspects of the text—1st, Towards Christian belief: suggest-

(9) *Didsbury Sermons*. By John Dury Geden, Tutor in Hebrew and Classics. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

ing that a future and temporal reign of Christ on earth would be a diminution of present privilege. 2*d*, Towards Christian sentiment and observance : frowning upon all interposition of the material and human between God in Christ and the soul of man. 3*d*, Towards Christian character and life : rebuking discontent, stating obligations, and opening up a glorious prospect of blessing from God as the fruit and recompense of faith.

These sermons are substantial and edifying : they may also be regarded as fair types of a method of argument and exhortation used with considerable success by our Wesleyan brethren.

The new edition of Dr. Hodge’s *Outlines of Theology* (10) is greatly enlarged and improved. It contains fifty per cent. more matter than the previous one ; and valuable illustrative extracts from creeds, confessions, and theological authorities are added to many of the chapters.

Dr. Charles Hodge, whom we may call the elder Hodge, was accustomed for several years to conduct Sabbath afternoon conferences in Princeton Theological Seminary. Under the appropriate title, *Princeton Sermons* (11), a large collection of the outlines which he used on these occasions has been recently published. As might be expected, no less from the author than from the occasion of their delivery, these outlines are doctrinal both in form and character. They evidently were the framework of such sermons as students love to hear and Professors to preach. Nevertheless they are excellent specimens both of exactness in the statement of doctrine and pungency in its application. We can indorse the testimony of the editor : “ As an effective exhibition of the great principle that all genuine religious experience is only the realisation in experience of Christian doctrine, and that all our true doctrine does immediately go out into the practical issues of the inward and outward life, this volume is eminently fitted to vindicate and supplement the three volumes of Systematic Theology which were the last work of the author’s life.”

(10) *Outlines of Theology.* By A. A. Hodge, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology, Princeton. New Edition. London : T. Nelson and Sons.

(11) *Princeton Sermons.* By Charles Hodge, D.D., Author of *Systematic Theology*, etc. London : Thomas Nelson and Sons.

A new handbook to the Bible is opportune (12). Recently there have been many antiquarian and historical discoveries that throw considerable light on the events narrated in the Old Testament. These, however, have to be gleaned from many separate volumes ; and their collection in convenient form is a real boon. Perhaps in the volume before us there is more certainty attached to some details than the evidence forthcoming at present warrants ; but generally and broadly we may accept the facts stated in this Handbook as trustworthy. For ordinary use, and as bringing our knowledge up to date, this volume by the Messrs. Conder leaves nothing to be desired. It furnishes additional proof, if such be needed, that in the region of verifiable facts the veracity of the Bible is unimpeachable. Many of us can remember a time when exception was taken to the Biblical narrative on account of supposed improbabilities in its historical statements. It always seemed strange to us that, if contradictions existed between the account given in the Bible, and another account found in some other document, it was quietly taken for granted that it was more legitimate to question the correctness of the Bible record than to question the correctness of any other history. Now, however, thanks to the indefatigable researches of men like Layard and Rawlinson, we find that, whatever be the value of other testimony, the good faith and accuracy of the Biblical writers are being placed beyond all doubt.

Bishop Monrad has furnished devout Christians with an excellent Manual on Prayer (13) in its relation to spiritual life and character. He does not present us with an argument to rebut the objections of infidelity ; nor does he attempt dogmatically to determine the doctrine of prayer in its connection with other truths of Scripture or Nature ; but he supplies us with the materials necessary to an intelligent apprehension of the place and power of prayer in the maintenance of a holy life. We

(12) *A Handbook to the Bible : being a Guide to the Study of the Holy Scriptures ; derived from Ancient Monuments and Modern Explorations.* By T. R. Conder and C. R. Conder, R.E. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

(13) *The World of Prayer ; or Prayer in relation to Personal Religion.* By Dr. D. G. Monrad, Bishop of Lolland and Falster, Denmark. Translated from the fourth German Edition by the Rev. J. S. Banks, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

give a short extract from the chapter on “The Contents of Prayer :”—

“ Are sinful desires and emotions excluded from prayer in every respect ? By no means. On the contrary, they take a conspicuous place in it—that is, in the sense that we pray not for but *against* them. In the closet, sacred truth should disarm them of all power to hurt, strip from them their array of embellishments and apologies, and present them naked, in all their enormity, before the pure, the holy God. And it is not enough to mention in petition such things as have just recently raised their voices within us, or against whose temptations we have only lately striven, for so much *slumbers* in the soul that only awaits the opportunity to break out. This is the explanation of the sad experience, that even feelings of sorrow for past offences remain so often without fruit, that so many good intentions remain unexecuted ; we too hastily regard ourselves as conquerors, jump to the conclusion that we have done with a thing, that the foe is finally worsted and destroyed, that all we have to do now is to take our rest. But the foe is nowise destroyed because he has once been beaten. On the contrary, he is quietly collecting new forces. Therefore must the soul remain watchful and send out scouts, *i.e.* its thoughts within itself, to the right and left, to spy out, not merely waking or conscious, but also slumbering desires. On this point it is helpful to recall to memory past transgressions, not for the purpose of again exciting doubt whether they are forgiven and blotted out, but partly, by this means, to preserve ourselves in humility, partly to keep constantly before us what weak sides, what gaps there are, where the enemy may easiest break into the fortress. Let us search carefully for the *occasions* of sin—those more remote and those nearer at hand. Very many never get rid of their sins—those which trouble them most—because, though they shun sin itself, they do not shun its occasions and opportunities. The saying, ‘ A burnt child dreads the fire,’ at all events does not apply to all adults. We know that the power of light does not diminish uniformly, but according to the square of the distance, so that an object standing at a distance of four ells from the light has sixteen times less light than one standing at the distance of one ell. This law holds good in moral relations of darkness also—of the darkness of sin. The further one keeps from it, the feebler its power to tempt. We put ourselves in the way of sin when we put ourselves in the power of the same *circumstances* which sin formerly used as an opportunity. At that time it was easy to avoid the opportunity, for the soul still enjoyed its full strength ; but we stood in no dread of the opportunity, because, forsooth, in itself it was so harmless. Still, when it had opened the way for sin to operate, at first we made some resistance, but sin’s attraction was too strong—we yielded to temptation. And this temptation retains its attractive power. Whoever, then, earnestly desires to get the better of sinful inclination, let him as far as possible avoid the opportunity, keeping far from it. In the petition, ‘ *Lead us not into temptation,* ’ we ask God, for the sake of our weakness and His mercy, so to dispose our circumstances that we may not, through any opportunity, approach too near to sin, and so the latter gain power over our soul. But if our prayer is to have its full mean-

ing and effect, it must not remain in indefinite generality ; we must have a perfectly clear perception what *circumstances* we have to fear."

It is not usual to notice reports of Missionary Conferences. They are supposed, somehow, to lie outside the range of ordinary literature. But a volume (14) containing an account of such a conference held at Shanghai from the 10th to the 24th May 1877, is so interesting, so practical, and so useful, that we would be failing in duty if we did not emphatically call attention to it. Whether it result from contact with the ancient civilisation of China, or whether it be determined by the obstacles and opposition presented by that peculiar sphere of labour, we cannot tell ; but in any case we have risen from a perusal of this volume with an intense admiration of the Christian intelligence, earnestness, and prudence, which seem common to the missionaries of all Churches in the "Flowery Land," and our interest in the work, and sympathy with the workers, have been greatly increased. If any one desires to gain exact acquaintance of a reliable character with the religions of China, let him read this book. If any one wishes to know the difficulties, social, moral, and intellectual, that have to be encountered by the servants of Christ everywhere, *mutatis mutandis*, let him read this book. If any one would learn the best methods and catch the contagion of zeal, whereby he may become successful in the ministry of the Gospel, again we say, let him read this book. We understand that it is proposed to reprint it in this country, and we give it as our honest opinion, that apart altogether from its very great interest as dealing with the peculiarities of China, it will prove a most valuable *ministerial help* to all Christian workers who are induced to study it.

Dr. Culross thinks clearly, writes pleasantly, and exercises no ordinary discrimination in the choice of subjects. These three characteristics are very apparent in his chapters on "The Greatness of Little Things" (15). In his hands the little things become manifestly great. He writes on such topics as "A cup

(14) *Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, held at Shanghai, May 10-24, 1877.* Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press.

(15) *The Greatness of Little Things.* By James Culross, D.D. London: The Religious Tract Society.

of cold water,” “ Two mites that make a farthing,” “ A grain of mustard-seed,” “ A mote in the eye,” etc. etc., and on all of them he has much to say that is interesting, instructive, and original. Like his other books, this one is pre-eminently “ good for the use of edifying.”

If our readers are interested in learning the secret of the success of Mr. Aitken as a Mission Preacher, let them read a volume of sermons which he has issued, bearing the title, *The School of Grace* (16). It is certainly encouraging to find that discourses characterised not only by scriptural richness and unflagging earnestness, but also by closeness of thought and cogency of argument, have proved so widely acceptable and so markedly useful. In twelve chapters he gives us an elaborate and excellent exposition of the “ teachings of grace ” as exhibited in the closing verses of the second chapter of Titus. On some minor points we might differ from his mode of statement ; but these are speedily forgotten in our satisfaction with his masterly defence of vital truth, and his frank, fearless, forceful application of it to the necessities of saints and sinners alike.

Mrs. Simpson has produced an excellent little book (17) for devotional reading, scriptural in matter, spiritual in tone, and practical in purpose. In thirty-one short readings intended to cover the days of a month, we have a large variety of suitable and seasonable themes for Christian meditation. They are, as they ought to be, simple in treatment, but they are none the less profitable on that account. We extract the reading for the ninth day, which is entitled “ A Threefold Cord : ”—

“ ‘ *All things are of God.* ’ ”

“ It is very easy to say this when all is going well and our desires are granted, but it is equally true when our desires are crossed and our plans thwarted. How thankful we should be to recognise that God’s hand is about our lives ! and yet it is very hard to have no will of our own. The Lord has made us for himself.

(16) *The School of Grace.* By W. Hay M. H. Aitken, M.A. London : John F. Shaw and Co.

(17) *Steps through the Stream ; or Daily Readings for a Month.* By Margaret Stewart Simpson. London : James Nisbet and Co.

‘The more the marble wastes,
The more the statue grows.’

We must not mind what seems to us waste and unnecessary chiselling. We do not see the design He has in view in making us a masterpiece of grace for a niche in the Heavenly Temple.

“ ‘ *All things are for your sakes.* ’ ”

“ We can understand God keeping the world in motion and working out His own grand purposes in heaven and earth ; but to think that my little commonplace life should be watched over by Him seems too wonderful. And yet ‘ He only keeps the world going on as a school for His children.’ Some day you will understand and read the secret of His glorious plan for you ; meanwhile you must believe that the circumstances of each day are arranged as if He had only you to think of, and that He guards you from numberless dangers of which it is well you do not dream. Some have learned from experience that the things they have dreaded have never turned out to be their real trials, and that brooding too much over the past does only harm.

‘To mourn a mischief that is past and gone
Is the next way to draw new mischief on.’

“ ‘ *All things work together for good.* ’ ”

“ It is generally in the blessed Afterward of our trials that we sound this triumphant chord. But He has taught some of His loved ones, even in the midst of the furnace, in the first freshness of disappointed hope, to say it. A little boy had been disobedient, and was struggling in the misery of wanting his own way. After prayer the victory was gained, and he ran to be the first to do what before he would not do. With a beautiful smile he looked into his father’s face and said, ‘ You’ve made me good, papa.’ Have we not known something akin to this ? We have ceased our rebellion, given up the useless struggle, and as we lay back on His glorious will, wondering at our changed selves, we have said with a deep sense of sin, and yet a note of victory, ‘ Thou hast made me good, Father.’ ”

Der Begriff des Kirchenregiments beleuchtet von F. L. STEINMEYER. Berlin, 1879. Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, London.

This is Steinmeyer’s fifth contribution to the literature of “ Practical Theology.” He has already written on the Sermon, on the Decalogue as the foundation of catechetical instruction, on the Eucharist and the Cultus, and on the cure of souls. With this short treatise on Church-government he closes the series, and returns with joy to the department of theology to which his inclinations lead him. His contributions to the apologetic criticism of the Gospels are of real

value, as he is an acute critic and a sound thinker. And we are glad to hear that he means to resume his labours in a field which he has made his own. But his contributions to "Practical Theology," although of less value than his apologetical writings, are not unworthy of his reputation. The present tractate is on a subject on which Germans have not had such practical experience as to give them the right to speak with authority. Bold in religious speculation, they have been timid in the domain of Church life, and have for the most part been contented to leave the outward guiding of their Church in the hands of civil rulers or of ecclesiastics nominated by the Government. Luther gave to the Princes of Germany a position in the Church which was an injury to the free development of Church life. Steinmeyer, however, like most conservative theologians of Germany, clings to the State connection with great tenacity, which is probably to be explained by the circumstance that German Princes have usually leant to the orthodox party. He will not admit that Luther's action at the time of the Reformation was a mistake.

If Luther found no other depository for Church power than the lords of the land, he grasped this anchor not through necessity, but because he saw it to be that pointed out by God. With fulness of conviction, not with Melancthonian hesitation, but without cautions and limitations, he handed over the entire Church government to the Princes. Steinmeyer is aware that this "Divine right" of the Kings to govern the Church will often bring trouble with it. But he consoles the Church with the words of Luther, "*Floruit ecclesia sub cruce, nec allibi ejus virtus magis apparuit, quam ubi conquassata est.*" It is a curious argument; and it is difficult to understand how he acquiesces in such a position while he evidently sees that the Egyptian bondage of the Church has had a tendency to quench missionary zeal, to interfere with the due exercise of discipline, and to deprive the Church of the control of theological education. It is true he would desire to limit the function of the State in matters ecclesiastical, and to see Church power committed by the State to orthodox theologians. But how can that be done in a constitutional country where the business of the Government is to reflect the opinions of the majority? Steinmeyer is evidently of opinion that the modern

Church has progressed in the wrong direction by every departure it has made from Luther. Under the auspices of the lords of the land there has grown up a hierarchy in the midst of the Evangelical Church with dignities and titles. To this Steinmeyer objects as contrary alike to the mind of Luther and of Paul; and he says that it is unworthy of Gerhard to justify these titles "ut externa ministerii facies decorata in oculos hominum incurrat." "Paul," Steinmeyer writes, "sought for the glory of the office in another factor. It is not biblical to endeavour to elevate the *δόξα* of the office by such means. The spirit it is which quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing."

We have noted points in which we disagree with the writer; but there is much with which we heartily concur. It is well worthy of study; for there is thoroughness of treatment, and it is written in a lively and interesting style.

Woman's Work and Worth, in Girlhood, Maidenhood, and Wifehood.

Illustrations of Woman's Character, Duties, Rights, Position, Influence, Responsibilities, and Opportunities, with Hints on Self-culture, and Chapters on the Higher Education and Employment of Woman. By W. H. DAVENPORT ADAMS. John Hogg, Paternoster Row.

The title of this book sufficiently indicates its character, and it treats most exhaustively the wide range of subjects it embraces. The great and good women of all ages are introduced in brief but graphic sketches; and the concluding chapters are of special value at the present time. A more interesting and *inspiring* book to place in the hands of a young girl it would be difficult to find, and it is one which may be read with pleasure and profit by women of all ages.

The publications of the Religious Tract Society continue to maintain their usual standard of excellence. The new volumes of the *Leisure Hour* and *Sunday at Home* are replete with interesting matter. The Pocket-books and Almanacs issued by the Society for 1880 are worthy of special attention.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1880.

ART. I.—*Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture.*

[The following Notes are to some extent an expansion of a paper read by me to a clerical club. Members of the club expressed a desire and expectation that the paper should be laid before the public. One reason of this desire was that the notes, as submitted to the club, were so aphoristic in form that members desired to see them in print for leisurely consideration. There is nothing in the original notes which the club discussion has induced me to alter in substance. But I now reproduce the paper in the light of that discussion, which means with very important advantages beyond what I had enjoyed in solitary study.]

THE preparation of this paper was originally occasioned by a suggestion to the effect that those who dogmatise copiously about inspiration do not, as a class, know very well what they are dogmatising about. Not a few good and true men are at this hour persuaded that the dogma of plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture is incompetent in the present state of knowledge and comprehension in our Evangelical Churches.

Under the form of discussion the paper is occupied mainly with definition rather than demonstration. In relation to the subject as regarded by intelligent advocates of a veritable divine inspiration of Scripture all through, my notes are

intended mainly for the purpose of clearing away obscurities which at this time are working mischief, as all darkness is the advancing shadow of death.

The distinction between revelation and inspiration, though continually asserted by one class of theologians, is continually ignored, or rejected as unreal and illusory, by another class. Yet the distinction is founded in the nature of things. Revelation is that through which rational beings come into possession of information; while inspiration is that through which they come to communicate that information—no matter how obtained. Thus, in relation to a scripture or book, the record of a revelation :—while the revelation question is, What is the source of the information? the inspiration question is, Who is the author of the book, or scripture, or record?

So Shakespeare, the “all-round” man, after describing “the poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,” as receiving some revelation when it glances “from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,” goes on to describe an ulterior process, in which “the poet’s *pen*” records what his eye has seen, so as to “give to airy nothings a local habitation and a name.”

It is not necessary here to speak of the revelation as supernatural. Of the information recorded in Scripture a large part may, by the human authors of Scripture, have been obtained from sources within reach of men in the natural use of their faculty of knowledge. For instance, the non-scriptural records appealed to in the Old Testament Scriptures, and the testimonies referred to in the preface of Luke’s Gospel, may have been simply human records of matters patent to every human eye looking on the events of the history of God’s kingdom. But the supposition that Luke obtained information from other men, who from the beginning had been eye-witnesses of the Word, does not imply that Luke was not the human author of the third Gospel, nor that what is said in that history is not said by him. The supposition that Moses and other Old Testament writers made use of previously existing documents, or unwritten traditions, does not imply that certain scriptures have not Moses and other Old Testament prophets or scribes for their authors. Froude’s *History of England* is not the less Froude’s because he makes copious use of materials which had existed long before his time.

It thus appears that the question regarding the source of information recorded in a book is distinct from the question regarding the authorship of the record. And the inspiration question has reference only to the authorship of the record, while the revelation question has reference only to the source of information recorded. On the one hand, though the source of information should be simply human, the authorship of the record, the inspiration of the book, may be divine; *e.g.*, while the genealogies so frequently appearing in Scripture may have originally been prepared simply by men in the ordinary course of political administration, yet the authorship of the Scripture *quâ* recording them may be properly divine and miraculous, God choosing to place in a record which is distinctively divine materials obtainable through simply human inquiry. On the other hand, a record may be simply human in its authorship though the source of the information recorded should be truly divine and miraculous. For instance, the great facts of distinctively supernatural revelation are, let us suppose, correctly recorded in the systems of Augustine and Calvin, or in the creeds and confessions of Evangelical Churches; yet the records, in the shape of those utterances of individuals and of Churches, are, in the view of Evangelical Christians, simply human.

The divine inspiration of Scripture means, that of the Record in our hands the author is God, in such a sense that the Bible is properly God's Word,—that what the Scripture says is said by Him. To say this is specifically distinct from saying that the revelation comes from Him directly or remotely. For, as we have seen, the source of the material recorded may be different from the authorship of the record. Hence, in relation to the authorship of the record, it does not suffice to speak of presentation, somehow, of truth or view *to* the human mind, so that this mind is able to apprehend it. After that apprehension—which may be effected through the poet's eye, or the prophet's, or the historian's, or the dogmatist's—there may come in a specifically different thing, the committing of the same *to writing*, putting the vision on paper. That is what we have now to think about in relation to the record of revelation as distinguished from the revelation recorded.

What we now say of the record, in the sense of supernatural intimation of God's mind by God, may be applicable to other

modes of intimation of God's mind by God. For instance, the symbolism of the Tabernacle and Temple may have resulted, not simply from Divine communication of ideas to men, but from Divine determination of every detail of the symbolism; so that Israel, in looking at the ordinary service of worship, may have been consciously receiving directly the mind of God from God, as truly as when listening to His articulate utterance of the Ten Words at Sinai. Again, when prophets spoke articulate words, it is conceivable that their spoken utterance should be so completely determined by the informing power of God as to make the utterances to be properly His word.

What we thus suggest is that the Bible, the record of revelation, is properly an *oracular book*. And when we speak of the Bible as an oracular book, we represent the feeling of the whole Christian world in relation to the Bible. This suggestion of theologians is anticipated by the experience of Christians. It is a matter of Christian experience that the Bible is an oracular book. Christendom reposes upon the belief that the utterances of this book are properly oracles of God; and this has been so from the beginning of Christian Church-history. It has been imagined by some that the dogma of divine inspiration of Scripture, as distinguished from divine revelation recorded in Scripture, is of recent origin, dating, say, from the time of Clericus or Spinoza, two hundred years ago; that at this recent period it came into being as a mere makeshift for evasion of difficulties occasioned by the discovery, then made for the first time, of "mistakes" in the Scripture record. But this imagination is a hallucination regarding the relative course of Christian thought, and feeling, and life.

The sort of "mistakes" alleged by Spinoza, and employed by Clericus for subversion of the received doctrine of inspiration, had been alleged by another famous Jew far back in the Middle Ages. The same sort of alleged mistakes had, for the same purpose, been adduced by Theodore of Mopsuestia in the primitive "Age of the Councils." And the received doctrine of inspiration, as meaning that the Bible is a properly oracular book, so far from having been invented as a makeshift for meeting the difficulties occasioned to faith by the speculations even of Theodore, is demonstrably as old as the Christian

religion. In the primitive age of that religion, the very *ratio decidendi* in relation to the canonical authority of this and that book, was that this and that book are properly of divine inspiration. And all down from the first century to our nineteenth century the feeling and belief of Christendom have reposed on the supposition, not simply that the Christian religion is of divine revelation, but that the Bible is a divine record of that revelation.

It is quite conceivable that a primitive divine revelation should have been left to be recorded by simply human inspiration or authorship. It is of great importance to remember that the character and history of the Christian Church, and the records contained in our Scriptures, though these should be regarded as simply human in their authorship, cannot be reasonably accounted for except upon the supposition of an original divine revelation, involving a miraculous intervention of God in history for the redemption of lost men. From the external apologetic point of view this is so important that Christian apologists are naturally impatient or doubtful in relation to a view received from within the heart of the Christian system. But the view received from within the heart of the Christian system is that upon which the apologists themselves, so far as they are Christian, live, and which has all along lain at the root of Christian life in God. And that view is that the record of revelation is divine.

It is conceivable that the record should be so connected with the revelation that the one has genetically sprung from the other by a sort of physical necessity; so that the revelation being given, the record in its distinctive character follows as matter of course. It is conceivable, in other words, that the revelation should be energetic to such an extent as to determine the very terms of the record. This however does not follow from the received doctrine of inspiration. Consistently with that doctrine the revelation and the record are not so connected by a bond of physical necessity; God having given the revelation direct from Himself might conceivably have left the record to be originated by simply human authorship.

Rash views of the meaning of divine inspiration are often implied when they are not expressed. It has of late been frequently represented as one problem left over to the theology

of our time, how to deliver the Church from a doctrine of *mechanical* inspiration; and it has been too easily assumed that "dictation" would involve mechanism of inspiration, incompatible with the rational nature of man, and therefore not to be supposed without impiety as having been perpetrated by Him who is the Creator of man's nature. Dictation does not necessarily imply violence to man's nature as rational. I am dictating at this moment without violence to the rational nature of the scribe. There was no violence to the nature of Moses as rational when he received the Ten Words as written by God's finger on the tables of stone. There was no violence done to the rational nature of Balaam when he was constrained to bless where he would have preferred to ban. Those who assume as matter of course that "dictation" must necessarily imply a violence to man's nature as rational thus appear to be mistaken in their assumption.

But the assumption, mistaken or not, is really irrelevant. For the received doctrine of inspiration does not professedly involve mechanism in the process of divine communication through man. It may appear to require some hardihood to maintain this; for able men are now-a-days frequently found assuming as mere matter of course that the received doctrine does involve supersession of human personality and individuality. Some of those able men have taken pains to prove, from the utterances of "old dogmatists," that it is the express intention of the received doctrine of inspiration to exclude human personality and individuality, *i.e.* reality of manhood, from the authorship of Scripture. But to contradict those able men does not necessarily imply hardihood of assertion; all that it necessarily implies is knowledge of plain historical fact and of elementary logic. For the assumption of those able men is mistaken, and their attempted proof a demonstrable failure.

There has not been much published in the way of attempted proof of the assertion that the "old dogmatists," in contending for divinity of authorship of Scripture, mean to exclude humanity of authorship. And what has been published in this way, so far as known to me, is worse than inconclusive—is perverse or wrong-headed. In this relation the well-known utterances about the inspired writers being "flutes"

of God, or "pens" of God, are quite irrelevant. For a "pen" of God may be a human pen: a man whose personality and individuality are not destroyed in order that God may speak through an unmanned organism, but employed for the expression of God's mind through man. Hence, merely to show that the "old dogmatists" regard man as having been employed by God, is to be far from showing that, in the estimation of those "old dogmatists," the man was destroyed when God employed him, or became a mere machine when he was made the instrument—"flute," or "pen,"—of divine inspiration.

The "old dogmatists" certainly did not mean that the man was unmanned who became the organ of inspiration truly divine. That they did mean this is maintained, *e.g.* by Rothe, in his work *Zur Dogmatik*. But Rothe, like an honest man, produces his proofs from the utterances of the old dogmatists themselves; and even from his proofs, the utterances printed for demonstration of his view of their meaning, it is clear that his view of their meaning is mistaken. A skilled reader of Rothe's footnotes will see that the "old dogmatists" whom he quotes, so far from making it essential to their doctrine that the man through whom God speaks shall *pro tanto* be unmanned, really held that God employed man for the purpose of expressing His mind through man, and therefore that man was not destroyed—or unmanned—when God spoke His mind through men.

Those who maintain the traditional doctrine which has been stigmatised as mechanical are in the habit of saying that all Scripture is the word of God, *and* that all Scripture is the word of man. That way of speaking makes perfectly clear the fact that in their estimation the divine inspiration affirmed by their doctrine implies no mechanism in the process. This again shows that it is really dishonest, on the part of an opponent of their doctrine, to speak as if mechanism had been a *confessed* result of the inspiration it affirms. And that dishonesty is perpetrated by every intelligent theologian who gives as the *status quæstionis* between him and the "old dogmatists," whether mechanical inspiration is to be affirmed of Holy Scripture?

But, some may say, it is *impossible* that Scripture should at once be the word of God and the word of man: if God have

really employed the penmen, so that the words of Scripture are His, then the men must have in His hands become, not human pens, but non-human pens: in a word, the process *must* have been mechanical if the Scripture have God for its author, in your sense. Here we have a perilous advance, downhill. He who simply says, The word is not God's in your sense, of being spoken or written by God, may mean only to deny the reality here of the distinction between revelation and inspiration,—i.e. to deny the reality of that inspiration which makes God to be properly author of Scripture. But to say that it is *impossible* for God to employ men as human pens, to make them instruments in writing a word truly His, yet so that the word is truly theirs,—this is in effect to set bounds to the Omnipotence of God, while setting no bounds to the presumption of men.

There is a sort of possession which cannot have place when the man is left free to the exercise of his proper individuality. Such possession seems appropriate to inspiration by heathen deities. Though at least one heretical sect of Christians are justly supposed to have maintained such possession as involved in inspiration by the true God and Saviour, Pythonic inspiration is a thing distinctively heathenish in conception. The possession ascribed to demons in the New Testament, and the experience ascribed there to poor tormented demoniacs, are things distinct in their nature from the *afflatus*, and consequent supersession of manhood, involved in the heathenish view of inspiration:—thus far, that what the latter describes as the normal and proper result of divine inspiration, the former ascribes to an abnormal condition, in which man is possessed by a malignant demon who is not God, but God's enemy and man's. Still, the Pythonic inspiration of heathenism coincides with the demoniacal possession of Scripture thus far, that in both cases alike there is set forth a possession which causes "depotentialisation," repression of individuality, putting manhood into abeyance.

I do not say that God may not conceivably have put manhood into abeyance through a divine possession in full keeping with God's nature and man's. That there may be ecstasy of this sort it would be extreme presumption to deny dogmatically. But the ecstasy of the saint or prophet is not only of a

species distinct from the non-human condition implied in properly demoniacal possession, but is as different from that possession as heaven is from hell.

We are thus led back to the proposition that God has employed men for the utterance of His mind through a word which is properly God's. Is it *possible* for God to possess and employ man so that the manhood is not destroyed?

And in relation to this proposition we say that real possession may conceivably assume one of three modes or forms. In one, the possession amounts only to that sort of interest, perhaps enthusiastic interest, in the matter revealed, which leaves the man's own personality and individuality not only distinct but *sole*, so that the utterance is his own and only his own; as when Dante sings of hell and heaven, or Luther teaches justification by faith, or Bunyan preaches "Grace abounding to the chief of sinners." At another extreme, represented by heathen oracles, the possession may be like that of the demoniacs, in which the human instrument, perhaps writhing and wrestling against the power possessing, is overcome, neutralised, submerged; so that the utterance is not properly the man's own, but only an utterance through him instrumentally, as if Lucan's witches had spoken through the dead corpses of Pharsalia. But there is a third form of possession at least conceivable—a form specifically distinct both, on the one hand, from that simply Pythonic inspiration through which only "the god" speaks, and, on the other hand, from that simply human inspiration through which only the man speaks. And we say, to deny the possibility of a really divine possession of this third sort,—such in effect that the resulting utterance is at once God's and man's,—is to err by presumption.

Christians are well acquainted with a case in which the utterance is and must be at once completely human and truly divine. I refer to the case of the person and the words of the Lord Jesus Christ. We may without irreverence speak of even Christ's person as representing distinctively utterance: because utterance, *Λόγος*, The Word, is a proper name of Him as the second person of the Godhead. But we now refer especially to the divine-human constitution of His person as Immanuel. Through that constitution of His person He is at once com-

pletely (τελείως) human and truly (ἀληθῶς) divine. I wish to detain attention to this case of a Word which combines the τελείως (completely) with the ἀληθῶς (truly).

In view of that case, can Christians deny the possibility of a word which is at once completely human and truly divine? The words which Christ spoke in the days of His flesh, were they not completely human? And if in the case of Christ we have not only a divine-human person, but divine-human words, then how can Christians deny the possibility of a divine-human word when the word in question happens to be the written word?

We come back to the statement that to deny the possibility of God's speaking through man without destroying man's individuality is to set bounds to the omnipotence of God. As has already been intimated, the difficulty here consists in our inability to see that man can be really employed by God, or wielded as God's instrument without being destroyed. More generally, we cannot comprehend how God in all history can be the first cause without destroying the substantive reality of second causes. But the difficulty here does not warrant us in alleging impossibility. According to the Christian doctrine of Providence, God, in a way incomprehensible to us, really is the first cause, doing according to His will in all events of creature-history, and yet by the same providence orders events to fall out according to the nature of second causes. According to the evangelical doctrine of salvation, it is God who, sovereignly, worketh in saints both the willing and the doing; while yet saints work out their own salvation with fear and trembling. To make such antinomies involve impossibility with God is to betray incaution, if not irreverence and presumption.

In this relation inquirers and dogmatisers are often seen under the power of a fatal prepossession, which makes it practically impossible for them so much as fairly to entertain the suggestion, that a word whose inspiration is completely human may at the same time be a word whose inspiration is truly divine. We know that in many cases this fatal prepossession is only one aspect of a view, of naturalism *versus* supernaturalism, which carries men, professing to be devout students of Scripture, into more or less complete rejection even of supernatural (divine)

revelation. But as we now have to do with the record, not with the revelation recorded, I shall deal, through sample, with the fatal prepossession only as blinding men beforehand in relation to the subject of divine authorship of Scripture.

As a sample suitable for my present purpose, I will take the well-known way of reasoning, in many cases, from the record regarding the superscription on the cross. Of the four recorded superscriptions no two coincide exactly in words. Therefore, it has been reasoned, the old doctrine of divine inspiration cannot be true; God cannot have said, in all the four cases, "This was the superscription." In some cases this reasoning is founded on the supposition that, as the superscriptions so vary in the records, in at least three of the records there must be a "mistake" or "inaccuracy." So far the reasoning is disposed of by the fact that no one of the records professes to give *the words* of the superscription, in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin; and also by the fact that it is the manner of Scripture, even when assuming the form of *verbatim* reporting, to be careless about literal reproduction of the words of an utterance—*e.g.*, any lecturer on the Gospels is aware that, in the *ex facie verbatim* reports of the words of the Lord Jesus, the thing given is, often at least, only the substance of His utterance. Thus, in the reports of His exposition of the parable of the Sower one record has "the word," another "the word of God," and another "the word of the kingdom." This fact shows that where there is a variation in words, even in reports ostensibly *verbatim*, there is not necessarily any "mistake" or "inaccuracy," but only a conformity to the well-known manner of Scripture,—a manner which, because well known, itself provides against misconception. If I know beforehand that, even when in form reporting *verbatim*, the record must not be regarded as of course giving the exact terms of the original utterance, then I need feel no uneasiness when confronted with the variations of the recorded superscriptions on the cross: I need only say to myself, all four agree as to *the thing* superscribed, while every one gives it in his own words; as well may happen when four perfectly honest men give a perfectly true account of one utterance.¹

¹ But does not the variation in the *words* of the superscription show that the inspiration is not *verbal*? A clever question, captious and misleading.

So far we have had to do with the credibility of the record rather than with the divinity of its authorship. The substantial credibility is not affected in the estimation of brethren reasoning as above. But though it should not be so to their feeling, it apparently is so in strict logic, so that their reasoning may often be found as part of the stock-in-trade of vulgar infidelity. I therefore deprecate the apparent facility, if not eagerness, with which good Christian men are found harping on supposed "mistakes" or "inaccuracies" in the record of revelation. Even among Christian men there is sometimes observable what might almost be described as a *mania* for such "inaccuracies." Indeed, this must almost inevitably be the result when men are passionately bent upon a theory of inspiration which excludes the proper divinity of the record. And the stupidity—as I will venture to call it—of imagining that there must, of course, be inaccuracy in the records of the superscription on the cross, because the recorded words of the superscription are in no two of the four cases the same, may serve to warn prudent men against the cry of "mistake" or "inaccuracy" on account of ostensible verbal discrepancy. There is much of warning, as well as of consolation, in the utterance, "Forgive them; they know not what they do." As of men's treatment of the Incarnate Word of God, so it may be of good men's treatment of His written word. Let them, at least, *make sure* that they know what they are doing, when they lend themselves to parading "mistakes" and "inaccuracies."

But some, owning the fact that the variation in the words of the superscription on the cross does not imply mistake or inaccuracy on the part of the human authors of the Gospels,

Does any one think that *Pilate* was divinely inspired? The question here is, whether four distinct *descriptions* of the superscription, which, *ex facie*, are given by four men, may not have (through them) been given by one God? In other words, may He not *employ* four men, i.e. make use of their fourfold idiosyncrasies, to convey His one meaning with a fourfold colouring? But why more than one colouring? Because God chooses to speak through more than one man. The fourfoldness of the colouring, with agreement in substance, is what might have been expected from real employment of men as "pens of God." It serves a secondary purpose in showing that the men are independent witnesses. And as their testimonies reveal no real discrepancy, it is fully consistent with the suggestion that they all alike, in producing their respective records, are instruments of God in producing His fourfold record.

are of opinion that the variation shows that, in the strict sense of the "old dogmatists," the authorship of the fourfold record cannot be divine. They may admit that God had to do with the preparation of the record, as He has to do with the determination of men's utterances in the ordinary course of providence, or in the course of His gracious work of regeneration and sanctification, so that the records are indirectly divine, as the best words of uninspired saints are indirectly divine; *i.e.* so that we really get from them what they have received from the Lord. But the present question is, whether through them we really get *from Him* what they have received from Him. And here some Christian brethren say in effect: "No, it is impossible, for the record is fourfold, even in terms, while God is one. If God had really, in the sense now in question, been the author of the records, they would not have been fourfold, but one, even in terms." Here I am endeavouring to give exactly what passes through the mind of the brethren referred to. And I say that it betrays the blinding influence of that fatal prepossession of which I have spoken. The brethren are prepossessed with the opinion that it is *impossible* for God to speak through men without overriding and placing in abeyance individuality, personality, manhood.

Try to suppose, for argument's sake, that God, speaking through man, *employs* him, *and so* does not destroy him. *Then what have we to expect* as the result? *We have to expect*, setting apart possibilities of error which exist in fallen men when God is not preventing, that four witnesses, all speaking perfect truth, shall speak the perfect truth in four different ways, if only those four ways be what would naturally result from their varied characters, idiosyncrasies, individualities. This, I say, is what we have to expect, on the supposition that God really *employs* men as the organs of His utterance; so that, for instance, if it be natural for four men to give four distinct reports of the superscription on the cross, distinct in terms, though the same in substance, then that same variety of form in four God-inspired accounts ought not to startle us, as incompatible with divinity of inspiration; but ought rather to be regarded by us as in the line of what might have been expected when the inspired record comes through four men.

"The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." Gene-

rally, as it has pleased God to give the record through men, we of course expect that the word shall be human in form. And as it has pleased Him to give it through this, and that, and that other man, we ought of course to expect that in form it shall exhibit the idiosyncrasies—apart from sin—of the individual men through whom it comes. If they be pens of God, they are human pens. And, it is to be presumed, He has selected this and that man, not with a view to suppress individualities, but precisely because the individuality, in the case of this and that man chosen for the purpose, is precisely fitted, through operative manifestation of it, to be the organ of expressing what God means to say.

I may add that the understood purpose of God, to employ individualities freely and fully manifested, would well accord with the manifest manner of the inspired writers, in giving free and full expression to their individualities. They write as if they had no-consciousness of Divine inspiration. And it is conceivable that, in the detailed articulation of their labour as scribes of God, they have no consciousness of Divine inspiration. But without the consciousness of that inspiration, they may have had full *confidence* in its presence and power; as when the martyrs of the first age were confident that there would “be given to them” what they should say, and thus felt no need of anxious preparation of speeches, but simply gave spontaneous utterance to what occurred to them when the testing time came on. So the manifest freeness, spontaneousness, *abandon*, of inspired writers, so far from militating against the supposition of the divine inspiration of their utterances, may rather fall to be regarded as resulting from their perfect confidence in the presence and power of the inspiration.

So far by way of definition. And this, very nearly, is the end of the journey which I had proposed to myself on this occasion. But my paper would be unwarrantably fragmentary if I did not make some remarks on the question, What then? What is the use of your definition? What are we to think of the view of inspiration thus defined? My answer is, It is the only view that will work, that will satisfy the existing conditions, supposing Christianity to be a new creation, and the Bible to be in some real sense a trustworthy record of a

Divine revelation. But in justification of this answer, I make a few very elliptical notes in conclusion.

(1.) To all appearance the revelation bids us regard the *record* as divine, the Book as properly oracular, the Bible as God's word in the sense of being a Scripture of which God is author. I will not now go into detailed evidence. I state as clear to my apprehension, after full inquiry, that the proper divinity of the authorship of Scripture is really declared in the revelation which the Scriptures record. Of this I have no doubt. And I do not think that any man will have any doubt of it who goes through the process of carefully and candidly considering the teachings of revelation regarding the record.

(2.) Scripture as a whole has certain *marks* of divinity of authorship. The marks may not be visible in this or that portion of Scripture, and may thus fall out of view of those whose career of inquiry is one of disintegration without redintegration. But if they be in the Bible as a whole, then the divinity without the marks will be believed in, and so the marks themselves may come to be seen and felt, in those portions,—*e.g.* The Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes, and Esther—in which the marks do not appear at first sight. Now, that the Scripture as a whole has those marks can, I think, be shown not only from its pretensions but from its achievements. In particular, it claims to be, and it has proved itself to be, (1) a word of *faith*, and (2) a word of *life*; in a sense and measure which imply nothing less than divinity of authorship. I could give very copious illustrations here. But I will only propose to brethren the exercise of considering, Has not the Bible caused men *to believe* in God, and *to live* by faith, in a sense and measure altogether unexampled on the part of books of simply human inspiration? The question at first sight will seem precarious. But I am certain that the longer you think of it, gathering in your experiences and readings, the more you shall feel disposed to say, This Book is shown to be divine by being distinctively creative; it alone, of all books, deserves the description, "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and hearing, shall live."

(3.) There has on the Church's part been an *intuitive sense* of *the divinity* of Scripture, not only in respect of contents but in respect of form. This intuitive sense of a divinity

inherent in the word is an effective *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. And the argument from it, though capable of abuse, has a right use, the use I now am making, viz., to corroborate the arguments drawn from the testimony of the revelation, and from certain manifest characters of the record. Apart from all such more external evidences, there is a self-evidence in the voice, or word, which is an object of intuitive knowledge to him who knows the person, and which may even make one to know him to whom the person was previously unknown—as a traveller in Africa may at once divine the lion's roar, previously never heard by him. At least, a child will know a father's voice. And it is simply a fact that Christians have an immediate feeling or conviction of the divinity of Scripture. It is upon this, subjectively, that the faith of Christendom reposes. There is a properly *religious reverence* for Scripture, distinct in kind from the veneration we owe to the best works of simply human authorship, even when the contents of those works are recognised as originally derived from revelation of God. Hence, for instance, Wilberforce and Andrew Fuller speak of that religious reverence for Scripture as one of the fruits and evidences of vital godliness, and the absence of it as an evidence of ungodliness of heart. Indeed, we may go further, and affirm that the Bible, wherever it is read in communities, goes on making way for itself, gaining the ground on which it stands, winning credit to itself, not only as recording a one divine revelation, but as being a veritably divine record of that revelation, not only containing but being "the Word of God."

What, then, do you make of the "mistakes" or "inaccuracies" of Scripture? I am willing to assume the position of one who confessedly does not know what to make of them, where they are manifestly real. In our day, difficulties of this class are paraded and pressed, with manifest relish and gusto, as if some professing Christian teachers had really felt an interest in giving to their existence an emphasis even of exaggeration. And it appears to be assumed that their existence is a discovery of our new time, involving a necessity of departing from the old doctrine of inspiration. In fact, there is no new discovery here. The particular cases of alleged "mistake" or "inaccuracy" may vary; but the existence of cases of this class has been full before the mind of the Church for

many generations. Two hundred years ago, a collection of them, borrowed by Clericus from Spinoza, occasioned a flutter among theologians, and certain weak evasions, about "partial inspiration," etc., especially among weak-kneed evangelicals in Britain. More than a thousand years before that they had been dwelt upon, and pressed to an alien conclusion, by Theodore of Mopsuestia; so that some of his lucubrations, *e.g.* about the Pentateuch, look as if they had but yesterday reached us by telegraph from Tübingen or Leyden. But the Christian Church, in view of this class of phenomena, and of the conclusions to which she was invited on the ground of them, has not accepted the conclusion, nor allowed the phenomena to disturb her confidence in the proper divinity of the Scripture. And in my judgment the Church has been right and the alarmists have been wrong. The phenomena of this sort do not necessitate, and therefore do not warrant, abandonment of the belief that Scripture is the word of God, and consequently rejection of the relative evidence furnished by the testimony of revelation, the manifest characters of Scripture as a word of faith and of life, and the intuitive feeling or perception of its divinity on the part of devout men.

I think it right to put this class of difficulties into the background, on account of a very prevalent method of pushing them into the foreground, and practically ignoring the positive evidence appropriate here. You say to a friend, "You appear to me to exclude from your doctrine the proper divinity of the record." Instead of answering straight, he will say, "But what do you make of the inaccuracies of Scripture? You will perhaps say that they do not exist, or that their existence is owing to errors of transcription." In such a case I think the proper answer is, "No, I do not say *anything* about them. At this stage I think it best to say nothing about them. I will begin with saying, that the proper divinity of Scripture is shown by positive evidence, of revelation and of experience. And then, if you choose, I may say, as to the phenomena described as 'inaccuracies,' I am perplexed by them, and I do not know what to do with them, *excepting* that I ought to prevent them from shaking my belief founded on that positive evidence." And this I will have a good right to say. For, I maintain, the phenomena are not

such in their nature as to warrant by necessitating the abandonment of belief really founded on that positive evidence. This, I think, I could show by detailed examination of those alleged "inaccuracies," especially in respect of logical bearing on the question of inspiration. But then that would lead us away into tangled talk which would cause the positive evidence to disappear from the mind's view, and thus disqualify us for judgment in the case, leaving us under a vague impression, under whose power many are at this hour enslaved and blinded, that those alleged "inaccuracies" are a main source, if not the main source, of information regarding the nature of *theopneustia*.

EPILOGUE.

(The capital letters here, A, B, etc., represent only *views*, not *persons*.)

A. "You make an illegitimate distinction between human inspiration and divine inspiration." ANS. I do make a distinction, as when one distinguishes between Homeric and Æschylean authorship of a book. And I see that the word "inspiration" has so much come to mean "inspiration of God," that I should prefer in popular discourse to employ the word "inspiration" only when I mean (*theopneustia*) *divine* inspiration. But for some scientific purposes it may be convenient to speak of "inspiration" as equivalent to *authorship*. In such cases I would feel no difficulty in employing the expression, "human inspiration," in speaking, say, of the Westminster Catechism.

B. "I hold with you that the Bible is a properly oracular book; and that all Scripture is the Word of God, a proper ground of faith. But, while maintaining this as the proper ground of my Christian faith and life, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact of ostensible 'mistakes,' which I cannot account for consistently with the doctrine of divine inspiration." ANS. I am so far in your position. I see ostensible "mistakes" which I cannot account for. And, if you sincerely regard Scripture as a divine record, or the Bible as an oracular book, I suppose that you and I must at bottom be of one mind and one heart. Only I hope that you agree with me in holding the oracularness of Scripture as the fundamental fact of *religion* in this relation. You know that some, while professing to accept Scripture as an oracle, though presenting on the face of it

ostensible "mistakes," found upon those ostensible mistakes their doctrine of the authorship of Scripture, *so that* the Scripture comes to be not a proper ground of faith.

C. "You after all have not told us where is the inspiration, and what it is." **ANS.** I have told you, first, as to the where of inspiration, that it is in the *Scripture*; and, second, as to the what, that it consists in the Bible being *God's Word*. Very clever people may here be really "blinded by excess of light"—from earth. Simple people have always known what is meant by an oracular book, a word which is God's, a scripture whose meaning is God's mind expressed by God.

D. "My view is this:—The inspiration resides in the moral and spiritual ideas of Scripture, not in its intimations about physical fact." **ANS.** That is an old Jesuitical view, ventilated for the purpose of obliterating the distinction between a divine record and a human record. And it is thoroughly unscriptural. The Bible, when speaking or hinting about its own divinity of authorship, nowhere distinguishes between moral ideas and physical facts. Whatever it appears to claim for itself, in respect of divinity of authorship, it appears to claim for itself alike all through. Christ and His apostles, when referring to the Old Testament Scripture, never said, You may believe this scripture statement, *for* it does not refer to physical facts.

E. "But is there not a real distinction between spiritual ideas and physical facts?" **ANS.** Yes, the Jesuits knew that. But the distinction is not relevant here. For here the question is not about the importance of the thing spoken of, but about the truth, credibility, divinity of the Speaker. There are no Bible statements about physical fact that are even ostensibly untrue. The Bible statements about physical facts have never been the real occasion of infidelity. The real occasions have been the spiritual ideas of Scripture. So said Christ, "If I tell you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things?"

JAMES MACGREGOR.

ART. II.—*Strictures on the Article "Bible," in the recent edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica."*

GENERALISATION upon the basis of questionable or imperfect *data* is one of the most fertile sources of error in the fields of Science and Philosophy. The author of this article has caught this spirit of the age, and has carried it into the department of Biblical Criticism. The first manifestation of its influence is seen in the opening of the second paragraph :—
 "The pre-Christian age of the Biblical religion falls into a period of religious productivity, and a subsequent period of stagnation and merely conservative traditions." This generalisation, besides being entirely too sweeping, proceeds upon a false assumption regarding the relation between religion and revelation, making piety the basis and condition of revelation, and thus, in accordance with one of the rationalistic schools, assuming that the religious consciousness is the source of theology. So far is this representation from being in harmony with the fact, the reverse relation is the one taught in the Bible. Both under the Old Testament and the New, religion was originated and maintained by supernatural interpositions occurring at sundry times and in divers manners. The knowledge communicated was not the offspring of the religion, but the religion was the offspring of the knowledge. The order has ever been, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God. It was just as true of Isaiah as it was of Balaam, that it was not by reading the record of his religious consciousness that he discovered the glories of the coming Messiah.

Nor was the Biblical religion left to depend upon one impulse which operated during a period of productivity, and then vanished away, leaving the Church to spiritual stagnation and conservative traditions. The diverse estates of action and stagnation have alternated throughout the history of the Church, divine communications always preceding religious revival. This fact forbids the generalisation with which Professor Smith has opened the discussion. The Biblical religion, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, cannot be classified under the two heads specified in this article. A glance at the history as given in the Bible itself is sufficient to justify this

stricture. Entering on life in the image of God, with knowledge and holiness supernaturally communicated, and not left to acquisition or development, man lapsed and lost both. By a supernatural and gracious interposition he was brought again into covenant relation. Under this covenant the seed of the woman, whilst having his own heel bruised, was to bruise the head of the serpent. In the one family the enmity is revealed, and the apparent triumph of the serpent's seed terminates the first period of the covenant of grace. God interposes again, and by the gift of Seth in the room of Abel renews the conflict. The next great epoch is marked by the deluge, by which God avenges Himself upon an ungodly race, and delivers the only family in which the true religion was found. But as there was a Cain in the family of Adam, so was there a Canaan in the family of Noah. And even the descendants of Shem became so corrupt that God, to preserve His truth, found it necessary to call out and separate Abram from amongst them. To illustrate this point fully would be to re-write the Bible. The true religion was maintained, if we are to accept the testimony of Scripture, by a series of supernatural impulses given at different epochs, and distributed all along the history of the covenant people, and not by an impulse operating for a period continuously, and then waning into feebleness and spiritual stagnation.

Professor Smith is aware of this, and hence represents the period of productivity as also a period of contest. This is true. It is true of the life of the body taken as a whole, and true of the spiritual life of its individual members. There cannot, therefore, be any warrant for a generalisation which assigns religious productivity a place at the beginning and religious stagnation a place at the end. The fact is, these estates have alternated from the beginning, and, if we are to credit the New Testament, will alternate to the end.

The period assigned for the beginning of the struggle between the spiritual principles of the religion of revelation and polytheistic nature-worship, and unspiritual conceptions of Jehovah, is singularly inconsistent with the facts. Professor Smith says the struggle began with the foundation of the Theocracy by Moses. We are to infer, therefore, that there was no polytheistic nature-worship or unspiritual con-

ceptions of Jehovah among the covenant people prior to the foundation of the Theocracy by Moses! This is a very questionable position. That polytheism had prevailed among the descendants of Shem before the call of Abraham is put beyond question by the express testimony of Joshua (chap. xxiv.), and that they continued to serve false deities is proved by the fact that Rachel, on leaving Padanaram, took her country's gods with her. Surely we are not to assume, with Kuenen, the alternative that at that stage there was no monotheistic religion.

In this same paragraph Professor Smith states, as a matter of course, that "it was only the deliverance from Egypt and the theocratic covenant of Sinai that bound the Hebrew tribes into national unity." What warrant is there for this statement? None whatever. During the lifetime of Jacob his sons were under his government, and recognised his authority. After his death till the time of Moses, there is little known of their tribal relationship. It is evident, however, that Moses was divinely commissioned to them as one people; for when he and Aaron went into Egypt they gathered together all the elders of the children of Israel, and when the people heard that the Lord had visited the children of Israel, and that He had looked upon their affliction, then they bowed their heads and worshipped. They were visited as being already Israel; they were redeemed as one people. It was neither the deliverance from Egypt nor the theocratic covenant that bound them into one nationality. On the contrary, it was as the one seed of Abraham that they were delivered, and their deliverance as a nation was in pursuance of the previously existing Abrahamic covenant. From the fact that Moses and Aaron gathered all the elders together, it is manifest that they were governed by an eldership which represented the whole nation.

Professor Smith speaks of the gradual development of the religious ideas of the Old Testament as if it were a discovery of criticism, while the fact is that the doctrine of development is expressly taught in the New, and has been held by the people of God under both Testaments.

Separating the sacred ordinances from the religious idea—a most unwarrantable procedure—he alleges that their subjection to variation was less readily admitted. The passages cited prove, notwithstanding, that from the very inception of

the Mosaic economy, the position taken was that variation was contemplated and, within certain limits, was to be allowed. How this should affect our views in regard to the authorship of the Pentateuch one is at a loss to determine. Does it prove that Moses was, or was not, the author, to cite passages extending as far back as the 20th chapter of Exodus, which prove that sacrifices might, so far as the legislation of the Pentateuch is concerned, be offered elsewhere than at the centre of worship, and then prove that Deuteronomy limits sacrifices to one centre? Well, the argument advanced is: that we find a practice of sacrificing in other places sanctioned by Exodus, xx. 24 ff., followed by Samuel, and fully approved of by Elijah, forbidden by a written law-book found in the temple in the days of Josiah (2 Kings xxii. xxiii.), and it is assumed that the legislation of this book does not correspond with the old law in Exodus, but with the book of Deuteronomy. The answer is obvious:—1. The book found is not described as “a written law-book,” but as *the* book of the Law. It is true the article is wanting before book, but it is before the noun “law” with which it is in construction, where it ought to be, and the phrase is properly rendered “the book of the Law.” This usage is in harmony with the rule that “the article is not prefixed to a noun in construction with a definite noun.” 2. There is no need for the new hypothesis that Deuteronomy alone was found, because the old hypothesis assumes that it was embraced in the Torah along with the other books. 3. It is as easy to reconcile Deuteronomy with Exodus, on the old assumption that both were written by Moses at different stages in the development of the Revelation, as on the new assumption that they were composed by different writers living at different epochs. The question is not how Moses could consistently write one law in Exodus and another law in Deuteronomy; but how God could authorise one, whether Moses or any other, to write diverse laws? It only enhances the difficulty to sever Deuteronomy from its historic position, and ascribe it to a date as late as the days of Elijah or Josiah. If God, by whose inspiration the Scriptures were written, could consistently issue, in the days of Elijah or afterwards, the law as it appears in Deuteronomy, could He not, with equal consistency, after a period of nearly forty years, and when His people were about to enter upon Canaan, authorise His servant

Moses, whom He was about to remove from among them, to issue a more restrictive law? The force of this consideration is all the more manifest when one examines the book of Deuteronomy, which contains the alleged diverse law, and finds that it indorses Exodus, from which it is said to differ. 4. The book of Deuteronomy itself professes that the things written therein were spoken by Moses before the Israelites crossed the Jordan: "on this side Jordan, in the land of Moab," chap. i. 5. No theory of the time of the issuing of the law in question, inconsistent with this claim, can be accepted by any man who believes in the inspiration of the book of Deuteronomy.

And, finally, the assumption on which the whole argument proceeds is utterly destitute of foundation. Professor Smith alleges that "the legislation of the book" (found in the temple) "corresponds not with the old law in Exodus, but with the book of Deuteronomy." His reason for this statement is that the reformation inaugurated by Josiah finds its sanction and authority, not in Exodus, but in Deuteronomy. Now, here two questions arise, (1) "What was the character of Josiah's reformation?" and, (2) "Is the authority for it to be found in the book of Deuteronomy alone, and not in Exodus, or elsewhere in the Pentateuch?" As to the former of these questions the answer is furnished by the narrative of what the good king did as given, 2 Kings xxii., xxiii. From beginning to end the work of reformation was an overthrow of the instruments and symbols of idolatry, and the abolition of idolatrous practices both within and without the temple, and the reinauguration of the pure worship of Jehovah. With regard to the second, which is the vital question in this controversy, both elements of the reformation have their full sanction and authority in the book of Exodus: "Ye shall not make with me gods of silver, neither shall ye make unto you gods of gold" (Ex. xx. 23). And this is, of course, but a reiteration of the second commandment: "Thou shalt not bow down to their gods, nor serve them, nor do after their works; but thou shalt utterly overthrow them, and quite break down their images" (Ex. xxiii. 24). "Ye shall make you no idols nor graven image, neither rear you up a standing image, neither shall ye set up any image of stone in your land, to

bow down unto it: for I am the Lord your God" (Lev. xxvi. 1). These prohibitions of idolatry, both in Exodus and Leviticus, are followed by threatenings as severe as are to be found in Deuteronomy. (See the reason annexed to the second commandment, and the outburst of the divine vengeance against Israel for their sin in the matter of the calf which they importuned Aaron to make, and the whole of Lev. xxvi., and the wrath revealed against Israel in the matter of Baal-Peor, Num. xxv.) So far, therefore, as the questions raised by the reformation of Josiah are concerned, there is no need for seeking a new book diverse from Exodus, or a new law diverse from anything found in the Pentateuch outside the book of Deuteronomy. All that Josiah wrought has full warrant in and was demanded by the law as given in the Decalogue itself, and as reiterated and illustrated by terrible judgments in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers.

If, however, Professor Smith's position is that the reformation consisted not merely in the overthrow of idolatrous shrines and practices, but also in the abolition of other places of sacrificing to Jehovah than the central single one at Jerusalem, the reply is: (1) Granting this to be true, the doctrine of "a single sanctuary" can claim the support not only of the book of Deuteronomy, but of the whole tenor of the Mosaic legislation. The doctrine is interwoven with the whole Mosaic economy. It is inseparable from the structure of the sacerdotal system, which restricted the priesthood to Aaron and his sons, and their successors. The invasion of the office by Korah and his company was visited by a fearful manifestation of the divine displeasure, and the record of it is found in Numbers, and not in Deuteronomy. As there was but one priesthood, so also there was but "a single sanctuary." Moses was not enjoined to make several tabernacles, but one, and David did not receive the plan of several temples, but of one. The rule from the inauguration of the priesthood and tabernacle in the wilderness, throughout the history of Israel, was a single sanctuary for all Israel. But (2) the assumption that the reformation effected by Josiah had exclusive or even chief reference to the erection of other sanctuaries or places of sacrificing to the true God cannot be granted. As already shown, the leading characteristic of the

great revival of religion by the hand of the good king was the destruction of idolatrous instruments and practices. According to the words of Huldah the prophetess, the reason assigned for the wrath of God threatened against Judah was their forsaking of Jehovah and their burning incense unto other gods (2 Kings xxii. 17). These words were the keynote of both the wrath and the reformation, and it is only incidentally that reference is made to the characteristic which Professor Smith has singled out as distinguishing the national reform.

However viewed, therefore, the generalisation is both groundless and gratuitous, and there is no need for the assumption of a book of law so peculiar as to demand at the hands of a Biblical critic a theory such as Professor Smith has advanced. There is no need for assuming that Deuteronomy alone was found, for there was nothing done that was not fully authorised in other parts of the Pentateuch, and there is no need for the assumption that Deuteronomy is anything else than what its name implies—a reiteration of the Law. Hence the author of the narrative of this reformation, in winding up the history of king Josiah, sums up his character as follows: “And like unto him was there no king before him, that turned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, *according to all the law of Moses*; neither after him arose there any like him” (2 Kings xxiii. 25). He who penned these words took a broader view of the characteristics of both Josiah and his reformation than the author of the article in question has done. He represents his standard of action as the whole law of Moses, and does so in such connection and in such terms as to leave no room for doubt that he attributes the thoroughness of the reformation to the fact that the king ordered it according to the whole law.

It is not, then, “an obvious fact,” as our author alleges, “that the law-book [the reader will mark that “law-book” is a translation in the interest of the theory] found at the time of Josiah contained provisions which were not up to that time an acknowledged part of the law of the land.” Could any theory be more absurd? On such a theory, how account for the wrath threatened against Judah by Huldah the prophetess, speaking in the name of Jehovah? What ground could there be for wrath against a people for not obeying a book hitherto

unknown? The wrath of God, we are told, has its law, and is revealed against those "who hold the truth in unrighteousness;" but here, if we are to credit Professor Smith, the wrath of God is revealed against Judah for not obeying a book of which they had never heard before! If the provisions of the book in question were not, up to that time, a part of the law of the land, Judah could not be held as guilty of any sin respecting it, and the discovery of it could not have awakened in the heart of Josiah such conviction of sin as caused him to rend his clothes. So far is Josiah from regarding this book as containing provisions hitherto unknown to Judah, that he recognises it as containing *an old law which had been neglected by their fathers*. His words on hearing it read are: "Great is the wrath of the Lord that is kindled against us, because our fathers have not hearkened unto the words of this book, to do according unto all that which is written concerning us" (2 Kings xxii. 13). And surely such language implies the existence of this book in the days of the fathers, and assumes their knowledge of it, and their refusal to obey it. The penalty dreaded by Josiah was the penalty incurred by the sin of departed fathers, which, according to the law, not only as given in Deuteronomy, but in Exodus, a jealous God was about to visit upon that generation. This reference to the fathers stamps the book with an antiquity which negatives the theory of its novelty, for the innovations abolished in purging the sin of these fathers embrace idolatries dating as far back as the days of Solomon and Jeroboam the son of Nebat. In fact, the good king purges the land of Judah and Israel of the symbols of idolatry introduced by the kings of Israel and Judah, throughout their whole history, from the time of the degeneracy of David's successor—a period of about 380 years.

Nor is it to be overlooked in this discussion, that the law according to which the reformation was conducted as stated by Professor Smith—the law of a single sanctuary—was a "positive" enactment. For the violation of laws founded in our moral nature, or in the nature of things, we may be justly held responsible and visited with punishment without any revelation beyond the light of nature; but it is not so in the case of laws founded simply on the will of God. In such cases those alone are responsible to whom the divine will has been

made known. Tested by this rule, Professor Smith's theory is disproved, for according to it the special sin condemned in the newly-discovered book—the sin for which the wrath of God was kindled against Judah—was the multiplication of sanctuaries and worshipping elsewhere than at the single sanctuary. Now the law prohibiting this was obviously a positive law. No one could have discovered it by the light of nature, whether internal or external. It rested simply and solely on the divine will, and was a mere temporary provision, to be abolished for ever on the introduction of that coming dispensation when the true worshippers should worship the Father neither at "Jerusalem, nor in this mount," but anywhere, in spirit and in truth. In order that Judah should have been held responsible for this law, it was absolutely necessary that they should have been made acquainted with it. This, however, if we are to credit the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, was not done; and thus we are conducted to the fearfully immoral conclusion, that for breach of an unknown positive enactment the descendants of the breakers of it are constituted the objects of the great wrath of Jehovah! Any theory leading to such a conclusion is, *ipso facto*, condemned (Rom. v. 13).

As additional arguments in support of this theory, Professor Smith (p. 637) adduces the refusal of Gideon (Judges xiii. 23) to rule over Israel, and the answer of the Lord to Samuel (1 Samuel vii. 7), when he prayed to Him respecting the request of Israel to have a king. On these passages he remarks that, "if the law of the kingdom in Deut. xvii. was known in the time of the Judges, it is impossible to comprehend" these texts. To this it were sufficient to reply, that if the law in Deuteronomy was not in existence till, as Professor Smith teaches, after the days of Elijah, it is impossible to comprehend it. Let us glance at the preface to this law of the kingdom. It is as follows: "When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me; thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose" (Deut. xvii. 14, 15). Now, according to our author, this law was issued after the days of Elijah, and therefore issued at least 550 years after Israel had come into the land,

nearly 200 years after the kingdom had been set up, after it had been rent in sunder, and after the two kingdoms had been ruled over by several kings! If it is difficult to comprehend Samuel's hesitation and Gideon's refusal, on the assumption that these men knew of the existence of the law of Deut. xvii., it is absolutely impossible to comprehend this law viewed as an *ex post facto* enactment. What could be the object of issuing a law to regulate the election of the first king of Israel after the days of Elijah, yea, after the kingdom of the ten tribes had been carried into captivity? Biblical criticism does not demand from any man the sacrifice of his common sense, and common sense pronounces such projection of a law five or six centuries beyond the events it was designed to regulate an utter absurdity. Besides, if Samuel did not know of this law respecting the rise of the king, he must have known less than his own mother (1 Samuel ii. 10), and less than Eli (1 Samuel ii. 35), and less than the elders who, in their request for a king, quote the very words of Deuteronomy (1 Samuel viii. 5).

But this theory is embarrassed with something worse than anachronism and absurdity: it involves a charge of gross immorality against the author of the book of Deuteronomy. Our author felt that it was not unnatural to raise this objection, for on p. 638 he anticipates it, and tries to fortify the theory against it: "If the author," he says, "put his work in the mouth of Moses, instead of giving it, with Ezekiel, a directly prophetic form, he did so, not in pious fraud, but simply because his object was not to give a new law, but to expound and develop Mosaic principles in relation to new needs. And as ancient writers are not accustomed to distinguish historical data from historical deductions, he naturally presents his views in dramatic form in the mouth of Moses." One on reading this attempt to disembarrass the theory of the charge of immorality which it necessarily involves, instinctively reads it over again to ascertain whether he has not made a mistake in his interpretation of the language which Professor Smith has here put in print. But beyond question there it is. The defence is, that although Moses did not use the words put into his mouth by the author of Deuteronomy, he taught the principles which that author has simply expounded and developed in relation to new needs.

On this defence it may be remarked: 1. That the slight degree of plausibility attaching to it arises from its abstractness. It is perfectly true that any rule of action deduced by just and necessary inference from Mosaic principles may be represented as a part of the Mosaic legislation. This however is a very different thing from what the author of Deuteronomy has done. He has not deduced principles from the teaching of Moses and put these principles in the mouth of Moses, but he has formally given us discourses uttered by Moses, and has told us when and where Moses uttered them. The moment one passes from the abstract defence to the concrete work for which it has been devised, all its plausibility vanishes. The actual work with which the theory professes to deal, and which it pronounces a drama, professes to be a *résumé* of the history of Israel throughout their wanderings from Horeb to the plains of Moab. The words recorded, and not the mere principles of the Mosaic legislation in their relation to new needs, the author represents as the words spoken by Moses. He tells us when they were spoken, for the events recorded in the third chapter fix the time, viz., "after he had slain Sihon the king of the Amorites, which dwelt in Heshbon, and Og the king of Bashan, which dwelt at Astaroth in Edrei:" and he tells us where the words were spoken, viz., "On this side the Jordan, in the land of Moab." The preface is manifestly historical, and it pledges the truthfulness of the author, not for the accuracy of historical deductions about to be drawn, but for the accuracy of the historical representation of words uttered and deeds performed. There is no more reason for regarding the book thus introduced as a post-Mosaic drama than there is for regarding Genesis, or Exodus, or Leviticus, or Numbers, as post-Mosaic romances. It were just as plausible to say that the previous books of the Pentateuch were *ex post facto* compositions written after the settlement in Canaan, for the purpose of justifying the Israelites for taking possession of other people's property, and instituting a peculiar system of national worship. It could be urged, as our author has pointed out, and as has often been pointed out by others, that even in Genesis, as in the other books, there are names of places which were not in use till after Israel had possessed the land. If the fact that Samuel and Gideon and Elijah seem to have been unaware of the

existence of the law respecting the king and the kingdom, found in Deut. xvii., necessitates the device of a theory which transforms Deuteronomy into a legal or ceremonial drama, and strips it of more than five and a half centuries of its antiquity, surely the reference to places under names which they did not bear till after the Israelitish occupation of the land must necessitate, not only the transference of the composition of these parts of the Pentateuch to a corresponding date, but, for the reason assigned by our author in the case of Deuteronomy, the transportation of them from their traditional character of veritable histories into historical dramas in which we are presented with historical deductions instead of historical facts.

2. These considerations acquire additional force in view of the principle avowed by our author, to wit, that "ancient writers are not accustomed to distinguish historical data from historical deductions." If this principle be applied to Deuteronomy, who will forbid its application to Genesis, or Exodus, or Leviticus, or Numbers? May we not, indeed, regard the argument for such application *a fortiori*, as these books are on the hypothesis in question much more ancient?

3. If a composition couched in historical terms and cast in historical form, as Deuteronomy is, without a single hint given to put the reader on his guard, and without a single expression from which one could infer that the writer was not putting on record actual historical occurrences, can, by the magic wand of criticism, be converted into a delusive drama, there is not only an end to all history, but a suicidal termination of all criticism. On such critical principles one must become not only a historical sceptic, but sceptical of all historical criticism, and find himself unable to determine whether the critic is in earnest, or whether he is not, as in Whately's Historical Doubts respecting Napoleon Bonaparte, turning a particular school of criticism into ridicule. There is no more reason for regarding Deuteronomy as belonging to the class of compositions to which Professor Smith has assigned it, than there is for assigning his Article "Bible" to the class of the witty Archbishop's famous critical *jeu d'esprit*.

4. But it is surely but fair to inform us what is meant by the expression, "ancient writers." Without some temporal limitation, such phraseology must set our author's disciples

completely adrift. Are we to understand, as he says, that it is customary with ancient writers not to distinguish historical data from historical deductions? If this be the common usage—the use and wont—of ancient writers, how are we to draw the line between the dramatic presentation of principles under the garb of history and actual veritable historical compositions? On such an hypothesis, how much of ancient history, whether sacred or profane, will remain history, one is at a loss to determine. If the rule laid down by our critic be valid, it is questionable whether we have any ancient history at all, either inside the Bible or outside it. The critical genius that can turn Deuteronomy into a drama, can, with equal facility, turn any ancient composition, indeed any composition, whether ancient or modern, into anything embraced within the domain of literary composition.

5. Nor are we to overlook the fact that what Professor Smith says of “ancient writers” is true only of writers of the fabulous period. Only of such writers can it be said that they were “not accustomed to distinguish historical data from historical deductions.” Are we to understand him as teaching, by this reference to the use and wont of ancient writers, that writers such as the author of Deuteronomy and his predecessors (for if the expression embraces the one it must embrace the others) belonged to the fabulous period and to the class of fabulous writers? If he does not mean to place these ancient Biblical writers in this class, he has certainly been most unhappy in the selection of his terms; for he assigns this custom which belongs to the period referred to, as a reason for stripping Deuteronomy of its historical character. If so, then it must follow that the author of Deuteronomy, and, at least, all his predecessors and contemporaries, belong to a period whose use and wont was unhistorical! As this period embraces not only the Pentateuch, but all the books of the Bible, as far as the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, and, probably (for he refers Deuteronomy to the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.), the larger portions of these national records, we have no guarantee that the first half of the Old Testament (for fully that amount of it must, according to our author, be assigned to this indiscriminating period) is veritable history! Surely a criticism leading to such conclusions is self-condemned. It is

reckless beyond all apology. Let its verdict be accepted, and the Scriptures are divested of all claim to be treated as the Word of God. Men will not long regard a book as composed under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which represents a man as speaking what he never uttered, and doing so with every detail of time, and place, and occasion, and this in order to acquire for it an authority to which it is entitled only on the assumption that these representations are true.

6. And this leads to the very obvious remark, that from this wholesale reference to the use and wont of ancient writers, it is natural to infer that our author does not distinguish ancient writers into inspired and uninspired. He who infers from the literary usage of the age in which a book of Scripture was composed what the character of the composition must be, does, *ipso facto*, treat the writer as an ordinary *littérateur*, and overlooks the grand fact that the writers are represented in the Bible itself as moved by the Holy Ghost. However others may deal with the sacred record, no Christian critic can thus treat it. Christian criticism can admit of no theory which classes the sacred writers of any period with profane writers of the same period, and treats their compositions as if they were the products of mere uninspired genius, determined, as to form and style and phrase, not by the indwelling Spirit, but by the use and wont of the age. The apostle Peter places the writers of the Old Testament beyond the pale of any such classification, for he affirms that they "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," and not as they were moved by the *Zeit-Geist* or spirit of the age in which they lived. The fact that they spake in the language of their country and age, and availed themselves of existing modes of presentation, such as the parable and other literary devices, as vehicles for the communication of the truths they were commissioned to proclaim, is far from warranting the sweeping conclusion that they were so ruled by the literary use and wont as to confound historical deductions with historical data. The principle laid down by the apostle Peter (and it is a principle which holds true of all "the ancient" sacred "writers") excludes any such conclusion. To say that men, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, writing seven or eight centuries after the entrance of Israel on the land of Canaan, and after the captivity of the

kingdom of the Ten Tribes, drew up rules to be observed by Israel respecting the election of a king, is nothing short of imputing folly to the Most High. The sacred writers are not to be so confounded with their profane contemporaries as to ignore their relation to the Holy Ghost, under whose all-determining agency they were borne along and guided, and by which they needed to be infallibly directed even to the words they employed in communicating truths of whose signification they themselves had very imperfect conceptions.

Besides, what evidence have we, so far as the great body of the sacred writers are concerned, that they were so familiar with their profane contemporaries as to adopt them as literary models? Christian apologists have been in the habit of saying that it was *largely* the reverse,—that the Gentile sages were *largely* indebted to the Jews. Professor Smith is much nearer the truth when he says that “the way in which a prophet, like Amos, could arise untrained from among the herdsmen of the wilderness of Judah, shows how deep and pure a current of spiritual faith flowed among the more thoughtful of the laity.” Well, it would seem that Amos at least was independent of the use and wont of ancient writers outside the wilderness of Judah, for it is not very likely that there was a circulating library embracing works of profane authors established among the herdsmen of Tekoa. To the same effect is the sentence which immediately follows. “Prophecy itself,” says our author, “may from one point of view be regarded simply as the brightest efflorescence of the lay element in the religion of Israel, the same element which in subjective form underlies many of the Psalms, and in a shape less highly developed tinged the whole proverbial and popular literature of the nation; for in the Hebrew commonwealth popular literature had not yet sunk to represent the lowest impulses of national life.” Assuming that the last remark was not intended to apply to anything embraced within the canon of the Old Testament, the passage may be accepted as a much more reasonable account of the literary influences which were ever at work on the Hebrew mind, than that which represents the sacred writers as subject to a certain *ab extra* influence which may be designated the use and wont of ancient writers. If it were allowable to assume such familiarity with the actual procedure

as characterises Professor Smith's article, one might say that it was just in the way described that the Old Testament writers were raised up and endowed, so far as their literary culture was concerned, for the agency with which they were honoured as the instruments and vehicles of the Holy Ghost. It is more than likely that even Moses himself was more indebted to his home training by his Hebrew mother than he was to the culture received at the hands of the sages of Egypt. It is eminently true of all the sacred writers—with, perhaps, the exception of the author of the book of Job—that they were nursed in the lap of Israel's piety, and nurtured on the word of Jehovah as it existed in their day. Thus trained at home, and by the very spirit and genius of their religion separated from the Gentiles and their literature, they acquired the national style—a style Hebraic in every instance, and utterly removed from anything that can be pointed out in the literature of any other nation under heaven, except those nations which have become acquainted with the sacred treasures of the chosen race. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine a more thoroughly baseless argument than that which infers the alleged dramatic form of Deuteronomy from the literary usage of ancient writers.

But we have now a very grave question to raise, and one which is peculiarly grave on Professor Smith's theory. How came this unpublished book—for unpublished it must have been, if we are to credit our author,—how came this hitherto unpublished book to be in the house of the Lord? Is there a single instance in the previous history of the Mosaic economy of "a written law-book," with its legal prescriptions all formally written out, being employed as the medium for communicating the will of God to His people, prior to the oral communication of its contents from time to time as the providence of Jehovah furnished the occasion? It was in this way the contents of Exodus and Leviticus and Numbers were introduced to Israel. The record containing the Mosaic legislation is so characterised by this peculiarity that it has been called a legislative journal. The order of procedure is set forth in the opening words of Leviticus: "And the Lord called unto Moses, and spake unto him out of the tabernacle of the congregation, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them," etc. etc. Very different, however, if we are to accept the theory of our

author, was the procedure in the case before us. Here is a book unheard of by priest, or Levite, prophet, scribe, or king, until the days of Josiah, when some peculiar incident brings its existence to the knowledge of Hilkiash the priest, who gives it into the hands of Shaphan the scribe, who reads it before the king. Neither Hilkiash, nor Shaphan, nor the king seems to have doubted its divine origin or authority. It is at once recognised as the law of God, and its words produce in the mind of the king such a sense of Israel's sin and danger that he rends his clothes. Why should a book thus introduced produce such effects? How came it to pass that no one ever doubted its claims to the obedience of the king and his people? If our author's theory be true, it was destitute of the wonted authentication, for what he regards as its central doctrine was never heard of before, and yet as soon as it is read its claims are recognised. There is no possibility of accounting for its recognition and effects except on the assumption of its being a copy of the law given by Moses, or perhaps the autograph itself, which Moses after writing had commanded the Levites to put 'in the side of the ark of the covenant, for a witness against Israel (Deut. xxxi. 26). If it be asked, How could so sacred a book as this, and one so carefully laid up, pass out of sight and memory? the answer is to be found in the same chapter in which the account of the discovery of it is found. The corruptions of which Josiah had purged Judah and Jerusalem could never have been introduced had not the book of the law been neglected and cast aside. If Judah and her priests could permit the house of the Lord to become a partial ruin, if they could introduce idolatry, not only into the high places, but into the very precincts of the Temple itself, it is not to be wondered at that they permitted the sacred book of the law to share in the general neglect, and to be hidden among the rubbish until it was unearthed by the workmen who repaired the breaches of the house. Why, the marvel is that any one acquainted with the narrative of the universal decay of religion, and cognisant of the desecration of the Temple, and the state of dilapidation to which it had been reduced, should think any theory necessary to account for the effects produced by the discovery of the book, much less the extraordinary theory that the book could not have been the book of Exodus,

as its characteristic laws are not found therein ! The state of religion and of the house accounts for the loss of the law of Moses laid up there, and the revival of religion and the repair of the house account for the finding of it ; and there is no need for the hypothesis of a hitherto unknown book, which, if brought in at all, must have been introduced surreptitiously.

Passing to the general question respecting the date and authorship of the Pentateuch and the earlier prophetic books, we find the old objections raised by Spinoza and others his successors urged once more by our author. The facts enumerated are, the fact that "the limits of the individual books are certainly not the limits of authorship;" the fact "that the Pentateuch as a law-book is complete without Joshua, but as a history is so planned that the latter book is its necessary complement;" the fact "that the Pentateuch uses geographical names which were not known till after the occupation;" the fact that in one place it even "presupposes the existence of a kingship in Israel;" the fact that "the last chapters of Judges cannot be separated from the book of Samuel, and the earlier chapters of Kings are obviously one with the foregoing narrative." "Such phenomena," Professor Smith alleges, "not only prove the utter futility of any attempt to base a theory of authorship on the present division into books, but suggest that the history as we have it is not one carried on from age to age by successive additions, but a fusion of several narratives, which partly covered the same ground, and were combined into unity by an editor !" In reply to these old objections it were sufficient to copy out of Horne's *Introduction* the conclusive answers so well summarised by that able apologist more than forty years ago. The resurrection of them in the present day, however, may serve as a partial apology for a fresh examination of their claims.

And first of all, it may be asked, "On what authority does Professor Smith assume that the traditional theory of Biblical authorship is based upon the present division into books ?" The contrary is the fact. The theory was the cause of the division, and not the division the cause of the theory. It was owing to the fact that both Jews and Gentiles, friends and foes, regarded Moses as the author of the Pentateuch that it has been regarded as a distinct book, the work of one author.

In the next place, it may be asked, "What is there in the systematic and orderly consecution of the books in question to necessitate the theory of one editor to combine them into unity?" Suppose it to be true that God had a plan of redemption, and that the history of His people was intended and designed, before its actual enactment on the stage of time, to be a systematic unfolding of that plan—suppose this to be the fact, would it not follow that the incidents, when placed on record, would fall in as consecutive, orderly arranged parts of the one plan devised and administered by the One Mind? And, on the other hand, to take the instance mentioned by Professor Smith, would it not awaken suspicion, and lead us to conclude that the history could not be a history of the administration of such a plan, if it were found that Joshua was not "the necessary complement of the Pentateuch"? And would not this fact preclude the possibility of interjecting Deuteronomy after the history of the kingdom of the Ten Tribes, or at any point later than the death of Moses, and prior to the history of Israel under Joshua? Professor Smith not only admits the existence of such a plan, but argues from it, and claims for Biblical Criticism the discovery of its development. Granting, which we do not, that this discovery was never made till the Deborah of Criticism arose in Israel, and holding, as we do, that the plan is developed in the history of the chosen race, does it not inevitably follow that the historical facts recorded do, by their character as a revelation and the progressive development of this plan, determine their own position in the inspired narrative? In a word, does not the development theory held, as we have already seen, throughout the history of the Church, forbid the resurrection of Moses from his undiscovered tomb in the land of Moab, to deliver his farewell to an Israel which must have been raised from the dead to hear it, after Elijah himself had gone to heaven, and after Israel had ceased to exist as a nation? Whensoever Deuteronomy was written, there is no place for it but that given it by both Jew and Gentile. Nowhere else can it be placed without marring the history of the development of the economy of redemption. And if this be the only place, the time is *ipso facto* determined, for it were truly preposterous to suppose that after the economy had been developed

to the point reached in the days of the kingdom of Judah, an inspired writer should write a book of which Joshua is the necessary complement. Let any one make the experiment suggested by the theory, and transfer Deuteronomy to the position assigned to it by this novel criticism, and if we have not overrated his claims to intelligence, he will feel shocked at the work of his own hands. Indeed, the principle of development itself furnishes a safe guide in all questions pertaining to the time and place of any part of the revelation. If, despite the lapses of the chosen seed, there is no lapse or retrogression in the revelation of which they were the ordained channel, if their very sins become the occasion for fresh disclosure of the plan and its infinite resources of pardoning grace, we have in this fact a rule to which our Biblical critics would do well to take heed. If this be a law of the economy, then the books naturally arrange themselves along the pathway of the divine Logos, as He has unfolded, in His sovereign wisdom, the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, was hid in God. On this principle it would be just as preposterous to place Deuteronomy after Joshua, or after Judges, or after Samuel, or the Kings, as it would be to transfer Joshua to any of these places.

Nor are we to lose sight of the confession made by Professor Smith, to wit, that "a good deal may be said in favour of the view that the Deuteronomic style, which is very capable of imitation, was adopted by writers of different periods." This is a considerable abatement of the pretensions of Biblical Criticism as an instrument by which the age of a given composition may be determined. If the style of a book may be imitated, and that "by writers of different periods," may not "a good deal be said in favour of the view," that the style of a book is not an absolute criterion of its authorship, and that genuine criticism implies much more on the part of a critic than a knowledge of the language in which the book has been written, or of the literature in which that language has been developed? In saying this, there is no intention to disparage such acquirements. On the contrary, it is held that they are among the most important of the many qualifications which the high functions of criticism demand. All that is here contended for is, that on Professor Smith's own confession, a

Biblical critic cannot determine the time or canonical place of a book by virtue of his linguistic or literary lore. In addition to all this, it is indispensable that the critic have a thorough acquaintance with the structure of the economy whose closely correlated provisions have been revealed through the agency of the sacred penmen, whose writings furnish, not merely grammatical exercises, but theological problems, which are immensely the profoundest with which the human mind has to deal. As already seen, the economy admits of no retrogression, and therefore, in this the norm of its evolution, furnishes one of the most reliable of all criteria for the determination of the times and canonical *loci* of the accumulating increments of a predetermined revelation.

But whilst the ordinary *apparatus criticus* furnishes, and can furnish, no safeguard against literary imposture, and is confessedly incompetent to detect an existing literary fraud, there are in the character of the economy and its author the highest of all guarantees against any such procedure. "Let God be true, but every man a liar." No man, whether learned or unlearned, can, without incurring great guilt, attempt to make the truth of God abound through his lie. And certainly no man, speaking by the Spirit of God, would put into the mouth of a well-known historical character words never uttered by him, and this, too, in constructing a book of law, whose whole drift and tenor render it all but impossible to regard it in any other light than that of a veritable historical sketch, with additional legal enactments or expositions, suggested by experience, or demanded by the approaching demise of the legislator, and the settlement of those he had been appointed to lead, in the inheritance promised to their fathers.

On p. 638, Professor Smith neutralises, to a very large extent, all that he had previously advanced in support of the late date of the composition of Deuteronomy :—

"The Levitical laws," he says, "give a graduated hierarchy of priests and Levites ; Deuteronomy regards all Levites as at least possible priests. Round this difference, and points allied to it, the whole discussion turns. We know, mainly from Ezekiel xliv., that before the Exile the strict hierarchical law was not in force, apparently had never been in force. But can we suppose that the very idea of such a hierarchy is the latest point of

liturgical development? If so, the Levitical element is the latest thing in the Pentateuch, or, in truth, in the historical series to which the Pentateuch belongs; or, on the opposite view, the hierarchic theory existed as a legal programme long before the Exile, though it was fully carried out only after Ezra. As all the more elaborate symbolic observances of the law are bound up with the hierarchical ordinances, the solution of this problem has issues of the greatest importance for the theology, as well as for the literary history, of the Old Testament."

On reading this passage it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the writer has taken alarm at his former critical deliverances, and is here endeavouring to tone them down by pointing out the weakness of the grounds on which they mainly rest, and the lack of unanimity among the critics regarding the date of the Pentateuch—the question on which he has already delivered a final authoritative judgment. If the question be as stated by Professor Smith, and if, in the determination of it, we are dependent "mainly" on Ezek. xliv., which teaches that "before the Exile the strict hierarchical law was not in force, and apparently had never been in force," it is no wonder his confidence should give signs of abatement. Leaving the contending critics to counterbalance one another, is there any one who has any regard for his reputation as a reader of the Bible who will venture to base any theory in regard to "liturgical development," before the Exile or after it, upon Ezekiel's vision of the temple and its priesthood? From that vision it is impossible to find out what the liturgical law was either before the Exile or after the Restoration. The house seen by Ezekiel, and the priesthood which was to take part in its services, have never had, and were never intended to have, a literal realisation. Whilst the vision was vouchsafed in order to cheer the hearts of his fellow-exiles, by the assurance of the restoration of the temple, and city, and land, its chief object was to foreshadow the spiritual temple by which all local centres of worship were to be superseded, and a dispensation under which the waters of the sanctuary were to flow forth to regenerate and fertilise the moral wastes outside the bounds of the land of Israel. If the vision is to be taken literally—and it is only on the assumption that it is to be so taken that it can serve the end to which Professor Smith has turned it,—if it is to be taken literally, there is no possibility of stopping short of the conclusion reached by the advanced

Premillennial school, who, on the ground that it has never been fulfilled, look for the restoration of the Jews to the land of Palestine, the rebuilding of the city of Jerusalem and the Temple, the restoration of the priesthood, and the reinauguration of animal sacrifices—who, in fact, make Christianity a sort of interlude in the Mosaic economy. It is difficult to see how any one can seek for the law of liturgical development in this marvellous vision, and stop short of the singular theory which looks forward to a time when the waters which Ezekiel saw issuing from under the threshold of the house shall burst forth in reality, and continue to flow as a symbol of the Holy Ghost !

Equally manifest must it be that no theory in regard to the relative positions of Leviticus and Deuteronomy in the Sacred Canon can be based upon the alleged diversity of their laws respecting the position of the Levites. The facts alleged may be accepted, while the theory may be rejected. The Levites may be regarded as excluded from the priesthood by the law as given in Leviticus, and as possible priests according to the Deuteronomic legislation, and yet our views as to which of these books should have the precedence remain unaffected, and the question be undetermined. In order that the alleged diversity of legislation should have any weight in the determination of the question of chronological precedence, it is necessary to assume that a graduated hierarchy bespeaks an earlier or a later stage in the process of liturgical development.

But are we in a position to say which of these assumptions is true ? Might not a good deal be said in favour of the view that the law of Deuteronomy on this point, which regards all Levites "as possible priests," denotes an earlier stage ? This much might be advanced with considerable force in its favour, viz., that a law limiting the priesthood to a tribe would naturally precede a law limiting it to a family. Prior to the Mosaic economy, and during an unquestionably earlier stage, there were no tribal distinctions in regard to the priestly office. All the tribes and all the families of Israel exercised the functions of the priesthood. Now, it would surely seem more reasonable, if we are to make assumptions at all, to assume that the first limitation in a process of development would be from the

nation to a tribe, rather than from the nation to one of the families of a single tribe. As the goal of the economy was the typifying of the one priesthood as held by the one Priest, would it not seem as if the first step towards the attainment of it should be less definite than the subsequent ones, and that the graduated hierarchy, of which the Aaronic priesthood is the crown and consummation, should mark the close of the whole typical evolution? And, on the other hand, might it not be urged with equal force, in favour of the view that the law of Leviticus indicates an earlier stage, that in an economy which was not only to prefigure the Christian dispensation, but give way to it, and wax old and give signs of vanishing away, it might be expected that all along the track of its administration there would be introduced changes premonitory of a final dissolution? On general principles, therefore, it is very questionable whether any rule can be arrived at by which a critic may determine what is or what is not an earlier or a later stage *in this particular element* of the liturgical development. This much, at least, may be assumed, that this point, around which Professor Smith alleges "the whole discussion turns," is one on which there is no warrant for critical dogmatism, and one which can give no key for the solution of questions of priority between the sacred books.

Under the head of "Fusion of several elements into one Narrative," Professor Smith gives us his views respecting the composition of the sacred books—if anything composed in the way alleged deserves to be styled sacred. The substance of the whole matter is this:—

"The Semitic genius does not at all lie in the direction of organic structure. In architecture, in poetry, in history, the Hebrew adds part to part instead of developing a single notion. The Temple was an aggregation of small cells, the longest Psalm is an acrostic, and so the longest Biblical history is a stratification and not an organism. This process was facilitated by the habit of anonymous writing and the accompanying lack of all notion of anything like copyright. If a man copied a book, it was his to add and modify as he pleased, and he was not in the least bound to distinguish the old from the new. If he had two books before him to which he attached equal worth, he took large extracts from both, and harmonised them by such additions or modifications as he felt to be necessary. But in default of a keen sense for organic unity, very little harmony was sought in points of internal structure, though great skill was often shown, as in the Book of Genesis, in throwing the whole material into a balanced scheme of external

arrangement. On such principles minor narratives were fused together one after the other, and at length in Exile a final redactor completed the great work, on the first part of which Ezra based his reformation, while the latter part was thrown into the second Canon. The curious combination of the functions of copyist and author, which is here presupposed, did not wholly disappear till a pretty late date ; and where, as in the Books of Samuel, we have two recensions of the text, one in the Hebrew and one in the Septuagint translation, the discrepancies are of such a kind that criticism of the text and analysis of its sources are separated by a scarcely perceptible line."

Here then is our author's account of the way in which those books which Christians have been wont to style the Word of God have come into existence! In the first place, it is laid down as an unquestionable axiom that the sacred writers had no genius for anything but literary patchwork. In proof of this assertion reference is made to the architecture of the Temple, to the acrostic structure of the 119th Psalm, and to the longest Biblical history! From the first of these references we are, of course, to infer that the architecture of the Temple was simply the offspring of Semitic genius. The Bible itself gives a somewhat different account of the authorship of the Temple architecture. If we are to credit the book itself, God Himself was the architect of both the Tabernacle and the Temple. It was not left either to Moses or to David, as representatives of Semitic genius, to determine what the fashion of the dwelling-place of Jehovah should be. The great symbol and type of Messiah's body, personal and mystical, was far too important a matter to be marred by the untowardness of any order or class of human genius, whether of the Gentile or the Jew. Speaking on this point David says: "All this the Lord made me understand *in writing* by his hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern" (1 Chron. xxviii. 19). The charge therefore of incapacity to develop a single notion, or to achieve an organic structure, if it lie at all against any one concerned in the authorship of the Temple, must lie against God Himself.

Equally irreverent and inconclusive is the second reference. It is not true that because the 119th Psalm is an acrostic its structure is not organic. It is not an impossible achievement to write an acrostic in which "a single notion" is developed. And certainly it is one of the slenderest and most partial of inductions to infer what Semitic genius could

achieve in poetry from the fact that the 119th Psalm is an acrostic.

What our author means when he says that "the longest Biblical history is a stratification and not an organism," we do not clearly comprehend; for the distinction between "stratification" and "organism," in such connection, is not very transparent. But taking his own account of the distinction, to wit, that in stratification "part is added to part," while in organisation "a single notion is developed," there is no ground for the assumption that the one is exclusive of the other. There is such a thing as organisation by stratification, and that too as a mode of development. Teleologists have been in the habit of arguing that our earth is an organised whole, and have cited in support of their position the correlated strata composing its crust. These strata are not haphazard deposits, but, on the contrary, reveal in their mutual relations and in their common subordination to the wants and purposes of man, the presence and control of an infinitely wise and beneficent mind.

In like manner we are told by physiologists and biologists that whilst the architecture of the body is of the cellular order, it is none the less an organism. Whilst "part has been added to part," as if outlined by some "Semitic genius," there is nevertheless a common consciousness in this wonderful "aggregation of small cells," which bespeaks an organic unity and demonstrates "the development of a single notion." And surely it is not necessary to refer to the *flora* of our world to confirm the position that stratification is not the antithesis of organic structure. What are the rings disclosed when a tree of the forest is felled, but so many elements of a stratification which is confessedly organic? In a word, it is not "the adding of part to part" that determines the character of the resultant aggregate, but the presence or the absence of a determining purpose to the achievement of which the parts are made or are not made to contribute. Wherever parts are so added to parts as to contribute to the attainment of an end, we pronounce the arrangement an organisation. This judgment we pronounce instinctively, whether the parts be the cells of the human body, or the rooms of a house, or the rings of a tree, or the companies or regiments or columns of an army moved on the

battle-field by the commander-in-chief, or the paragraphs or chapters, or "books" of a work.

But not only is the distinction groundless, it is peculiarly inapplicable to the actual products of "Semitic genius" given us in the Bible. Christian apologists have been wont to argue the divine authenticity of the Bible from its organic unity. Of course, if it be a stratification, as Professor Smith would have us believe, and if, as he tells us, stratification is the very antithesis of organic structure, the doctrine of organic unity, and with it this apologetic position, must be given up. Besides, Biblical Criticism itself must lose one of the tests by which it judges of the claim of any of the sacred books to a place in the Sacred Canon. If, as critics say, in addition to all other proofs, "the organic function" of a book must be taken into account, that is, the manifested fitness of the book to fill its place as a part of one organism, it must be clear that no book of the Bible could, on the principle of our author, stand the trial. If Professor Smith were within reach he would foreclose the inquisition and dismiss the inquisitors, telling them that no men of intelligence would sit down to test the fitness of a stratum, or any number of strata combined, to perform organic functions, as the ideas of stratification and organisation were mutually exclusive.

It is true "the Semitic genius" sometimes all but shook itself loose from the trammels of stratification, and somehow or other managed, as in the book of Genesis, "to throw the material into a balanced *scheme* of external arrangement," but, of course, a balanced *scheme* of external arrangement is not an organic structure, at least a writer by using this nicely balanced phrase can, for the moment, avoid the appearance of self-contradiction, while, at the same time, he admits a fact subversive of his theory. As a matter of fact, the book of Genesis reveals a "*scheme*" balanced both externally and internally. It contains a brief but most comprehensive history of the *development* of the *protevangelium* as displayed in the conflicts of the two seeds—the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent—for a period of more than two thousand years. Professor Smith may, if it please him, deny that the development of the first promise is "the development of a single notion," but most people will regard the denial as an additional illustration of

the way in which a pet theory may blind the intellect and warp the judgment. What our author styles "a balanced scheme of external arrangement," is a living organisation—an organisation of living men brought into existence in order that through them the promise of the Messiah might be developed towards its fulfilment. To speak of the history of this organisation as if it consisted of a congeries of incongruous elements, brought into a sort of external harmony by some *ex post facto* copyist, or final redactor, who, from the untowardness of the materials, felt it necessary "to add and modify," and not to be too precise about distinguishing the old from the new, is as unfair and as unphilosophical as it is irreverent. Of "the curious combination of the functions of copyist and author which is here *presupposed*," and which, we are told, "did not wholly disappear till a pretty late date," it is difficult to speak with calmness, or suppress feelings bordering on indignation. Here is a young man talking about the way in which one of the most ancient of books was composed with as much confidence as if he had lived throughout the 1500 years occupied in the writing of it, and had looked over the shoulders of the writers as from age to age they plied their marvellous task; and when he has told us just how the work was done, turns round and tells us that he was merely *presupposing* it had been composed in this way! *Presupposing!* and presupposing all this about the genesis of the Word of God, that cannot be broken and abideth for ever! Let rationalistic, destructive critics utter and give currency to such hypotheses regarding the origin of our Bible, but, "O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united."

ROBERT WATTS.

ART. III.—*The Latest Phase of the Pentateuch Question.*

Geschichte Israels. Von J. WELLHAUSEN. In zwei Bänden ; erster Band.
Berlin, 1878.

THE assault upon the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch has opened from another side and upon a new plan. From a triplet of articles which appeared a few years ago in the now extinct *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, signed by J. Wellhausen, professor in Greifswald, it was already known that another and no mean antagonist had entered the lists against the ancient view of the unity of the Books of the Law. The high position accorded to Kuenen in the fourth German edition of Bleek's *Introduction to the Old Testament* rendered it also highly probable that Wellhausen had accepted the hypothesis commonly associated with the names of Graf and Kuenen; for in performing the very necessary editorial task of surveying the course of criticism upon the Pentateuch since Bleek's death, a mere translation of a portion of Kuenen's *Historisch-kritisch Onderzoek* was regarded as an amply sufficient *résumé*, with the addition of a few remarks. Wellhausen's last work, which a German reviewer not unjustly describes as a book "not seen every day in the literary market," leaves its author's position perfectly unmistakable. In this first volume, a preparatory criticism of the sources of the history of Israel, the post-exilic origin of the Levitical law is definitely and powerfully maintained. It is singular that this criticism of sources confessedly occupies as much space as the narrative based thereon; it is still more astonishing that the narrative itself must be such as no Jew or Christian would recognise as biblical. The work is dedicated to "my unforgotten teacher, Heinrich Ewald;" if Milman longed for "an Ewald to criticise Ewald," our desire might well be for an Ewald to criticise Wellhausen.

Life and growth are synonymous, and the curious in evolution would find a fascinating and instructive study in tracing the "critical" dismemberment of the Pentateuch. That development is strategic rather than biologic; it displays the

sources of able generals, and not tender gardeners. There has been no steady growth as from cotyledon to firm root, solid stem, umbrageous branches, and fertile fruit; the advance of "critical" views upon the origin and date of the Torah has been the cautious and versatile movement of a hostile force in the face of a wary foe. There have been many changes in the object of attack. At one time it was the unity of Genesis; at another of Genesis and Exodus; at another of the entire Pentateuch; yet again of the Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua, or the so-called Hexateuch; whilst, judging from the few sections substituted for Bleek's review of the historical books from Judges to Kings, Wellhausen would lead the way in the application of the same analytical process to several other of the historical books of the Old Testament. The method of attack has undergone many changes. First there was the adoption of the rough and ready test of the divine names; then additional linguistic considerations were introduced; yet more refined methods were subsequently brought to bear, and apparent anachronisms, supposed omissions, too congruous repetitions and too incongruous contradictions, peculiarities of phrase and peculiarities of thought, differences in lexicology and differences in literary style, psychological assumptions and theological bias, the conclusions of philosophers and the intuitions of experts, even the data of the modern theory of evolution and a presumptively axiomatic conception of the origin and growth of religion,—this whole armoury of weapons has been ransacked to enliven and press the controversy. And different results have been successively claimed. At some it seemed proven that the Pentateuch was a compilation from several documents, whether two or three or four or any in number; to their successors the so-called Book of the Law was the ultimate product of various supplementings and revisions of an original story. As for the age of the various writers or editors, opinions very widely differed. Nevertheless, regarded in mass, there has been a sort of progress in these "critical" views, marked by three distinct phases. In the first phase, the Pentateuch was regarded as a compilation from two or more writers of an earlier age, the time of the compilation being variously stated to be as early as the days of Samuel, and as late as the Exile. In the second phase, the former con-

tention was discarded, and the Pentateuch came to be looked upon as the final outcome of successive editings of a *Grundschrift* or original narrative; the original narrative being considered to belong to an early age of the Jewish history, Deuteronomy being accepted as the latest of the five books, and the ecclesiastical system of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers,¹ the *Priester-codex* of Wellhausen, being included in the original narrative and being of high antiquity, in all probability an oral tradition from the days of Moses. The third phase has in its turn revolutionised the second: the conception of a series of editors is retained, but Deuteronomy is supposed to succeed the *Grundschrift* in age, but to precede the *Priester-codex*, which in the form in which we now possess it is described as certainly posterior to the Exile. It is this third view which Wellhausen supports. This theory is, it is true, commonly associated with the name of Graf; but as our author has some objection apparently to be styled Graf's disciple we must do him the justice of stating that in his opinion "his inquiry is based upon a broader foundation than Graf's, and approaches Vatke in method," from whose work upon Biblical Theology, published more than sixty years ago, as one of the first-fruits of rationalism in Biblical Theology, Wellhausen acknowledges to have learnt "*das Meiste und Beste*." Wellhausen wishes us to infer, that as far as this generation is concerned, he puts in a claim for novelty in method, if not in result.

Wellhausen certainly has the merit of approaching the question from another side. In an editorial addition to Bleek he had already emphasised the opinion of Merx,² that the two questions might be separated, as to *the sources* of the Pentateuch, and *the relative age* of those sources. At any rate Wellhausen has kept these questions distinct. The investigations into the composite structure he has pursued in the articles previously mentioned upon the "Composition of the Hexateuch," the first of which deals with the Genesis, the second with the narrative portions of the later books, and the third with the great legal code. The inquiry into the relative age of the supposed sources is followed in the volume before us.

¹ Exodus xxv.-xl., except xxxii.-xxxiv.; all Leviticus, and Numbers i.-x., xv.-xix., xxv.-xxxvi. with a few exceptions.

² Tuch, *Commentar zur Genesis*, 2d edition, 1871; edited by Arnold and Merx, pp. lxxix.-cxxii.

It will greatly facilitate a statement of the peculiar views advanced, if a brief summary is given even of the earlier labours. Wellhausen finds, he thinks, clear evidence in the Hexateuch of three distinct strata, which he respectively names the history of the Jehovist (or JE, according to his common abbreviation), the law-book of the Deuteronomist (or Dt.), and a book of blended history and law, the *Priestercodex*, or Priestly Code (P. C.). The history of these sources is traced as follows. The Jehovist (JE) is a combination of two documents, one of which (J) is identified by its use of Jahve for the divine name, and the other of which (E) is identified by its use of Elohim. These two sources, he thinks, have run through several editions before their union. To the book of the Jehovist, which was almost wholly a history, Deuteronomy was added by the Deuteronomist, who also revised the whole of the Jehovistic portion of the Hexateuch; that revision being slightest in Genesis, more close in Exodus and Numbers, and most rigid in Joshua. Side by side with the blended works of the Jehovist and Deuteronomist, and quite independent of it, there also existed, it is said, another book of history and law, the Priests' Code, which sets law in a frame of history. The present impression of unity was imparted, finally, by the last editor of the Hexateuch (the so-called Redactor or R), who dovetailed and revised the works extant in his day, assuming everywhere the standpoint of the Priests' Code. So far Wellhausen was upon old ground, and is largely indebted to Nöldeke.¹ The plan of the *Geschichte Israels* is novel. An endeavour is there made to assign the relative ages of these three sources from considerations of Biblical theology. What Kuenen, Duhm, and Kayser have done incidentally, Wellhausen has done systematically. By a critical questioning of the Levitical religious system, he claims to have established that so-called Mosaism was not a revelation to one meek man, but an evolution slowly and laboriously effected by many minds and through many years. Two assumptions are everywhere made. The Jehovistic work is assumed to have been written, if not soon after the division of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, at any rate before the Assyrian period of Jewish history; Deuteronomy is also assumed to have been written, if not at the

¹ *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des A. T.*, 1869.

reformation under Josiah, towards the end of the Assyrian age. It is a peculiarity of the theory before us that it does not claim any great chronological precision. Merely taking for granted that JE was first composed, Dt next, and P.C. last, a double aim is kept in view. On the one hand an endeavour is made to demonstrate a veritable process of development in these three documents, Dt presupposing JE, and P.C. presupposing both. On the other hand an attempt is made to show the harmony between these results and the statements of contemporary prophets and historical writers; that is to say, it is attempted to show that the prophets of the Assyrian period reflect the Jehovist's standpoint, the prophets of the Chaldean period reflect the standpoint of the Deuteronomist, and post-exilic writers reflect the post-exilic Priests' Code. Accordingly the work before us is divided into three parts: the first part treats of the History of the Cultus, with chapters upon the Place where God was worshipped, upon the Sacrifices, upon the Feasts, upon the Priests and Levites, and upon the Establishment of the Clergy; the second part deals with the History of the Tradition, with chapters upon the Chronicles, upon Judges, Samuel, and the Kings, and upon the Pentateuch and Joshua; whilst the third part picks up the thread of the theory and resumes the History of Israel and Jewry, with chapters upon the Inference from the Criticism of the Law, upon the Oral and Written Law, and upon the Theocracy as an Idea and an Institution. To put the whole hypothesis in a sentence:—the common view has been that the Law was given at the outset of the career of Israel, being presupposed in its entire secular and religious history; Wellhausen thinks to have proved, by a narrow inspection of the extant documents, that the Law was unknown before the days of Ezra and Nehemiah, and that Mosaism, with its Tabernacle, priesthood, sacrifices, and festivals, is even in idea post-exilic.

There is one great difficulty in appreciating these theories of German birth. The premisses do not seem to warrant the conclusions; and that from two causes. The most dispassionate and unbiassed investigator seems to be in the position of the man who opens Euclid at random, and, from ignorance of the preceding propositions, axioms, and postulates, is unable to judge of the cogency of the proposition which

meets his eye, apparently a logical sequence of solemn trifling. German writers assume too readily that because their views are rejected, they are unknown. Only a laboured effort of the historical imagination can help us to barely understand these hypotheses. The fact is, too, that if there is a strong bias in our theological schools in favour of the Mosaic authorship, there is as strong a bias in Germany in favour of the composite view. It is not wholly our fault if the arguments relied upon unavoidably partake to our minds of the character of *argumenta ad homines* or even *argumenta ad familiares*. Of course neither one bias nor the other is scientific. Science corrects for atmosphere. Science also states all postulates with care. With all their boasted scientific precision these theories are the products of two factors: data and *danda*, reasons and bias, positions and prepossessions. For a well-trained Englishman or Scotchman or American, who is ignorant of recent Continental thought, to take up this book of Wellhausen's, for example, is to breathe a new air. He is an emigrant in another world. His sense of proportion is awry. His judgment is at fault. Respect makes him patient, and respect alone; respect for his own truthfulness and respect for a great name. He finds that he can only breathe freely and judge rightly after a somewhat difficult constructive process. As he makes a laborious investigation into the sources of conviction, his mind clears, and he moves as a free man in the midst of this new environment, able to accept or reject at the bidding of evidence. Then two things become manifest: *first*, that the inferences drawn are not warranted by the reasons assigned; *second*, that the inferences drawn only appear warranted by the reasons assigned upon certain presuppositions. The historical investigator sees a subtle rationalistic element veiling its distaste for the supernatural under the garb of science; he becomes aware of a growing antagonism to the Mosaic authorship because of its supernatural claims; he comprehends the widespread and semi-paralysing influence of great reputations, reader and pupil receiving, with too loyal a love and too hasty an assumption, the dicta of teachers of European fame. This also he understands, that, supposing there is no such thing as prophecy, or miracle, or divine interference in human affairs in

any supernatural sense, then this theory of Wellhausen's is the most rational product of the most rational phase of that investigation which endeavours to account for the Pentateuch by purely human agency. The fundamental assumption of Wellhausen's, the recognition of three strata in the Pentateuch—how has this arisen? the historical inquirer would ask. How have these three strata become axiomatic? The reply opens up a thrilling episode in the operations of the human mind. All the mysterious and coalescing forces which mould and impart conviction are seen at work, logical laws, but also psychological laws,—concurrence with a half-unsuspected prejudice, hero-worship, reverence for scholarship, possibly that "something *splây*," as Matthew Arnold calls it, "that something blunt-edged, unhandy, and infelicitous,—some want of quick, fine, sure perception, which tends to balance the great superiority of the German in knowledge."¹ If these views are to be fairly judged of outside of Germany and German scholars, an indispensable preliminary would seem to be a statement of arguments *ab initio*. Especially must there be exactitude in stating the postulates everywhere assumed; for a suspicion or avowal of ulterior motive, such as discrediting any of the prominent features of the Christian faith, makes all the difference in forming an estimate. This work of Wellhausen's is far from being an inquiry *ab initio*. It is virtually an appeal to those who have entered the second phase of "critical" views, and have persuaded themselves of the existence of the three strata, to proceed to the third phase and arrange those strata in another order. As Wellhausen himself puts it somewhat naïvely: "It is recognised that the three strata materially differ from each other, the question is what is their chronological order (*wie sie folgen*)."¹ When, therefore, Professor Kautzsch of Bâle gave the best possible advertisement to this work by confessing in a review conversion to its views, all he meant was conversion from the "critical" view of Ewald, Knobel, and Dillmann, as to the superposition of the three strata, to the other "critical" view of Graf and Kuenen.

Nevertheless there ought to be rejoicing in the ranks of the orthodox at this latest assault upon the Pentateuch. The

¹ *Literature and Dogma*, p. xxvi.

decisive battle-ground is at last recognised. Upon points of language, apparent anachronisms, dual or triple or multiple repetitions, seeming contradictions, and all the paraphernalia of negative criticism, there has been too long a delay ; they are but outworks and mural towers ; Mosaism itself is the central citadel ; and this Wellhausen recognises. He spends his strength upon the great religious system of the Book of the Law. As all miracles become more credible if the resurrection of Jesus be conceded, so the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch will be more credible if Mosaism be proved superhuman. As there is cause for joy when opponents move from questions upon miracles and prophecy and chronology and history and the canon, and when they lay their ladders against the character and claims of Christ, the most impregnable fortress of our Faith, so is there cause for joy when minor questions are left in abeyance to bring the engines of criticism against the Moral and Ceremonial Law, the one supreme pre-Christian testimony to a divine interposition. In itself a splendid unity, in its reference to the nature and condition of the Jew a magnificent adaptation, in its moral effects a grand education, and in its spiritual results an inspiring solace, that religious system was second only to the Gospel of Jesus. As the present writer has said elsewhere,¹ and cannot in his esteem too frequently repeat, its success was as marked as its aim was ambitious. It declared itself divinely originated ; no unworthy details belied the declaration. Tested by the grand purpose of all true religion—the adaptability to evoke, cultivate, and satisfy the spiritual cravings of mankind—it has no superior but Christianity. Truths of the highest import it effectually conveyed to fishermen, herdsmen, and shepherds. Mosaism inspired awe without despair, and trust without presumption. Under its regenerating influence the mighty God became an exalted friend, a righteous judge, a benignant king. It was a notable realisation of a beneficent ideal ; and by means of the magnificent and varied cultus which it enjoined under most tremendous sanctions, all those perplexing yet invaluable contrasts of profound spirituality—of time and eternity, death and im-

¹ *Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice*, pp. 108, 109 ; *Princeton Review*, May 1879, reprinted in Dickinson's *Theological Quarterly*, July 1879.

mortality, a God wrathful and reconciled, lust and aspiration, sin and salvation, unacceptable service and possible sacrifice—entered into common thought and tinged common experience. Indeed, if the great things for man *to know* are the existence of superhuman powers, nay, of an unchangeable God of adorable attributes, the fallen state of man and his personal incapacity of restoration, the possibility of forgiveness, and of a renewal to some degree of the intercourse of Eden; if the great things for man *to do* are to fear, to repent, to revere, to forsake evil, to cleave to good,—then must this Hebrew faith be regarded as astonishingly complete in the faculty and knowledge it was able to impart. The fact is that this intricate and protracted ritual was a unique provision for the deepest needs of man; omit one feature and that provision would have been less than complete. In that sacrificial constitution were portrayed, for any man who believed in God and in the possibility of His revealing Himself, all the essentials of true religion. As the Jew regarded the sacred structure of the Tabernacle, the eye whispered to the soul that God Most High dwelt in the midst of his nation, and might be approached in worship. As his attention was engrossed by the gorgeous vestments and busy ministrations of priests and Levites, he would recognise a divinely appointed organisation, by whose mediation and intercession divine worship might be beneficially and innocuously conducted. In the performance of the rites of purification the truth was palpable that those hereditary taints and personal faults which might intelligibly hinder approach to God, however disqualifying in their nature, might be neutralised. At the same time, the divinely arranged series of animal and bloodless gifts would deliver the messages with which they were divinely laden, the welcome and inspiring messages of the forgiveness of sins and a possibility of uninterrupted, or only momentarily interrupted, fellowship with God. In the sin-offering he recognised the divinely arranged instrument for obtaining forgiveness for sins of weakness and ignorance; in the trespass-offering a fitting retribution for fraud against God or man; the burnt-offering was an aid to consecration, the peace-offering a channel of communion. In short, the Mosaic injunctions brought into satisfactory prominence the consolatory and instructive truths

of the Divine nearness and approachableness, of human sin in its stupendous effects upon the physical nature and conscience, together with the possibility of atonement, forgiveness, and the restoration of Divine favour. The question immediately rises: Was this wonderful religious system of man or super-human? The reply very largely affects the credibility of Moses, and the books which claim him for their author. Not that Wellhausen has touched upon the supernatural element in Mosaism with any directness. Such high things, with their peculiar methods of proof, are altogether beyond his sphere. That he has concentrated attention, however, in any degree upon the religious contents of the Book of the Law is matter for jubilation.

As for Wellhausen's main thesis, the post-exilic origin of the Levitical code, one would have thought that the Book of the Psalms was sufficient disproof. That book is, at any rate, sufficient disproof to any one who attaches a high historical importance to the letter of the original Hebrew. An expositor like Olshausen, who does not regard a single Psalm in the whole collection to be the work of David, is, for sober critics, out of court by such an opinion; and even the evidence is rendered suspect of such negative reviewers as Ewald, Hitzig, and von Lengerke, who refuse to find any Davidic reference in the Fifty-first Psalm, for one or both of two reasons apparently, either because the prayer in the eighteenth verse of that Psalm, "Build Thou the walls of Jerusalem," is to them an anachronism, or because the mature conviction of sin displayed throughout is contrary to *dem kindlichen Charakter*—the childishness of that early age—or, to use Wellhausen's phrase, contrary to the naïveté of antiquity. When an express assertion is made that the Psalm was the effusion of a sinful heart after the adultery with Bathsheba, few will see the cogency of the reasons assigned; instead of chronological misplacement they will see a most subtle and significant contemporaneity, and, as for the theory of development, they will no more rely upon it to explain the spirituality than the genius of David, the profundity of his contrition than the universality of his poetry. Surely to the end of time sanctified and cultured common-sense, as it reads that eminently penitential outcry, will picture the suppliant king alone in that

most terrible of solitudes, and as thought grows calmer, and conscience more powerful, and trust more possible, as the touching parable of the ewe-lamb rings in his ears, and his own passionate condemnation is now consciously reiterated, unfolding his "dark sayings" upon his harp. Must not a rigorous judgment shrink from a critical demand, which is the manifest outcome of a foregone conclusion upon the nature of the Hebrew religion, which presents all the accessible data in a distorted form, and which, like a falsehood, does not "come alone," but requires the surrender of the historical trustworthiness of the Chronicles, the denial of the Davidic origin of the so-called Davidic Psalms, belief in the fraudulent ascription of Deuteronomy to Moses, and, in short, complicity in a series of "pious frauds" in authorship extending from the days of Moses to those of Ezra! The superscriptions of the Psalms, be it remembered, unlike the analytical headings of our authorised version, are part and parcel of the Hebrew text. Now, without attaching undue weight to those headings, Dr. Samuel Davidson's canon may at least be accepted, that "the best mode of proceeding is to assume the alleged Davidic authorship till internal evidence proves the contrary."¹ Taking, therefore, those Psalms expressly ascribed to David, or, better still, confining ourselves to the contents of the first two divisions of the Psalms, that is to say, to those Psalms which peculiarly belong to the Davidic age, and close at the Seventy-second, there is abundant proof of the existence of just such an ecclesiastical system as is depicted in the so-called Priests' Code. Whole pages might be filled with the minute features of the Law which are incessantly appearing, whilst undesigned coincidences innumerable suggest the conviction that the ceremonial law was at once the source and the stimulus of all the genuine spiritual life of the people. The Tabernacle of Jehovah, with its ministrants, sacrifices, and feasts, forms the unvarying background for all the play of religious emotion, with this result, that what is the express testimony of the Nineteenth Psalm may be taken as the latent testimony of the whole Davidic cycle: "The law of Jehovah is perfect, restoring the soul; the testimony of Jehovah is sure, making wise the simple; the statutes of Jehovah are right,

¹ *Introduction to Old Testament*, vol. ii. p. 255.

icing the heart; the commandment of Jehovah is pure, brightening the eyes; the judgments of Jehovah are truth, and are righteous altogether; more to be desired are they than silver, yea, than much fine gold, sweeter also than honey and the droppings of the honey-comb; moreover, thy servant is brightened by them, and in keeping of them there is great reward." The Fortieth Psalm alludes to *burnt-offerings* and *offerings*, and indeed employs the common sacrificial classification which summarises *the whole round of offerings* (*tsevach inchah*). In the Fiftieth Psalm, with dramatic force, the Lord is represented as commanding His angels "to gather His beloved,—those that have made a covenant by festal ring." Or if it be maintained that Asaph lived in a subsequent age to David, a similar technicality occurs in the twenty-seventh Psalm, where David tells how, when he has come to the one legal place of sacrifice and worship, he will offer "in His TABERNACLE *jubilant thank-offerings*;" whilst in the picturesque liturgy contained in the Twentieth Psalm, David puts into the mouth of the congregation led by the Levites the expressive prayer for his own acceptable worship: "Jehovah hear thee in the day of distress, the name of the Lord of Jacob defend thee, send thee help from the *sanctuary*, uphold thee out of Zion, remember all thy *sacrifices*, and **KEEP THY BURNT-OFFERINGS AS FAT**," a phrase with a history which plunges us at once into the regulations of Leviticus. Let us analyse the Psalm already mentioned, the Fifty-first, and the same result will follow. As surely as it paints a picture of remorse, it also calls up a picture of the Mosaic salvation, and, it may be added, of that alone. There is a sense of outcry throughout such as the law only would create. The sin denounced is no error, *bishgagah*, or *without deliberate intent*, but wilful, egregious, violent, presumptuous, and *beyond the reach of constituted sacrifices*. For so awful a sin no atonement was provided, from so terrible a sinner no sacrifice was acceptable. A clean heart is a divine gift to be implored, not an ecclesiastical exculpation to be purchased. Since the Psalmist knows himself an alien from the commonwealth of Israel, "Create in me a clean heart, O God," is his significant prayer; . . . Thou delightest not in sacrifice . . . restore unto me the joy of thy salvation." Yet is there no hopelessness. The writer

looks through rites to doctrines. He believes in a possible divine detergent; and as faith in the Almighty compassion grows stronger, he is able to rejoice in that renewal of favour which can once more transform *burnt-offerings* and *holocausts* into *sacrifices of righteousness*. To a student of the Levitical plan of salvation, in short, this crown of the Penitential Psalms is as luminous from what is unseen as from what appears. Or, not to delay longer upon this point, convincing as it is, let this one further fact be attentively pondered. In the so-called Priests' Code there is a somewhat minute terminology for the Tabernacle and its several divisions. In the Psalms of the first two books *expressly ascribed to David*, and *discredited by no internal evidence*, that terminology is repeated at sundry times and in divers manners. If the Pentateuch speaks of *bayith* or House of God, *ohel* or tabernacle, *mishkan* or habitation, *miqdash* or sanctuary, and that in various combinations, the unquestionably Davidic Psalms employ the same technicalities again and again, and in different associations; the very divisions of the Tabernacle, so characteristic of the Law, are also reproduced, and David recognises his place in the "*great congregation*," the restriction of his sacrifice to the "*altar of burnt-offering*," and the revelation of Deity more especially confined to the "*Holy Place*," or, as he says with more accuracy still, to the "*Holy Places*." Even the Psalms conceded by Ewald to be David's would be sufficient evidence for the pre-existence of the Levitical system.

Very many of Wellhausen's positions have been completely and fairly answered times out of number; some require no answer. To Wellhausen the *bamoth* or high-places may be a suggestive survival from the days of a common Canaanitish heathenism, long tolerated by the rising Monotheism, and assuredly not denounced until centuries after Moses, a kind of *os coccyx* in fact which betrays the once pendent tail. To the majority of investigators the *bamoth* will be survivals from heathenism, it is true, but survivals roundly condemned from the first, and steadily overcome, a standing illustration of the hardness rather than the spirituality of heart of the chosen nation. So, too, the supposed growth of a clergy from a laity, and of a priesthood from a clergy, has been frequently refuted. As for positions which are simply dictated by the exigencies

y, they no more call for animadversion than the subter-
the physicist who believes the surface of the earth to

When, for example, in substantiating the hypothesis
Tabernacle of the Exodus is "a historical fiction, . . .
erives its significance, its centralisation, and its exter-
from the Temple of Solomon," our author is reduced
ting that the passage in 1 Sam. ii. 22, with its express
lity *ohel moed* or Tent of Assembly (*A.V.* Tabernacle of
gregation) is "badly attested, and from its contents,
us," or when he allows that there are traces of the Ark
arly chapters of the first book of Samuel, but not of the
cle, or when he decides that David placed a bare tent
on as a protection for the Ark, which should be care-
tinguished from the Tabernacle of priestly imagination,
his ingenious accommodations of matters of fact are
the pale of calm discussion. It is impossible in the
ace at disposal to follow Wellhausen step by step
out his singular book; nevertheless a tolerable estimate
argument may be derived from his second and most ori-
apter upon the Sacrifices of Israel. If that pillar prove
a reed, the lesser supports of his argument will scarcely
the collapse of his laboured structure.

mentally a general view is presented of the idea, con-
pplication, and atoning value of the Old Testament
s which it would be a task as grateful as easy to
trate unscriptural. Possibly Wellhausen would rather
in such a demonstration, since he gives his opinion,
ristically enough, that upon the reason and origin of
s, Spenser, that greatest but least supranaturalistic of
rs, has written by far the best account. It would also
ease to linger upon the unscripturalness of many
of that general view, such as the assumed primariness
estal offering, the erroneous interpretation of the use of
supposed early presentation of cooked food, the mis-
significance of the blood sacrifices, and the improper
ation of the vegetable and animal sacrifices; and some
points will come up presently in another connection.
ellhausen shall be met upon his own ground. "The
is," he says, "whether as regards sacrifice, that main
in the Hebrew worship, there has not been a gradual

history, the stadia of which are reflected in the Pentateuch." He means, of course, not that "gradual history" which any orthodox student of the Scriptures would concede, but that "gradual history" which has been previously mapped out by him in his critical analysis. This question he would answer by a close examination, according to his habitual method, of the three so-called strata.

The features emphasised in the Jehovist (that is to say, roughly speaking, in the whole Pentateuch, with the exception of Deuteronomy, Leviticus, and the chapters of Exodus and Numbers previously mentioned) are twofold. The first point is this: The Priests' Code represents sacrifice to be the one mode of religious worship, but sacrifice of a very precise and detailed kind—its *form* is its essence; in the Jehovistic stratum also no other method of divine worship is known than sacrifice, but sacrifice may take place at any time and in any way. The ritual observed is wholly unimportant; the one distinguishing thing is, not "how" an offering is made, but "to whom." The second point is, that all the historical and prophetic writings of the pre-exilic age testify to the same distinction, and invariably determine the righteous character of sacrifices, not by the test as to whether they are presented *rite* or *non-rite*, but whether they are offered to *Jehovah* or to *strange gods*. The standpoint of the Deuteronomist is said to be identical.

Judged, however, by the only accessible records, both points are incorrect. Setting aside the arbitrariness of the method, the contrast of *rite* and *non-rite* does most assuredly appear from the first. Is there no insistence upon ritual when one altar is alone mentioned as valid for sacrifice (Exod. xx. 24), and that an altar of earth or unhewn stone? Is it not a point of ritual when altar steps are prohibited? Is ritual so wholly indifferent in the earlier injunctions when leavened bread is disallowed (Exod. xxiii. 18)? What but ritual prevents the fatty portions of the blood-sacrifices from remaining till the morning (Exod. xxiii. 18)? Is there no ritual involved (Exod. xxiii. 19) in the compulsory presentation of tithes in the House of the Lord? Was not failure in the precise aspersion of blood at the first Passover (Exod. xii.) represented as a capital crime? As for the literary testimony, the careful labours of Keil and Hengstenberg have conclusively shown, in spite of

some over-refinements, that just such an ecclesiastical system as that of Mosaism is everywhere pre-supposed in the Old Testament. All extant history, prophecy, and poetry furnish ample evidence that the Levitical laws formed the basis of the religious as well as the civil and political life of the Hebrew nation.¹ Whilst history, prophecy, and poetry largely deterred from idolatrous worship, they also widely and profoundly stimulated the legal performance of the Levitical ceremonial.² And the express Biblical references to the injunctions of the Pentateuch might be arranged with crushing force against the hypothesis of Wellhausen. As surely as the so-called Priests' Code assumes the existence of the Jehovist, the so-called Jehovistic sections presuppose the existence of the Priests' Code. Such allusions, for example, as those in Exodus xx.-xxiii. to the altar, the record of the divine name, to ransom and retribution, to the three feasts, to the sacrificial fat, to the first-fruits, to the House of the Lord, to the peace-offerings (the technical designation of which, by the way, is here used for the first time, without further explanation), as well as to many a social and judicial manner or custom, would have been more or less unintelligible without the more minute details of the subsequent laws. If these brief commands were a kind of exordium to the subsequent lengthy legal discourse, as the Pentateuch states, all is clear; upon the hypothesis of Wellhausen all is unexplained. Further, these direct quotations (the later of which presuppose the earlier, and the earlier the later) may be largely supplemented by the indirect evidence of "undesigned coincidences." No very keen gaze will detect passage after passage solely explicable upon the pre-existence of Mosaism. Wherein lay, to wit, the gist of the horrible story of the Danites (Judges xvii.-xxi.), but in the infringement of the Levitical law by the erection of the rival sanctuary of Dan? Wherein, too, lay the egregious sin of Saul (1 Sam. xii.) which marked his severe moral declension and became the turning-point in his spiritual career, if not in the illegal presentation of sacrifice, as described by the rules of Leviticus? Indeed, were this article to assume the form of a running commentary

¹ See Keil : *Einleitung in die Schriften des A. T.*, § 34.

² See the chapters upon the National, Hagiographic, and Prophetical Conception of Sacrifice in the *Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice*, ut supra.

upon the *Prophetæ Priores* and *Posteriores*, these indirect testimonies would fill pages. Does not the very class of facts which has formed the foundation of so many critical extravagances, and upon which Wellhausen strongly relies, namely, that which treats of the presentation of acceptable sacrifice *otherwise than at the Tabernacle or Temple*, provide just one of the most telling of "undesigned coincidences"? Sacrifices remote from the one legal place and offered without priestly mediation were acceptable upon one of two grounds, each of which recalls and emphasises the Mosaic commands. Either they were legalised by an express divine command conveyed by an angel, or else they were legalised by prophetic intervention; no instance appears in post-Mosaic times of an acceptable sacrifice remote from the Altar of Burnt-offering except *upon a divine authorisation, as authoritative* as the original Sinaitic commands. And, let it be noted in this connection, that changes were only made in the original commands upon express divine revelation. Samuel instituted changes in the Tabernacle arrangements; revelations made to David were the authority for the peculiarities of the Temple of Solomon; and the peculiarities in the construction of the second Temple originated in revelations made to Haggai and Ezekiel.

Then, turning from these somewhat external considerations, certain further differences are perceptible, according to Wellhausen, in the sacrificial arrangements of the Priests' Code. He mentions two. First there is, he says, a certain refinement in the bloodless-offering; and secondly, there are certain changes in the blood-sacrifices. We will cite and criticise all the details he gives in illustration. An instance of refinement is seen, he thinks, in the introduction of incense in the later ritual; to quote his own words, "the older literature of the Jewish canon" (where, of course, the late date of Leviticus is assumed) "knows absolutely nothing of this form of offering until the days of Jeremiah and Zephaniah, . . . and in enumerations in which the prophets mention everything exhaustively which pertains to offerings and liturgical practices, and in which to lengthen their statements they do not shrink from repetition, there is no mention of incense, neither in Amos iv. 4, etc., v. 21, etc., Isa. i. 11, etc., nor in Micah vi. 6." But Wellhausen must know that, whether incense is or is not

mentioned in the earlier prophets is a very moot question after Isa. i. 13 and vi. 7, and some other passages; but however that question be decided, it is most assuredly not a fact that the prophets in such passages as those named give "exhaustive enumerations" of sacrifices; they do not even offer "exhaustive enumerations" of the sacrifices of the laity; those prophetic enumerations were simply popular classifications for popular address, having no pretensions to completeness. Besides, there was a special reason for the absence of incense in these popular summaries, for, with the exception of the high-priest's peculiar offerings, which would scarcely be mentioned, incense, like salt, was simply used as an accompaniment to other offerings. Wellhausen believes that "salt" was offered at a very early date, but where does he find salt in these enumerations of liturgical practices? Another instance of the refinement claimed is attested, it is said, by the use in the Priests' Code of *solet* or *fine flour* instead of *qamah* or *grain* of earlier usage. Again let Wellhausen's words be quoted: "In the pre-exilic literature," he says, "*solet* is found only in three passages, but never in connection with sacrifice; that this is not accidental is seen, on the one hand, since *qamah* vanishes in the later literature from the days of Ezekiel, and *solet* constantly appears in its place; and, on the other hand, since the LXX. or its Hebrew original stumbles at *qamah* in 1 Sam. i. 24, and substitutes the later word." But is the real state of the case fairly given? Of course, if Numbers, Leviticus, and the earlier chapters of Exodus are assumed to be post-exilic, the contention is made out, since, as Wellhausen truly says in a foot-note, *solet* occurs more than forty times in the Priests' Code; but this age of Leviticus is the point to be proved; the only course open is to compare the usage of Leviticus with the confessedly earlier and the confessedly later usage of the Old Testament; and what then appears? This merely, that *solet* occurs five times in the Genesis and the Kings, without any special reference to divine worship, that it occurs once in Ezekiel in the same general way, and that it occurs twice in Ezekiel and twice in the Chronicles in reference to sacrificial usage. Surely no solid argument can be built upon such exceptionable evidence; further, the attempt to draw a distinction between the sacred and common use of the word wholly

fails (compare the usage in Ezekiel) ; as with *oil* and *wine*, so with *flour*, there was no confining of the word to a sacred use; therefore the case stands thus: *solet* was used five times in what Wellhausen would call the earlier, and five times in what he would call the later literature, and no light whatever is thrown by this word upon the age of the Priests' Code. Upon the remaining illustrations there need be very little delay. Further instances of refinement during the progress of time are seen in the substitution of raw flesh for cooked in the sacrifices, and in the substitution of meal for cakes. But these substitutions are not made out. They both depend upon the reiterated assertion that the earliest sacrifices were of a festal character; if such an opinion is an inference from a preconceived idea upon the nature and growth of religion, it is not an inference from Scripture. The passages attributed to the Jehovist declare the earliest sacrifices to have been burnt-offerings, whilst even the defection of Phinehas, so far from attesting the presentation of cooked flesh, was in itself a splendid "undesigned coincidence," testifying to the common observance at Shiloh of the Levitical laws of festal-offering. The change that Wellhausen thinks he sees in the blood-sacrifices is this: he says that the earlier literature only knows two kinds, whilst the later knows four (adding sin- and trespass-offerings to burnt- and peace-offerings). But here again the actual state of the case is not quite fairly put; he is not at liberty, by the conditions of the problem, to appeal to his Priests' Code, for the advocate of the unity of the Pentateuch would claim the usage of Exodus and Leviticus as upon his side. Now outside of the Priests' Code the technical term for offerings for sin and trespass very rarely occur; nevertheless they do occur, and reference to any Hebrew concordance will show that they occur both in pre-exilic and post-exilic writings.

Upon the frail basis thus described the elaborate structure is erected of the evolution of the Mosaic sacrifice. For the rest of this subtle but infelicitous chapter advances no new argument. It is simply shown therein how all the later peculiarities originated in the priestly dream of centralisation. Such a dream accounts, it is suggested, for the prominent position assigned to the burnt-offering; such centralisation also explains the usurpation by the later idea of atonement of

the place of the earlier idea of presentation; in short, such centralisation elucidates all that manifest change from nature to art, from naïveté to rite, from spontaneity to statute. All which would be a brilliant statement of fact, upon one proviso. Substitute Patriarchal for Pre-exilic in his theory, and Mosaic for Post-exilic, and these remarks are profound and valuable. The Mosaic institution of a central sanctuary, instead of the previous indiscriminate divine adoration, did assuredly mark the advance from nature to art, from naïveté to system, from spontaneity to statute.

To conclude: this last great production of "criticism" has brought into yet stronger relief the opinion so often expressed as to "critical" views. They are the offspring of a few scriptural facts, *interpreted, however, by the light of a philosophical postulate*. There are, beyond all doubt, a few facts in the Book of Genesis which seem to necessitate the belief in its composition by Moses from a variety of sources; there are also undoubtedly a few facts in the canonical books which point to the probability of an occasional revision; but undoubtedly, also, neither the one class of facts nor the other warrants the conclusions of such writers as Wellhausen. Only an assumption, latent or explicit, that Mosaism is a birth of nature in the same sense as Buddhism, warrants such conclusions. It is the *acceptance or the rejection of the miraculous* which really divides the readers of the Pentateuch into two classes. The disbeliever in divine interposition must, because of the exigencies of his position, set to work to account on purely natural grounds for the religious system certainly attributed in the Old Testament to Deity, whether that attribution be regarded as a pious or an impious fraud; and such a disbeliever, finding it incredible that a pattern of the Tabernacle could be shown in the Mount, or that the Almighty could concern Himself with such details as the hem of a priest's robe, or the purification of a tent, or the presentation of a handful of flour, will hail with acclaim any such ingenious hypotheses of evolution as that of Wellhausen. A thing seems somehow to be less divine if its originator takes time. Upon the evolutionary theory of Mosaism the believer in divine interposition will still pronounce an emphatic verdict of Not Proven.

ALFRED CAVE.

ART. IV.—*Methodism in Ireland: ¹ Life of Gideon Ousley.*

IT may be as well to state at the outset that the purpose of this article is not theological nor controversial, but historical and descriptive.

It was in the month of August 1747 that the Rev. John Wesley paid his first visit to Ireland. On reaching the metropolis, he found that a little Methodist brotherhood had been formed a few months before by the earnest efforts of a lay preacher from England named Thomas Williams. Wesley was very cordially received by the Society, as well as by outsiders, on the occasion of his first visit, insomuch that he pronounced the Irish the politest people he had ever seen.

Wesley was not surprised that Protestantism had made so little progress among the natives of Ireland. "Nor is it any wonder," he writes in his Journal under date of 15th Aug. 1747, "that those who are born Papists generally live and die such, when the Protestants can find no better way to convert them than Penal Laws and Acts of Parliament."

Not that other plans had not been proposed. Twelve years before Wesley's arrival, Berkeley, the famous Bishop of Cloyne, had suggested that lay instructors taken from the common people, speaking the Irish tongue, and well instructed in the principles of religion, should be sent all over the country, to endeavour, in the absence of abler missionaries, to reach the common people. But his proposal came to nothing. This idea of the Idealist Bishop was partially acted on by Wesley, but it remained for a later generation fully to take it up and work it out.² For indeed in the earlier days of Wesleyan

¹ 1. *History of Methodism.* By ABEL STEVENS, LL.D.

2. *Life of Gideon Ousley.* By WM. ARTHUR. London, 1876.

3. *Ireland and the Centenary of Methodism.* By W. CROOK, D.D.

4. *Minutes of Conference.* Dublin.

² The Bible and Colportage Society of Ireland—which is largely indebted for its rise and progress to the Rev. Dr. M'Cosh, formerly of the Queen's College, Belfast, now President of Princeton, and to a worthy namesake of the Idealist Bishop, the Rev. L. E. Berkeley of the Presbyterian church at Belfast—is earnestly endeavouring to overtake the wants and necessities of the country in the very way that Bishop Berkeley suggested, for it is bringing the Bible and Bible readings and Bible teachings and Evangelistic invitations among the common people all over the country.

missionary effort, the only avenue to the heart of the majority of Irishmen was by earnest, simple gospel preaching, as at that time a very small proportion of the population was able to read. And so Wesley and his companions gave themselves heartily to the ministry of the Word. It was not to be expected that in a country, the majority of whose inhabitants were under the dominion of the Papacy, or of worldliness and spiritual indifference, Wesley's efforts to spread the gospel would be unopposed. And so on the arrival of Charles Wesley in Ireland, a few weeks after his brother had returned to England, there was a thoroughly Irish riot on his first attempt at preaching in Dublin. The Methodist Chapel was broken into; its furniture was smashed; a bonfire of it was made in the public streets; and wholesale murder was threatened against all who would assemble to hear him. He and his fellow-preachers held their ground however, and had the satisfaction even then of seeing multitudes added to the Lord. They journeyed from town to town, preaching the Word as they had opportunity. But it was in Cork they met with the most remarkable opposition. There still stands on the city records the following remarkable presentment drawn up by the City Grand Jury:—"We find and present Charles Wesley to be a person of ill-fame, a vagabond, and a common disturber of his Majesty's peace; and we pray that he may be transported." Nine of his associates were denounced in the same terms. The Judges, however, on the matter coming before them, nobly did their duty and vindicated the persecuted preachers. Nevertheless, when in 1750 John Wesley returned to Cork, he was most violently assailed again. He proceeded to Bandon to preach; but the Cork mob followed him there, and hung him in effigy. Nor did the opposition come from the Roman Catholics only. To their shame be it told, multitudes of professing Protestants made common cause with the Roman Catholic rabble in their wicked endeavours to annoy and silence the Methodist preachers. But, in spite of all the opposition, all the violent persecutions, even unto blood, which Wesley and his preachers were counted worthy to suffer, the spirit of glory and of God rested upon them, and through their instrumentality multitudes were brought to be living and dying witnesses of the power of true religion. Drunkards became

sober, blasphemers ceased to blaspheme, mockers learnt to pray, churches which had been wellnigh deserted were once again frequented, the Lord's table was surrounded by devout and earnest disciples, Romanists were brought to a saving knowledge of the truth, and notable names like Thomas Walsh and James M'Quigg were added to the roll of Irish Protestants. Even before Wesley died he was permitted to rejoice over a larger Society in Dublin (always peculiarly receptive of evangelical movements¹) than anywhere else in the United Kingdom except London. His mission indeed, as Dr. Killen truly remarks in his valuable History, "proved a signal blessing to the cause of religion in the country. The Irish Episcopal Church is unspeakably indebted to the labours of the Wesleyans."² Of this we ourselves have seen abundant evidence; for while we cannot accept wholly the statement of Jackson, "that but for Methodism Protestantism would have been almost extinct in Ireland,"³ yet it is our solemn conviction, from personal observation, that in many of the backward parts of the country—especially in the south and west—it would have been so, but for the weekly, or fortnightly, or monthly visits of the Methodist preachers, during the first centenary of Methodism in Ireland.

The picture given us in Stevens' History of the first visit of Charles Graham—the first Methodist Irish-speaking missionary—to Milltown, in the county of Kerry in 1790, lets us see clearly the true state of things; and the present writer can testify that half a century later, or more, a perfect copy of the picture could have been found in other villages and districts in that very county. Riding into the town, Graham asked a youth—"Do you know any one here that has a Bible, and reads it?" "O yes," he was answered, "the clerk of the church,"—to whose house he was directed. Riding up to the door, he accosted the clerk, expressing the hope that as he was accustomed to read the Bible, he would have no objection to a preacher of its truths. The man appeared astonished and confounded. "I read the Bible! No, sir! I never read the

¹ Walkerism, Kellyism, Irvingism, Plymouth-Brethrenism, Methodism, as the first offshoot from England, all found in Dublin a ready reception.

² Dr. Killen's *Ecclesiastical History of Ireland*, vol. ii. p. 263.

³ Jackson's *Life of Charles Wesley*, chap. xv.

le unless what I read of it in church on Sunday." However, he brought the preacher in, became a devoted Christian, and helped to advance Methodism in the district.¹

Much of the success of Methodism was owing to this directness of appeal and of approach : much to the earnestness and simplicity which the preachers and members in Society displayed : much to the itinerancy of their ministers, by which variety and business in preaching was secured : much to the arrangement and character of its services, which were carefully adapted to the needs of the people : much to its frequent meetings and warm and lively fellowship-meetings : much to individual effort and liberality, and the abiding sense of personal responsibility—"all at it, and always at it," as Wesley put it : much to joyous and abundant service of sacred songs and hymns, by which the deepest emotions of its followers were stirred : but most of all to its preaching of Christ crucified as the sinner's only hope and refuge. "Preaching and fellowship," says Dr. Rigg, "this was all from first to last : true preaching and true vital Christian fellowship, which involved opposition to untrue preaching, and to fellowship not truly and fully Christian. From this unfolded all Wesley's life and history."² We do not conceal that we are not prepared to accept all the teachings of Methodism, or to homologate all its doings. Yet we hesitate not to bear testimony to the fact that all through its history its method seems to have been to preach Jesus, its aim the salvation of men. And while we respect it for what it has done to civilise and elevate the lower orders in England and in Ireland, to regenerate and purify the brutal savages of the South Sea Islands, and to transform and spiritualise the idolaters of the East, we honour it most of all because its chief business has been (to Wesley's words) "to save souls."³

Throughout the country districts and smaller towns of the West, Methodism did not make so much progress as in the

Stevens' History of Methodism, p. 317.

The Living Wesley. By Dr. James Rigg.

When the Bishop of Bristol told Wesley that he had no business there, he had not been commissioned to preach in his diocese, Wesley replied—"My Lord, my business on earth is to do what good I can. Wherever, therefore, I think I can do most good, there must I stay so long as I think so. At present I think I can do most good here, therefore here I stay."

other provinces of Ireland. This may be accounted for in various ways. 1. Ulster was chiefly Presbyterian, being, as is well known, to a large extent colonised from Scotland; and though the almost universal coldness and deadness of the eighteenth century prevailed for a season in the Synod of Ulster,—though the Arianism which Clayton, Bishop of Cloyne, afterwards of Clogher (for notwithstanding his errors he was promoted from Killala to Cloyne and from Cloyne to Clogher), was the first to promulgate in the country,¹ had made itself felt in Ulster,—yet before or about the days of Wesley representatives of the Seceders from the Church of Scotland—men full of the faith and fire and holiness of the Erskines—had come to Ulster and had fanned and spread the flame of piety in many of the towns and hamlets of the province. 2. Another reason for its want of success in Ulster may be found in Wesley himself—in his own bearing to the Presbyterian Church. For not only was he ardently attached to the Church of England—never disconnecting himself from it, though it very foolishly endeavoured to cast him out and cast him off,—but even when the Episcopal minister in places where he might be sojourning was a man of doubtful reputation, he waited on his ministrations,² and encouraged his followers to receive ordinances in the Episcopal Church. The Presbyterians, observing these things, and thoroughly believing in the scripturalness and apostolicity of their own Church, as they were and are well warranted in doing, did not give him that countenance which, but for his own exclusiveness,³ they probably would have done. 3. Then his peculiar doctrinal views were unpalatable to the orthodox Presbyterians of Ulster. He very early and definitely embraced the views of Arminius,

¹ Clayton published his work entitled *An Essay on Spirit* in 1751. In this work his peculiar theology was announced. In 1756 he proposed, in the Irish House of Lords, that the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds should be removed from the Liturgy.—Killen's *Hist.* vol. ii. p. 257.

² "At Carrickfergus on the morning of the Lord's day, I went," says Wesley, "to the (Episcopal) Church, to the surprise of many, and heard a lively sermon. After dinner one of our brethren asked 'if I was ready to go to the (Presbyterian) meeting.' I told him I never go to meeting."—Wesley's *Journal*, p. 392.

³ Towards the close of his life John Wesley seems to have outgrown much of his High-Churchism. But his brother Charles carried *his* with him to the grave (a very good place for it, by the way). He absolutely refused to sleep his last sleep in his brother's tomb in City Road Chapel, because it was not consecrated ground!—Stevens' *Hist.* p. 583.

calling even the magazine which he started *The Arminian Magazine*. And though it is the barest justice to say that it seems to us that his Arminianism was not akin to the Arminianism of Tomline and Whitby, through which a Pelagian thread so manifestly runs, and though he himself said that "the Methodists do not impose in order to their admission any opinion whatever; let them hold particular or general redemption, absolute or conditional decrees: they think, and let think, one condition, and one only, is required—a real desire to save their souls. Where this is, it is enough: they desire no more: they lay stress on nothing else. They ask only, 'Is thy heart herein as my heart? If it be, give me thine hand'"—yet he had preached and published sermons against the doctrines of Calvinism; and thus, very naturally, a barrier was created between himself and the Calvinistic Presbyterians of the North. And as Chalmers said jestingly to Wardlaw, when the latter was endeavouring, amidst great topographical difficulties, to get a site for his chapel in Glasgow—"Ah, Dr. Wardlaw, ye canna get a foundation for your Independency in Scotland," so would the Calvinistic Presbyterians of Ulster have been disposed to say seriously to Wesley—"You cannot get a foundation for your Arminianism among us."¹ But though it did not take hold in Ulster to the same extent as elsewhere, its influence was felt and appreciated in Ulster as well as in the other provinces. It is felt and appreciated to this hour, and appreciated by all denominations too, all over the kingdom.² What a change in public

¹ The *Methodist Recorder*, writing recently on the proposed increase of the Episcopate in England, said:—"Methodism has nothing to fear from an increase in the number of Bishops (the brand-new Bishop of Truro, as Mr. Bright calls him, evidently does not think so). Facts show that the Presbyterians of Scotland and the Dissenting interest in such counties as Essex, while professedly friendly, is actually more inimical to its growth than the influence which beams from mitred heads and crosiered hands."

² Not long ago we happened to be in Kinsale at the time that the Manx fishermen (chiefly Methodists) were there for the mackerel-fishing. And it was something remarkable to see the good order, the temperance, the respect for the Sabbath, the delight in the worship of God, which characterised the immense majority of the hundreds and thousands of these Methodist fishermen, who in pursuit of their calling were for a time sojourning there. A gentleman in the town connected with the Protestant Episcopal Church told us that the moral and spiritual tone of the whole community was raised by the presence and the deportment of these fishermen,—that their annual sojourn was a blessing to the town.

feeling and sentiment with regard to Methodism and Methodists since the days when the word "Swaddlers"¹ was opprobriously and pertinaciously flung by Protestant and Roman Catholic at the head of any preacher that might show his face! What a change since the days when Sydney Smith wrote in the *Edinburgh Review*:—"If the choice rested with us we should say, Give us back our wolves again, restore our Danish invaders, curse us with any evil but the evil of a canting, deluded, and Methodistical populace. Wherever Methodism extends its baneful influence the character of the English people is constantly changed by it. Boldness and rough honesty are broken down into meanness, prevarication, and fraud!" But in spite of all this tomahawk warfare—in spite of all the bad names thrown at Methodism by the witty clerical reviewer, and by the Dublin and Cork rabble,—Methodism has not only proved itself to be worthy of a place in the city of God, but it has also commended itself to the goodwill of the noblest in the land. It is not many months since the generous and liberal Dean of Westminster opened the Abbey to receive statues of the Wesleys, and in the presence of assembled multitudes himself pronounced their eulogy. What a change in public sentiment has God, in His good providence, wrought! Of the many instruments used in bringing about this change, in leavening the minds and hearts of Britons and of Irishmen, in promoting and commending vital religion in the country, there was none more remarkable than GIDEON OUSLEY, a new and worthy biography of whom, from the graceful pen of William Arthur, has recently been given to the public.

Gideon Ousley came of an ancient English stock. His family, through their loyalty to the royalist cause in the Stuart days, having lost their estate in Shropshire, migrated to Ireland, settling at Dunmore, in the county of Galway. Several scions of the family attained to eminence. Two of Gideon's cousins—Sir Gore and Sir William Ousley—became

¹ This opprobrious word, Wesley tells us, was shouted at himself by the children in the streets, etc. It sticks to us all. Its origin was in this wise: A preacher named John Cennick preached a Christmas sermon in Dublin on "the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes." A Roman Catholic hearer, who knew little of the Bible, deemed the text a ridiculous Protestant invention, and called the Methodists "Swaddlers," which word was immediately adopted by the mob to be used as an epithet of contempt.

distinguished as scholars and diplomatists. His brother Ralph served his country under Wellington, became Major-General in the army of Portugal, and an English knight. But, as Sir P. Crampton wrote to Sir Ralph, when congratulating him on his knighthood—"a knighthood of any order which terrestrial sovereigns can confer will not raise you to the rank of your brother, Saint Gideon, as you justly term him." So may we truly affirm of this remarkable man, whose life it is worth our while to freshen up a little, all the more that Irish Methodism was for such a length of time so closely mixed up with it.

Gideon Ousley was born at Dunmore on the 24th of February 1762. His father was a Deist. Yet Deist as John Ousley was he destined Gideon for "the Church." Through it lay the shortest road, he thought, to honour and preferment. His father's plans were, however, frustrated; for though a good Latin and Science scholar, Gideon knew so little Greek that he was unable to pass the entrance examination at the University. After his rejection he returned to Dunmore, where he idled away his time, acquiring, however, from his surroundings, an education not easily forgotten. The knowledge and experience of that period became a source of power to him in after life. But for a time his life was as irregular as the life of any around him. Drinking, gambling, hunting, racing—such was life in Connaught one hundred years ago, as Lever has truly described it. Gideon was a young man of drollery and wit, of strength and courage, and so was an acceptable companion to all the fools in the district in which he lived. Before he was twenty-one he got married—the parents on both sides consenting—to Harriet Willis, the daughter of a neighbouring gentleman, who gave his daughter as her portion the house and lands of Woodhill. Gideon's affection for his wife, from the first, was tender and strong, yet it was unable to keep him out of the whirlpool which the wild revellers of Connaught had set in motion. As might be expected, he soon got embarrassed. His father-in-law died: the heir-at-law disputed the validity of his wife's marriage settlement, and without waiting for any legal decision, Gideon, in a fit of half-tipsy pride, as some supposed, threw all up, and with his wife returned to the old paternal home at Dunmore.

One day as he was walking up Dunmore street, after having

attended a relief-committee meeting, he received—when passing a party engaged in a drunken scuffle—on the right side of his face and neck, the entire charge of a fowling-piece, that had gone off accidentally. He was carried home to his wife all covered with blood. It was believed that he was mortally wounded, and indeed for weeks his life trembled in the balance. He now got time to think. His past life in all its hideousness came up before him. The truths of Scripture and the images in Young's *Centaur not Fabulous*, which in his earlier days he had, at his mother's solicitation, often read to her, now stirred his soul.

He could vividly see the picture in which "the brute runs away with the man, galloping with more than human haste after temptations." He got better, and resolved to turn over a new leaf. But he very soon, like those who repent in their own strength, blotted the page again. He began to see vaguely that he could not cure himself. He had striven to establish his own righteousness, and it would not do. And then he began to think that his wound was incurable. It was when he was in this plight that he went to hear the preaching of a Mr. Robinet, a Methodist, and the Quartermaster of the 4th Dragoon Guards, at that time quartered in the town. It had been noticed that all the soldiers who attended the Methodist meetings were steady men; and though the townspeople, led on by the clergy of both church and chapel, laughed at the praying soldiers, yet they whispered that it might be well for the parsons and the priests to be a little more given to prayer.

Ousley was roused by the preaching and by the prayers, and a new light seemed to reach inward to the hidden places of his heart. The preaching of a Mr. Gordon, from the Parsonstown circuit, impressed him deeply. He studied the Scriptures with great diligence. Thoughts of eternity possessed and overwhelmed him. "His views of God's plain way of mercy," writes Mr. Arthur, "were still far from being clear; but he had a dawning knowledge that salvation was of grace alone, through the merit of Christ alone, and received by faith alone." His constant cry was, "Oh that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his seat!" At last the great deliverance came. It was on a Sabbath morning in May 1791.

He had gone into his room in a state of great mental agitation, and locked the door with the resolution to remain there until he had found peace. He threw himself on the floor, and groaned and cried for mercy. To his amazement and horror a growing sense of hardness of heart came upon him, and with it the wondering thought, "Am I ever to be saved?" And then the appeal, "O Lord God! is there no mercy for me?" and still the growing sense of hardness. At length, in the midst of his renewed and resolute appeal, the thought of entire and instant submission rose up within him. "Lord, I submit, I submit," he cried, and simultaneously came up "the thought of Jesus the Saviour—the Saviour for him. I saw Jesus, the Saviour of sinners—I saw him as the gift of the love of God to me. Jesus loved me and gave himself for me; and the hardness of my heart all passed away. It melted at the sight of that love of God to me; and I knew, yes, I knew, that God had forgiven me all my sins, and my soul was filled with gladness, and I wept for joy."

Thus he passed from death to life. He had found out his disease; he had got the cure; old things passed away; all things became new. The Spirit of God took possession of him, and he entered into the joy and peace of believing.

Speedily the fire began to burn, the light to shine. He could not hold his peace. "From this time forth," writes his biographer, "wherever he went he spoke of the things of God, telling of a kingdom, not in the golden clouds of a distant world, but within you—a kingdom of righteousness, of peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." Like the first disciples—like Andrew—he began to work within his own home-circle. His wife, through his instrumentality, was brought to the saving knowledge of Christ. Then, as he had opportunity—and when he had not an opportunity he made it—he spoke and pleaded privately but earnestly with others. But a call to go forth resounded every day louder and louder. It was, he tells us, as if a voice had said to him, "Gideon, go forth and preach the gospel." His reply to it was like Jeremiah's, "Lord, I cannot speak, I am but a child—a poor ignorant creature." Then would rush into his mind the question, "Do you not know the disease?" "Oh yes, Lord, I do." "And do you not know the cure?" "Oh yes! glory be to Thy name, I do." "Go, then,

and tell them these two things, the disease and the cure ; never mind the rest ; the rest is only talk." So out he went, and continued all through his ministry of forty years and more, and to its very end, to tell sinners of the Disease and of the Cure.

His first attempt at public exhortation was in the parish graveyard, which lay within view of his own residence. The funeral of a neighbour had entered it, and the wild "*keena*" that rose from the women and rung in his ears filled his soul with an irresistible impulse. The hour for him to begin his public labours had arrived ; and so, in the Irish tongue, of which he was a perfect master, he began to tell them of the disease ; of the sinful state they were in ; that no effort of man could save them ; that God alone could forgive their sins ; that He was willing to do this for Christ's sake ; that there was no way of recovery save through the agency of the Holy Spirit. All this seemed new teaching to the inhabitants of the district. When the priest heard of it he told his people not to mind Mr. Ousley, for he had lost his senses. The people replied, " If you would hear him, sir, you would find there is good sense in every word he says." The rector and his curate also reprobated his conduct in the severest terms. The rector thought he was either crazed or the dupe of fanatics, and told him that but for his family he would proceed against him in the Bishop's Court !

But he laboured on. His own house became a home of the disciples. A class of a dozen members was formed, and Mr. Ousley became a nursing-father to the little flock. Gradually Mr. Ousley extended the sphere of his efforts, preaching in the public streets and at "patrons," and stations, at wakes and funerals, in season and out of season. He was always anxious, and always ready, to speak a word for the Great Master, and for the salvation and wellbeing of his fellow-men. And he was always equal to the occasion. For example : coming one day upon a multitude that had gathered at a wake, and learning that the priest was reading mass before the burial would take place, Gideon dismounted, and with manifest solemnity knelt in the midst of the congregation. As the priest went on reading in a tongue of which the people knew nothing, Mr. Ousley caught up passage after passage, selecting those portions which conveyed directly Scriptural truth or solemn warnings, then,

turning the words from Latin into Irish, he repeated them aloud after the priest, saying with deep feeling at the end of each passage—"Listen to that." The priest, we are told, seemed to have been overwhelmed and awed, and the people completely melted. Then, when mass was over, Mr. Ousley urged upon the people the necessity of making their peace with God, showing them how this was to be done. As he departed the crowd cried to the priest, "Father ——, who is that? Who is he at all?" "I don't know," said the priest. "He is not a man at all. Sure he is an angel. No man could do what he has done."

Nor was this effort to do good unsuccessful. Long afterwards, when riding through the county, he met with a peasant, to whom he said—"My dear man, would you not like to be reconciled to God, to have His peace in your heart, and stand clear before the Great Judge when He will come in the clouds of heaven to judge the world?" "Oh, glory be to His holy name, sir, I have this peace in my heart, and the Lord be praised that I ever saw your face." "You have! What do you know about this peace? When did you see me?" "Don't you remember the day, sir, that you were at the berrin (burial), when the priest was saying mass?" "I do, very well. What about that day?" "Oh, gentleman, you told us then how to get that peace, and I went, blessed be His holy name, to Jesus Christ my Saviour, and I got it into my heart, and have had it here ever since."

Take another instance of his readiness and skill—a case to which, as his biographer tells us, he frequently referred, and the recital of which in his open-air preachings was often blessed to his Roman Catholic hearers. Going along the road to Croaghpatrick, there met him a man with the aspect of a pilgrim coming from the Reek, as the cone of Croaghpatrick which stands on the south of Clew Bay is called. This mountain is supposed by the Irish Roman Catholics to be very holy. The legend goes:—

"Twas on the top of that high hill
Saint Patrick preached his sermon."

Mr. Ousley asked the pilgrim where he had been. "To the Reek," was the reply, the distance being fourscore miles.

“What were you doing there, poor man?”

“Looking for God, sir.”

“On what part of the hill did you expect to find Him?”

The poor fellow replied, with tears in his eyes, “I did not think of that, sir.”

Mr. Ousley then put the question—“Where is God?” To which the reply was naturally, “Everywhere,” and now came out the point. “When the sun is up, where in Ireland is the daylight?” Of course the pilgrim replied—“Sure, sir, it is everywhere.” “So then it is about your own cabin as much as in any place? Would it not then be a strange thing for you to go fourscore miles, and bruise your poor feet so, looking for the daylight?” The man paused. “Oh, the Lord help us, sir, and sure I never saw the folly of it before. I will never take another pilgrimage.”¹

Mr. Ousley did not, in his preaching to a mixed audience of Protestants and Roman Catholics, adopt the style then and still too common of imperiously denouncing “Papists and their errors.” He greatly disliked, as he phrased it, “the ascendancy strut.” And so he endeavoured to reach the Roman Catholic heart by a style of speech which was to many of his hearers as acceptable as it was uncommon. He would entreat them, for example, to turn from their sins “for the sake of the Son of the Virgin;” or he would begin an address by referring to the Virgin and St. Peter. The Virgin, he would say, had the best religion in the world. Then he would tell them how Peter had the true religion, and what Peter’s religion was. He would tell them how both Peter and Mary had learned it all from the one perfect Teacher, and how they owed everything to Him: then he would teach them to render to Jesus the same obedience and implicit trust. Thus would he preach as a wise winner of men, whose work was not to blow blasts of scorn, to heap up denunciations on those who might differ from him, to affect “the ascendancy strut” that for two hundred years and more has been the curse of Ireland, but whose work was to exalt the Saviour, and to save souls. If there had

¹ The days of pilgrimages, even in Ireland, are not yet ended. In the *Cork Examiner* of 20th January 1877 we find a lecture on pilgrimages in Donegal, by the Very Rev. J. M’Devitt. He tells that near Letterkenny he met a pilgrim whose home was thirty miles off burdened with bottles of the “Miraculous Waters” (as he describes them) of Doon Well!

more preaching of this kind the accessions to Protestantism from among the native population of Ireland would have been far greater than they are.

For five or six years Mr. Ousley, unsalaried and uncommissioned by any Church or Society, carried on with all earnestness the work to which he had devoted himself, undergoing such training as has been noticed, and finding that—according to the theory of the Methodists—"there is no training *for* the work of God like training *in* it."

But at last the Wesleyan Methodist Conference, which had been watching his movements, laid its hands upon him, at the strong recommendation of Mr. Hamilton, then Superintendent of the Sligo district, in which circuit Mr. Ousley had for some time been labouring, having previously removed to Sligo, where, in 1798, he had opened a school. The Conference immediately appointed Mr. Ousley to act in concert with the zealous Charles Graham, as an Irish missionary.

And thus, at the age of thirty-six, he began his regular ministerial and missionary work. And for forty years and more he went up and down the country—not much restricted by circuit arrangements—from the extreme south to the extreme north, from east to west, telling all to whom he got access of the Disease and of the Cure.

On riding into a town, the two yoke-fellows would pull up at the market-place, or near to the police-barracks, or if possible before a Roman Catholic apothecary's windows, under shadow of the big and coloured bottles, as a protection against stone-throwing, and there, remaining on their horses, and with their topkaps on their heads, one of them would give out a hymn,

if in an Irish-speaking district would translate it into English: then they would sing it to some plaintive air. By this means a crowd would have gathered; prayer would then be offered: and thereafter one of the missionaries would deliver a short, pithy, earnest sermon, full of Christ, to the assemblage.

The missionaries were partial to preaching at the fairs. It was their opinion that they did more in spreading the truth in one fair or market day than in weeks or months in private houses. But in truth they had no regular plan of procedure.

An old minister still living tells us that when, in 1815, he was an accepted candidate placed under the superintendence

of Mr. Ousley, he asked him for his plan. The answer was, "I have no plan to give you, my son : the country is before you : go into every open door ; and, if admitted, preach and exhort and pray, proclaiming the grand truths of our holy Christianity, and while you thus preach with divine power, and the love of God burning in your heart, you will never want hearers." This he himself could fully testify, though oftentimes he met with much opposition in this very work.

Once, for example, in Clones, when he was preaching, the rector approached the place where Mr. Ousley was standing ; and as Gideon refused to desist at the rector's bidding, he ordered the soldiers to be called out. The captain of the regiment appeared ; the drums beat to arms ; and the men were drawn up as if in line of battle ! A magistrate, anxious to prevent the shedding of blood, interfered ; ordered the soldiers back, and attempted to pull Mr. Ousley from the block on which he stood. The courageous and earnest preacher held his ground, however, until he had finished his sermon ; then with all solemnity he pronounced the benediction, and dismissed the congregation. One gets sick at reading the accounts given of the persecution to which Mr. Ousley and his faithful fellow-labourers were subjected—of the dirty tobacco-water thrown down upon them from the windows of a large storehouse, beside which they had taken shelter ; of the mud cast in their face ; of the stone-throwings, by which, upon one occasion, Mr. Ousley lost several teeth. All this, and far more, had they to endure ; but they took it all gladly, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for His name.

Nor did their zeal flag in the slightest degree because of all this. Nay, rather their courage, their earnestness, and their labours continued to grow and expand under all these persecutions. We are aware that some are of opinion that Mr. Ousley brought a good deal of the opposition upon himself by speaking strongly against the Papacy, and by writing and publishing his famous work, *Old Christianity*. But whilst there is no manner of doubt that he looked upon Romanism as a perversion of the religion of Jesus Christ, and spoke of it to his friends as "the foul apostasy," yet we do not remember to have met with a single instance in which he abused its

as they have been—alas how often!—abused by versial preachers and lecturers. The following extract from a letter to Dr. Hoole, the English Missionary Secretary, sheds the clearest light both on his spirit and plans :—

shall close by stating what has often struck me would do vast good to this country—namely, if a few, even two, of our brethren were sent by our Conference, and sent through all parts, either together or singly: men of some education, good talents, and possessing fearlessness both in the streets, etc.: that could speak in Irish, and have by all means an accurate knowledge of the religion of Rome—some of the pretensions of which are exquisite, pure, and apostolic, and essentially Protestantism: but its practical doctrines, framed by men of great authority and by Councils, in order to uphold the glory of the Papacy and of its numerous clergy, are the very reverse, and are with all their pomp passed on the credulous for *divine mysteries* of faith without which none can be saved, and which, even to doubt in any point, is heresy, leading to certain damnation, for that to doubt in one is to doubt in all. Now the Christian missionary, knowing these things, must see it his duty to bring forth these *pure tenets* as found in their catechisms, and writings, in the three Ancient Creeds, and in the Gospel, and to show that no Protestants, however learned, no angel from heaven, could ever in truth object to them, and of course that all doctrines contrary to them must be false and damnable. To all this will the people freely assent. Then should he mildly advance the contrary tenets, and *without* any *or sarcasm* contrast them with the pure. The people will instantly see how these matters are; for many of them are candid and intelligent and so far from being enraged with the preachers, will return home saying that *these pretended mysteries of faith* are ruinous deceptions. This is the plan I have adopted; and for many years past have been endeavouring to follow, both in my preaching and writings, and not wholly

with all his wit and tact and wisdom he was frequently assailed in the most violent way. In the earlier years of his ministry, owing doubtless to the position of his family, the nature of the work, the solemnity and earnestness of his labours, he wonderfully escaped envenomed annoyance. But gradually, as his work began to tell, priests and parsons took offence and stirred up the people against him. When a controversy like that of Terry M'Gowan occurred, it became, as a matter of course, the talk of the country-side—reaching even the priests, and exciting active hostilities. Terry was a famous cock-fighter who lived near Maguiresbridge. Making

¹ *Life* by Arthur, p. 282.

for the cockpit one day with a game-cock under his coat, he found two men before him on horseback with black caps on their heads, preaching in his mother tongue. They spoke of the great and terrible day of the Lord : they called on every sinner to lose no time : to repent : to surrender at once to the Lord Jesus Christ. Terry knew not how it was, but forgetting the cockpit, and the game-cock under his coat (which speedily disappeared), he lifted up both his hands on the spot, and cried to God for mercy. The cry was heard, and Terry, full of excitement and of ecstasy, bounded home to tell his wife and family of the peace and pardon he had found. His wife, thinking he had gone mad, sent for the priest. The priest arrived. "What is the matter?" said the priest. "Never better in my life," said Terry. "Nonsense!" replied his reverence; "did you hear the black caps?" "I did, thank God." "So I thought: these fellows would turn the world mad. Well now, Terry, just mind your own business and go to your duty next Sunday." "I will, if your reverence will do one thing for me." "What is that, Terry?" "It is to come up with me to Maguiresbridge to get the Lord to undo for me what He did there this day." "What did He do for you?" "He said to me, Terry M'Gowan, your sins, which were many, are all forgiven you." "I give you up as a lost case," he said to Terry, and took his leave. A case like this would be sure to excite the priests against him. But the instances were very few in which he was not able, by his ready wit and graphic touches, and fluent use of the Irish tongue, to allay hostility, even when at its fiercest. Preaching once at a fair, a furious mob of roughs bore down upon him intent on mischief. Some friends gathered round him for protection; but Mr. Ousley immediately, with a loud voice, cried out, "Make way for the gentlemen," and looking the roughs in the face he added, "Come forward, gentlemen, I want to speak to you on important business." The mode of address was so unexpected that they were quite disarmed, and their leader hushed them to quiet and respectfully approached the preacher. Said Mr. Ousley—

"You know Father O'Shaugnessy, the parish priest?"

"Yes, your rivrence."

"Will you carry a message to him from me?"

"To be sure, your rivrence."

"Well, take Gideon Ousley's compliments to the reverend father, and ask him can he make a fly. Not the fly that they put on the fishing-hook, but one of those little things buzzing about our ears."

"It's no use, your rivrence," said two or three at once. "Shure we know he couldn't."

"What, is it Father O'Shaugnessy, the parish priest, cannot make one of these little flies?"

"Och and shure he could do nothing of the kind," several voices good-humouredly shouted.

"Ah! then, gintlemen, if you are sure he could not make a little fly out of a bit of clay, how could he make the blessed Saviour out of a piece of bread?"

"True for your rivrence," said several gravely and quietly. Thus did he disarm hostility, and at the same time show the absurdity and impossibility of Transubstantiation.

The *Life* by Mr. Arthur is full of similar incidents—told in Mr. Arthur's inimitable style—which will be found to possess much interest and instruction.

Mr. Ousley's motto was "Instant in season and out of season." Hard work, hard fare was his daily lot. And he wrought wonders. During the first six years of his missionary labours, the membership of Irish Methodism increased from 16,277 to 23,321. Nor was he above engaging in any work by which the preaching of the Gospel might be furthered. Employing upon one occasion the bellman of a town, in which he was a stranger, to announce his preaching, he came upon that functionary as he was very feebly—and as if afraid of the Romanist population—performing the duties of his office. Ousley seized the bell, rang it himself, and proclaimed aloud—"This is to give you notice that Gideon Ousley, the Irish missionary, is to preach this evening in such a place and at such an hour. And I am the man myself."¹

In many of the country and outlying districts the fare was hard indeed. Preaching upon one occasion in Ballina, and announcing his next visit to that place, he said to one of his hearers—a man in humble life, who had been brought to the saving knowledge of Christ by his street-preaching—"Frank,

¹ Stevens' *Hist. of Methodism*, p. 325.

I'll stop and preach in your house." "Ah, sir!" said Frank, "I would be delighted to have you in my house, but what shall I do for a bed? The only one myself and my wife have to lie on is straw." "Can you give me straw and a blanket?" asked the missionary. "I can, sir," said Frank gladly. "Then I'll be with you, please God, this night month," said Ousley. And sure enough he came, and preached and met the class, and slept on the straw, and put up with the poor fare, and continued to come regularly as long as he was in that district.

In remote parts of the country it was not uncommon for him to have to wait for a meal until the corn would be dried over the fire, then ground in the quern in true Oriental style, and then baked for his scanty repast.¹

He would often travel thirty or forty miles a day and preach once or twice. And yet in his busiest days, as his companion tells us, he would devote hours to private prayer and the study of the Scriptures. He often read on horseback; and if opportunity offered, in the houses in which he sojourned, he would retire for writing and for study, as well as for devotion.

Mr. Ousley was a man of frank disposition and great kindness of spirit. "The grace of God saved me from a sectarian spirit," said he of himself. And so he was very generally loved and welcomed. Even in those days, when the denominations did not know and understand each other as well as they do now, we find that though the Episcopal churches were shut against him, he was freely admitted at times to the Presbyterian pulpits.

In the great debate on the sacramental question which agitated Irish Methodism—even as it had Wesleyanism in England, and which in 1816 divided Irish Methodists into two bodies—Mr. Ousley did not hesitate for a moment to remain with the party in the Conference that had been led step by step to detach themselves from the Episcopal Church, and had

¹ Times in Ireland have changed somewhat since Ousley's days. But even yet the Methodist missionary has to put up, in the poorer districts, with much inconvenience and hardship. A Methodist missionary told the present writer that on one occasion he was sitting in a small country dwelling-house, in which he usually stopped and conducted a monthly service, awaiting by the kitchen fire the assembling of his audience. Presently a little flock of chickens came in wailing piteously. "Poor wee things! poor wee things!" said a little child in the corner. "That man has ate your mother!"

been made to see that it was their duty to observe and administer all the ordinances of the Church of Christ, without the presence and without calling in the aid of a prelatically ordained ministry. Our only wonder is that he and his brethren in England and in Ireland were so long in coming to the decision to which at last they came, since the very Church to which they so tenaciously clung spurned them from her unmotherly heart with the utmost scorn.

But we must hasten to note the end of the earthly career of this most remarkable man. Till within a month of his death Mr. Ousley preached with vigour and acceptance, welcomed everywhere as a man, and popular everywhere as a minister, except in Dublin, where, for some unexplained reason, he never seems, according to his own judgment, to have been cared for as a preacher. The summons to depart found him prepared, and found him at his post. In the middle of April 1839, being then in his seventy-ninth year, he preached several times in Maryborough, on his way to Dublin.

At Mountmellick, where he preached his last sermon, he called upon those who were resolved to flee from the wrath to come to give in their names and join the Society. Several came forward. On writing each name, he solemnly repeated it, and said, "I write your name before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the dead at His appearing and His kingdom." Shortly after, he reached Dublin, where he got quite ill, and suffered intensely. But with much patience he would say, "Thy will be done, my Father God." Being asked by his nephew a few hours before he died—"What do you now think of the gospel which you have preached all your life?" He replied, "Oh, it is light, and life, and peace." His last words were—"I have no fear of death. The Spirit of God sustains me. God is my support." And thus on the 14th of May 1839 he passed away from earth, and entered, we doubt not, by the gate into the city, into the very presence of Him whom he loved so well and served so loyally. A few days afterwards devout men laid in Mount Jerome Cemetery at Dublin all that was mortal of Gideon Ousley—a man who had the spirit and the courage of an apostle, and was "one of the best sons of Erin that the green sod ever crossed."

But the work in which he so earnestly engaged still goes on.

True, in point of numbers, Irish Methodism has not as many members within its fold as it had fifty years ago.¹ But this may be easily accounted for. The seed it sowed within the Episcopal Church before it took to itself a separate denominational existence has borne ample fruit; and to-day the parishes in Ireland are very few in which the gospel of the grace of God is not freely preached. Hence the field in which it sowed and reaped so largely does not now to the same extent need its assistance, or call for its aid in the work of awakening sinners, or developing and fostering the spiritual life of believers. And so from this quarter it gets few accessions. Then by emigration it, like the other Churches, has been largely drained of many of its most excellent and enterprising members. John Wesley, when charged with undue partiality for Ireland on account of the frequency and length of his visits to it, used to say—"Ireland will repay it all." And so it has. America, Canada, India, Australia, Africa, the South Sea Islands, etc., are largely indebted to Irish Methodism for the very commencement as well as the continuance of the Methodist cause in many portions of their territories. Said Bishop James at the Centenary Meeting in New York: "The fact is, that wherever English-speaking Methodism exists out of England it has been planted by Irishmen; and English-speaking Methodism is Irish Methodism the world over."

And so, whilst in nowise accepting all its doctrinal teachings, or fully approving of all its arrangements and practices, as we have previously indicated, yet we are free to acknowledge that Methodism has made not only Ireland but the world its debtor. It awoke the Protestant Episcopal Church of Ireland when it was asleep, or worse; it stimulated by its zeal and labours the other great Protestant Church of Ireland; it showed all the Churches how to labour, how to live, *how to give*, how to suffer for Jesus and His cause. One of its ministers, Mr. M'Hugh, at the expense of the Bible Society, gave the Bible in Irish to Ireland. It created a taste for reading among the poorest of its members, and carefully provided, by its tracts, magazines, and books, for the gratifying of

¹ The number of Wesleyan Methodists in Ireland in 1876, according to the Conference Minutes, was 20,405, the number on trial was 822. The number of Primitive Methodists was somewhere about 8000.

that taste. It carried the gospel into regions where, from the days of St. Patrick and Columbkille, it would seem to have been almost if not altogether unknown. It brought multitudes to Christ. All this it has done, and is doing still.¹ And it is girding itself for fresh exploits. Never was it so well equipped with schools and collegiate institutions and an educated and earnest ministry as now. It has within the ranks of its ministry and of its membership, north and south, men who would do credit, by their ability, fervour, generosity, and labours, to the oldest Churches in Christendom. There seems to be no exhausting of their energies; life, warmth, activity, loyalty to Christ, are abundantly manifested in their preachings, missionary and social meetings, even as in the days when Methodism was young. Irish Methodism, though burdened now with the weight of a hundred years and more, moves still with a step as light, and a heart as buoyant, and a hand as open, as when the dew of youth was fresh upon its brow. And it is less controversial, less polemical, than it was a generation ago. The rising generation are learning to respect the wise counsel of Bishop Horsley to his students—"Young gentlemen, before you attack Calvinism, be sure you know what Calvinism is,"—even as Calvinists themselves are beginning to know and understand Methodists better, and to discover that there are important points upon which they cannot but come together—that, as the judicious Andrew Fuller put it long ago, "The points on which Evangelical Christians of the different denominations agree are far more numerous and far more important than the points on which they differ."

There is still room and need for all the Evangelical denominations in Ireland. We hold, as Edmund Spenser did three hundred years ago, "that true religion is the sole hope for Ireland. . . . Yet in planting of religion this much is needful to be observed, that it be not sought forcibly to be impressed with terror and sharp penalties, as now is the manner; but rather delivered and intimated with mildness and gentleness, so as it may not be hated before it be understood, and its professors despised and rejected. And therefore it is expedient that some discreet

¹ The organ of "The Irish Church Society" laments, in a recent issue, that, owing to the "popular Protestantism" of the laity, it is impossible for Church (High) principles to make rapid progress.

ministers of their own countrymen be sent among them, which by their meek persuasions and instructions, as also by their sober lives and conversations, may draw them first to understand and afterwards to embrace the doctrine of their salvation."

Ireland needs the gospel as much now as then. The very activities of Protestantism in Ireland have roused the priests to a deeper interest in and an increased and increasing watchfulness over their flocks. And so, as Dr. Wylie of Edinburgh truly writes, "The real propaganda is not at Rome: it is not at Lyons: it is in Ireland. It is where the Atlantic surge breaks high on the bleak coast of Galway and the black bog stretches drearily out to the horizon at Connemara." In the face of the fresh outbursts of Ultramontaniam which are patent to all men, in the face of the bold demands and daring manifestoes of Irish Romanism,¹ it is time, and more than time, not only that the division which took place in Irish Methodism in 1817 should be healed—as indeed it has been—but that in the presence of a common danger the different Protestant denominations in Ireland should make common cause in a spirit of greater unity and brother-love, even as they own allegiance to a common Lord and Master. And therefore, with all its denominational peculiarities, we cannot but rejoice that Irish Methodism is still sounding the silver trumpet of the everlasting gospel. And we conclude our review of it by saying to it, as the immortal Chalmers, shortly before his death, said to the late venerable Thomas Waugh ("the Bunting of Irish Methodism"²), from whose lips we had the incident:—"You hae your doxy, and I hae my doxy. I think I could show that I am theoretically richt, but I am sure you are no' practically wrang. Fare ye weel, and Guid Almichty bless you."

W. IRWIN.

¹ Not long ago the Lord Mayor of Dublin presided at, and glorified, a lecture, delivered in Dublin by the Rev. Canon Murphy on Cardinal Ximenes, the Spanish Inquisitor, in which this man of blood was highly exalted!

² Stevens' *History of Methodism*, p. 336.

ART. V.—*Jabez.*

“And Jabez was more honourable than his brethren : and his mother called his name Jabez, saying, Because I bare him with sorrow. And Jabez called on the God of Israel, saying, Oh that thou wouldest bless me indeed, and enlarge my coast, and that thine hand might be with me, and that thou wouldest keep me from evil, that it may not grieve me ! And God granted him that which he requested.”—1 Chronicles iv. 9-10.

THE age in which we live is pre-eminently one of historical discovery. No longer dependent upon the doubtful traditions of the Greek and Latin historians, we are brought face to face with the actual sources of their imperfect information in the long-sealed-up monuments of distant centuries. The inscriptions of actors in the great historic past or of their contemporaries, have yielded their treasures of knowledge to the learning, ingenuity and patient research of modern investigators. Egypt and Ethiopia, Himyaritic Arabia and Accadian Chaldea, Assyria, Media and Armenia, Persia and Elam, Cyprus and Moab have contributed in large or small measure to our acquaintance with the ancient world ; and the keys will doubtless soon be found to unlock the secrets of Hamathite Syrian, of Etruscan, and of the inscriptions of Central America. Already many deciphered monuments have corroborated the truth of the Bible narrative, and have amplified our knowledge of the times, persons and places of which the inspired writers treat. But, for as long a period as many of these records have lain hidden from mortal view, there has been concealed within the leaves of our well-thumbed Bibles another historical record, brief indeed, yet comprehensive and of infinite value, being the very key to the truthful but often chaotic facts of the monuments themselves. It is in this genealogical record that the brief notice of Jabez occurs.

To the eye of the superficial student, and to the mind of him who would limit God to one way of revealing Himself in his Word, Jabez is, as he was to the Jewish commentators, a wise doctor of the law belonging to the tribe of Judah, who lived at some unknown period in an unknown city called Jabez. Now if Jabez lived after the conquest of Palestine, it must have

been at a time of religious declension, for his brethren evidently did not call upon God. He dwelt in a city of some importance, since a notable family of scribes, mentioned in chapter ii. verse 55, had their abode there, and a city that reflected his dignity since it was named after him ; but the Scriptures, so full of geographical information, tell us nothing concerning this great literary centre, and, when we consult our Hebrew lexicons or manuals of Scripture antiquities, we learn that Jabez was "an unknown town in the tribe of Judah." But Jabez was a Prince rather than a doctor of law, for he had a coast to defend against his enemies and to enlarge at their expense. In the Book of Judges we learn that Caleb, the son of Jephunneh, with his nephew Othniel, enlarged the coast of the Kenezites, who are mentioned lower down in the genealogies which contain the name of Jabez ; but concerning the greater Jabez there is absolute silence. It is plain that this Prince does not belong to the period of the Conquest, for at that time there were none but honourable men and worshippers of Jehovah in all the host of Israel. If again we refer him to the time of the Judges, it is strange that a record which sets forth Tola and Jair, Ibzan, Elon and Abdon should leave us in the dark regarding so worthy a character as this hero of faith. Shall we place Jabez in the time of Israel's sojourn in Egypt ? If so, we must find his city in that ancient land, and, finding it there, we shall, as will shortly appear, be compelled to deny that Jabez was in any sense, save that of faith, an Israelite. Indeed the Gentile origin of Jabez is apparent in many ways. His very name has no signification in Hebrew, much less that which is attributed to it in the text. In order to find such a meaning, the letters of the word must be transposed to form an anagram, and, allowing such a liberty, it would be easy to prove that Zaphnath-Paaneah, and Abrech are Hebrew also. But the most striking evidence of his Gentile origin is found in the statement that he called, not upon *God*, but on *the God of Israel*. He was a proselyte, more honourable than his brethren, because he left the worship of their false gods to implore the favour and protection of the One Living and True.

Let us glance over this fourth chapter of First Chronicles, and find the connection in which Jabez stands. The chapter begins with these words : "The sons of Judah ; Pharez, Hezron,

and Carmi, and Hur, and Shobal ;” and proceeds at once to give part of the genealogy of Shobal. Now Pharez was undoubtedly a son of Judah, and Hezron and Carmi were two of his descendants, but while Hur, the father of Uri, belonged to the same family, we have no evidence that a patriarch so named had a son called Shobal. The name Shobal is not Jewish, and I have proved, in my essay on the Horites and elsewhere, that this Shobal, who is also mentioned in chapter i. of the same book, is Shobal the Horite, whose line is set forth in the 36th chapter of Genesis. These are the Auritae, or earliest rulers of Egypt, according to the Old Chronicle, the Hor-shesu of the monuments : and some of those mentioned in Chronicles and Genesis must be of great antiquity, as they are the very ancestral gods of the ancient Egyptian line. In Shob-al we recognize Seb-ra, the father of the solar family ; in his sons Reaiah, Manahath, and Onam, the deities Ra, Month-ra (a name which Mr. Osburn in his *Monumental Egypt* identified with that of Manahath), and An-ra ; while his descendants Ahumai and Etam appear as Ahom-ra and Re-Athom. Passing to the line of Asshur, the father of Tekoa, in the 5th verse, we find ourselves among Hittites. Zohar, wrongly called Jezoar in our English version, by the error of substituting a *yod* for a *vav*, is the father of Ephron, the contemporary of Abraham, whose name occurs in the 23d chapter of Genesis. Zereth left his memorial in the geographical term, Zereth Hashachar, commemorating his name in conjunction with that of his father Ashchur, which was a city in the neighbourhood of Moab that fell to the lot of Reuben. Another Ashchurite here mentioned is Haachashtari or Achashtari, a word that has no connection with the Semitic languages, and which Gesenius derives from the Persian. He is Ashtar, the great deity of the Hittite enemies of the Egyptians, and, at the same time, the Hasisadra or Xisuthrus of the Accadians of Babylonia, who have recently been connected with the Hittite family by Assyriologists.

Passing over the immediate predecessors of Jabez, we are introduced in the 11th verse to the family of Chelub, the brother of Shuah. The name of Chelub is significant in Hebrew, but those of his descendants are foreign, such terms as Beth-Rapha, the family of the physicians, and Ir-nahash,

the serpent city, together with the general designation "men of Rechah," exhibiting no relation whatever to Hebrew phraseology. Rapha was a Philistine, and Nahash an Ammonian, name. Who again is Shuah, that fixes the relation of Chelub and his family? The only Shuah that connects with the line of Judah is mentioned in Genesis xxxviii. 2, as a certain Canaanite, whose daughter became by that patriarch the mother of Er, Onan, and Shelah. At the 13th verse, the genealogies of the Kenezites, who were a people in the days of Abraham, are given. Professor Plumptre and the Bishop of Bath and Wells have asserted the non-Israelite origin of this family, to which Caleb the son of Jephunneh belonged; and, indeed, commentators must have strangely understood the temper of the ancient Israelites, when they imagined it possible for them to call their children by the name of an unclean animal, Caleb, the dog. The genealogies of the Kenites, who are mentioned together with the Kenezites in Genesis, as a Gentile people inhabiting Palestine in the days of Abraham, are set forth in chapter ii verse 55, and are continued in the chapter under consideration at the 17th verse. Concerning them, the remarkable fact is noted that one of their number, Mered, married Bithiah, the daughter of Pharaoh. Mered, "the rebel," is not a name that could be honourably borne by any Israelite, even were it probable that a remote descendant of Judah took to wife the daughter of an Egyptian monarch; nor can we understand how such an one could connect with Garmites and Maachathites.

Lepsius and Osburn have discovered Mered and the Pharaoh whose daughter he married. His sepulchral chamber was unearthed at Gizeh and carried to Berlin; his very portrait forms one of the illustrations of Mr. Osburn's book. He was a prince and high functionary in the Pharaonic court, and, at the same time, a royal scribe. His name is given as Merhet, and his royal father-in-law was Cheops, the builder of the great pyramid. So far, therefore, from being a descendant of Judah, Mered must have lived some generations earlier than the entrance of Israel into the land of Egypt. The names immediately following those of the line in which Mered appears are thoroughly Gentile, and some, like Zoheth,

present roots that occur in no Semitic language. Truly, as the writer remarks in verse 22, "these are ancient things."

Ewald looked upon the brief notice of Jabez as one of great antiquity, but I am not aware that any writer has yet given to that prince his true place in the world's history. So far we have found him to be a convert from gentilism to the worship of Israel's God, and a prince who, in spite of disastrous circumstances attending his birth, received special favours from God, including a happy and prosperous life and the extension of his dominions. His surroundings in the genealogies are Gentile, and some of them peculiarly Egyptian. Those who were able to record facts connected with Egyptian history, such as the incident regarding Mered, may be reasonably supposed to have dwelt at some period in the land of the Pharaohs. The recorders, there can be little doubt, were the Kenite scribes of chapter ii. verse 55, some of whose descendants, including the brother-in-law of Moses, entered the Land of Promise and received an inheritance in Israel, with whom, however, they seem never to have amalgamated. An ancient abode of these scribes was the city of Jabez, a city we search for in vain either in Palestine or in the Kenite region of Arabia Petræa.

Turning to Egypt, there is little difficulty in identifying Jabez with Thebez, the famous capital of the Thebaid, and the University of the Upper Kingdom. The forms by which Thebez is represented in the inscriptions are *ape*, *apet*, *aptu*, etc., the initial *T* or *Th* of the Greek word being the Egyptian feminine article, which was frequently employed as a prefix to names of places, and which as a mere locative prefix, meets us in the geographical nomenclature of other lands, as in Thapsacus, a word derived from Pasach. Thebez, therefore, which is also the name of a somewhat obscure town that existed in Central Palestine in the days of the Judges, may appropriately represent T Jabez. It is most probable that the Palestinian Thebez, like those of Asia Minor and Greece, derived its name from the Egyptian original. In the Bible the title of the Egyptian Thebez is No-Ammon, that city having been the great centre of the worship of the divinity so-called, for Ammon, with his wife Maut and son Chonsu, made up the Theban triad. The first records of the

city are those which associate it, not indeed by its name of T Jabez, with the earliest monarchs of Manetho's twelfth dynasty. It appears to have been founded by the Amenemhes and Osirtasens, of whom that dynasty is exclusively constituted.

The name, however, with which it seems most natural to associate that of Jabez, if he be an Egyptian Pharaoh, is that of Apophis, the shepherd, whom all the ancient and most of the modern authorities agree in regarding as the friend of Joseph. He is also called in different lists Apepi, Aphobis, and Apappus the Great. Eratosthenes, who designates him by the latter name, ascribes to him a reign of one hundred years. As a Shepherd King, his name is in some lists preceded, and in others followed, by that of Archles. Now it is not a small coincidence that gives us, in the verse immediately preceding that in which mention is made of Jabez, the name of one of his kinsmen, Acharchel, the son of Harum. Again the shepherd king, Anon or Bnon of the lists, who precedes Apophis, is generally, as for instance by Lenormant and Chevalier, regarded as a misreading of Annoub, who occupies the same position in the Turin Papyrus. But in verse 8 we read :—"And Coz begat *Anub* and Zobebah and the families of Acharchel the son of Harum,—and Jabez, etc." In the Shepherd Kings, Annoub, Archles, and Apophis, we have thus a presumption that Anub, Acharchel, and Jabez may be found.

Who is Coz, the father of this wonderful family? There is, so far as I am aware, only one Egyptian monarch whose name agrees with that of the sire of Anub. This is the Kaiechos of Manetho's second dynasty, the Choos of Eusebius, the Kekeu, whose pyramid, said to be the oldest of Egyptian monuments, Lepsius found at Saccarah, and whose inscription now lies in the Berlin Museum. This Choos is reported by Manetho to have introduced animal worship into Egypt, and thus to have been the originator of a degrading form of idolatry. It is another remarkable coincidence that Manetho makes the first pyramid-builder, not this Kaiechos or Choos, but one Uenephes of the first dynasty, the Anoyphes of Syncellus, and adds the statement that his pyramids were built at a place called Cochome. The site of Cochome, which the Armenian version of Eusebius calls Cho, is unknown. Kenrick supposes it to relate to the

Coptic word *Kos*, meaning to embalm. Is it not a little striking then to find that the god who presided over embalmment was Anubis? I cannot doubt, therefore, that Anoob, Uenephes, Anoyphis, Anubis, denote one and the same historical character—Anub the son of Coz.

Zobebah, the second child of Coz, was a woman, as all lexicographers are agreed, and is mentioned on account of some celebrity that attaches to her personally. The successor of Uenephes of the first dynasty is Usaphais, a name not altogether discordant from that of Zobebah, yet not sufficiently resembling it to enable us to found an argument from similarity. Still more unlike is Binothris, who follows Choos of the second dynasty, although the name is feminine, being the same as Benteresh of later Egyptian story. Eusebius calls this personage Biophis, which name compares better with Usaphais. But the confirmation of the identity of the Hebrew and Egyptian lists appears in the statement of Manetho, that in the reign of this sovereign it was decided that women should have the prerogative of royalty. Now, putting together all the facts contained in the forms Usaphais and Biophis, in the double relation to Choos on the one hand, and to Uenephes on the other, in the undoubted feminine appellation Binothris or Benteresh, and in the statement that her reign was signalised as the legitimate commencement of female royalty, we find an argument of no small force for the identification of Zobebah, the daughter of one Pharaoh and the sister of another, with the Egyptian queen. As a goddess, since her brother Anub became Anubis, I would be disposed to find in her, as Usaphais and Biophis, his companion deity Bubastis. This Zobebah, however, must be the mother of Jabez.

The deification of Anub can hardly have taken place without raising his father Coz to divine honours. Among the divinities portrayed on the Egyptian monuments there are three that differ from all others in the peculiar form and bearing of what may be called the mane or head-dress. These are Chonso, Anubis, and Bubastis. Chonso and Bubastis also are in being lunar divinities, bearing upon their heads a representation of the moon. In Chonso I have no hesitation in discovering the deified Coz or Choos. He is represented the son of Ammon, and, with him, one of the guardians of

Thebes or No-Ammon. The mythologists represent Anubis as a subordinate son of Osiris, but his name is frequently compounded with that of Ammon. What is lacking in our knowledge from Egyptian sources, the mythology and legendary history of the Greeks will supply, for the older Greek writers constantly asserted the intimate connection of their theological system with that of Egypt. According to Diodorus Siculus and other writers, the son of the Egyptian Ammon was the Greek Bacchus or Dionysus, and the son of the latter was Oenopion. Dionysus, moreover, was known as Iacchos, and the island which celebrated his worship and over which his son Oenopion is said to have ruled, is that of Chios. Bochart derived Bacchus from Bar Chus, the son of Cush, and made him Nimrod. It is more rational to derive it from the form Pa-chons, in which the Coptic article is prefixed to the name of the divinity Chons. Oenopion, the man of wine and the king of Chios, is undoubtedly Anub son of Coz, the very word Anub denoting grapes in more than one Semitic language. It will be evident that I hold the old doctrine of Euhemerus, that heathen gods were in the main historical characters deified by their descendants, and that ancestor-, not nature-worship, was the origin of all systems of mythology, a doctrine received by the most honest of the Greeks, by all the fathers of the Church, and, indeed, by all reasonable men but a few ancient allegorising philosophers, who were ashamed of their national creed, and some over-poetic souls in the present day. In Ammon, therefore, the father of Coz and great-grandfather of Jabez, I am perfectly convinced that we should find Ammon, at once the son and the grandson of the patriarch Lot. He was one of the late divinities of Egypt. Mr. Osburn connects the fortunes of Moab and Ammon with those of the Hittites, and it is thus appropriate that the mention of Ammon's son Coz, should, in Chronicles, immediately follow that of the Hittite line of Ashchur.

The contemporaneousness of many of Manetho's dynasties, and the actual identity of certain Pharaohs whose names appear in different lists, is a doctrine which has the sanction of most living Egyptologists. We must look in vain upon the monuments for records of the so-called Shepherds, if we regard their greatest king, Apepi, as a distinct personage from Pepi or

Phiops of the sixth dynasty, who, like the Apappus of Eratosthenes, is said to have reigned a hundred years. This Pepi, as Lenormant says, "was one of the most glorious and powerful kings. The whole country was subject to his sceptre, for his monuments have been found in all parts of Egypt from Syene to Tanis." He subdued the Negroes and Bedouins in the south, and took possession of the Sinaitic Peninsula, at the same time engaging in great public works at home. The most interesting feature in the identification of Pepi with Jabez is that it furnishes us with the name of his father. He is the Othoes of Manetho, the Atl of the monuments, whose reign was one of great trouble and internal strife. Two competitors for the crown, named Teta and Userkara, warred against him; and at last he was put to death by his own guards. We understand now why Zobeab called her son Jabez, and what was the sorrow wherewith she brought into the world a posthumous child. A king from his birth, his whole long life was a reign. He was but a child when Joseph stood before him, and afterwards became, as he himself said to his brethren, "a father to Pharaoh." It was this lad, in whom the honesty and simplicity of youth had not yet been contaminated by the evils of an idolatrous and licentious court, who, taught by the heaven-sent Hebrew captive, became more honourable than his brethren, and called on the God of Israel. Ammon, Maut, Chonso, and Anubis, his ancestors, with all the solar line of Hor, he knew to be but men, unable to save themselves from the power of the grave. So, as we read in the first Sallier Papyrus, "King Apapi took to himself Sutech for Lord, refusing to serve any other god in the whole land . . . he built for him a temple of goodly and enduring workmanship; King Apapi appointed festivals, days for making sacrifice to Sutech with all rites that are performed in the temple of Ra Harmachis." Sutech was the name of a Hittite god, but, inasmuch as it is a form corresponding to the Hebrew Shaddai, there is no more reason for declaring Apapi to have been a Hittite idolater than there would be for making St. Augustine a worshipper of Zeus, because Deus, the name by which he knew God, originally pertained to that divinity. To the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, God had revealed Himself as El Shaddai, the Almighty, and by this well-known name doubtless Joseph

declared to Pharaoh the being and the character of his father's God.

The only Egyptian monument which even doubtful tradition connects with the prime minister of Apophis is the great canal that runs parallel with the Nile through a great part of its course, and which is known to this day as the Bahr Jusouf. By this canal Lake Moeris was fed. Now Lake Moeris is a monument of the twelfth dynasty of Manetho, and around the name Moeris cluster many facts that cannot be foreign to the story of Joseph's Pharaoh. The Amenemhes, who began the worship of Ammon, belong to this dynasty, and to them must be attributed the foundation of No-Ammon or Thebes. According to the lists of Manetho and the interpretation of some modern historians of Egypt, the Shepherds followed the twelfth dynasty, but, according to the more trustworthy monuments that dynasty was immediately followed by the so-called Eighteenth, consisting of the Pharaohs that knew not Joseph and the vanquishers of the Shepherd line. From the monuments we also learn that certain Pharaohs of the Sixth dynasty, in which Ati and his son Phiops of the hundred years occur, were contemporary with others of the Eleventh and Twelfth. Mr. Sharpe observes that Eratosthenes, who professed to have exercised much care in compiling his list, placed Apophis after Osirtesen III. of the twelfth dynasty, although it is proper to add that Mr. Sharpe does not think this arrangement is supported by the monuments. But the Pharaoh who succeeds Osirtesen III. on the monuments is Amenemhe III., and he is universally regarded as the Moeris from whom the lake received its name. Now Bunsen held that Pepi or Phiops of the Sixth dynasty, who is called Merira, was the Moeris of the Labyrinth and lake, and Sir Gardner Wilkinson supposed that Pepi might have been the original king of that name. I am disposed to go further and assert that Pepi Merira of the Sixth, Amenemhe III. of the Twelfth, and Apophis of the Shepherd dynasty, are one and the same. It is certainly remarkable that Amenemhe II., whom we may reasonably regard as the father of Amenemhe III., met with a fate identical with that which befel Ati, the father of Pepi, being put to death, as Manetho informs us, by his own guards of the bed-chamber. All the reforms and public acts which the Bible attributes to the Pharaoh of

Joseph are, by the ancient historians and the evidence of the monuments, referred to monarchs of the Twelfth dynasty. To the same dynasty belongs the famous picture of Benihassan representing the arrival in Egypt of a Palestinian family, which was once supposed to be that of Jacob. So many are the facts that serve to mark the Pharaoh of Joseph as a king of the Twelfth dynasty, that those writers who reject the ancient evidence in favour of Apophis, place the entrance of Israel into the land of Egypt in the reign either of Osirtesen III. or his immediate successor, Amenemhe III. Moeris.

In seeking the reconciliation of such widely different names as Pepi, Apappus or Apophis, and Amenemhe, we must remember that the one is a personal and the other a dynastic appellation. Thebez, called Te Api, was also known as No-Ammon, and the name of its great divinity naturally formed part of the dynastic title of those who not only were Theban kings, but traced their descent from the god himself. It is probable that we owe the knowledge which Egyptian monuments afford of the personal name Pepi to the conversion of the youthful Jabez, and his consequent rejection, so far as his personal inscriptions were concerned, of the idolatrous title Amen-mai, "the beloved of Ammon."

It is true that beyond the fact of the twelfth dynasty being Ammonian and Theban, we have little that serves to connect Jabez, as Amenemhe III., with his maternal ancestors. The name of Amenemhe II. is read Noub or Knephcheres, and may thus designate Anub rather than Ati. If such be the case, Manetho must have erred in referring to him the death he elsewhere attributes to Ati. This Ati could only claim the title Amenemhe as connected by marriage with the family of Ammon in the person of Zobebah, the daughter of Coz. I have evidence, which the limits of this article will not permit me to set forth at present, that Ati was the son of Ophrah, the son of Meonothai, mentioned in First Chronicles iv. 14, so that Osirtesen II., whose name is Meshophra, may represent this unfortunate Pharaoh rather than Amenemhe II.

Once more, however, the Greek traditions, which know Apophis as Epaphus, the son of Io, must help us to unravel the tangled skein of the Egyptian records. The story of Cybele, the site of which is given as Phrygia, is but a version of

that contained in the Egyptian annals, and in the genealogical record of Chronicles. Cybele, an old Queen reigning in her own right, is the lover of Atys, who is put to death before her eyes. Lamenting his death, she roams throughout the earth like Io, and at last brings forth her child Sabus or Sabazius, whose name is intimately connected with the worship of Bacchus, just as Io gave Epaphus to the world. It is a singular coincidence, though I do not count much upon it, that Banier interprets the name Cybele by the Hebrew Chebel—*enfant avec douleur*, the very expression that the sacred narrative employs in regard to the birth of Jabez. In Cybebe, however, another form of this heroine's name, it is not hard to recognise Zobebah. The companion of the Queen and guardian of the youthful Sabazius, who is also called after his father, Atys and Papas, is Marsyas. Now, according to Osburn, the father and guardian of Apophis was Moeris, from whom doubtless he received the surname which makes Pepi, Merira, and Amene-mhe, Moeris. Among geographical terms, which are of great use in connection with early history, when men called their lands after their own names and after those of their ancestors, Ritter points out a Kubeibeh in southern Palestine and near it a Mareshah. This Mareshah I identify with the names Marsyas and Moeris, and find him as a historical personage in the Mareshah who is mentioned in First Chronicles iv. 21, and ii. 42, as the son of Laadah and the father of Hebron. From many sources, which space and the patience of my readers do not permit me to set forth in the pages of this *Review*, I have obtained the information that Laadah, his father, was the son of Ephraim, the son of Midian, whose invasion of Egypt, attested alike by Josephus and the Arabian historians, gave rise to the story of a Shepherd dynasty. To the line of Midian Jabez did not belong, his parents representing two of the families which exercised sovereignty contemporaneously prior to the Midianite invasion. But, inasmuch as the Shepherds are both by the Egyptians and the Arabians termed Aadtous or Adites, it would seem that Ati or Othoes, the father of Jabez, had allied himself with these foreigners, who themselves exercised a petty sovereignty, and that on the death of Ati, Mareshah or Moeris, the son of Laadah, Alites or Salatis, became the guardian of the youthful monarch. This is strictly in accordance with the

order or succession given by Mr. Osburn, as Othoes, Salatis, Moeris, Apophis. He was not aware, however, that Salatis and Moeris had no right to be considered ancestors of Jabez or Apophis, although recognising the fact that their authority was one, not of inheritance, but of guardianship.

The tradition concerning the tragical fate of Ati, the father of Jabez, seems to have been widely diffused in ancient times. Already we have found it embodied in the story of Cybele and Atys, the scene of which is placed in Phrygia. In Lydia, the tale connects with Croesus, whose son Atys was killed by those who should have defended him. In Greece Ati became Actaeon, torn to pieces by his own hounds; and, as Mr. Talbot has shown, the same legend appears in the Izdubar tablets. Since there is so much repetition in the dynasties of Manetho, it is far from improbable that his only king of the ninth dynasty, Achthoes the Atrocious, who did great mischief to the people of Egypt, who fell into madness and was destroyed by a crocodile, is another form of Ati, Othoes, Atys and Actaeon. It is worth remarking that the next monarch named by Manetho is the first Ammenemes or Amenemhe. Diodorus Siculus makes the predecessor of Moeris, whom he calls Mendes or Marrus and characterises as the builder of the Labyrinth, an Ethiopian named Actisanes, who cut off the ears and noses of offenders, and banished them to Rhinocolura on the borders of Syria or rather Palestine. If Achthoes and Actisanes designate the same person as Othoes or Ati, he is given to history as a cruel and oppressive king, against whom his own people rose in rebellion. The licentious myth of Atys, and the statement by Manetho that Amenemhe II. was put to death by his eunuchs, or guards of the bed-chamber, together with the fact that such *evirati* were almost unknown in Ancient Egypt, seem to indicate that the cause of the rebellion was the introduction into that country of the barbarous oriental custom. Its introduction is also suggestive of a Babylonian connection at this period with the land of the Pharaohs. Such a connection appears on the tablets of Babylonia in the reign of Naram-Sin, the son of Sargon, who conquered Apirak or Avaris, the kingdom of the Shepherds, and also Maganna or Egypt proper. The late Mr. George Smith fixed the date of Sargon about 1600 B.C., a period at

which the conquest of Egypt by a Babylonian king is a historical impossibility. His date should be a century and a half or two centuries earlier, in the stormy time that marks equally the beginning of the sixth, and of the twelfth dynasty, in other words, that which became known as the period of the Shepherd invasion. I have a suspicion that Acharchel and his father Harum represent the Babylonians at this time in some connection by marriage with the line of Coz, and I should not be surprised to find that Harum is the Naram-Sin who actually conquered Egypt. If this be the case, Acharchel may be represented by one of the Babylonian Kurigalzus, as well as by the Egyptian Archles.

I have also discovered in the record of Chronicles the successors of Jabez on the throne of the Pharaohs. The sixth dynasty of Manetho gives us as his successor, and perhaps his son or grandson, Menthesuphis or Methosuphis, whom Mr. Osburn makes the founder of Thebez, the city named after his father, and who, as Mentuhotep, is erroneously placed by the Egyptologists in an eleventh dynasty. This Menthesuphis, called "pure gold of the gods," I identify with Mezahab, *the golden*, who is mentioned in First Chronicles i. 50, and Genesis xxxvi. 39, as the father of a Queen Matred, who, again, is the mother of Princess Mehetabel, the wife of Hadar, an Edomite king that held his court at Pai. In Matred I recognise the so-called Nitocris who follows Menthesuphis in Manetho, and in the list of Eratosthenes is the second from Apappus the Great. The twelfth dynasty of Manetho also ends with the name of a queen, who, however, is called Scemiophris. She is made the successor of an Ammenemes, whose reign lasted but eight years. Mr. Sharpe identifies queen Nitocris with Mykera or Mytera, by whose marriage with Thothmes II. the kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt were brought under one sceptre, and whose son Thothmes III. was one of the greatest of the Pharaohs. It was a sister of this Thothmes III., named Mehetabel, who married Hadar, king of Edom, and thus gave to the kings that knew not Joseph a valuable ally on the borders of Palestine. On the death of Jabez, the southern tributaries, descended from an ancient line of local Egyptian monarchs, gained sufficient strength to take possession of the entire Upper Kingdom. By marriage with the heiress of the

Ammonian or Apophian line, one of these kings, Thothmes II., brought the whole land under one sceptre, and proceeded to oppress and expel the Midianite, Kenite, and other Palestinian allies or tributaries, who had been invited to settle in the neighbourhood of the Delta by the wise policy of Jabez or his predecessors. These Midianites, Kenites, Hittites, and Hebrews, and not any series of Egyptian kings, were the original Shepherds of the Manethonic story.

The materials which furnished me with the information justifying a connection between Mezahab and Jabez, so far separated in the lists of Chronicles, were drawn from many sources, including the Sanscrit and other scriptures. But the one legend which most fitly illustrates the connection is that which several Greek authors supply. Many circumstances, too numerous to specify here, led me to find in the legendary Abas, king of Argos, the land of the Egyptian Apis, Io, Epaphus, and Danaus, the Jabez of Chronicles and the Apophis of Manetho. His son Acrisius, the golden, is but a translation of Mezahab. But, better still, in the story of his daughter and heiress, Danae, who was wooed by Jupiter in a shower of gold, we have a myth arising, as Max Müller has shown often to be the case, out of a wrong use of words. Matred denotes a shower, and she herself is the golden shower, as the daughter of Mezahab, the golden. The true story, though much corrupted, is that which makes her the mother of the great Perseus by Dictys of Seriphos. Dictys is the natural Greek rendering of the Egyptian Tahuti, which is the true form of Thoth, from whom the kings that knew not Joseph derived their dynastic name Thothmes. But still clearer does the Egyptian connection appear, when we learn that Perseus accidentally killed his grandfather Acrisius at the court of the Larissean king Teutamias. Herodotus was told by the Egyptian priests that Perseus was one of their kings, and a native of Chemmis. His watch-tower was shown in the Delta, and all ancient authorities place the scene of the deliverance of Andromeda by this hero at Joppa in Palestine. He has been identified, time and again, with the Persian Mithras, many traces of whose worship are found in Egypt and Ethiopia. This Mithras has been generally regarded as symbolizing the union of two creeds, and, as a personage, he is made the

mediator between two religions. In reality he was the offspring of a marriage by which not two religions, but two states, were merged in one; and Mithras is but the masculine form of the well-known goddess Mithra, who is Matred his mother, the daughter of Mezahab.

The wide diffusion among savage as well as civilised peoples of the same ancient legend, has been the theme of many students of mythology and folk-lore, and writers, like Sir G. W. Cox, the author of *Aryan Mythology*, have striven to account for the phenomenon by imputing to the people of antiquity a faculty, for the existence of which they have no other evidence than the myths themselves—a faculty which compelled them to personify according to set forms the objects and powers of nature. But even if it were possible for any modern Niebuhr to nullify the almost universal testimony of the Greek historians and poets to an ancient connection between the populations of Egypt and Hellas, there would still remain an evidence of such a connection that no adverse criticism can touch. It is stated briefly in the title of one of the Records of the Past: “The Invasion of Egypt by the Greeks in the reign of Menephtah.” This Menephtah is supposed to have been the Pharaoh of the Exodus.

We have learned, then, that certain Kenite scribes, probably of the family of Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses, carried with them into Palestine the genealogies of Egyptian Pharaohs and other Gentile chiefs, which their ancestors and predecessors in office had placed on record in the city of Thebez. Expelled from this seat of learning, and from the land of Egypt by a new dynasty that had no sympathy with their pure religion, they had carried these treasures and their faith into the peninsula of Sinai, where Jethro became the priest of Midian, and worshipped, as the great king Jabez had appointed, Joseph’s God, El Shaddai. Why the inspiring and guiding Providence, that caused these truthful and invaluable documents to be placed in the canon of His Scriptures, permitted them to be annexed to, I dare not say confounded with, the brief genealogies of Israel’s tribes, and interspersed with the purely Jewish genealogies of David and the Levites, is a question hard to answer. I do not speak of the ten years and more of my leisure that have been spent in the vain

attempt to reconcile these genealogies (always excepting those of David and the Levites) with others given in the Word of Inspiration; for some who have preceded me have given the better part of a lifetime to the same great task, and have met with similar failure. But now we know how right and good it was that failure should attend such an effort. Of what value after all would it have been to the Church or the world to know the names of men that had no record on the page of history, even though they had Abraham for their father? Here, on the contrary, in the part of Scripture that has long been a sealed book, a very mine of knowledge, or of materials for correcting and arranging information elsewhere obtained, lies open to the student, and will soon, I trust, lie open to every intelligent reader of the Word of God. And yet, in comparing the brevity of the record that sets before our eyes the whole history of the ancient world with the fulness of the Church's story, there is impressed upon the mind a lesson of infinite wisdom—the smallness in God's sight of what man deems great.

By the internal evidence of the short account of Jabez, given in Chronicles, we have found him to be no Israelitish doctor, but a Gentile prince, whose life presented a marked contrast to those of his fellows in that he called upon the God of Israel. An undoubted reference to Egyptian history in the brief mention of Mered, the son-in-law of Cheops (who is the Joab of 1 Chron. iv. 14, and appears as the son of Seraiah, the Soris who precedes Cheops) furnished presumptive evidence of the Egyptian origin of Jabez. An examination of the whole chapter sufficed to indicate that its genealogies are not Israelite, and that, in its very commencement, we are introduced to the beginnings of Egyptian history in the persons of the Auritae or first rulers of the Nile valley, the Horites of Bible story. And the name of Jabez, a seat of learning and the city of the royal proselyte, has been found in the Egyptian Thebez. This name should have carried us at once to the twelfth dynasty of Manetho, whose Amenemhes and Osirtasens were the earliest rulers of the famous city so called. But the universal testimony of ancient writers could not, in the meantime, be disregarded, and as this testimony points to Apophis, the shepherd, as the only royal Egyptian convert, his identity with Jabez was taken

for granted. Our only important record of Apophis is that contained in the First Sallier Papyrus, which, although written by an enemy, corroborates the story of Jabez's conversion, and represents him as relinquishing the worship of Egypt's national divinities for that of one God, Sutech or Shaddai, the Almighty. The monuments afforded no information concerning this great monarch, a circumstance altogether unaccountable when we consider the important events by which, according to the book of Genesis, his reign was marked. But these monuments do speak out regarding a powerful Pharaoh named Pepi, who, according to Brugsch, was censured by king Sken-n-re of the so-called eleventh dynasty for favouring the Shepherds. This Pepi is universally recognised as the Phiops of Manetho's sixth dynasty, who reigned a hundred years, and by this remarkable circumstance coincides with the Apappus of Eratosthenes, in whose name we are brought back to Apophis, the shepherd. We are told that he extended his borders on every side, and that the whole of Egypt was subject to his sceptre. The hundred years of a useful and prosperous reign, the widely extended empire, are the comment of history upon the brief Bible statement "God granted him that which he requested," when he prayed—"O that thou wouldest bless me indeed, and enlarge my coast, and that thine hand might be with me, and that thou wouldest keep me from evil, that it may not grieve me."

The incidents furnished by Manetho and the monuments concerning the father of Phiops or Pepi explained how it was that "his mother called his name Jabez, saying, Because I bare him with sorrow." His father's reign, unlike his own, had been one of strife and bloodshed. He had called to his assistance against Teta and Userkara, competitors for the throne, foreign tribes who took from his name Ati their designation of Aadtous or Adites, and whose original pastoral occupations gained for them and for the dynasty they supported the name of Shepherds. Other Egyptian and Greek traditions have enabled us to see in Ati a cruel and probably a licentious king, the inaugurator in Egypt of the barbarous harem system of the East, whose wife proper, however, was a queen in her own right, no longer in the bloom of her youth, the Cybebe of a strange and shameful story. Whether by the

unfortunates whom his cruel policy had deprived of manhood, or by the foreign tribes he had called to his assistance, Ati was put to death, leaving his queen, Zobebah, the mother of a posthumous child. Her husband dead, his murderers within the walls of her palace, her enemies emboldened to renew the strife for empire, and, perhaps in addition to all this, a Babylonian invasion upon her borders, we can understand how Jabez was her Benoni and Ichabod, and her exclamation, "I bare him with sorrow." It is not a little remarkable, as has been already stated, that the Abbé Banier and other students of mythology explain Cybele, the commoner name of Cybebe, by the Hebrew word *chebel*, "to bring forth with pain."

The Phrygian legend of Cybebe, originally no doubt a legend or tradition from Apirak or Avaris, the land of the so-called shepherds, has given us the clew to the subsequent history of the family of Ati. This wife of the murdered Atys and mother of Sabazius found a friend in Marsyas. Among the Palestinian or Arabian tribes whom Ati had invited to aid him against his enemies was a Midianite family, probably in the line of Ephraim, whom Josephus and the Arabian historians represent as an invader of Egypt. The Midianites, as we learn from the story of Joseph, were in friendly relations with the Shepherd dynasty, and their name, as Matennu, long denoted a class of Egyptian mercenaries. The chief of these Midianite warriors and the son of Ephraim was Laadah of the Chronicles, known to Egyptian history as Alites or Salatis, the leader of the Shepherds; and his son Mareshah, the Moeris of the Egyptians and the Marsyas of the Greek tradition, became the friend of the widowed Zobebah and the orphan Jabez. Assuming the command of the faithful Egyptians and their allies, Laadah and his son subdued the revolted, overcame the claimants for the throne, and drove them far into the Upper Kingdom, where, unable to regain their lost dominion, they were fain to content themselves with censuring Pepi or Jabez for employing the doughty shepherds in his service. In gratitude doubtless for such signal benefits, the youthful Jabez added to his name that of the wise and warlike Midianite who had been to him a father, and called himself Pepi Merira, Jabez of Mareshah. If we rely upon ancient testimony, and find that

Jabez was a king from the day of his birth, we see Joseph appearing before a mere child in his eighth year. The use of the third person in the address of the chief butler to Pharaoh, when he said, "Me *he* restored unto mine office and him *he* hanged," may not be significant, but again it may point to one different from the youthful monarch, and exercising sovereignty in his name, in other words to Mareshah or Moeris. If this be the case, we may presume that since his act of judgment upon the two officials he had died, and that Joseph became his successor as the royal adviser and viceroy. At any rate we know from Joseph's calling himself "a father to Pharaoh," though he was but thirty years of age when he stood before him, that Jabez must have been at best a youth; and the fact that Joseph was exalted to the highest position under the king would seem to indicate the previous death or withdrawal from office of the Midianite regent.

Jabez being the Apophis and Pepi of the lists and monuments, it was to be expected that Egyptian history should at least mention those who in Chronicles are placed in proximity to this honourable Pharaoh. Accordingly we found Anub, his uncle, and Acharchel, his kinsman, in the Shepherd dynasty, as set forth by Manetho and the Turin Papyrus under the forms Anoob and Archles, two names so uncommon as to take their resemblance to those of Chronicles out of the sphere of mere coincidence. Seeking for a further recognition of Anub, who as Anubis is mentioned together with Hercules or Acharchel in more than one ancient list of Egyptian divinities, he was discovered in Uenephes of the so-called first dynasty of Manetho. As the first pyramid builder, and by Cho or Cochome, the site of his pyramids, he connected with Kaiechos or Choos, the Kekeu, whose pyramid is regarded as the oldest Egyptian monument, and whom Manetho places in his second dynasty. Since there is good evidence of the multiplication of dynasties and of individual Pharaohs by this historian, it is not unlikely that Kenkenes, the immediate predecessor of Uenephes in the first dynasty, is but a corrupted form of Kaiechos or Choos, who is Coz the father of Anub. If we identify Chons the Theban god with Kaiechos, the form Kenkenes is capable of easy explanation. I have not yet indicated the monumental Anub; as a pyramid builder, I hold him to have been Kneph Chufu, the contemporary, during the latter

part of the reign of Cheops, with that illustrious Pharaoh. The initial letter of Anub is the Hebrew *ayin*, which often receives the power of *g* or *c* in transliteration into other languages. Thus Canopus and Anubis are the same term. The surname Chufu he must have acquired from some alliance with the house of Cheops or Joab. In Usaphais, the successor of Uenephes, and in Biophis or Binothris, who follows Choos, Zobebah, the daughter of Coz, and sister of Anub, appeared, as the first female sovereign in the land of Egypt. Seeking the aid of the other records it was found that Greece knew Anub, the man of grapes, and Uenephes, the king, under the name of Denopion, king of Chios, the son of Bacchus, the god of wine, whose ancient worship connects with Cybebe and Sabazius. This Bacchus again was the son of Ammon, according to the mythologists, and thus reveals his Egyptian origin. In Thebez was his seat; and Chonsu was his son, who, by the representations of divinities upon the monuments, is allied with Anubis and Bubastis. Bubastis, as the goddess of the moon, which she is portrayed as bearing on her head, must be the Greek Io, mother of Epaphus, and Zobebah, mother of Jabez. These were late divinities compared with the old solar line of Ra, and came into note only when the twelfth dynasty began its reign. Now, placing the Hebrew line alongside of the maternal ancestry of Jabez, the four generations, Ammon, Coz, Zobebah, Jabez, may easily coincide with the three, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and give us in Ammon, the god, the son of Lot, for Ammon and Isaac were contemporaries. It is true that we have little else on which to base this identification, save the undoubted Egyptian origin of the Moabite god Chemosh, and the fact that in the story of the *Theban* Niobe many mythologists have found a reminiscence of Lot's wife.

But the name of Ammon conducted us to Thebez or No-Ammon and to Manetho's twelfth dynasty. There we found, with the deities Ammon and Chons, the Pharaohs named Amenemhe after their ancestor, one of whom had the same fate as Ati, the husband of Zobebah. It was, however, in Amenemhe III. Moeris, that we met with the great Egyptian builder and legislator, who may fitly represent the Pepi Merira of the sixth dynasty. If the record of Chronicles be true, which, apart from its appearance in the most truthful of all books, should be established by the fact that the men who handed it


down were the contemporaries in Egypt and in Thebez itself of those whose names it commemorates, then it follows of necessity that this Theban dynasty is that in which Jabez occurs. In order, therefore, to restore the history of Jabez to the world, all the glories of the reign of Moeris must be added to those of Pepi Merira and the obscure notices of Apophis. As we have seen, many modern writers place Joseph under a Pharaoh of this dynasty, feeling compelled to do so by the coincidence of the reforms introduced by the Hebrew viceroy, as these are recorded in Genesis, with those attributed to the Osirtesens and Amenemhes. The most ancient monument that marks the site of On or Heliopolis, the city whence came Joseph's wife, is that of Osirtesen I.

The materials at my disposal are not such as to enable me to give the Pharaohs of the twelfth dynasty their individual places in the scheme of Chronicles. The present system of chronicling the monarchs of Egypt by their dynastic titles is as absurd and useless as it would be to call the English John, Plantagenet III., and Elizabeth, Tudor v. The Pharaohs had simple names like other people, and these names, such as Cheops, Schafra, Pepi, are the only ones by which they can be identified in other records. For they do survive in other records, not only in that contained in the book of Chronicles, nor in those which Sanscrit and Persian, Greek and Latin authors have written, but also in the oral tradition of far-off peoples in whose ears the name of Egypt has never been breathed. And one great mission of the long-neglected chapters with which this paper has been occupied is to reduce to system and unity all these old legends of the world's second infancy, and prove that God has made of one blood all nations of men.

It was no part of my scheme to reduce the alleged antiquity of the Egyptian annals and place the patriarch Abraham not many generations later than their commencement. I had no theory to work out, no preconceived notion to prove true. The study of Chronicles led me, whether I would or not, into Egypt, astonishing me more, perhaps, than any of my readers may be astonished with the new revelation the book unfolded, when read in the light of the ancient glories of that historic land. Nor did it diminish these glories to find that Abraham must have been the guest of one of Zoan's most ancient

JOHN CAMPBELL.

THE GENEALOGY.



EGYPTIAN.



GREEK, ETC.

Jupiter Ammon.



ART. VI.—*The Conservation of Energy.*¹

THE man who journeyed from Jerusalem to Jericho fell among thieves. The doctrine of the conservation of energy has been still more unfortunate; it has fallen a prey to the magazine scientists and rhetoricians. These have stripped it of its true meaning, and saddled false ones upon it, until scarcely any likeness to its scientific self remains. "We read constantly," says Professor Tait, "of the so-called 'physical forces'—heat, light, electricity, etc.; of the 'correlation of the physical forces,' the 'persistence or conservation of force.' To an accurate man of science, all this is simply error and confusion."² These misunderstandings of the doctrine have given great support to materialism and atheism. Hence the need of examining the subject.

The doctrine in question was first known as the correlation and conservation of the forces. The forces were said to correlate, and hence force is one. Force was also said to be conserved, and hence was presumably eternal. But this terminology was treacherous; for force is defined in text-books on physics and mechanics as anything which tends to change the condition of a body whether in motion or at rest. Hence, gravity, cohesion, affinity, repulsion, pressure, impact, etc., were all arranged under the head of force. Now, as the forces were said to correlate, it was easy to blunder into the notion that all the attractive and repulsive forces of matter can pass into one another. It was not uncommon to hear it asserted that chemical affinity, and even repulsion, were but transformed gravity. Even the space-filling quality of matter depends upon force; and since all the forces correlate, it occurred to some speculators that solidity and inertia also must, in some way, correlate with the other forces. Other speculators, whose ignorance was equally dense and exhaustive, urged that this would never do; as in such case matter might go off in a puff, and thus nothing would be left. This necessity of limiting

¹ From a suggestive treatise on *Theism*. By Borden P. Bowne, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University.

² *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 389.

correlation was felt as a great hardship by the more radicalulators; and was regarded as a victory by the conservatives. The discussion was mainly a logomachy without a ray of insight into the scientific meaning of the doctrine. All things are phenomena of force; and are not gravity and repulsion, and life, and mind, and matter, and everything, forces? If, then, can we deny their correlation? With this understanding of the doctrine, Mr. Herbert Spencer proceeded to set forth a rich variety of propositions, such as the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, the correlation and equivalence of physical and mental force, the impossibility of perpetual motion, and divers sociological laws. Mr. Bain found in it the reason why one cannot attend to many things at once, or move great in many directions. So terrible are the ravages of the physics of arguing from words without attending to their scientific content.

The doctrine of the constancy of force suffered no less from verbal exegesis. Inasmuch as force is constant, what shall we make of the fact that all the attractive and repulsive forces vary with the distance across which they act, so that while the law is constant, they themselves are incessantly varying? In the case of gravity, a body at half the distance acts with four times the energy; at double the distance, it acts with only one-fourth of the energy. Whence the gain and loss of power? If a force is constant, the idea of creation or destruction is inadmissible; whence, then, the increment, and whither the decrement? No less a man than Faraday was sent off on a wild-goose chase by reasoning of this sort; and he concluded that it must come from, and return to, the ether—that limbo of scientific difficulties. He argues at length that without some new assumption we come in hopeless conflict with the doctrine of conservation.¹ Strangely enough, it never seems to have occurred to him that this result bordered on a *reductio ad absurdum* of the conservation doctrine.

In like manner the doctrine that work involves the expenditure of force was misunderstood. Inasmuch as an attractive force is for ever pulling at all the rest of the universe, it occurred to many speculators that the attracting forces of the planets must be wearing out. They have already pulled the

¹ See his paper in *The Correlation and Conservation of Forces*.

matter of our solar system through vast spaces, and condensed it into comparatively very small spaces. Now as a vast amount of work has been done; and as work involves the expenditure of force, of course the attractions are growing less and less. Opposed to this conclusion, however, was the awkward fact, that, in truth, the attractions are now stronger than ever before; and thus the doctrine of conservation was again endangered. To escape this difficulty, some speculators imagined that motions may become attractions or repulsions, and conversely. That motion implies something which moves, and attraction something which attracts, and that a moving thing, as such, is not an attracting thing, was a fact of which they had not the slightest suspicion. This impossible identification of motion and attractive or repulsive force seems to underlie the following extraordinary statement by Mr. Grove, whose treatise upon the correlation of the physical forces is popularly supposed to be classical:—

“Of absolute rest nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as we can ascertain, is ever in movement, not merely in masses, as with the planetary spheres, but also molecularly or throughout its most intimate structure, . . . so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any portion of matter that it is absolutely at rest. Supposing, however, that motion is not an indispensable function of matter, but that matter can be at rest, matter at rest would never of itself cease to be at rest; it would not move, unless impelled to such motion by some other moving body, or body which has moved. This proposition applies not merely to impulsive motion, as when a ball at rest is struck by a moving body, or pressed by a spring which has previously been moved, but to motion caused by attractions such as magnetism or gravitation.”¹

If by rest equilibrium is meant, this passage is true and trivial; otherwise, it is in such opposition to elementary mechanical physics, and even to the true doctrine of conservation, that it is difficult to conceive how any one, acquainted with the most rudimentary principles of physics, could make it. The physicist is constantly considering cases of motion generated from a state of rest by the mutual attractions of bodies. All that is needed is mutual attraction, with space through which to move. A great proportion of mechanical problems are of this kind. If Mr. Grove's statement were true as it stands, the whole science of dynamics would be at an end. But it would not pay to unravel its possible meanings.

¹ See chapter on *Motion in Correlation of Physical Forces*.

The root of the blunder lies in the assumed correlation of force and motion.

Yet, in truth, there was a certain grandeur in those rhetorical misunderstandings. The notion of one universal power, for ever equal to itself, but of infinite manifestation, had great attraction for speculative minds; and withal, it offered manifold opportunities for fine writing. Proteus was almost worn out by the demands made upon him for illustration. Physics, as was said, had come to the aid of metaphysics, and solved magnificently the problem of the beginning and the end, over which philosophy had puzzled in vain. There is neither beginning nor end. Nature is a cycle returning into itself, and hence self-centred and eternal. As such it rolls on for ever, manifesting its various phases, and bringing to life and death. It may be well to quote a few passages in illustration of the correlationists' exalted state of mind at this period.

According to Dr. Bray, in his *Anthropology*, "The scientific idea of force is the idea of as pure and mysterious a unity as the one of Parmenides. It is a noumenal integer, phenomenally differentiated into the glittering universe of things." It would be easy to fill pages with such dazzling matter; but volumes of it would give no information, and we content ourselves with the overwhelming glory from the pen of Dr. Youmans:—

"Thus the law characterised by Faraday as the highest in physical science which our faculties permit us to perceive, has a far more extended sway; might well have been proclaimed the highest law of all science—the most far-reaching principle that adventuring reason has discovered in the universe. Its stupendous reach spans all orders of existence. Not only does it govern the movements of the heavenly bodies, but it presides over the genesis of the constellations; not only does it control those radiant rods of power which fill the eternal spaces, bathing, warming, illumining, and vivifying our planet, but it rules the actions and relations of men, and regulates the march of terrestrial affairs. Nor is its dominion limited to physical phenomena; it prevails equally in the world of mind, controlling all the faculties and processes of thought and feeling. . . . Star and nerve-force are parts of the same system—stellar and nervous forces are correlated. Nay, more, sensation awakens thought and kindles emotion, so that thisondrous dynamic chain binds into living unity the realms of matter and mind through measureless amplitudes of space and time."

After this unspeakable flight, the writer continues:—

"And if these high realities are but faint and fitful glimpses which science has obtained in the dim dawn of discovery, what must be the

glories of the coming day? If, indeed, they are but 'pebbles' gathered from the shores of the great ocean of truth, what are the mysteries still hidden in the bosom of the mighty unexplored?"

Echo may safely be left to answer these questions. Pending such reply, the best criticism of this rhetorical flummery will be to develop the doctrine of conservation as scientists understand it.

By a happy change of terminology, scientists have escaped the confusions attendant upon using the word force. The doctrine is now known as the conservation of energy—a phrase which will be explained further on. Meanwhile, we remark that the doctrine says nothing whatever about the inner nature of matter whereby it is enabled to attract or repel; still less does it affirm any correlation between these qualities. It does not pretend that chemical affinity or cohesion is transformed gravitation, but all alike are accepted as primary and irreducible. "We must not imagine the chemical attraction destroyed, or converted into anything else." "In no case is the force which produces the motion annihilated, or changed into anything else." "Of the inner quality that enables matter to attract matter we know nothing; and the law of conservation makes no statement regarding that quality. It takes the facts of attraction as they stand, and affirms only the constancy of working-power. The convertibility of natural forces consists solely in transformations of dynamic into potential, and of potential into dynamic energy, which are incessantly going on. In no other sense has the convertibility of force, at present, any scientific meaning."¹ In order, however, to affirm a constancy of working-power, a single affirmation must be made about the so-called attractive and repulsive forces of matter, namely, they must vary only with the spaces through which they work. Any other law of variation would overturn the true doctrine of conservation. As the foundation of the doctrine, then, science does not affirm a single unitary power, but an indefinite manifold of elements in the most complex relations of action and reaction. How such action is possible the scientist does not pretend to know; he simply accepts the fact with its discovered laws, and says that if we are allowed to make certain assumptions about the elements, then the

¹ Tyndall's *Fragments of Science*. Paper on "Constitution of Nature."

energy of the system is a constant quantity. But what is energy in the scientific sense? It has two factors: (1.) any attraction or repulsion, or other force, which can initiate motion; and (2.) a free space in which this motion can take place. If a stone lie on the earth, it has no energy with reference to gravitation, although the attraction between it and the earth is then at a maximum. Two chemical elements, also, have no chemical energy when once they have united; yet their attractive grip on each other is more than gigantic. But let the stone be raised from the earth, or the chemical elements be wrenched apart, so that motion can take place; then energy becomes possible. Hence, there can be no energy without both moving force and space in which to move. But this energy, which is said to be constant, turns out to be double. The scientist splits it into actual and potential energy, or sometimes kinetic and potential energy. Kinetic energy is the power a moving body has of doing work; and in strictness the name of energy belongs only to this form. Potential energy is the possibility of kinetic energy. Thus our stone at any point above the earth's surface has potential energy, because if left free to fall, it would begin to move and thus develop actual energy of motion, or kinetic energy. But the potential energy decreases as the kinetic increases. The energy of a body just beginning to fall would be all potential; its energy at the lowest point of its course would be all kinetic; and at all intermediate points, it would be partly one, and partly the other. Neither of these forms is constant, but their sum is. Hence the notion of the conservation of energy. The energy, then, of the universe, does not consist merely in the fact that the elements attract and repel, but in this fact with the additional one that they have also spaces to act through. These same elements might be so arranged that, remaining just what they are, the system should be utterly powerless. Such, indeed, is the future which this law of conservation seems to be preparing for our system. Placing ourselves, then, in the nebulous time, we see that the energy of the universe was then mainly potential, and consisted of the pushing and pulling forces of the elements multiplied into some function of the spaces that separated them. Ever since, that potential energy has been becoming kinetic; and this has been developed by the fall of

the atoms through a portion of the space between them. We see, then, what the scientist means by affirming that the energy of the universe is constant. If at any moment we measure the potential and kinetic energies of our system, their sum will be equal to the similar sum obtained from any other measurements at whatever time. Such is the statement of the law; it remains to inquire into its scientific limitations. Unless we do this, the rhetoricians will renew their ravages by interpreting it verbally; and then we shall have another flood of devastating rhetoric. We shall best learn the limitations by studying the proofs of the doctrine.

The well-known mechanical theory of the conservation of *vis viva*, when extended to molecular motions, gives the general doctrine of conservation. If we assume any finite system, say some huge nebula, and suppose it to fulfil certain conditions, such a system will be dynamically conservative. The conditions are as follows:—(1.) The system must be free from all external action. (2.) The motions of the system must all depend upon the forces of the elements; and these forces must vary only with the spaces through which they act. (3.) The atoms must never clash so as to diminish motion by any inelastic solidity. When these conditions hold, the conservation of energy follows directly from the third law of motion, or the equality of action and reaction. When they do not hold, energy is not constant. If there be forces which vary with velocity, or with time, or with the mode of aggregation, the formula is not exact. Or if there be agents in the system capable by volition of originating any motion whatever, again the law does not hold. Now all of these suppositions are quite simple, and full as easy to realise in thought as the assumption that the forces shall vary only with the spaces. Indeed, more or less of empty space seems of all grounds for force-variation, the least rational and conceivable. Of course, the facts can be determined only by observation and experience. There seems to be no way of satisfying the third condition except by giving up the extension of the atom altogether, and adopting Boscovich's notion of unextended force-centres.¹ The collision of inelastic bodies is invariably attended with the loss of energy

¹ See Essay by Sir John Herschel on the Origin of Force, in *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*.

unless they have a molecular structure, and the molecules fulfil the conditions mentioned. But if the atom be a solid, and not merely a force-centre, it is impossible to view it as elastic.

This general theorem of dynamics has been raised into importance by the mechanical theory of heat and the other molecular energies of matter. The discovery of their mechanical nature enables us to trace molar motion into molecular motion, and conversely; and the determination of their mechanical equivalent enables us to say that the seeming loss of energy in case of molar collision is only apparent, the same amount of energy being reproduced in molecular forms. This discovery is a matter for just pride on the part of physics, but our exaltation must never lead us into making extravagant claims. The doctrine in question is proved only for a theoretical physical system; whether the actual system fulfils the theoretical conditions, must be decided by observation and experiment. Thus far experiment has given a very high degree of probability to the doctrine in the physical realm; but even there all questions are not answered. In particular, electricity and magnetism furnish some troublesome facts. Thus Tait and Thomson question Weber's law of electric currents, although it is in harmony with experience, because it conflicts with the law of conservation. The dogmatism of this procedure is evident; for it is by no means a first truth that natural forces must vary only with the space; indeed, if we ask ourselves what ground for force-variation there is in more or less of empty space, we shall find ourselves greatly puzzled to see any. The truth is, it is purely a question of experience, and not of conceivability at all; and if experience point to other laws than those which the doctrine of conservation contemplates, we must admit them, no matter what the theoretical consequences may be. Still we must allow as highly probable, that for physical agents left to themselves, the law is absolute.

Remaining still in the physical realm, it must be further pointed out that the appearance of simplicity which the doctrine lends to our physical theories is mostly misleading. When the various activities of the elements are all described as energy, we are apt to fancy that we have reduced the many to one; but, in truth, these forms remain as mysterious as

ever. We have discovered that one form of energy can give rise to another according to the measure of its own *vis viva*, but we have no hint of why or how one form becomes another. We know that heat has a mechanical equivalent; but heat remains as mysterious and as separate as ever. We know that the other forms of energy also have mechanical equivalents, but still each one remains as peculiar as before. They are all modes of motion, it is said; but what is the nature of these motions? How are they produced and propagated? In what does a heat-motion differ from an electric or magnetic motion? If alike, the effects would be alike; but if different, what is the difference? Some physicists are inclined to assume that the heat-motion is an expansion and contraction of the atom upon itself, and not a vibration. Here is a realm of mystery, and of almost total darkness. In short, why many forms of energy and not one? or, why so many and not more? We are shut up to the assumption that these differences must rest upon a complex qualitative nature of the atoms themselves, whereby these diverse manifestations are made possible. Upon this inner mystery the doctrine of conservation throws no light. We have to assume this complex qualitative nature; we cannot construe or deduce it. We must guard ourselves from thinking that grouping various forms of energy under a common name in any way abolishes their differences. Sir John Herschel has a word on this point which still deserves consideration:—

“Nor (while accepting with all due admiration as approximate truths these great revelations as to the mutual convertibility of these correlatives according to the measure of *vis viva* appropriate to each), shall we advance any nearer to a rational theory of any one of them till it shall be shown with much more distinctness than at present appears in what these molecular movements themselves consist; by what forces (in the dynamic acceptation of the term) they are controlled; in what manner or by what mechanism they are propagated from one body to another, and how their mutual interconversion is effected.”¹

Whether, in addition to the mechanical agents which the law assumes, there are also vital and voluntary agents whose action is subject to other laws, is a point to be settled by observation. It is a vexatiously common error with semi-

¹ *Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, p. 472.

scientific speculators to affirm the doctrine of conservation to be absolute, and then to conclude that there can be no vital or spontaneous agents in the system. The fallacy is evident, for it consists in deducing the premises from the conclusion, which, in turn, is true only on the preassumed truth of the premises. Herbert Spencer goes so far in his misunderstanding as to declare the doctrine to be an *a priori* truth. He says it is "deeper than demonstration—deeper even than definite cognition—deep as the very nature of the mind." "Its authority transcends all other whatever; for not only is it given in the constitution of our own consciousness, but it is impossible to imagine a consciousness so constituted as not to give it."¹ The absurdity is evident of calling that an *a priori* truth which is not true at all except upon certain contingent assumptions. Still more amazing is it to call that a necessary deliverance of consciousness which not one consciousness in a thousand can formulate. The truth is, Spencer is here confounding a physical truth with a metaphysical dogma. This appears from the following statement:—"Thus by the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception. . . . In other words, asserting the persistence of force is but another mode of asserting an unconditioned reality without beginning or end." Different things should be kept apart. Yet Mr. Spencer never seems to have the slightest suspicion that he is not on the high road of science; and in so far we must allow his claim, that the doctrine in question is "deeper than definite cognition," at least on his own part. But old friends often turn up in odd places. Spencer's doctrine of persistence, which he persists in confounding with the physical doctrine of conservation, is identical with Hamilton's doctrine of causation, namely, that the sum of being is changeless, and hence that the many are but flowing states of the one. In fact, Spencer's knowledge of physics is mainly verbal; and hence he understands scientific doctrines by verbal exegesis. And as force may be applied to anything without manifest absurdity, there is no difficulty in verbally identifying everything, from gravitation and sunshine to the force of prejudice or of an illustration. Unfortunately, Spencer is not alone in

¹ *First Principles*. Chapter on "Persistence of Force."

this verbalism. Speculators have largely made the doctrine of conservation to teach a kind of pantheism, or all-engulfing substantialism. They have been led into this error by the phrases, 'correlation of forces,' and 'transformation of energy.' To an ill-trained mind both phrases are treacherous. We have but to hypostasize force or energy, and think of it as manifesting itself in different forms, and we have the pantheism of Spinoza. And this is the direction which the hybrid philosophical and scientific speculator has taken. Energy is first made substantial, and declared one, and then the easy conclusion is drawn that all things are but manifestations of one omnipresent energy. What appears here as matter appears yonder as mind. What here is sunshine is yonder life and thought. At bottom all are one, and one is all.

It may be that metaphysical considerations would lead us to a view not unlike this, but it is no deduction from the physical doctrine of conservation. This doctrine is based on the conception of a manifold of elements of a certain kind, each of which is an individual. To guard against this interpretation of the doctrine, we must inquire into the meaning of the transformation of energy.

Energy must always be the energy of something. Physical energy is the energy of the physical elements; and its so-called transformation, while practically allowable, is only a figure of speech. Thus when a moving body puts another in motion and comes to rest itself, we do not think of the motion of the first as transferred to the second, and for the reason that motion cannot exist without a subject. The motion of the first ceases, that of the second begins; but nothing is transferred or transformed. In like manner energy cannot exist without a subject. But the elements are so related to one another, that they mutually condition one another's action; that is, the activity of one may furnish the conditions of another's activity. In such a case, the activity of the second will be greater or less according as the antecedent activity was greater or less. We may say in general, that the subsequent activity will vary with the *vis viva* of the preceding one. If the resultant activity be not of the same kind as the antecedent, still the same relation of intensity will hold. Speaking loosely, we say in such a case that energy has been transferred

nd transformed; but in truth no such thing has happened. Every element has acted out of itself; but the conditions of its action have been furnished by antecedent action, and the intensity of the consequent depends upon the *vis viva* of the antecedent. This is all the transference and transformation of energy mean, even in physics. There is no mysterious and ethereal something gliding from one thing to another. No element receives anything from other elements, except that they furnish the conditions upon which it may manifest its power of action. No *a priori* reason can be given for the relation, and still less why the activity of one should appear in inciting that of another. To be sure the law of conservation would not hold in that case, but this law is purely contingent one.

With this understanding of the transformation of energy,

question whether thought is not transformed physical energy, is seen to involve mental confusion. Whether simple mental subjects exist can be determined only by psychological analysis; but if they do, the transformation of energy in the case of thought is at least no greater than in the case of the physical elements themselves. The nerves would not supply the mind anything but the conditions for unfolding its own proper powers; just as when a ball is thrown into the air, it does not receive attractive force from the motion, but is put in position for manifesting its own inner attraction. In the relation of body and soul, nothing would pass into the soul, nothing would come out of it. Whether sensation and perception are attended with any loss of *vis viva* in the brain and nerves is unknown. It may be, that, if we could trace the nervous action, we should find each physical antecedent completely exhausted in the physical consequent, and should get no hint of the thought-series which the physical series summons. It may also be that physical energy is expended in causing the soul to react with sensation and thought. A positive decision is impossible and needless. However it may be, there is no transformation, except in the sense that nervous action supplies the occasion upon which the mind develops its own proper activity, for this is all that transformation means in any case. The pretended deduction from the doctrine of conservation, that vital, mental, and social forces are only

transformed sunshine, must be at once dismissed as simple moonshine. The following word by Professor Tait is severe, but just :—

“One herd of ignorant people, with the sole *prestige* of rapidly increasing numbers, and with the adhesion of a few fanatical deserters from the ranks of Science, refuse to admit that all the phenomena even of ordinary dead matter are strictly and exclusively within the domain of physical science. On the other hand, there is a numerous group, not in the slightest degree entitled to rank as Physicists (though in general they assume the proud title of Philosophers), who assert that not merely Life, but even Volition and Consciousness, are merely physical manifestations. These opposite errors, into neither of which is it possible for a genuine scientific man to fall, so long at least as he retains his reason, are easily seen to be very closely allied. They are both to be attributed to that Credulity which is characteristic alike of Ignorance and of Incapacity. Unfortunately there is no cure; the case is hopeless, for great ignorance almost necessarily presumes incapacity, whether it show itself in the comparatively harmless folly of the Spiritualist or in the pernicious nonsense of the Materialist.”¹

Of course, no one imagines that vital and spontaneous agents, if they exist, are likely to upset all the laws of energy, and put physics to shame. On the contrary, we should expect in a rational system to find them taking all lower forces and energies into their service. “Life,” says Balfour Stewart, “is not a bully who swaggers out into the open universe, upsetting the laws of energy in all directions, but rather a consummate strategist, who, sitting in his secret chamber before his wires, directs the movements of a great army.” Aristotle defined life as the cause of form in organisms, and no later definition has equalled his in either simplicity or adequacy. Certainly, if we hold that a living agent is anything substantial, we shall have to allow that its main function in the body is directive. The same remark is equally true for animal and human volitions; for while our wills must be able to originate some material change, unless we are pure automata, that change mainly consists in changing the direction of physical energies, which are thus guided to the end desired. Whether our wills can thus direct physical forces, is a matter for separate inquiry. The doctrine of conservation is neutral; but, unless appearances are very deceiving, our volitions do count for something in the course of events.

Materialism finds no support from this doctrine; we have

¹ *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 24.

next to inquire into its bearings on Atheism. From its first announcement, it has been the great demiurge of all atheistic systems. It seemed to teach the possible eternity and self-sufficiency of the physical system, and also to exclude the design-argument. Hence atheists with one accord pounced upon it, and, as usual, misunderstood it. Of course, it could not be otherwise when one is under obligation to interpret a scientific theory, not by the facts, but by the irreligious use which can be made of it. In opposition, however, to verbal exegesis, an intelligent understanding of the doctrine shows all such atheistic fumbling to be questionable, if not entirely groundless. Indeed, as our science stands at present, the law of conservation points rather to a finite duration of our system. As far as the meaning of the law is concerned, energy is energy, no matter what its form, while, in fact, energy has many forms. Now the continuance of the universe, as a dynamical agent, does not depend solely upon the fact that all these energies have a constant sum, but also upon the relations of these various forms to one another. And here the surprising fact comes out, that while it is easy to pass from some forms to some others, it is not so easy to pass back. This is pre-eminently the case with heat. Other forms can be entirely transformed into heat, but heat cannot be entirely retransformed into other forms. The descent to *Avernus* is easy, but the return is difficult, and in part impossible. There is as much energy as before, but there is no possibility of using it. For heat can do work only when there is an *inequality of temperature*, as water can do work only when there is a *difference of elevation*. If water stood at the same level all around the world, there would be no loss of water, but water-power would cease. Heat follows the same law, and is powerless when it has the same level in all bodies. But heat tends constantly to a common level, and thus becomes the great cesspool of energy, out of which there is no known redemption. This fact, that energy tends to sink to lower forms, ending at last as heat, has been called by Sir William Thompson the Dissipation of energy; a better term is, the Degradation of energy. But the continuance of the present dynamic system is as dependent on the differentiation of energy as upon its conservation. What, then, does this law of

degradation mean? It points to a powerless homogeneity of energy as its goal. A little relief may be found for a time in the wreck and clash of solar systems, until all the matter within the grip of gravitation shall be gathered into one great effete lump. It and the ether may be supposed to have conserved all their energy, but to no purpose, as transformation has become impossible. It would be a relief to our thought if such a system could be buried out of our sight. Why should it remain—useless, inert, effete—a fit inhabitant of chaos and old night?

From this fact of degradation many distinguished physicists have drawn the conclusion that the present system is a temporary one, at least if the present physical laws hold. Among these may be mentioned Thompson, Tait, Balfour Stewart, Helmholtz, and Clausius. No names rank higher than these in physics. For ourself, we do not wish to insist upon the conclusion; we regard it rather as a pointing than a demonstration, and are not prepared to lay any stress upon it. The fact, therefore, that these men have drawn this conclusion from the law of conservation, is of less use as a positive argument for theism, than as putting a stop to atheistic fumbling with it. At the same time, it must be allowed that no satisfactory answer has yet been made to their argument, although a great many have been attempted. Now, the gist of the argument for the temporary character of the present system is, that a process of degradation cannot be eternal, and hence that what ends in time must also have a beginning in time. Many of the replies assume that the question is, whether the laws of heat directly prove the system to have had a beginning; and it is said, rightly enough, that they do not. But this is not the question. The claim is, that they point to an end of the dynamic system, and the beginning is an inference from the end. We give one or two quotations:

“It will be seen that in this chapter we have regarded the universe, not as a collection of matter, but rather as an energetic agent—in fact, as a lamp. Now, it has well been pointed by Thompson, that, looked at in this light, the universe is a system that had a beginning, and must have an end, for a process of degradation cannot be eternal. If we could regard the universe as a candle not lit, then it is, perhaps, conceivable to regard it

as having always been in existence ; but if we regard it rather as a candle that has been lit, we become absolutely certain that it cannot have been burning from eternity, and that a time will come when it will cease to burn."¹

"The very fact, therefore, that the large masses of the visible universe are of finite size, is sufficient to assure us that the process cannot have been going on for ever ; or, in other words, that the visible universe must have had its origin in time ; and we may conclude, with equal certainty, that the process will ultimately come to an end. All this is what would take place provided we allow the indestructibility of ordinary matter ; but we may, perhaps, suppose that the very material of the visible universe will ultimately vanish into the invisible."²

Most of the replies, however, consist in appealing to the unknown. We cannot tell what new laws may appear under new conditions ; and hence it is unspeakably rash to conclude that the visible system is temporary. One prominent atheistic writer, in his zeal against the conclusion, questions the absoluteness of the law of conservation, and even the principles of mechanics themselves. His idea of the law seems to be, *that it is true so far as it serves atheism, and false for the rest*. This standard of truth is most ingenious and instructive. But all of these objections are irrelevant. No one ever dreamed that the doctrine in question admits of absolute demonstration. The proof is based on the assumption that the present mechanical and physical laws shall continue valid. Of course, any one can question this assumption, and suggest ineffable possibilities ; and as long as he remembers that he is dealing with his own vagaries and fancies there is no objection to it. We do not know that some awful dragon will not appear to overturn the dead equilibrium, and set nature to work again. Such a suggestion is possible, but it can hardly be called scientific. We must, however, confess our surprise that no speculator has suggested as a way of escape a periodic change from attraction to repulsion ; so that when attraction has gathered all matter together, repulsion shall set in and scatter it again, and thus in eternal oscillation. Of course this would be a mere fancy,

¹ *Conservation of Energy*, by Balfour Stewart.

² *Unseen Universe*, p. 127. See also Tait's *Recent Advances of Physical Science*.

but it would not be the first fancy which has been mistaken for science. But as long as we confine ourselves to the known laws of physics and mechanics we make a sorry show in escaping Thompson's conclusion. Some invoke the notion of a space of n dimensions to save the system. Zöllner, the German astronomer, uses this conception to explain the feats of tied conjurors, as a knot cannot really be tied in such a space. What more natural than that he should appeal to it here? Others, again, think that Thompson's theory is due to theological prepossessions. This is true, if the laws of mechanical physics are theological prepossessions. It is further urged that we cannot allow the conclusion, for that would deny the self-sufficiency of the system, and necessitate the notion of miracle. Oddly enough, those who use this argument seem never to suspect that their objection is based, not on science, but on an atheistic prepossession. Whether men like Tait and Thompson, Helmholtz and Clausius, are liable to theological prepossessions the reader must judge for himself; but as a matter of fact, atheistic prepossessions are full as prominent in speculation as theological prepossessions. Of course, the former are far more scientific and respectable. And speaking of prepossessions, it is rather odd that every one may be suspected of them, except the atheist. We allow for prejudice in judging the politician, the statesman, the historian, the philosopher, and the theologian; but we are expected to believe that the atheist, of all men, is absolutely impartial. Hence, also, he claims the largest right of twitting his opponents with prejudice, bigotry, and general incapacity; while for himself he claims the profoundest insight and the most immaculate mental integrity. There are some things which transcend even a mountain-removing faith, and this is one of them. Being still, for all slips of his, one of Eve's family, the atheist has no *a priori* claim to exemption from the frailties of human nature, and he certainly has no claim in experience. It is a hard saying, but we cannot avoid a secret conviction, that if the known laws of mechanical physics pointed to the eternity of the system with half the clearness with which they indicate its temporary character, the theist would not be allowed to lose sight of the fact. Much would be said about the uniformity of nature, and about the folly of appealing to the unknown against the known; but the

atheist, like poor Yorick, is commonly "a fellow of infinite jest." The zeal with which Darwin's speculations have been taken up, and the coolness with which the theory in question has been received, are facts not without interest and instruction.

But, as we have said, we do not wish to insist upon the conclusion. It is a pointing of the fundamental known laws of matter. That there are no compensations in the system we affirm not. We adduce the argument, less for its positive than for its negative effect. It is something to have the doctrine rescued from atheism and materialism. And yet it is almost a disappointment to reach a result so different from what the rhetoricians lead us to expect. All those beautiful solutions of philosophic questions vanish, and leave not a wrack behind. We point out, in closing, that if the universe were dynamically conservative, so that transformation could go on endlessly if not interfered with, the atheistic conclusion would still not follow. Leibnitz, as is well known, taught just such a doctrine of conservation, and held also, that such a universal world would be the highest possible proof of creative wisdom. Indeed, both he and Descartes held that it would be derogatory to God to suppose that the system tends to run down. The design argument is left untouched by it; for the conservation of energy no more explains the theological aspect of things than does the allied doctrine of the indestructibility of matter. As the latter doctrine is consistent with all kinds of meaningless and chaotic combinations, so the former is consistent with all kinds of meaningless applications of energy. Neither doctrine accounts for form. Why there should be as many forms of energy as exist; why these should be related as they are; why things should work together to produce an orderly system, and one replete with marks of intelligence—these questions find no answer in the conservation of energy. Upon the whole, we cannot see that the theist has any reason to be much afraid of this doctrine.

BORDEN P. BOWNE.

ART. VII.—*The Massacre of St. Bartholomew.*¹

FRANCE, in the age when Protestantism was spreading in Europe, found herself in a place where two seas met. If the ship of State did not go to pieces, like the vessel which threw St. Paul upon the coast of Malta, it had to struggle through a long and frightful tempest from which it barely escaped. In the other European countries the situation was different. There was intestine discord, but not to the same extent; or with consequences less ruinous.

In Germany, the central authority was too weak to coerce the Lutheran States. The war undertaken by Charles v. for that purpose was brief, and comparatively bloodless. The final issue was the freedom of the Protestants for a long period, until imperial fanaticism, in the early part of the seventeenth century, brought on the terrible Thirty Years' War, which exhausted what was left of the vitality of the German Empire, and ended in the establishment of Protestant liberties at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). In England, as late as Elizabeth's reign, not less than one-half the population preferred the old Church; but in the wars of the Roses the nobles had been decimated and regal authority strengthened; and the iron will of the Tudor Sovereigns, Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, coupled with an inbred hatred of foreign rule, ecclesiastical and secular, and supported by the fervent love of a great party to the Protestant faith, kept the nation on one path, and stifled various attempts at insurrection, which might otherwise have blazed up in civil war. In Scotland, the league of the nobles with the reformers, aided by the follies of Mary Stuart, proved strong enough to uphold against the opposing faction the revolution which had made Calvinism the legal religion of the country. In Sweden, Protestantism speedily triumphed under the popular dynasty erected by Gustavus Vasa. In the Netherlands there was a fierce battle continued for the greater part of a century; but the contest of Holland was against Spain, to throw off the yoke that she was determined to fasten upon that persecuted and unconquerable race,

¹ From the *New Englander*.

In Italy and in the Spanish peninsula, Protestantism did not gain strength enough to stand against the revived fanaticism of its adversary, and was swept away, root and branch.

In general, it may be said that in the North, among the peoples of the Teutonic stock, the preponderance was so greatly on the side of the Protestants, that the shock occasioned by the collision of opposing parties was weakened, and unity was preserved; while in the South, among the Romanic peoples below the Alps and the Pyrenees, the Catholic cause had a like predominance in a much greater degree, and overwhelmed all opposition. But, as for France, she stood midway between the two mighty currents of opinion. Her people belonged, in their lineage and tongue, to the Latin race; but they had somewhat more of German blood in their veins than their brethren in the South, and—what is much more important—by their geographical situation, previous history, and culture, they were made much more sensitive to the influences of what was then modern thought.

Yet, France was a powerful and compact monarchy, and seemed better able than any other country to breast the storm. On the 1st of July 987, Hugh Capet, Count of Paris, elected king by an assembly of nobles, superseded the foreign Carolingian line, and was crowned at Rheims. From him all the later kings of France—the Bonaparte usurpers alone excepted—the direct Capetian line, the Valois, Bourbon, and Orleans monarchs, down to the abdication of Louis Philippe, are sprung.¹ Out of the dominion of Hugh Capet, the small district known as the Isle of France, of which Paris was the centre, there was built up in the course of centuries, by the accretion of feudal territories, by lucky marriages, by treaties or conquest, the modern kingdom of France. The wars with England which went on, with many intervals, for 250 years—from the end of the twelfth century to the middle of the fifteenth—resulted at the end of this period, largely through the heroic deeds of Joan of Arc, in the expulsion of the English from every place except the single town of Calais. Normandy, Guienne, and all the other territories which had been held by the victors of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, who were more

¹ The Valois line begins with Philip vi. (1328); the Bourbon with Henry iv. (1589); the Orleans with Louis Philippe (1830).

than once the almost undisputed masters of France, fell back to their native and rightful owners. Towards the close of the fifteenth century, the crafty policy of Louis XI. effected the downfall of Charles the Bold, and secured to France the Duchy of Burgundy. From the King of Aragon, he acquired, on the south, the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, the last of which was permanently incorporated in France. Anjou, Maine, and Provence reverted to him from the house of Anjou, together with the claims of that family upon Naples. Charles VIII., son of Louis XI., married Anne, the heiress of Brittany, and so this fine province was added to the jewels of the French Crown.

Francis I., who ascended the throne in 1515, two years before the posting of Luther's theses, had a consolidated kingdom powerful enough to enable him, a few years later, to cope on equal terms with his rival, Charles V. At home, he could set at defiance the will of his Parliaments, and augment his authority through the Concordat with Pope Leo X., which secured to the king the power of filling by nomination the great ecclesiastical benefices in his realm. During the thirty-two years of his reign, and the twelve years' reign of his son and successor, Henry II., the Protestants could offer only a passive resistance to the persecution which was instigated and managed by the Sorbonne—the Faculty of Theology at Paris—and which found myriads of brutal agents throughout the land. Francis, and Henry after him, with one arm aided the German Lutherans in their contest with Charles V., and with the other crushed their French brethren of the same faith. "One king, one law, one faith"—was the motto. There must be one, and only one, religion tolerated in the realm. Yet Protestantism, notwithstanding its long roll of martyrs, and partly by means of them, had gained a firm foothold before the death of Henry II.

The revival of learning, which in other countries paved the way for the reform in religion, was not without its natural fruit in France. Francis himself was proud of being called the father of letters; cherished the ideas of Erasmus; founded the college of the three languages at Paris, in spite of the disgust and hostility of the doctors of theology, the champions of mediævalism; drew to his side from beyond the Alps men like

Leonardo da Vinci, scholars and artists; protected his sister Margaret in her Protestant predilections; and contributed not a little, indirectly, notwithstanding his occasional cruelties, to the diffusion of the new doctrine. Henry II. was more of a bigot; but he followed his father's policy of joining hands with the Protestant communities of Germany, in opposition to Charles.

The first converts to the Reformation in France were Lutherans; but Lutheranism was supplanted by the other principal type of Protestantism. Calvinism was more congenial to the French mind. Calvin was himself one of the most acute and cultivated of the Frenchmen of that age. Driven from his country, he continued to act upon it from Geneva with incalculable power. Geneva became to France what Wittenberg was to Germany. The lucid, logical, consistent character of the system of Calvin commended it to the French mind. The intense moral earnestness and strict ethical standard of that system attracted a multitude who were shocked by the almost unexampled profligacy of the age. Among the higher classes, and still more among the industrious and intelligent middle classes, the Calvinistic faith had numerous devoted adherents. In 1559 the Calvinists held their first national synod at Paris. Their places of worship, scattered over France, numbered at that time two thousand; and in their congregations were four hundred thousand worshippers, all of whom met at the risk of their lives. That same year, Henry II., who had just agreed with Philip II., in the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, to exterminate heresy, and to give his daughter in marriage to the Spanish monarch, was accidentally killed by a splinter from the lance of Montgomery, the captain of his guards, with whom he was tilting at the festival in honour of the wedding.

The whole posture of affairs was now changed. His eldest son, Francis II., was a boy of sixteen, feeble in mind and body. He was not young enough to be made subject to a regency; and too young, had he been possessed of talents and character, to rule. Who should govern France? Catherine de Medici, the widow of Henry; she to whom, more than to any other individual, as we shall see, the massacre of St. Bartholomew was due, thought that the power for which she had long waited was now within her grasp. The granddaughter of the great

Lorenzo de Medici, and the daughter of Lorenzo II., she was left an orphan in her infancy, and was placed in a convent. Her childhood was encompassed with perils. When her uncle, Pope Clement VII., was laying siege to Florence, in 1530, she being only twelve years old, the Council of the city proposed to hang her in a basket over the wall as a mark for the besiegers' cannon. About ten years after, she was married to Henry, the second son of Francis I., in pursuance of an arrangement between the Pope and the King, which grew mainly out of the King's want of money. The death of the Dauphin placed her husband within one step of the throne. She was obliged to pay obsequious court to the mistresses of the King and of her husband, the Duchess d'Étampes and Diana of Poitiers. Henry regarded her with a feeling little short of repugnance. Under this feeling, and disappointed that she bore him no children, he entertained, at one time, the thought of sending her back to Italy. This was prevented by her own submissive demeanour, and by the favour of Francis I. Later, after the birth of her children, her situation became more tolerable. She professed to be utterly devoted to her husband, mourned his death with real or affected grief, and would never ride or drive near the spot where he received the fatal wound.

Catherine de Medici is generally considered an execrable character, an impersonation of the principle of wickedness such as rarely appears on earth, especially in a female form. History has put her in the pillory among monsters of iniquity, like Domitian, Nero, Cæsar Borgia,—enemies and destroyers of their kind. It is hardly possible to dispute the justice of this verdict. Yet she was not destitute of attractive qualities. On the ceiling of a room in the old Burgundian château at Tanlay, Catherine is painted as Juno, with two faces, one of which is described as "masculine and sinister," while the other is full of "sweetness and dignity." She might seem to have a dual nature. Her complexion was olive, bespeaking her Italian birth. She had the large eyes peculiar to the Medici family. Her arm and hand are said to have been "the despair of the sculptor," so faultless was their model. She was of medium height, large, but compactly made. Her figure was admired even in middle life. She required and was capable of the most

vigorous out-of-door exercise. In the chase, she dashed on through stream and thicket, keeping up with the boldest riders. Then she would give herself up with a hearty appetite to the pleasures of the table ; but she rose from it to apply herself with untiring energy to business. Her manners were lively and gracious ; her conversation full of spirit and intelligence. She has left behind numerous monuments of her taste in architecture—the palace of the Tuileries owed its beginning to her. Her versatility and tact were equal to any emergency. Her letters to her children are those of a sympathetic mother. She was personally chaste, little as she valued chastity in others. But at the core, as Milton says of Belial, all was false and hollow. It was the grace of the leopard, serving as a veil for its ferocity. Beneath exterior accomplishments, and charms even, was a nature devoid of moral sense. She was swift to shed blood, when a selfish end required it. But falsehood, and the treachery that springs from it, was her most loathsome trait.

To comprehend the possibility of such a character, we must remember the spirit of the age, and the atmosphere in which she grew up. In the famous Church of Santa Croce, at Florence, where are the sepulchres of Michael Angelo, Galileo, Alfieri, and the cenotaph of Dante, the attention of the visitor is arrested by an impressive epitaph. High up on the smooth face of a marble monument stands the name NICOLAUS MACHIAVELLI. Below, where the inscription would naturally come, there is a broad space left untouched by the chisel, beneath which are carved the words : “ *Tanto nomini nullum par elogium* ”—“ To so great a name no eulogy is adequate ; ” as if the pen had been dropped in despair, for want of words commensurate with the genius and merits of the statesman, scholar, and historian whose name had been recorded. Yet the word “ Machiavellian ” has become a current term to denote knavish intrigue, double-dealing, and fraud. It would be unjust to Machiavelli to brand him as the inventor of the ethical code which he has set forth in “ The Prince. ” This work, which was written for Lorenzo, the father of Catherine, deliberately advises rulers to break their word, whenever they find it convenient to do so. It presents a fair picture of that base public morality of the fifteenth century, which had grown up in the conflicts of the Italian States, and under the eye of the Popes,

some of whom were its notorious exemplars. The Machiavelian spirit tainted the public men of the sixteenth century ; in some degree, the best of them, as William the Silent and the Regent Murray of Scotland. As for assassination—that in Italy had been almost reduced to a fine art. The grandfather of Catherine, Lorenzo I., barely escaped from a murderous attempt, which proved fatal to his brother Julian, who fell under the dagger of an assassin before the high altar of the cathedral of Florence during the celebration of mass,—Pope Sixtus IV. being probably the chief contriver of the plot. Catherine de Medici was an Italian woman, born and nurtured under the influences that then prevailed, constrained from childhood to cloak her thoughts and impulses, and developing, under the unhappy circumstances in which she was placed, prior to the death of her husband, the cleverness and cunning that belonged to her nature. She was destined to be the mother of three kings of France, and to play a conspicuous and baleful part in a most eventful period of French history.

At the accession of Francis II., the Queen-Mother naturally felt that the hour for the gratification of her ambition had arrived. But she was disappointed. She found that the King and his government were completely under the sway of the family of Guise, in the person of Duke Francis, and of his brother Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine—the knight and the priest, the lion and the fox united. Claude of Lorraine, their father, was an opulent and influential noble, who had distinguished himself in the wars against Charles V. His son Francis, who was now forty years of age, had acquired brilliant fame by his defence of Metz against the Emperor, whom he forced to raise the siege after a loss of 30,000 men, and also by the recent capture of Calais from the English. The Cardinal had been the confessor and trusted counsellor of Henry II. The power of the family had been increased by matrimonial connections. Their brother had married a daughter of Diana of Poitiers. Their niece, Mary Stuart, the daughter of James V. of Scotland, had, in the preceding year, when she was sixteen years old, married Francis II., who was about a year younger than herself. Her beauty, her tact, accomplishments, and energy were cast on the side of the Guise influence. With her aid, her uncles found no difficulty in managing the boy-

King. Catherine was obliged to stand back and yield up the station that she had long coveted. The Constable Montmorenci, who, with his numerous relatives, had shared power with the Guises in the last reign, was civilly dismissed from his post.

The Guises, in whose hands everything was practically left, set themselves up as the champions of the Roman Catholic cause, and the enemies of the Protestant heresy. But their path was not to be a smooth one. The princes of the house of Bourbon—descendants of a younger son of Louis IX., St. Louis of France—considered that they were robbed of their legitimate post at the side of the throne. Anthony of Vendôme, the eldest, was the husband of that noble Protestant woman, Jeanne d'Albret, the daughter of Margaret, the sister of Francis I., and through his marriage wore the title of King of Navarre. He proved a vacillating and selfish adherent of the Protestant party, which he at length was bribed to desert. His younger brother, Louis of Condé, who had married a niece of the Constable, and a devoted Protestant, was a gallant soldier, but rash in counsel. With the Bourbons stood the Chatillons, the sons of Louisa of Montmorenci, the Constable's sister; of whom the most eminent was the Admiral, Gaspard de Coligny, one of the greatest men of that or of any age. He was of middle height, with his head slightly bent forward as if in deep thought. His spacious forehead reminds one of the portraits of William the Silent, to whom in character he had many points of resemblance. He spoke little, and slowly. In battle his grave countenance lighted up, and he was observed to chew the toothpick, which, to the disgust of a class of courtiers, he habitually carried in his mouth. Frequently defeated, he reaped hardly less renown from defeats than from victories. He rose from them with unabated vigour. His constancy never wavered in the darkest hour. He embraced the Calvinistic faith; and whether in the court, the camp, or among his dependants on his own estate, his conduct was strictly governed by the principles of religion. His reserve and gravity, in contrast with the vivacious temper of his countrymen, commanded that respect which these qualities, even when not united with remarkable powers of intellect, usually inspire in them, as we see in the case of Napoleon III.

Here then, in the middle of the sixteenth century, in France,

were all the materials of civil war. It was inevitable that the Calvinists, harassed beyond endurance, should league themselves with the disaffected nobles who offered them the only chance of salvation from their persecutors, and whose religious sympathies were on their side. Thus the Huguenots became a political party. The nation was divided into two bodies, with their passions inflamed. A tempest was at hand, and there was only a boy at the helm.

The conspiracy of Amboise, which occurred in 1560, was an abortive scheme, of which a Protestant gentleman named La Renaudie was the chief author, for driving the Guises from power. Condé was privy to it; Calvin disapproved of it; Coligny took no part in it. The next year the Estates assembled at Orleans, and a trap was laid by the Catholic leaders for the destruction of all Protestants who should refuse to abjure their religion. Condé had been arrested and put under guard, when, just as the fatal blow was ready to fall, the young King died. Charles IX., his brother, was only ten years old, and it was no longer practicable to shut out his mother from the office of guardian over him, and from a virtual regency. From this time she comes to the front, and becomes a power in the State. Mary Stuart returned to Scotland, and on another theatre entered upon that tragic career which ended on the scaffold at Fotheringay. The Queen-Mother was now free from her dangerous rival. Through her whole career, tortuous and inconsistent as it often seemed, Catherine de Medici was actuated by a single motive—the purpose to maintain the authority of her sons and her own ascendancy over them. To check and cast down whichever party threatened to acquire a dangerous predominance, and to supplant her, was her incessant aim. Caring little or nothing for religious doctrines, she hated the restraints of religion, and hence could regard Calvinism only with aversion. But how indifferent she was to the controversy between the rival Churches is indicated by her jocose remark, when the mistaken report reached her that the Protestants had gained the victory at Dreux: “Then we shall say our prayers in French.” She believed in astrology, and that was about the limit of her faith. To rule her children, and to rule France through them, was the one end which she always kept in view.

The civil wars began in 1562 with the massacre of Vassy, where the troopers of Guise provoked a conflict with an unarmed congregation of Protestant worshippers, many of whom they slaughtered. Ten years intervened between this event and the massacre of St. Bartholomew; years of intestine conflict, when France bled at every pore. Neither party was strong enough to subjugate the other. The patience of the Protestants had been worn out by forty years of sanguinary persecution. The battle on both sides was waged with bitter animosity. The country was ravaged from side to side. The Catholics found it impossible to crush their antagonists, who revived from every disaster, and extorted, in successive treaties, a measure of liberty for their worship. Among the events which it is necessary for our purpose to mention is the assassination of the Duke of Guise by a Huguenot nobleman in 1563, while the Duke was laying siege to Orleans, then in the hands of the Protestants. This act met with no countenance from the Protestant leaders. It was condemned by Calvin. It was said that the assassin, when stretched on the rack, avowed that the deed was done with the connivance of Coligny. But he was subjected to no fair examination, and there was no reason to doubt the assertion of the Admiral that he had no agency in it. He admitted that for six months, since he had learned that Guise was plotting his own destruction and that of his brothers, he had made no exertions to save that nobleman's life. Innocent though Coligny was of all participation in this deed, it planted seeds of implacable hostility in the minds of Guise's family, the fruits of which eventually appeared. Another event, which it specially concerns us to notice, was the insurrection of the Huguenots which they set on foot several years later, in anticipation of a projected attack upon them, and which resulted in their extorting from Charles IX., in 1568, the Peace of Longjumeau. The King was exasperated at being obliged to treat with his subjects in arms. This humiliating event was skilfully used afterwards to goad him on to a measure to which he was not spontaneously inclined.

At this time the foundations of the Catholic League were laid. The extreme Catholics began to band themselves together, instigated by the spirit of the Catholic Reaction which, through its mouthpiece, the Pope, and its secular head,

Philip II., breathed out fire and slaughter against all heretics. Between this bigoted faction, which became more and more furious as time went on, and the Huguenots, were the Moderates—the Politiques, as they were called—Catholics who deplored the continuance of civil war, deprecated the undue ascendancy of Spain, and were in favour of an accommodation with the Protestants. The treachery of Catherine de Medici broke the treaty of Longjumeau; but her plan to entrap and destroy the Huguenot leaders failed. Their defeat at Jarnac, where Condé perished, and at Moncontour, with the military triumph of her favourite son, the Duke of Anjou, did not bring to her content. The defeated forces of the Protestants, under the masterly lead of Coligny, found a refuge within the walls of Rochelle, where the Queen of Navarre established her Court, and whence Coligny, with his cavalry, and with the young princes, Henry of Navarre and Henry of Condé, at his side, was soon able to sally forth and take the offensive. The Queen-Mother was now eager for peace. The atmosphere of intrigue and diplomacy was always more pleasing to her than the clash of arms. The King's treasury was exhausted. He did not relish the military successes of Anjou. The Huguenots sprang up from their defeats with indomitable courage. Moreover, Catherine, the King, the whole party of Moderates, saw that the continuance of the strife could only redound to the profit of Philip, who lent aid, or withheld it, with sole reference to his own ambitious projects. If the war was to go on between the King and his Protestant subjects, the latter would get help from England and Germany, and the government, forced to fall back upon the support of Spain, would come into practical subservience to Philip. To this the Queen-Mother was not at all inclined. At the Conference of Bayonne in 1565, both she and Charles IX. had disappointed Alva by refusing to enter into his plan for a common crusade against the heretical subjects of France and Spain. Thus, in 1570, the Peace of St. Germain was concluded. The Huguenots, who could no longer be expected to trust the King's word, were put in possession of four fortified towns for the space of two years. They were to be given up to Henry of Navarre, Henry of Condé, and twenty Huguenot gentlemen. The Lorraine faction, the Guises and their followers, acquiesced in the treaty.

Observe, now, the political situation. The policy of the Court was turned in the anti-Spanish direction. The power of Philip was becoming too formidable. The Duke of Alva had begun his bloody career in the Netherlands in 1567 with the execution of Egmont and Horn, and numerous other judicial murders. Now, his tyranny was at its height. Philip had planned a marriage between his half-brother, Don John of Austria, and Mary Stuart, which would give him, as he hoped, control over Scotland and England both. He was already supreme in Italy. His wish was to marry his sister to Charles IX., and to unite with him in an anti-Protestant coalition. Then all Europe would lie at his feet, and France be practically a Spanish province. On the 25th of February 1570, Pius v., an untiring and un pitying instigator of persecution, issued his bull of excommunication against Elizabeth. A year after, the brilliant victory of Spain over the Turks at Lepanto still further raised the prestige of Philip, and left him more free to pursue his ambitious schemes in Western Europe. The Queen-Mother loved power too well for herself and her children, to fall into the snare which Philip was setting. She entered warmly into the project of a marriage between her second son, the Duke of Anjou, and Elizabeth, which was first suggested by the brother of Coligny. When Anjou, seduced by the Spanish Court, and by the offer of 100,000 crowns from the Pope's Nuncio, drew back from a match with a heretic so much older than himself, Catherine was eager to substitute for him his younger brother Alençon ; and indulged, also, the chimerical hope that Anjou might secure the hand of Mary Queen of Scots. This policy of the Court could not be otherwise than satisfactory to the Huguenots. War with Spain, to be fought out in the Netherlands, in alliance with England and Germany, but with due care for French interests, appealed at once to their patriotic feeling and their religious enthusiasm. The government and the Huguenot party were thus drawn towards each other. A marriage between Henry of Navarre and Margaret of Valois, the daughter of Catherine, had been spoken of long before, prior to the death of Henry II., when both Navarre and Margaret were children. The idea was now revived from the side of the Moderates, by a son of Montmorenci. It was heartily favoured by Catherine, warmly supported

by the King, who was personally fond of Henry, and was struck with the expediency of a marriage which would thus unite the contending parties; and it obtained at length the consent of the high-toned Queen of Navarre, with whom worldly distinction for her son was of far less account than honour and religious conviction. Coligny and the other Huguenot leaders lent their cordial approval to the plan.

Coligny was now urgently invited to come to the Court. The King and the Queen-Mother were anxious to have the benefit of his counsel. Despite the opposition of his friends, including the Queen of Navarre, who were unwilling to see him commit himself to the hands of those who had been, in the past, his perfidious enemies, Coligny determined to comply with the invitation. He confided in Charles, he said; he would rather die at once than live a hundred years subject to cowardly apprehensions. He earnestly desired to bring the civil conflict to an end. He was full of ardour for the enterprise against Philip, in the Netherlands, into which he hoped to carry the King. It would give employment to the numerous mercenaries and marauders whom the cessation of the war at home had left idle. It would strike a blow, alike honourable and useful to France, and damaging to Spain. Coligny left Rochelle, escorted by fifty gentlemen, and arrived at Blois, where the Court was, on the 12th of September 1571. He was welcomed by Catherine, and by the King, who greeted him with the title of "father," and declared that day to be the happiest of his life.

Charles was twenty-one years of age. His natural talents were above the ordinary level. He was fond of music, and his poetical compositions were not without merit. But the education which he had received was the worst possible. His nature was unhealthy, and utterly unregulated. Though not a debauchee, like his brother Anjou, his morbid impulses raged without control: his anger, when excited, bordered on frenzy. Yet there was in him a latent vein of generous feeling. He met in Coligny, almost for the first time in his life, a man whom he could revere. Coligny was fifty-four years of age. He had been a man of war from his youth up; but he had drawn the sword from a stern sense of duty; and his lofty character could not fail to impress all who were thrown in his

company. He, in turn, seemed to be charmed with his young Sovereign. The jealousy of Catherine was soon aroused. "He sees too much of the Admiral," she said, "and too little of me." As the veteran soldier painted the advantages that would result from going to the rescue of William of Orange, and striking a blow at Spain in the Low Countries, the sympathy of Charles was awakened, and he expressed an eager desire to enter personally into the contest.

Meantime, the project of the marriage of Henry and Margaret continued to be pushed. The Queen of Navarre was persuaded herself to come to Blois, in March 1572. While there, in a letter to her son, she described the indecency of the Court, where even the women had cast off the show of modesty, and did not blush to play the part of seducers. The marriage of Henry and Margaret, the plan of a matrimonial connection with Elizabeth, the scheme of an offensive alliance with England, and of a war with Spain, to be waged in Flanders, were all parts of a line of policy which the Huguenots urged, and which Catherine for a while favoured. But she became more and more alarmed at the influence acquired by Coligny. Elizabeth was cautious, and the negotiations looking to a change of the defensive into an offensive alliance, lagged. A war with Spain, Catherine felt, would establish Coligny's ascendancy over the mind of Charles. Such a war she more and more dreaded on its own account; and when the force secretly sent by Charles, under Genlis, to the support of Orange, was defeated and cut up by Alva's son, the Queen-Mother declared herself vehemently against the measure on which Coligny rested all his hopes for France, and towards which the King, in his better moods, was strongly inclined. In the Council, the party opposed to the war was led by Anjou. He, with Catherine, Retz, Tavannes, and others to support him, was able to keep back the King from an absolute decision; and thus, through the spring and early summer of 1572, the question was warmly, and sometimes angrily, debated. The death of the Queen of Navarre at Paris, on the 9th of June, was one cause for the postponement of the wedding of her son to the 18th of August. The refusal of the Pope to grant a dispensation was another hindrance. The King was resolved to effect the marriage, with or without the Pope's consent. A forged letter,

purporting to come from Rome, announcing the consent of Gregory XIII., the new Pope, to the nuptials, was exhibited by Charles to the Cardinal of Bourbon, who had refused to solemnise the marriage without the Papal authorisation.

In subsequent years Henry IV., the Conqueror of Ivry and the Restorer of Peace to France, looked back on the 8th of July 1572 as one of the brightest days in all his tempestuous career. On that day he made his entry into Paris, riding between the King's two brothers, and accompanied by Condé, the Cardinal of Bourbon, the Admiral Coligny, and eight hundred mounted gentlemen. The procession, however, was greeted with little enthusiasm by the crowd that filled the streets. Paris was the hot-bed of Catholic fanaticism. In all the treaties which had given liberty to the Reformed worship, the capital had been excepted. Here the enmity of the populace to the Huguenots was rancorous in the extreme. All the pulpits in those days rang with fierce invectives against the heretics. Guise, with his mother, the Duchess of Nemours, and with a great military following, came to Paris also. The Huguenots had no protection but their own vigilance, their swords, and above all, the good faith of the King, against the host of enemies by whom they were surrounded.

On the 18th of August the long-expected marriage took place. The splendid procession, composed of the royal family and the nobility of France, moved along a covered platform from the Bishop's palace to the pavilion erected in front of Notre Dame, where the ceremony took place. The bride, whose beauty and grace of person unhappily were not associated with moral qualities equally winning—for she was untruthful and vain, if not something worse—describes her own costume—her crown, her vest of ermine spotted with black (*couët d'hermine mouchetée*), all brilliant with pearls, and the great blue mantle, whose train of four ells in length was carried by three princesses. Charles, Navarre, and Condé, in token of their mutual affection, were dressed alike, in garments of light yellow satin, embroidered with silver, and glittering with pearls and precious stones. Micheli, one of the Venetian Ambassadors—accurate reporters—states that the cost of the King's bonnet, charger, and garments, was half a million crowns; while Anjou wore in his hat thirty-two well-known pearls, purchased

at a cost of 23,000 gold crowns. All this, when the royal treasury was exhausted! Navarre led his bride from the pavilion into the church; and then, during the celebration of mass, with the Huguenot chiefs withdrew to the adjacent cloister. De Thou, the French historian, who was then a youth of nineteen, after the mass was over, climbed over the barriers erected to keep off the people, went into the choir, and heard Coligny, pointing to the flags taken at Jarnac and Moncontour, say to Damville that "soon these would be replaced by others more agreeable to see;" alluding to the war in Flanders, on which his thoughts were bent. The next few days were given up to festivities—"balls, banquets, masques, and tourneys," into which Navarre entered with zest, but which were equally offensive and tedious to the grave Coligny, who longed to be away, and who vainly tried to draw the King's attention to the business which lay nearest his heart. Charles put him off. He must have a few days for pleasure; then the Admiral should be gratified.

Five days after the wedding, on Friday, the 22d of August, at a little past ten in the morning, as Coligny was walking between two friends from the Louvre to his own lodgings, an arquebus was discharged at him from a latticed window of a house standing near the cloister of St. Germain l'Auxerrois. At the moment he was in the act of reading a petition. He was hit by a bullet on the first finger of the right hand; another bullet entered his left arm. With his wounded hand he pointed out the window whence the shot had come, and directed an attendant to inform the King. He was then conducted to his lodgings. The King, vexed and enraged, threatened vengeance upon the guilty parties. His surgeon, Ambrose Paré, was sent, who amputated the finger, and extracted the ball from the arm. Navarre, attended by hundreds of Huguenot gentlemen, soon visited the Admiral. Condé and other Huguenot leaders waited on the King, and demanded leave to retire from the Court, where their lives were not safe. Charles begged them to remain, and swore vengeance upon the perpetrators of the deed.

The authors of the attempt to assassinate Coligny were Catherine de Medici, and her son, the Duke of Anjou, in conjunction with the Duke of Guise and his mother. The house

belonged to a dependant of Guise; the weapon, which was found in it, to one of Anjou's guards. The instrument who was employed to do the work was Maurevel, who, a few years before, had been hired to kill Coligny, at a time when a price was set on his head, but had murdered one of his lieutenants, Mouÿ, in his stead.

In the year following the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Anjou—afterwards Henry III.—was elected King of Poland. In the narrative which he is said to have given verbally to Miron, his physician, we are furnished with an account of the motives and causes of the transaction in which he bore so guilty a part. The reporter, Miron, states that when Henry III. was on his way to Poland, in the cities of the Low Countries, wherever a crowd was assembled, he was saluted with bitter execrations in German, French, and Latin, for his agency in the massacre; and that in apartments where he was entertained and lodged, he found paintings depicting scenes in that fearful tragedy which had been arranged beforehand to meet his eye. Hence, two days after his arrival in Cracow, he was kept awake in the night by the recollection of the terrible occurrences which had thus been brought to his mind. Restless and agitated, about three hours after midnight, he summoned Miron from an adjacent room to his bedside, and related to him there the story of the origin of the massacre. According to this statement of Henry III., Charles, in the period just before the Navarre marriage, was in frequent conference with Coligny; and after those long conferences, the King treated Anjou and his mother in a very frigid and even rough manner. On one occasion, as Anjou was entering the King's apartment, after one of these interviews, Charles looked at him askance in a fierce way, and laid his hand upon the hilt of his dagger, so that he was glad to escape precipitately from the King's presence. Convinced that Coligny was undermining the King's regard for them, the Queen-Mother and Anjou resolved to destroy him; and for this end called in the aid of the Duchess of Nemours—the widow of Guise, and an Italian by birth—whose vindictive hatred of the Huguenot leader made her a willing coadjutor. Maurevel, who had abundant cause to fear the Chatillons, was pitched upon to do the deed. When the attempt had failed, the King after dinner—he dined at

eleven—went to visit the wounded Admiral. Catherine and Anjou took care to go with him. While they were in the Admiral's chamber, he signified his wish to speak with the King privately. Anjou and his mother retired to another part of the room. Alarmed at the way in which this private conference was prolonged, and at the menacing demeanour of the throng of Huguenot gentlemen, who treated them with less than usual respect, Catherine stepped to the bedside, and, to the obvious disgust of the King, broke off the conversation, saying that Coligny must not be wearied, that there was danger of fever, and that a future time must be chosen for finishing their talk. Whatever may be false in this narrative of Henry III., or may be omitted from it, the main circumstances of the interview are correctly given. Coligny thought that the bullets might have been poisoned, and he wished to give his dying counsel to the Sovereign. On the way back to the Louvre, Anjou proceeds to say, Catherine by her importunity wrung from the King the avowal that the Admiral had warned him of the fatal consequences that would follow from allowing the management of public affairs to remain in her hands, and had advised him to hold her in suspicion, and to guard against her. This the King uttered with extreme passion, implying that he approved of Coligny's advice.

There was good ground for the consternation of the Queen-Mother and of Anjou. A crisis had come for which they were not prepared. The wrath of the Huguenots was ready to burst forth in an armed attack upon the opposite faction. They were restrained only by the King; and even he was resolved to punish to the full the assailants of Coligny. If the Guises fell, the ascendancy of the Huguenot chief, who would recover from his wounds, was assured. But the punishment which the King threatened might fall on Anjou also, if not on Catherine herself. Nothing was left to her but to make another desperate effort, with the aid of counsellors as unprincipled as herself, to win back the King, resume the control over him which she had exercised from his childhood, and to enlist him in the work of destroying the Admiral, and of breaking down the Huguenots' power of resistance. After noon on Saturday she collected about her, in anxious conclave in the Tuileries, besides Anjou, the Count de Retz, the Chan-

cellor Birogne, the Marshal de Tavannes, and the Duke de Nevers; three of whom were Italians like herself, with no scruples about assassinating an enemy, and with whom deceit and mystery lent an added fascination to crime. With these men the Queen-Mother repaired to the Louvre, to the cabinet of her son. There she made, with all her energy and skill, her last and successful onset upon him. She avowed her own agency and that of Anjou in the attempt upon Coligny. But first she declared to him that the Huguenots were everywhere arming to make themselves masters of the government; that the Admiral was to furnish 6000 cavalry and 10,000 Swiss; that the Catholics in turn had lost all patience, and would instantly combine in a league to supplant him and seize on power; that there was no deliverance but in the death of Coligny, without whom the Huguenots would be left destitute of a leader. She reminded Charles of the insurrection when, at Meaux, they had nearly got possession of his person—a recollection that always excited his anger. When she saw that he did not yield; that he could not bring himself to give up Coligny and his friends—La Rochefoucauld, Teligni, and others; she begged—almost breathless, in her feigned despair—that she and Anjou might have leave to withdraw from the approaching ruin—to retire from the Court. To retire, as he well understood, meant to join themselves to the Catholic faction, soon to be in arms against him. At last she taunted him with fear of the Huguenots. Then he gave up; and in the fury of his vexation, wild with excitement, bade them kill not the Admiral alone, but all the Huguenots in France, that none might be left to reproach him. Such is the statement of Henry, who thus attributes the general massacre to the suggestion of the King. But Tavannes—or the son in the memoirs of his father—relates that the recommendation of the Council was to slay all the Huguenot leaders: he asserts that Navarre and Condé were spared by his own intercession. Catherine must have foreseen that the murder of Coligny, which could only be effected by open violence, would lead to a general slaughter, or to a bloody encounter between the forces of the two parties, resulting in a great loss of life. If she did not first recommend the general massacre, she consented to the plot, and joined in the execution of it.

The plan being formed, the requisite orders were promptly given. Guise took in hand to destroy the Admiral. Chanon, the Provost of Merchants, and with him Marcel, his predecessor, on whose influence and cruel disposition more reliance was placed, were summoned, and commissioned to shut the gates of the city, so that none could go out or come in, to arm the people, and have them in readiness in their proper wards. The organised soldiery were conveniently disposed under their commanders. A conspiracy and threatened rising of the Huguenots were the pretext for these arrangements; but the soldiers and the leaders of the mob needed no such inducement to reconcile them to the task of putting to death the heretics. As the dawn approached, Guise, with the bastard Angoulême, a son of Henry II., moved with a strong force silently through the streets to the lodgings of the Admiral, where the King's guards, who had been stationed there for his protection, were ready to side with the assassins. Coligny heard the tumult; divined its nature; calmly commended his soul to Christ; told his friends that he was ready to die; bade them escape, and was pierced with the swords of the hired murderers, who flung his body from the window upon the pavement, that Guise might be satisfied that the work was completely done, and trample on the lifeless hero whom he had hated. Guise had ordered that every true Catholic should tie a white band upon his arm, and fasten a white cross to his hat. A distinguished painter, Millais, has depicted, in "The Huguenot Lover," a scene that might naturally have occurred. A maiden, in whose countenance tenderness is mingled with terror, is gazing up into the face of her lover, about whose arm she is trying to bind a white scarf—which he gently but firmly resists. The houses of the Huguenots were registered; there was no difficulty in finding the victims.

At early dawn the great bell of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois tolled out the signal and the slaughter began. Even the hard-hearted Marshal Tavannes, who superintended the soldiery, says: "Blood and death fill the streets with such horror that even their Majesties, who were the authors of it, within the Louvre cannot avoid fear; all the Huguenots are indiscriminately slain, making no defence;" "many women and children are slain by the furious populace; two thousand are massa-

cred." Catherine de Medici and her two sons had come to the front of the Louvre "to see the execution commence." This same Tavannes, with savage ferocity, cried to his men, "Kill, kill! bleeding is as good in August as in May!" The Protestant noblemen who were near Coligny, placed there for his defence, were murdered. La Rochefoucauld, who had spent the previous evening with the King until eleven o'clock, and whom Charles had tried to detain for the night in order to save him, was stabbed to the heart. Teligni, Coligny's son-in-law, a man beloved by all, was butchered by a valet of Anjou. Brion, the white-haired preceptor of the Marquis of Conti, the young brother of Condé, was massacred in the arms of the child, who begged in vain that the life of his teacher might be spared. Among the killed was Peter Ramus, a renowned scholar and philosopher, who was detested as a Protestant and as an opponent of Aristotle, and fell a victim to the jealousy of his rival, Charpentier. Private revenge and avarice seized on the occasion to strike down those who were hated, or whose property was coveted.

Among the most revolting features of the massacre were the part taken by women and children in the work of death, and the brutality with which the corpses of the dead were mutilated and dragged through the streets. The tumult, as a writer has said, was like that "of hell. The clanging bells, the crashing doors, the musket shots, the rush of armed men, the shrieks of their victims, and high over all the yells of the mob, fiercer and more pitiless than hungry wolves, made such an uproar that the stoutest hearts shrank appalled, and the sanest appear to have lost their reason."¹ On the evening before, Margaret of Valois had been bidden by her mother to retire to her own room. Her sister Claude caught her by the arm and begged her not to go, an interference which Catherine sharply rebuked. "I departed," says Margaret, "alarmed and amazed, not knowing what I had to dread." She found the King of Navarre's apartments filled with Huguenot gentlemen, talking of the demand which they would make of the King, the next day, for the punishment of the Duke of Guise. At dawn, her husband went out with them to the tennis-court, to wait for Charles to rise. She fell asleep, but an hour later was awakened by a

¹ Henry White, *Massacre of St. Bartholomew*, p. 413.

man calling out, "*Navarre !*" "*Navarre !*" The nurse opened the door, when a wounded gentleman, pursued by four soldiers, rushed in and flung himself upon her bed. She sprang up, followed by the man, who still clung to her—as it soon appeared, for protection. The captain of the guards was fortunately at hand. He drove out the soldiers, and the life of the wounded man was saved. The friends, guards, and servants of Navarre and Condé were slain. Two hundred bodies lay under the windows of the palace. They were inspected, at a later hour, by the ladies of the Court, who commented on them with a shameless indecency, that would be incredible were it not attested by good evidence. The Princes themselves had been summoned to the King's chamber. Charles, excited to fury, demanded of them to abjure their heresy. "The Mass, or Death !" he cried. Navarre, politic though brave, reminded him of his promises, and required time to consider. Condé firmly refused. Three days were given them in which to make their decision. They finally conformed, to save their lives ; and these converts, made in this way, were graciously accepted by the Pope. In the course of the massacre there were many who narrowly escaped death. A little boy, the son of La Force, saw his brother and father killed, and lay, pretending to be dead, all the day under their bodies, until he heard from a bystander an expression of pity for the slain, to whom he revealed himself, and was saved. Sully, afterwards prime minister of Henry IV., then in his twelfth year, escaped almost by miracle.

The slaughter, once begun, could not easily be stopped. Several days passed before the scenes of robbery and murder came to an end. Capilupi, who wrote his account immediately after the massacre, under the direction of the Cardinal of Lorraine, referring to Sunday, the principal day, says, "It was a holiday, and therefore the people could more conveniently find leisure to kill and plunder." Orders were sent to the other principal towns of France, where the massacre of the Huguenots was carried forward with like circumstances of cruelty. Not less than twenty thousand persons of both sexes, and of every age, were killed in obedience to the command of the Court.

On the first evening after the massacre, the King had sent

out messages, ascribing the whole to a conflict of the hostile houses of Guise and Chatillon. Soon it was found necessary, as well as expedient, to assume the responsibility for the dreadful transaction, and to declare that the massacre was made necessary by a dangerous conspiracy of the Huguenots against the King and government. To carry out this false pretension, several of the Huguenot leaders, who had escaped with their lives, were put through the forms of a judicial process, convicted, and executed. Henry of Navarre was compelled to be one of the spectators of the death of these innocent men.

In all Protestant countries, the report of the great Massacre called out a feeling of unmixed reprobation and horror. Burghley told La Mothe-Fénélon, the French Ambassador, that "the Paris massacre was the most horrible crime which had been committed since the crucifixion of Christ." John Knox said to Du Croc, the French Minister in Scotland: "Go, tell your King, that God's vengeance shall never depart from him nor from his house; that his name shall remain an execration to posterity; and that none proceeding from his loins shall enjoy the kingdom in peace unless he repent." The Emperor Maximilian II., Catholic though he was, expressed the strong condemnation which was felt by all whose hearts were not hardened by sectarian animosity. On the contrary, in Rome and in Madrid, the seats of the Catholic Reaction, there was joy and thanksgiving. Philip II., who, it is said, laughed aloud for the first time in his life, was profuse in his congratulations. The event was celebrated at Rome by the ringing of bells, bonfires, and solemn processions. An inscription over the church of St. Louis, where a *Te Deum* was chanted, described Charles IX. as an avenging angel, despatched from heaven to sweep his kingdom of heretics. A medal was struck by Gregory XIII. to commemorate the massacre—bearing on one face the inscription, "*Hugonotorum Strages*"—Slaughter of the Huguenots—together with the figure of an avenging angel engaged in destroying them. Three frescoes were painted by Vasari in the Vatican, according to the Pope's order, describing the attack upon the Admiral, the King in his council plotting the massacre, and the massacre itself. This painting bears the inscription: *Pontifex Colignii necem probat*—the Pope approves the killing of Coligny. It is pretended by some that the

authorities at Rome were deceived by the story of a Huguenot conspiracy against the King's life, which the massacre prevented from being carried out. But Charles did not bring forward this story until the 26th of August. On the 24th, he wrote to his ambassador at Rome—Ferraz—that the slaughter resulted from a conflict of the two families of Guise and Chatillon. Salviati himself, the Nuncio of the Pope, said that no person of sense believed the tale of a conspiracy. The Nuncio's despatches put the Court of Rome in immediate possession of the real facts. The Cardinal of Lorraine claimed at Rome that the massacre was the product of long deceit and premeditation. The circumstance that Muretus, in his inhuman panegyric of the murderers, delivered in Rome four months after the event, charges a conspiracy upon the slain Huguenots, does not prove that anybody believed it. It is probable that few, if any, were deceived by the fiction of a Huguenot plot—an after-thought of Catherine and the King. The exultation at Rome and Madrid was over the destruction of heretics, and the downfall of the anti-Spanish party in France. The rejoicings of the Vatican were kept up, after the massacre at Paris, as the reports of the continuation of the tragedy reached Rome from other parts of the kingdom. It was simply a fanatical joy over the murder of apostates from the Roman Catholic religion.

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew, like the whole course of events in the sixteenth century, was due to a mingling of political and religious motives. It was not political ambition and rivalry alone, nor was it religious fanaticism alone, that gave rise to this terrible event, but both united. But personal motives were also closely interwoven with these agencies. The principal, most responsible, author of the crime was Catherine de Medici. It sprang out of her jealousy of Coligny's influence, and her fear of being supplanted. Anjou, her companion in guilt, was moved by the same inducements. Their confederates, Henry of Guise and his mother, were stimulated by revenge, mingled with the ambition and resentment of political aspirants who saw themselves on the verge of a downfall. But the instrument by which these individuals accomplished their design was the fanaticism which the reactionary Catholic movement had kindled in the populace and soldiery of Paris. It was religious malignity that sharpened

their daggers, and found vent in the fiendish yells that resounded through Paris on that fearful night. The slaying of heretics had never been rebuked by their religious teachers, but only encouraged and applauded. The thanksgivings at Rome were the proper sequel of the exhortations which had been sent forth from the same seat of authority.

Was the Massacre of St. Bartholomew contrived long beforehand? So it was once thought. Davila and other Italian writers declared this to be the fact. To them the event would have been shorn of a great part of its interest if it did not occur as the result of a long and intricate plot. Even the authors of the crime, to account for the sudden reversal of their attitude towards Spain, and for their previous acts of hostility against Philip, were willing to countenance this interpretation of their conduct. The Huguenots, on whom the blow fell like a thunderbolt, and who had a right to consider those murderers of St. Bartholomew capable of infinite falsehood, naturally took this view. The treaty of St. Germain, the marriage of Navarre, the collecting of the Huguenot leaders in Paris, the offensive demonstrations in the Low Countries, were elements in a diabolical scheme for their destruction. Yet this theory was undoubtedly erroneous. Philip and Alva had been right in expecting a war with France. Not only the Navarre marriage, but the negotiations with Elizabeth respecting marriages and an alliance, were undertaken with a sincere intent on the part of Charles IX. and Catherine. The theory of a long premeditation of the great crime, and that all these transactions, stretching over two years, were steps in a deep-laid plot, is confuted by an irresistible amount of circumstantial evidence, and by the authentic testimony of Tavannes and Anjou, chief actors in the tragedy. The spell which Coligny had cast upon the mind of the King, whom he had impressed so far as to persuade him to enter into war, was what determined Catherine de Medici to bring about the death of the Admiral by the agency of the Guises. She probably anticipated that vengeance would be taken by the Huguenots upon these leaders of the Catholic faction; but for that she did not care. The fall of the leaders on both sides would strengthen her power. When the Admiral was wounded, instead of being killed, when she saw that he survived with undiminished and even increased

influence, and that her and Anjou's complicity in the attempt could not be concealed, she struck out another programme.

All this appears to be established by conclusive proofs. And yet, on the other hand, there are facts going to show that the thought of cutting off the Huguenot leaders had long haunted Catherine's mind ; and that she even shaped the course of events in such a way as to enable her, if she found it expedient, to convert this thought into a definite purpose, and to carry it out in the deed.

The destruction of the Huguenot chiefs, as a means of paralyzing and crushing their party, had been recommended to her by Philip as early as 1560. At Bayonne, Alva had given her the same counsel. He had himself acted on his theory in the treacherous seizure and execution of Egmont and Horn. These things must have made the idea familiar to Catherine. In 1570, the Venetian Ambassador says that it was generally thought that it would be enough to strike off five or six heads. It is, at least, a curious coincidence, that Catherine declared, after the Massacre, that she took on herself the guilt of the murder of only six. It was Catherine who insisted that the wedding of Navarre should be at Paris. Other points she was willing to waive ; but not this. What was her motive, unless it was to collect the Huguenots in a place where they would be in her power ? In January 1572 the Papal Legate wrote to Rome, that he had failed in all his efforts ; yet there were some things, which he could only verbally report, which were not wholly unfavourable. Cardinal Salviati, a Florentine, a relative of the Medici, and intimate with Catherine, had informed Pius v. that there was a secret plan favourable to the Catholics. After the Massacre, Catherine reminded the Nuncio of the word that she had sent to the Pope, that he would see how she and her son would avenge themselves on the Huguenots.

Facts of this nature appear to contradict the conclusion to which the general current of evidence leads us. They justify the inference, not that Catherine had resolved upon the deed, but that she was glad, even while pursuing an opposite policy, to provide herself with the means of doing it. Other princes of that day—Queen Elizabeth, for example—were fond of having two strings to their bow. While pursuing one policy, Elizabeth was fond of holding in her hand the threads of

another and opposite line of conduct. In this double intent of Catherine de Medici, we are presented, as Ranke has said, with a psychological problem, such as one occasionally meets with in historical study. It is like the question of Mary Stuart's participation in the murder of Darnley. These are problems which the philosopher and the poet are most competent to solve. They require, as the same great historian has said, an insight into the deep and complicated springs of action in the soul—the profound “abysses where the storms of passion rage,” and where strange and appalling crimes have their birth. It would seem as if, in the brain of this devilish woman, whose depth of deceit she herself could hardly fathom, there were weaving at once two plots. While she was moving on one path, she was secretly making ready, should the occasion arise, to spring to another. If all should go well in amity with the Huguenots, she would be content; but if not, they would be helpless in her hands. Not only was she double-tongued, but she was double-minded; there was duplicity in her inmost thoughts and designs. But this occult thought, which finally developed into purpose and act, was confined to herself. The King had no share in it. Like Pilate, he gave consent. His crime was that he yielded to the pressure brought upon him by his inhuman mother and her confederates, and authorised a crime a parallel to which we can find only by going back of all Christian ages, to the bloody proscriptions of heathen Rome.¹

It is interesting to glance at the fate of the authors of the Massacre. Less than two years after, on the 30th of May 1574, Charles IX. died. On his deathbed, his brief intervals of sleep were disturbed by horrible visions. He suffered from violent hæmorrhages, and sometimes awoke bathed in blood, which recalled to his mind the torrents of blood shed by his orders on that dreadful night. In his dreams he beheld the

¹ On the question whether the Massacre had been planned long before, there are three opinions. That it was so planned is maintained, among others, in an elaborate argument by Sir James Mackintosh, in his *History of England*, vol. iii. That there was no such premeditation is, at present, the more general opinion. It is clearly set forth by Professor Baird, in his recent *History of the Rise of the Huguenots*. The middle view, which attributes to the Queen-Mother a dual plot, is that maintained by Ranke, and appears to me to match best the evidence, collectively taken. Salviati's despatches, as copied by Chateaubriand, are in the Appendix of Mackintosh, vol. iii.

bodies of the dead floating upon the Seine, and heard their agonising cries. Anjou—Henry III.—more guilty than he, mounted the throne. But Guise, his rival, the idol of the League, stole away the hearts of the people. He enjoyed the reality of power, and there was danger that he might get the crown too. On the 23d of September 1588, in the château of Blois, where the Estates were assembled, Henry of Guise was invited to the cabinet of the King. As he crossed the threshold, by the order of Henry III. he was stabbed and thrown down by men belonging to the King's body-guard, and after a short but desperate resistance, was killed at the foot of the King's bed. The Cardinal of Lorraine, the brother of Guise, was seized and executed. The Cardinal of Bourbon was placed under arrest. Catherine de Medici was at this time labouring under a mortal illness. Her son had renounced her counsels, power had slipped from her hands, and she had become an object of general aversion and contempt. Her apartment was directly under that in which Guise had been struck down, and the sounds of the deadly struggle reached her ears. When she learned what had occurred, she saw that the murder boded no good to the King. She rallied her strength and visited the Cardinal of Bourbon. He charged everything upon her; she could not rest, he told her, until she had brought all to the slaughter. In this scene, pale and haggard,—like the wife of Macbeth, "troubled with thick-coming fancies that keep her from her rest"—she appears on the stage for the last time. In full view of the danger that impended over her son, and of the ruin of her house, she expired. Soon Henry III. was obliged to fly from the anathemas of the Sorbonne, and the wrath of the League, to the camp of Henry IV. There, on the 1st of August 1589, a fanatical Dominican priest, Clément by name, came to him, pretending to have secrets of importance to communicate. The King bent his ear to listen, but was immediately heard to cry out: "Ah! the villainous Monk—he has killed me!" Clément had drawn a knife from his sleeve and buried it in his body. Henry lingered for eighteen hours; and then the last of the four principal conspirators who planned the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the last King of the line of Valois, died.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ART. VIII.

*Rationalism in the Church versus Rationalism without.*¹

IDLENESS, faithlessness to duty, and discontent, are prone to lay the blame of failure at the door of "the times," to exalt the past at the expense of the present, and to croak over the degeneracy of these latter days as compared with the purity and power, the vigour and virtue, of days gone by. The writer of this article in the outset distinctly disavows such a tendency. He firmly believes that men give tone to the times, and not the times to men; that the human race, as a race, is as teachable, as ready to receive and apply the truth, as it ever has been. Whenever a teacher rises up with the credentials of his commission in the truth of his message, in the earnestness of its delivery, and in that self-abnegation of life which attests the singleness of his motive, he lacks not listeners, and one age gives as good audience as another. There are occasional exceptions to be met with here and there in the long line of teachers, whose excellence makes them the contemporaries of all time; all men claim them, and all countries recognise them; but these are rare, and the exception is not so much in the pupils as in the teacher. The great average of the world is just as wise, just as pure, as ever it was; and while some particular species of error may be more prominent in one age than in the preceding, yet on the whole, truth is equally as powerful as in former times, and even more so. If the querulous of each generation would view the whole battle-field, they would doubtless discover that, though some little squadron of error seems to have the advantage, yet the army of truth, *as an army*, is steadily and surely advancing from age to age.

Let no one, therefore, impute the sentiments expressed in this article to the tendency above alluded to. No comparisons are instituted between periods of time. The present only is examined, and charges are preferred against it without reference to the past, whether better or worse.

It is scarcely conceivable that any observant eye can have

¹ From the *Southern Presbyterian Review*.

failed to notice the virulence of the scepticism of the last few years. The prevailing type seems to be a species of rationalism, or the disposition to use reason as the sole and satisfactory interpreter and expositor of all the facts presented in the nature or history of man. The supernatural element is discounted or entirely eliminated, and human reason essays by its own ingenuity to solve every riddle, without reference to any supreme, sovereign, *personal* God. Unbelief is so Protean in form that there is nothing surprising in any shape it may assume. The object of this article is not to discuss rationalism from this quarter; being professedly and avowedly "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel," we need not be surprised to find them theoretically as well as practically "without God in the world." But when those who are, on the other hand, professedly in the camp of Israel, yet speak the language of Ashdod, surprise is natural. Better things are justly expected of them.

That not only soldiers but even *leaders* in the camp *do* use this mingled dialect is evident. There is a painful attitude of compromise and conciliation on the part of those who should give no uncertain sound in this conflict. The great burden of effort seems to be to reconcile and harmonise, and this, mark it, not the position of the enemy with the demands of dogmatic faith, but the reverse. Whenever there is a difference between the two, in the minds of these harmonisers the presumption is in favour of rationalism, and dogmatic faith must immediately rise to an explanation. Thus the enemy receives the lion's share in this compromise. Without learning from past experience that the arrogance of this rationalism grows with what it feeds upon, becoming more exacting with every concession, these conciliators are for ever finding new harmony, inventing new methods of keeping the peace with this belligerent spirit, and seem entirely to have forgotten that "the wisdom which is from above is *first* pure, *then* peaceable." We have the Church assuming the humiliated position of a weather-vane to show from what quarter the hostile wind sets. Indeed, by examining the latest interpretations, readings, etc., of the Scriptures, one can almost determine the character of the latest assault made upon Christianity.

There are expositions advanced and defended, as consistent

with God's Word, which would doubtless have astonished the Westminster Assembly beyond expression. It seems that there is hardly a theory too intrinsically absurd, too God-defying in its nature or effects, to find some professed champion of revelation to advocate its claims and invent some method of reconciling God's Word with it. They learn no lesson from the proverbial fickleness of these theories; though it hardly gives them breathing space between one adjustment and the demand for another. Scarcely have they reconciled one theory before a change of base calls for another exhibition of their ecclesiastical legerdemain. Such a course is calculated to bring the Word of God into profound contempt. If it means everything, it means nothing. Such treatment would give it about the coherency and force of the fabled Sibylline leaves, blown hither and thither by the winds and put together like the games of mutilated figures invented for the amusement of children. Given the existence of the God of the Bible, the personal, present Jehovah of his people, and all attempt to eliminate the supernatural is not only unnecessary but atheistic in tendency. It may recognise some species of God, but it owns no allegiance to the Lord God of Hosts. And yet how common is this attitude of conciliation and compromise with an infidel rationalism!!

I. Hear one of the latest expounders, one high in authority, and chosen by a great University to trace the hand of this living, personal God in the history of his people. In commenting on the rebuke the ass gave Balaam, he says:—

“It is, however, worthy of observation that the words of the ass do not rise above the animal sphere; they are strictly confined to the region of animal perception or sensation. The miracle consists merely in the fact that by a divine influence or operation, the natural expression of animal sensation is made to acquire a modulation which gives it the character of the articulate sounds of human language. It is difficult to decide whether this modulation occurred already in the mouth of the ass, or in the ear of Balaam only; the decision, perhaps, depends on the answer to the question whether Balak's messengers were present or absent. If they were present, the modulation of the voice occurred in the ear of Balaam; . . . if they were absent, that interpretation claims the preference according to which the modulated words proceeded from the mouth of the animal.”

Which, being translated into plain unvarnished English,

means simply that the incident is as little miraculous as it could be, to be at all so ; not *objectionably* miraculous even at its worst—"merely this" "animal sphere," "natural expression of animal sensation." The miracle consists merely in the fact that the animal, when struck, brayed ; this braying was modulated somehow and somewhere so as to sound like human language. The whereabouts of this wonderful modulation is to be determined by the consideration whether there were *spectators* or not ; if there were none, we may venture to place it in the mouth of the ass ; if, however, there were spectators, this would be hazardous, and the modulation had better be confined to the ear of Balaam ! When this wonderful feat of exposition is examined in the light of 2 Peter ii. 16, "But was rebuked for his iniquity, *the dumb ass speaking with man's voice* forbade the madness of the prophet," the laborious effort of the learned D.D. seems utterly futile ; and the reader, while according him peculiar fitness to explain the *modus operandi* of this particular animal's exercise of speech, will doubtless excuse the task.

A comparatively recent work from a high source, which has received unstinted praise, and has not yet met with the fair and just criticism which its gorgeous mosaic of excellence and defect merits, evinces the same tendency. In commenting on the miracle in which the demoniac of Gadara was healed and the devils sent into the swine, it says :—

"That the demoniac was healed—that in the terrible final paroxysm which usually accompanied the deliverance from this strange and awful malady, a herd of swine was in some way affected with such wild terror as to rush headlong in large numbers over the steep hillside into the waters of the lake—and that in the minds of all who were present, including that of the sufferer himself, this precipitate rushing of the swine was connected with the man's release from his demoniac thralldom—thus much is clear, . . . and knowing to how singular an extent the mental impressions of man affect by some unknown electric influence the lower animals—knowing, for instance, that man's cowardice and exultation, and even his superstitious terrors, *do* communicate themselves to the dog which accompanies him, or the horse on which he rides—there can be little or no difficulty in understanding that the shrieks and gesticulations of a powerful lunatic might strike uncontrollable terror into a herd of swine."

Mark two phrases in passing : "in large numbers," and the apparently careless, but suggestive addition of the words, "and even his *superstitious terrors*," to "cowardice and exulta-

tion ;" this addition certainly adds no force to the specifications already given, and how artlessly the insinuation is entered, "and even his superstitious terrors"! But to continue :

"It is true that the evangelists (as their language clearly shows) held, in all its simplicity, the belief that actual devils passed in multitudes out of the man and into the swine. But is it not allowable here to make a distinction between actual facts and that which was the mere conjecture and inference of the spectators from whom the three evangelists heard the tale?"

This language is too plain to need translation. Compare it with Luke's account, in which it is said : "So the devils besought him, saying, If thou cast us out, suffer us to go away into the herd of swine. *And he said unto them, Go.* And when they were come out, they went into the herd of swine : and, behold, the *whole* herd ran violently down a steep place into the sea and perished in the waters."

The three evangelists agree in representing the devils as making this request, and our Saviour as granting it. Hence the remark of the author is just, that the language of the evangelists "clearly shows that they held in all its simplicity the belief that actual devils passed in multitudes out of the man and into the swine." Let the reader ask himself, Is Luke's account a narrative of what occurred, or is it the "mere conjecture or inference" of those from whom he "heard the tale"? Can an *inspired* narrative of events be a mixture of "actual facts" and "conjecture and inference"? If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the very practical problem arises, Where there is no distinction made in the text, how is the reader to draw the line? What part of this wondrous combination is myth, and what part is the word of God? If there are rocks undistinguished in this chart, of what value is it? It is of no avail to tell the mariner that it is *substantially* correct ; there may be the fewest unsafe places as compared with the whole, but the freight is an immortal one, and the craft cannot afford to risk wreck ; the issues are so tremendous and the value of the cargo so transcendent, that even the slightest risk becomes intolerable.

In another place, the same author says :

"We must here follow that (order) given by St. Luke, both because it appears to us intrinsically probable, and because St. Luke, unlike the two

previous evangelists, seems to have been guided, so far as his information allowed, by chronological considerations."

"So far as his information allowed"!!

Again :

"Under the dark shadow of the trees, amid the interrupted moonlight, it seems to them that there is an angel with him."

"It seems to them"!!

Again :

"An earthquake shook the earth and split the rocks, and as it rolled away from their places the great stones which closed and covered the cavern sepulchres of the Jews, so it seemed to the imaginations of many to have disimprisoned the spirits of the dead, and to have filled the air with ghostly visitants, who, after Christ had risen, appeared to linger in the Holy City."

How shamefully weak and trifling does this pretty piece of word-painting seem when placed side by side with the plain simple statement of *fact* made in the Scriptures: "And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many." The author obviously offers his sentences as a mere paraphrase of the inspired narrative; yet observe the laboured effort to explain away the supernatural element so plainly contained in the Bible account. The scepticism is rather insinuated than honestly pronounced. To read it is like inhaling the subtle and perfumed breath of a miasmatic atmosphere. The reader will not be surprised to find that this author never loses an opportunity to throw a contemptuous fling or a covert insinuation at "orthodox theology;" terming it variously "cold," "hard," "denunciatory," "pharisaical," "unreasoning," "unspiritual," "narrow, stolid prejudice," etc. etc.

II. Another evidence of this tendency to eliminate the supernatural in deference to man's reason, is seen in the explanations of the New Birth given in some quarters. God's agency is reduced to a minimum, and man's exalted. Regeneration, as explained by some professedly evangelical teachers, is simply reformation. What has been considered by the *consensus* of truly evangelical teachers as the Bible idea of re-

generation, a new birth, a new creation—the “being born not of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God;” the being “created in Christ Jesus unto good works”—is openly scouted as fanaticism, emotional frenzy, animal excitement; and regeneration is made about equivalent to ecclesiastical connection. When referred to the teaching of the Scripture, they respond: True, the Bible uses strong language if strictly interpreted, but such interpretation is unnecessary. It is mysterious, incomprehensible, humbling to man. Objection will constantly be made to it, and this must be taken into account in any system which is addressed to the enlightened understanding of man. Hence these eminently considerate explanations. We have a religion which man will not be inclined to cavil at. When the imperious human understanding asks doubtingly, if not contemptuously, How can these things be? instead of answering the question, *as Christ did*, by a re-announcement and reinforcement of the truth, however mysterious, these obliging champions proceed to show that these things do not “be” in any offensive sense; that what some fanatics call regeneration is merely “a half-hour’s excitement in a hot meeting-house.”

And here may be observed a striking instance of the inconsistency of error. Closely allied to this position, which owes its very existence to a deference to rationalism, we find rationalism sorely tried by a religion of superstitious sacramentarianism, beginning with *baptismal regeneration* and ending with the *real presence*, practically, if not theoretically taught. Every principle of a sound and consistent rationalism would repudiate and scorn such absurdities. Still, there is presented this strange heterogeneity of obsequious deference to reason in one department, and in another department of the same faith, reason asked to accept, swallow, and digest principles which, it would be easy to show, invalidate every deduction of this same reason, render scepticism inevitable, and introduce the chaos of lunacy into the world of man’s mind. And what is the result of this compromise? It is, that here, as everywhere else, the truth is vindicated, which declares that the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God stronger than men; a spectacle of large communion rolls, upon which are the names of many who not only are not

converted, but even ridicule the idea. This unnatural coalition produces worthy fruit, and its offspring is an infertile hybrid, "having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof." An opiate has been administered, which places men in a slumber of security from which nothing can arouse them. The sword of God's Word falls blunt upon this terrible coat of mail woven out of ecclesiastical connection. Being "in the church," such warnings and appeals as are addressed in the Scriptures to the unconverted, apply not to them. Taught that they are cured, they of course take no medicine, and their case is practically hopeless. Imposition of hands has usurped the functions of the Spirit of God; and the ghostly farce has sealed the ear, closed the heart, and soothed the conscience.

III. The same course has been pursued with reference to prayer. Here the supernatural element is equally incomprehensible, and hence equally distasteful. Objections arise grounded on the character of God, his immutability not to be changed by man's desires, his omniscience not needing man's reminders; on the stability of nature and the predetermined course of events, not to be affected by human breath. To meet these objections, we have the usual course resorted to. The compromisers are equal to the emergency, and the result is what is styled the Subjective Theory. Say they, True, it is inconceivable how God, his character being such as it is, and the course of nature being what it is, can be affected by the petitions of men. But then it is not necessary to hold any such view. Prayer is effective, and indeed is a mighty power, a great nourisher of Christian growth, but its effect is subjective; an exaltation of soul in the act of prayer, a lifting of it up to higher aims and nobler feelings, a soother of sorrows and a strengthener of virtues, by means of this spiritual elevation. It is like a golden chain, on which we hang and draw ourselves towards the throne of God; the little boat pulling on a line draws itself towards the mighty vessel, but it is the tiny boat that moves, not the mighty vessel; so with frail, feeble man: *he* moves really nearer to God, but God is immovable. No effect in him, no change in nature, is necessary to explain the real power of prayer, but an effect in the soul of him who prays, a change in the spiritual condition of the suppliant.

“ Lord, what a change *within us* one short hour
 Spent in thy presence will prevail to make !
 What heavy burdens from our bosoms take,
 What parched grounds refresh us with a shower !
 We kneel, and all around us seems to lower :
 We rise, and all, the distant and the near,
 Stands forth in sunny outline brave and clear ;
 We kneel—how weak ! we rise—how full of power ! ”

All of this is very beautiful, very comforting, and very true, as far as it goes. It is, however, but half of the truth ; and without the other half, is not the truth at all. When combined with the scriptural view of prayer, it is fruitful of peace, comfort, and strength ; when alone, it is a withered branch. So far from being sufficient in itself, it derives all its force from the truth of the Objective Theory. For the merest tyro can prick this beautiful bubble, blown for the delight of rationalism, by simply asking, How can prayer have this effect upon a man who believes that this is all ? Does not this comfort, this elevation of soul, arise from the very faith that rests itself in the Bible teaching that God is the hearer of prayer ?

Dissipate this “ illusion,” as these expositors would term it, and it is like taking the spectator behind the scenes and showing him the machinery which manufactures the thunder and lightning ; revealing the prosaic homeliness of that which, when painted and bespangled and set off by the glare and glitter of gas, throws the audience into paroxysms of enthusiasm over its beauty. You have robbed it of its romance when it appears weighed by the pound and measured by the yard. If this subjective theory is a sufficient explanation, then the reproach, Ignorance is the mother of devotion, is just. Any thoughtful man feels that comfort purchased at the price of self-deceit is dearly bought. It is true that rationalism scoffs at prayer in any scriptural sense of the term, but it is surely better to let it scoff than to attempt to conciliate it by any such compromise as this. Better even to join with it in ridicule, than virtually to take the ground that prayer is a comfortable delusion, a mummary to be encouraged and defended, because it affords peace to those who engage in it—a peace which is the offspring of delusion, a comfort which is in proportion to the ignorance of the superstitious devotee.

IV. The same tendency is again brought to light by the discussion growing out of the latest freak of a sensational age, the presence of the female evangelists, who infest certain portions of the country. Society, religious and irreligious, arrays itself *pro* and *con*. Of course, the irreligious care nothing for the teachings of the Scriptures. But the minister who desires to utilise the sensation created and reap the advantage of whatever is going, finds it incumbent upon him to explain his position and reconcile this new monstrosity of petticoats in the pulpit with the teachings of Paul. It is, indeed, a hard task; but hard as it is, it would be a still harder task to conceive anything which these reconcilers would give up as irreconcilable.

A learned argument is constructed from the word used in the passage, "I suffer not a woman to teach." But common sense, not to say a sound scholarship, blows this defence too high to be seen with a telescope. If the word "teach" means *babble*, why the declaration at all, in the first place? In the second place, why restricted to woman? Are women alone interdicted from *babbling*? Judging from this interpretation, it is to be inferred that the prohibition applies not to men, and that its defenders maintain it upon personal grounds. Thirdly, common sense asks, Of what is the immediate context (1 Tim. ii. 9-14) treating? of the character of preaching, or of the relation of the sexes and certain restrictions arising from sex-distinctions?

When this interpretation fails, resort is had to the theory of "degrees of inspiration." The very name by which this theory is baptized is prophetic of its absurdity. How can there be any such thing as degrees of inspiration? Can one passage be less inspired than another, if inspired at all? This obvious absurdity, however, is based upon certain passages in which this same apostle *distinctly disavows* authority, and states that he speaks not of commandment, but by permission; giving merely his own opinion, which he says is not to be binding upon any one. With a strange convenience, these "degree" interpreters extend this exception, "But I speak this by permission and not of commandment," to the passage under consideration, and that, too, *as authoritative a passage as any in his writings*.

But if this resort also fails, then the defence is built upon

the *temporary* force of the declaration. Times have changed, say they, and though the apostle did really prohibit female preaching in his day, the prohibition is not binding now under such circumstances as those of the present day. Without laying stress upon the reason assigned for his prohibition by the apostle himself in the next verse ("For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression"—which bases the prohibition upon a rather permanent distinction), attention is directed to the danger of such a position. If the Bible is out of date in one portion, why not in another? If man is allowed discretion to sit in judgment upon one express declaration, and declare it antiquated, why may not another exercise the same discretion, with reference to some declaration which stands in *his* way? You have the wedge entered; the camel's nose is in the tent, and according to the old Arab proverb, you may get ready to vacate the premises in the camel's favour. What can the preacher, who gives such a view, say when one of his inconsistent members parries, in the same manner, the force of such declarations as "The friendship of the world is enmity against God;" "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him"?

- But the crowning argument, the imperative necessity for this compromise, is the apparent success of this new species of preaching. But even were it successful, beyond the shadow of a doubt, it would still be easy to see that this could not constitute an argument against a divinely inspired command. God's providence is not our rule; He acts *sovereignly* when and where and how He pleases. We are taught that He causes even the wrath of man to praise Him. It is His province to overrule even wickedness to His glory. His rule is His sovereign pleasure; *ours is the inspired Bible*. So that even were the success of such preaching a demonstrated fact, it would still prove nothing in this discussion, except the sovereignty of God. Man, however, has not the data by which to judge the success or failure of this movement; eternity alone can furnish it. The presumption is against the success. This much merely in passing; there are but two propositions in an argument upon this question: Is the Bible inspired? Does the Bible forbid a woman to preach? The first question

is unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. Then it is humbly submitted, that the arguments to be used in the second are *purely exegetical*; the authorities are grammars and lexicons, not any success resulting from the work, whether such success be fancied or real. The exegetical argument ought to be satisfactory, conclusive, and final, to all who hold the theory of inspiration in its integrity.

Any appeal to the effects of such preaching is an implicit surrender of the inspiration of the Scriptures. It manifests a weakness in the knees on this fundamental article in the Christian faith. To all such appeals, the firm adherent to this fundamental doctrine will respond, I do not doubt the piety of those ladies, I do not impugn their motives, I do not under-rate their eloquence or ability; but *my* guide is God's word; in my opinion, it distinctly forbids them the performance of this function, and believing this, I cannot indorse the movement. There is no appeal to me from the Word of God.

Of course such a position will raise the cry of unenlightened, harsh, narrow bigotry; but the Christian minister should be able and willing to endure this. If he allows such a cry to frighten him out of his stronghold that is afforded by an unwavering, unhesitating adherence to God's inspired Bible, he is then at the mercy of every freak and fancy of this essentially sensational age. He has thrown overboard his compass; his course will be according to the whim of every new wind of doctrine; he may reconcile himself to the position of drift-wood, to a course as wild and uncertain as the vagaries of error.

V. But the attitude of religion towards physical science is a more striking illustration of this tendency than any previously presented in this article.

Were it not so serious and important a matter, it would be amusing to see the gymnastics through which certain interpreters go, to reconcile this branch of the opposition. It is doubtless amusing to the infidel. The first chapter of Genesis has been converted into a perfect circus ring for these performances, and commentators vie with each other in agility. The deadest of all dead languages proves to be exceedingly living and plastic in their hands. Just consider the number and variety of interpretations that have been offered to conciliate science.

Concerning these theories of "reconciliation," Professor Huxley is reported to have said in New York, in his lecture on The Untenable Hypotheses :—

"In the first place, it is not my business to say what the Hebrew text contains and what it does not ; and in the second place, were I to say that this was the biblical hypothesis (creation in six literal days), I should be met by the authority of eminent scholars, to say nothing of men of science, who, in recent times, have absolutely denied that this doctrine is to be found in Genesis at all. If we are to listen to them, we must believe that what seems so clearly defined as days of creation—as if very great pains had been taken that there should be no mistake—that these are not days at all, but periods that we may make just as long as convenience requires. We are also to understand that it is consistent with that phraseology to believe that plants and animals may have been evolved by natural processes, lasting for millions of years out of similar rudiments. A person who is not a Hebrew scholar can only stand by and admire the marvellous flexibility of a language which admits of such diverse interpretations. Assuredly, in the face of such contradictory authority upon matters upon which one is competent to form no judgment, he will abstain from any opinion as I do ; and in the third place, I have carefully abstained from speaking of this as a Mosaic doctrine, because we are now assured upon the authority of the highest critics and even dignitaries in the Church, that there is no evidence whatever that Moses ever wrote this chapter or knew anything about it."

It would be a digression from the purpose of this article to enter into any statement or discussion of these interpretations. When they fail to give satisfaction, then resort is had to the general character of the writings and writer as an apology for the statements contained in the opening chapters of Genesis. The special attention of the reader is invited to this resort. Vague reference is made to "the early age," "period of childhood," "undeveloped character of knowledge," etc. Under this specious guise we are insensibly educated to consider Moses as a sort of *semi-barbarian*, well informed *for his times*, but still uncultured, ignorant, and even superstitious. He gave the account of creation in general vogue in his day ; indeed, no other would have been understood. Science was yet in the loins of its parent, and it would be unreasonable to expect anything like a statement consistent with scientific truth. When one reads so interminably of the inadequacy, incorrectness, etc., of the "Mosaic idea ;" the many apologies made for the ignorance, the crudeness of his notions, he is tempted to ask, In what sense can this account of creation be called the Mosaic

idea? *Is it Moses speaking, or God?* Was Moses merely putting on record the curious absurd fancies of an unenlightened age, or was he the mouthpiece to declare the word of the Lord God? Were God's ideas crude? Was Jehovah in his childhood at that time, waiting for the illumination of this wonderful science? Did God publish an account which was false to fact and put it into man's hands as *his inspired word*?

The books of Moses run like a thread through the Old Testament Scriptures. Reflect upon the frequency of quotation, reference, illustration, or allusion, all pointing to some portion of the Pentateuch. Let any one attempt to expunge from the Old Testament every verse depending for its force upon the books of Moses, and he will be surprised at the havoc he has made in his Bible. These writings have as much connection with the rest of the Bible as the first five chapters of Arithmetic have with the science of Mathematics. Blot out addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division from Arithmetic, and what would become of the rest of it? Further: Is not this semi-barbaric venter of crude notions amply supported by the New Testament? The Pharisees were constantly confronting our Lord with the sayings of Moses, and endeavouring to establish contradiction, or at least conflict, between the doctrines of the Pentateuch and His teaching. How easy it would have been for him at once finally and for ever to have emancipated himself from these difficulties by fixing the status of Moses according to the views of these modern conciliators; their theory would have been eminently in point. Instead, however, of pursuing this simple and easy course, he, on the contrary, sustains Moses always. "For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me." Our Lord quotes from Moses, and Moses alone, in repelling each assault of the devil against him in the wilderness. Strange that the devil did not impugn the authority of those writings then as he has done since. We see Moses on the Mount of Transfiguration as representative of one of the three great dispensations. During the walk to Emmaus *after his resurrection*, in expounding the Scriptures concerning himself *he begins with Moses*. And strongest of all the testimonies, in one place he says: "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

How then is the Bible to be sustained if Moses is discredited? What department of it, history, narrative, or precept, does not depend upon the authority and credibility of Moses? Underrate the Pentateuch, and you underrate the whole Bible; undermine the authority of Moses, and you undermine that of Christ. Our Lord vouches for Moses on all occasions, and the candid student will be driven to the conclusion that *Christ and Moses stand or fall together*.

These sentences have been penned to little purpose if their practical character is not evident, and hence any extended or detailed application is deemed unnecessary. However, it may not be amiss to indulge in a few reflections by way of concluding the subject.

The first thought suggested by an examination of these theories is, *cui bono*? Admit that they succeed in the work undertaken, *i.e.* that the explanations are satisfactory, where is the advantage? Does any one believe that rationalism, with the way thus cleared, will be any more ready to receive the gospel, any the less hostile to its Great Author! Every one at all acquainted with the human heart knows that these objections are the merest pretexts behind which carnality entrenches itself. To remove a *pretext* is no advantage whatever. When the Holy Ghost shakes a soul with the conviction of personal sin, these barricades are levelled with the shock, and we see and hear no more of them. Until this power comes, to destroy one series of outworks is but to clear the way for the immediate erection of another. The Christian heart needs no such processes of reconciliation, and the infidel rationalist is not bettered by them. Even if satisfactory, they are of no avail; but they are notoriously unsatisfactory. They are even derided by those to whom they defer. The extract from Prof. Huxley, quoted above, is a fair sample of the spirit in which such overtures are received. In political circles it is said that to throw a candidate on the defensive is to ruin his prospects. Has not Christianity been on the defensive long enough? The world is flooded with apologetic literature of this sort. It is a question for serious reflection whether on the whole, taken in its length and breadth, apologetics has not been of more injury than benefit to the cause. We find no trace of it in the Scriptures.

Consider the difficulties with which those Scriptures had to contend, the condition of mankind to whom they were addressed. Polytheism was enthroned in the high places of the earth, and the world was one great pantheon of idol-worship. Every nation had its numerous priesthood, generally the influential, cultivated, noble class of the people. Every city had its splendid temples and its complicated ritual. Every tree and fountain had its peculiar divinity. Art and science, education and refinement, culture and influence, power, civil and military, all were arrayed on the side of idolatry. Wherever there was any philosophy or literature, it was the handmaid of this all-prevalent system of gods many and lords many. It was completely inwrought into the very national life of every people upon the face of the earth excepting only a nation of liberated slaves. The Bible coming into such a world, encountering such opposing influences and prejudices, without one word of argument, apology, compromise, or conciliation, contradicts the universal sentiment of mankind by opening with the sublime declaration, "In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth." And the rest of it is consistent with its opening sentence. We find no argument, no compromise, no conciliation in it from beginning to end. It lays down truths, inculcates doctrines, and states as facts mysteries which mock the profoundest intellect with its inability to comprehend them. Yet wherever it has gone, men have acknowledged its authority and bowed beneath its sway. Sadduceeism was rampant in Christ's day, and repeatedly plied him with its difficulties; on what occasion did he ever manifest the slightest deference to its rationalism? His own disciples came to him more than once with questions of curious, interesting speculation, such as, "Are there few that be saved?" When did he ever fail to turn their attention from such topics to the practical concerns of religion by such replies as, "Strive to enter in at the strait gate"?

May not the defenders of the faith learn a lesson from the structure of the Scriptures and the example of the Founder of the religion which they essay to defend? Perhaps the cause would be benefited by a little more of the *fortiter in re* and a little less of the *suaviter in modo*. If the Bible is the Word of God, the Christian can afford to stand by it from beginning to

end; indeed, he cannot afford to do less. If, however, it is not the Word of God, the more quickly it is thrown entirely overboard the better. In either case, half-way allegiance is the poorest policy.

There are some minds for whom this species of speculation has peculiar fascination. Before becoming intoxicated with it, it is well to look ahead and see the terminus of the path which seems so inviting and innocent in the beginning.

If the reader will consult the practical issue of the various popular and apparently plausible theories, he will discover that however innocuous their beginnings appear, their issues are perilous. However compromising *they* are, logic is uncompromising; these unguarded conciliations so heedlessly given and so laboriously defended, are the beginnings of a course of reasoning the end of which is oftentimes fatal. They are but the premises of conclusions from which the devout believer would shrink in horror. The enemies of the faith are not slow to perceive this, and to press such conclusions to the detriment of the cause. Theoretical and harmless as they seem, they soon become intensely practical. He who accepts their guidance may find, alas, too late! that they lead him to an empty grave, and can but exclaim in the anguish of despair, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him."

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

ARTICLE IX.—*Current Literature.—Notices of Books.*

THE seventh series of the Cunningham Lectures (1) is a singularly fair and judicious examination of the Biblical doctrine of man. There is evidence on every page of solid scholarship and impartial investigation. Mr. Laidlaw has taken pains to make himself familiar both with recent and more remote discussions of the doctrine, and he proves his competency to enter the lists in support of what may be fairly termed the Catholic and orthodox belief.

(1) *The Bible Doctrine of Man.* The Seventh Series of the Cunningham Lectures. By John Laidlaw, M.A., Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

In the first lecture the Bible account of man's origin is stated clearly and carefully, the evolution theory is also described and criticised, and both statements are so placed as to exhibit an instructive contrast. The second lecture treats of man's nature, and enters with some fulness into psychological questions, assigning cautiously to such terms as "flesh," "heart," etc., their exact meaning. In the third lecture we have an excellent and suggestive study of man's primitive state, including an estimate of what is implied in the fact that he was created "in the divine image." Our attention is here called, and called justly, to what has been generally overlooked and often denied, that "the true idea of human greatness we owe, not to modern thought, but to the primary axioms of revelation" (p. 122). Naturally there follows, in the fourth lecture, a statement of the Bible doctrine on the origin of evil, and an examination of man's nature under sin and death, followed in the fifth by a discussion of the psychology of the new life, in which of necessity special prominence is given to regeneration and sanctification. The last lecture is occupied with the "Bible view of man's nature in its bearing on a future state." In this connection the doctrines of immortality and the resurrection of the body are stated, and effectively vindicated against current objections. In the appendix a valuable series of notes contributes materially to the elucidation of the subject and the value of the volume.

We have been specially interested in the arguments adduced in favour of the twofold division of human nature as against the threefold, or what is known now-a-days as the "tripartite theory." On this subject Mr. Laidlaw's reasoning is at least fitted to give pause to those who are inclined to commit themselves to the superficial trichotomic distinction, "Body, Soul, and Spirit." The truth is that both in the interpretation of nature and the Bible, we are inclined to accept theories that are sharply cut and clearly defined; indeed we are disposed to force our modes of thought upon the facts rather than to permit the facts to modify our thinking, and in our eagerness for definitions we do injustice to the indefiniteness of the Infinite. We must learn, and contentedly recognise, that there is a vagueness of boundary both in the works and word of God that may be

unsatisfactory to our minds, but that is none the less real and important.

We would also call attention to Mr. Laidlaw's interpretation of Rom. vii. and viii. (p. 199 *et seq.*) In the former of these chapters there is a description of an inward conflict which has proved a most fruitful theme of controversy in recent times. We have been accustomed to speak of this description as *diagrammatic*. It is impossible to accept the terms in which the conflict is described as applicable throughout either to man fallen or to man renewed. Mr. Laidlaw's exposition, which we have not space to indicate, fully and fairly removes the difficulty.

As an illustration of our author's method, and as bearing upon one of the more interesting details, we subjoin an extract from note F, p. 315 :—

“ This dormant existence of the *πνεῦμα* in the natural man is further insisted on as giving us assurance of the possibility of regeneration or conversion, and insight into its method. Were the *πνεῦμα* in man supreme, as by his constitution it ought to be, there would be no need of regeneration. As Butler says of it under the name of conscience, ‘ had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world ;’ on the other hand, were it wholly obliterated, regeneration would be impossible. Men would be beyond the reach of redemption, as devils are with reason supposed to be. Thus the rudimentary existence of the *πνεῦμα* in all men in their unconverted state is the ground of the possibility of their recovery by grace. In the same way this theory suggests the possibility and mode of sanctification. The Evangelical view of fallen human nature is said to land in a dilemma those who hold man as a compound of soul and body only. For if the immaterial nature of man is wholly corrupt, desperately wicked, and that nature is a unit, no *nidus* in human nature is reserved into which the Divine Spirit can descend and purify all within. How can a good thing come out of an evil ? Upon this view the heart is desperately wicked, and remains so, even in the regenerate, who nevertheless are led by the Spirit of God, and walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. How this can be is as unexplained as how a deaf man can hear, or a lame man can walk. Let but the distinction between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* be seen, and all is clear and consistent. The *ψυχή* is like the flesh, prone to evil, and remains so even in the regenerate. But the *πνεῦμα*—the God-like in man—is not prone to evil, indeed it cannot sin. Its tendency is naturally upwards to God. Regeneration, then, is the quickening of this *pneuma*. Sanctification is the carrying on of that which conversion began. Conversion, or the first quickening of the *pneuma*, may be dated either from the first moment of conviction by the law (Rom. vii. 9), or from the time when the *pneuma* is practically acknowledged to be the master principle, and our

members are yielded as instruments of righteousness unto God. The gradual character of sanctification and the conflict implied in it thus explains itself. It is the working out of that which was begun at conversion. The seminal principle, then quickened, grows and asserts its presence by asserting its mastery over the lower part of our nature, until the true harmony of man's constitution, spirit, soul, and body, overturned by the fall, is completely restored.

"Besides the groundless and unscriptural assumption that there is any part or faculty in fallen man which is 'not prone to evil and cannot sin,' this whole theory of regeneration and sanctification differs from that of the Bible as being almost purely naturalistic. With the exception of once bringing in the supernatural in the regenerating or reawakening act, it makes the whole a natural process, whereas the Scriptural view of the renewed life is that it is a standing miracle, a supernatural life. It is a miracle to begin with, and precisely such a miracle as is here disparaged, 'bringing a clean thing out of an unclean.' And it is a continuous miracle; exactly such a miracle too as was shadowed forth in the healing works of Him who made 'the blind to see, the deaf to hear, and the lame to walk.' Were this tripartite theory correct, theology must be recast, and so also must Christian preaching. Evangelical teachers must change their note (as Mr. Heard's critic in the *London Quarterly* puts it), and, instead of calling men to repentance, must say, Develop your *pneumata*."

In these times of minute critical dissection it is a relief both to mind and heart to contemplate a broad pictorial representation either of a life or of an era. We are somewhat wearied of Dr. Dryasdust and the archives from which he elaborates numberless details, significant enough perchance, but sadly lacking in meaning and momentum. We seek to be brought face to face with the stirring energies of history, and are ill content to waste our time in merely sifting and analysing the materials from which, at some distant date, construction may be possible. And we are unfeignedly grateful when, in such a volume as *Times before the Reformation* (2), we are presented with a complete picture, at once interesting and accurate, of one of the formative epochs in the development of Christian thought and character. Mr. Dinwiddie, in telling the story of Savonarola and his times, proves that he possesses nicety of touch and vigorousness of execution. The surroundings are grouped with ease and naturalness, and the central figure stands out in happy relations both of likeness and contrast.

(2) *Times before the Reformation, with an account of Fra Girolamo Savonarola, the Friar of Florence.* By William Dinwiddie, LL.B. London: James Nisbet and Co.

His book is an admirable illustration of historical tact and treatment.

With a kindly and just allowance for the prejudices of his time, which does not blind him to the Reformer's faults, he fastens our attention on the grandeur of his conceptions, the unselfishness of his aims, the breadth of his learning, and the devotedness of his life. Savonarola is seen rising from the renaissance, that wonderful period of keen vision and shameless immorality, pre-eminent as a Seer, yet pure as becometh a Prophet of God. Even to those who are already familiar with the history, this volume will prove welcome by its grasp and charity; while to those who wish to learn, it will prove a charming teacher by the fulness of its information and its graphic delineation of events.

There are already numerous expositions of the First Epistle of John, and yet it would not be difficult to state some good reasons for welcoming another. At all events, Erich Haupt satisfactorily justifies the issue of his commentary (3), when he tells us that it is his design, "with the New Testament only in hand, to unfold the order and substance of thought in St. John's Epistle." We have tested this volume by an examination of its treatment of characteristic passages, and we are persuaded that the author's intention is fairly carried out. We have found that it differs from other well-known German commentaries, mainly in its attempt to comprehend and convey the meaning of the apostle. While not denying the value of grammatical hand-books to the New Testament, we venture to claim a higher and more useful place for those which deal with the thought-contents and spiritual purpose of the various books. Certainly, preachers of the Word can gain more assistance—and assistance not less legitimate—from an author who endeavours to reproduce in modern form, and as adapted to modern wants, the teachings of the authoritative expounders of the faith. This commentary—reminding us in some respects of Tholuck's exposition of the same epistle, though occupying a somewhat different position—will be found serviceable, and on the whole trustworthy. We may add that Haupt is Lutheran

(3) *The First Epistle of St. John: a Contribution to Biblical Theology.* By Erich Haupt. Translated by W. Pope, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

in theology, and Platonic in philosophy. Zimmermann, in the *Theologische Literaturblatt*, speaks of it as exhibiting "scientific profoundness and practical application in harmonious union."

In Germany the true state of the controversy between faith and unbelief is more widely recognised than in this country. Although critical questions bulk most largely and are pressed to the front, the real issue lies behind them. From the first, the sceptical party made it no secret that their whole contention rests on a denial of the supernatural. Criticism is only a means to an end. No doubt it must be met, and met within its own sphere. But that which gives it most force and demands consideration at first-hand is its persistent refusal to acknowledge miracle or God. Consequently, the evidence of all others which must determine the conclusion, is evidence of Divine action in history and life, if such evidence be attainable and available. This explains why the conflict has raged so fiercely round the record of the resurrection as it is presented in the Gospels. Let it be proved that the Lord Jesus was put to death on the cross, and that thereafter He rose from the dead, and then, practically, the controversy ends. Assaults on the testimony to that resurrection have been vigorous and pertinacious. In different forms they have been made from diverse quarters by new forces armed with new weapons. We are saying nothing more than the history warrants, when we assert that these attempts have hitherto failed. The change of front and method on the part of our opponents demonstrates their consciousness of failure.

A fair statement of the facts connected with the Passion and Resurrection of our Lord, determined by a knowledge of the objections, critical and otherwise, that have been taken to the Biblical narrative, is of great value in this state and stage of the contest. This is given to us admirably and fully in Steinmeyer's acceptable volume (4). In no other readily accessible form have we such a storehouse of relevant information and cogent reasoning. It is emphatically the hand-book for all who desire to be conversant with the details of this most important subject.

(4) Steinmeyer's *History of the Passion and Resurrection of our Lord*. Translated by Rev. T. Crerar and Rev. A. Cusin. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Strictly speaking, the events in the history of Christ take their character from His Person. A treatise, therefore, on *The Person of Christ* from the pen of such a competent writer as Dr. Schaff (5) ought to be welcome. And it ought to be the more welcome, since, within the compass of less than 300 pages, it presents a sufficient and satisfactory statement of the Catholic doctrine. Dr. Schaff, in several consecutive chapters, frames a telling argument in proof of our Lord's divinity, by a careful consideration of the circumstances and character of His life; summing up by the inference undoubtedly warranted by the premises, that "Christ is the greatest moral miracle of history." Stating thereafter Christ's own testimony concerning Himself, he maintains that "these are the most astounding and transcendent pretensions ever set up by any being. He, the humblest and lowliest of men, makes them repeatedly and uniformly to the last, in the face of the whole world,—even in the darkest hour of suffering. He makes them, not in swelling, pompous, ostentatious language, which almost necessarily springs from false pretensions, but in a natural, spontaneous style, with perfect ease, freedom, and composure, as a native prince would speak of the attributes and scenes of royalty at his father's court. He never falters or doubts, never apologises for them, never enters into an explanation; he sets them forth as self-evident truths, which need only to be stated to challenge the belief and submission of mankind." He adds, forcibly and truly: "no human being on earth could set up the least of these pretensions without being set down at once as a madman or blasphemer. But from the mouth of Christ these colossal pretensions excite neither pity nor indignation, not even the least feeling of incongruity or impropriety. We read and hear them over and over again without surprise. They seem perfectly natural and well sustained by the most extraordinary life and the most extraordinary works."

Having stated the positive evidence for Christ's divinity, Dr. Schaff proceeds to examine the false theories which have been

(5) *The Person of Christ: the Perfection of His Humanity viewed as a proof of His Divinity.* By Philip Schaff, D.D., Professor to the Union Theological Seminary, New York. London: James Nisbet and Co.

adduced in explanation of the facts. These he sums up under three heads, the hypothesis of imposture, the theory of enthusiasm, or self-deception, and the theory of poetical fiction, this last including the mythical and legendary hypothesis. In an appendix are collected what may be termed in a fit enough sense impartial testimonies to the character of Christ.

We have no hesitation in saying, that, as a *résumé* of the argument, this volume is entitled to rank very high, and that for practical usefulness it is worthy of very special commendation.

We have heard a good deal about sensational novels, and even sometimes about sensational science. Will no one utter a warning against sensational theology and sensational sermons? In asking this question we are not thinking of extreme instances which we do not care to particularise, but of the thousand and one volumes that are issuing yearly from the press. In too many cases the interest of these volumes is associated with startling novelties either in doctrine or in exposition of Scripture. There seems to be a revival of Athenian curiosity and an unworthy readiness on the part of some preachers to meet it. We are tempted to think that some writers can only escape the commonplace by rushing into the paradoxical, and eagerly espousing bizarre, if not heretical, opinions. Sensationalism of this sort is really more hurtful than sensationalism of a broader and more vulgar kind. It has also a certain quality of meanness, and it is altogether without excuse.

It is, therefore, with something more than the ordinary language of congratulation that we welcome a volume of sermons from the New York pulpit (6), which are as much characterised by orthodoxy of doctrine and sobriety of interpretation as they are by vigour of language and solidity of thought. Without any meretricious appeals to the restlessness of the age, Dr. Taylor succeeds in arresting attention and arousing conscience by a simple, seasonable, and striking presentation of scriptural truth. His thoughts are wise and weighty; his style always clear and often eloquent. Such

(6) *The Limitations of Life, and other Sermons*. By W. M. Taylor, D.D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

sermons have, as they deserve, our warmest commendation,—
O si sic omnia !

One other volume of a similar character reaches us, strangely enough, from the same side of the Atlantic. Formerly we were disposed to expect eccentricities from America ; perhaps our export trade in that article may soon out-balance our imports. Nevertheless we are right glad to find that our American cousins are now contributing so largely to the material available for the increase and right development of spiritual life. Dr. Vincent's *Studies in the Psalms*, under a somewhat fanciful though striking title, (7) founded mainly on the versions of Canon Perowne, are excellent illustrations of the happy uses to which experimental theology may be applied. He leads us into the Psalm-country, one of the most humanly interesting in the whole Bible, by the orchard gate, the threshing-floor gate, the pasture gate, the treasury gate, the drill gate, the caravan gate, etc., etc. There is not a dull page in the book from beginning to end, and it is replete with practical lessons of wisdom, made frequently all the more winning by language at once simple and beautiful. This is pre-eminently a book for thoughtful meditative Christians.

Dr. Christlieb sends us a stirring discourse—shall we call it a polemic?—on the opium traffic (8). The Bonn Professor has made himself acquainted with the history of England's sinful selfishness in the extension and maintenance of this traffic ; and in plain honest words he foretells the consequences that must ensue if our complicity in this nefarious trade be continued. If it be asked what is the remedy for this evil, he replies straightforwardly : “ *Consult first of all your conscience and not your purses.* Is the continuation of this traffic, which you legalised only by force of arms, and from which you are implored by China out of pity for the millions of her sons which you have ruined, to desist,—is its continuation right—I mean is it justifiable before God and man, or not? If your

(7) *Gates into the Psalm Country.* By Marvin R. Vincent, D.D., Pastor of the Church of the Covenant, New York. London : James Nisbet and Co.

(8) *The Indo-British Opium Trade.* By Theodore Christlieb, D.D. London : James Nisbet and Co.

answer must in simple humanity be, *It is not*: then in God's name *follow the voice of conscience*, be led astray by no suggestions of little faith—*give up the injustice at once!* . . . *Let chief prominence be given to the moral question*—a question which, as it seems to us, resolves itself into one of *simple trust in God*. For the continuance of the opium traffic has been due, not solely to the sordid lust for gold, but, since its iniquity has been recognised, to a want of faith in God, and to that anxious calculation of mere material consequences, which leaves out of account the *divine* blessing resting on every act of self-denying faith" (p. 87). We wish that we could be as certain that our statesmen would heed these faithful words as we are convinced of their truth. This little volume is a well-considered argument against a gross injustice, by one of our most sober and learned theologians.

It must be confessed that there are many phrases and forms of expression that ignore, if they do not deny, the personal action and sovereignty of God. We are therefore not surprised to find that a writer, who is evidently zealous for the Lord of hosts, has published a volume bearing this suggestive title, *The Reign of God not the Reign of Law* (9). He certainly calls our attention to a most important subject, and makes out a good case for a much more cautious use of language on the part of Christian apologists. His strictures in some instances seem to us too severe, for although the words he criticises are fairly capable of a pantheistic meaning, we are confident that they were used only in delineation and defence of Theism.

We must add, however, that Mr. Bacon's argument is very weighty, and that many of his citations show that it is relevant. There is a tendency at the present time to assign a certain impersonal, fatalistic, and independent authority to law, in which tendency there are elements of no common danger. Without committing ourselves to an unqualified acceptance of this book, we do heartily recommend it as a most valuable contribution to Christian thought at this juncture.

(9) *The Reign of God not the Reign of Law*. By Thomas Scott Bacon. Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers.

Studies in Life. By H. SINCLAIR PATERSON, M.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

A series of eight unwritten lectures dealing with some of the most important problems that in our days force themselves on the attention of reading and reflecting men. The lectures have been revised from a verbatim report. While this secures some advantages by permitting a free and vigorous style, with greater liberty of exposition and illustration, yet the evidence of the extempore address is sometimes obvious, in the less exact expression, and the want of the continuous logical treatment which would have characterised the scientific treatise. But though such a systematic work from Dr. Paterson would be a valuable contribution to the literature of the engrossing controversies which now give to biological inquiries so great an interest, it would have failed in the object the author had in view in putting clearly and popularly before busy young men the actual state of the case in regard to these controversies. His early studies, and the way in which amidst engrossing pursuits he has kept himself abreast of the rapidly advancing discoveries and speculations in science, enable Dr. Paterson to speak with authority on the subjects treated of in this volume. He states the views held, exhibits their weaknesses and defects, and controverts the positions dogmatically maintained, from the standpoint of a practical acquaintance with biological science. Among the subjects thus dealt with are the nature and origin of life, the various forms of organised beings, and the evolution theories which are supposed to explain these forms, together with the bearing these speculations have on man in his physical, moral, and spiritual natures. In looking at the natural and necessary outcome of a creed which places man in the same position as the animals with which he is surrounded Dr. Paterson says:—

“Of course we find our friends deprecating any interpretation of their creed that would lead us to think that matters will become worse supposing it were adopted. And we find them contending—honestly, I admit; for I do not deny any man’s honesty in these matters of thought and argument—that, for their own part, they are quite as resolved to live what they esteem to be moral lives, without any regard to heaven above and without any regard to the consequences that may follow, as Christian men and women who are under the influence of belief in God and belief in an eternal state

of retribution hereafter. I am not speaking of what individuals may feel or profess, but I am speaking of what human nature is, and what human nature must continue to be, when I indicate that this creed of our beast-like origin and beast-like condition must determine our conduct in a beast-like direction. For my own part, I confess I cannot see how it could be otherwise. If it were possible for me to expunge from my mind all that I have learned about truth and virtue from the Word of God and from Christian influence ; if it were possible for me to believe that I occupy precisely the same position as either Darwin’s ante-monkean monkey or any other supposed ancestral beast, I would infer logically that there was not, at least, *any obligation* resting on me to do otherwise than to give full play to my animal instincts, and enjoy as much of this present world as I safely might without injury to myself or to those with whom I might be associated in affection and interest. And depend upon it, gentlemen, if you get the great majority of mankind to accept this teaching—if you get, particularly, those who have less of this world’s goods than their more fortunate neighbours to believe that the short span of fifty or sixty years is the only time in which they can receive either good or evil, and that always and only the prize is to the strong and the reward to those who clutch it, I will not venture to prophesy what the result may be. You can read it anticipatively in the French Revolution, and in many other catastrophes that have happened in the world long before.”

We congratulate the young men who listened to these lectures on the wholesome direction they received in their studies, and it is well that the benefits of the lectures are not to be confined to those who were assembled in the hall of the Young Men’s Christian Association. An intelligent appreciation of Dr. Paterson’s lines of argument, and apprehension of his facts will secure every young man against the attractions of the baneful dreams which have forced themselves into so remarkable a position in modern science.

W. CARRUTHERS, *British Museum.*

System der christlichen Glaubenslehre. Von Dr. J. A. DORNER. Erster Band : Grundlegung oder Apologetik. 1879.

This work, which a second volume is to complete, is practically a treatise on Systematic Theology in the form of an Apologetic, and as such it will form a valuable addition to existing literature of this class. It is characterised, as one would expect in anything from Dr. Dorner’s hand, by great depth of thought and comprehensiveness of treatment. We

have also been peculiarly struck by the beautiful clearness of arrangement. Many theological writers get into utter confusion, and are betrayed into endless repetition simply through lack of clear and logical division, but of this we find no trace in the volume before us. By way of introduction, Dr. Dorner shows the weakness of those who adopt the merely historical standpoint in the settling of belief—a weakness only equalled by that of those who regard all objective proof, historical or other, as worthless, and take their stand upon a theological Idealism. Then he proceeds to vindicate faith as standing upon higher ground than either, and yet claiming, only in a different sense, to have its position strengthened alike by the facts of outward history and of inward experience. This leads naturally to a division of the subject-matter contained under the head of “*Glaubenslehre*.” First of all, he breaks up the whole into two parts—the *Fundamentallehre* and the *Specielle-Glaubenslehre*,—of which the present volume deals only with the former. This fundamental doctrine Dr. Dorner proceeds to consider under a threefold division: (1.) The Doctrine of God; (2.) The Creature, especially Man; and (3.) The Oneness of God and Man. We have not space here to follow Dr. Dorner through the various lines of argument suggested by these heads; nor is it necessary, for his province in this volume is mainly to deal with the great elements of our religion, indicating and defending as to these the faith of the universal Church. We need only say that nothing could be more beautiful than the way in which we are led upward from the most elementary argument for the Divine existence step-by-step to the sublime manifestation of that existence in the incarnation of Jesus, the visible union-point of God and man. We anticipate that the second volume, from the nature of its contents, will demand more detailed review.

Erklärung der Korintherbriefe. Erster Band: von Dr. C. F. GEORG HEINRICI. 1880.

Our libraries are so well supplied with commentaries on the Epistles to the Corinthians in general, and with monographs on such sections as the 13th and 15th chapters of the first epistle, that we doubt whether the work before us is likely to

gain for itself a prominent place. Whilst saying this, however, we must add that it seems to us to be an admirable exposition. As a discussion of the text it is not characterised by the profound scholarship of Meyer; but the comparative lack of searching grammatical criticism which strikes us on a superficial survey is so far made up by a popularity of style not always combined with the other. There are some passages, doubtless, in which we should find ground for difference of opinion with the writer, as, for instance, the 10th and 11th chapters; and we are by no means inclined to follow him in his views (chap. xv.) on "Baptism for the Dead," but, with such inevitable reservations, we commend the book to our readers.

Whilst we have admirable Hebrew Grammars of the more scientific order, we are somewhat in want of a simpler manual for beginners, and Mr. Bowman's *Hebrew Course* (1), of which we have received the first part, promises, we think, to serve this purpose very well. He does not enter into the science of the language, but contents himself with such simple lessons as will well prepare the student for such works as those of Gesenius and others.

We have also had in our hands a *Manual of the Chaldee Language* (2), by Dr. M'Calman Turpie, to which we give our heartiest commendation. To many who have acquired a fair knowledge of Hebrew it must be matter for frequent regret that there are parts of the Old Testament whose meaning is so far closed to them for lack of some slight knowledge of Chaldee. Besides there is a literature, outside Scripture, most valuable to all who wish to understand the manner of Jewish thought and belief after the close of the inspired record,—to which only a knowledge of Chaldee will introduce us. We therefore heartily welcome this manual, which has been compiled by one well acquainted with the various languages of the East, and evidently well able to communicate his knowledge.

(1) *A New Hebrew Course.* By the Rev. T. Bowman, M.A., Clifton. Part I. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1879.

(2) *A Manual of the Chaldee Language.* By David M'Calman Turpie, D.D. Williams and Norgate. 1879.

In *Fifty Years of Foreign Missions* (3), Dr. Smith gives us an interesting survey of what has been done for Missions by the Free Church of Scotland since the year 1830. None could do the work better than the author of the lives of Dr. Duff and Dr. Wilson, and we need only say that Dr. Smith has laid the friends of Missions, and especially those of his own church, under a deep debt of gratitude by this labour of love. It is no mere passing memorial; it is rather fitted to be a most useful handbook—full, and yet so brief that those who have little time can peruse it in an evening. The maps and illustrations are admirable.

Sabbath Mornings with the Bombay Mission (4). In these "Sabbath Mornings" we have a brief prayer from the German of Johann Arndt and a study from the history of Missions for each Sabbath in the year. It is designed as a manual of devotion for those interested in the Mission cause, and it will serve its purpose well. But why should the prayers be so exclusively of an introspective kind?

Of *Counsels to Parents* (5), by Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell, we speak with a tone of caution. Its motives are high, for its purpose is to help parents towards developing a more healthy and pure morality among their children; in addition to this, many of the suggestions as to the *physical* wisdom of virtue are invaluable. But there is a point at which "plain speaking" on such matters runs a risk of defeating its purpose: has not this indeed been one of the evils of the Confessional?

Christian Home Life. A Book of Examples and Principles. By the author of "Christian Manliness." Religious Tract Society.

A capital book, upon a subject the importance of which is apt to be overlooked in those days of religious bustle and excitement. We advise all heads of families to purchase it.

(3) *Fifty Years of Foreign Missions.* By George Smith, C.I.E., LL.D., Secretary of the Missions of the Free Church. J. Maclaren and Son. 1879.

(4) *Sabbath Mornings with the Bombay Mission.* By the Rev. R. Stothert, Bombay. J. Maclaren and Son. 1880.

(5) *Counsels to Parents.* Second Edition. By Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell. Hatchards. 1879.

The New Hebrides and Christian Missions. With a Sketch of the Labour Traffic, and Notes of a Cruise through the group in the Mission Vessel. By ROBERT STEEL, D.D., Ph.D., minister of St. Stephen's Church, Sydney. London: James Nisbet and Co.

A tragic interest is attached to the history of missions in the South Seas, for there, perhaps more often than in any other modern mission-field, have the labourers been called to seal their testimony with their blood. This volume gives a graphic account of the missionaries and their work, from the time when John Williams perished on the shores of Eromanga until the present. The information regarding the labour traffic, the fears of French occupation, and the desire in the Colonies for annexation of the New Hebrides to the British Crown, gives additional value to the book, which also proves that, contrary to the assertions of the opponents of Christian missions, the life of the Lord's servants in those far-off islands is very different from the easy and luxurious one they would have us believe it to be.

The White Fields of France, or the Story of Mr. M'All's Mission to the Working Men of Paris and Lyons. By HORATIUS BONAR, D.D. London: James Nisbet and Co.

An account of one of the most remarkable religious movements of the day, written, as the author states in the preface, in order that the churches of Great Britain and America might be better acquainted with the spiritual condition, past and present, of Paris and of France, and to call their attention to the work carried on by Mr. M'All. Whatever Dr. Bonar writes is sure to be worth reading, and this book will, from the extent and variety of the information it contains, well repay an attentive perusal.

Lays of the Covenanters. By JAMES DODDS, author of "The Fifty Years' Struggle of the Covenanters," and "Thomas Chalmers, a Biographical Sketch," etc. Edinburgh: John Maclaren and Son.

A most interesting biographical sketch of the author precedes those "Lays," which certainly entitle him to no mean

place among the poets who have treated this fertile theme. No one can read the book without being thrilled by the vivid pictures of what may truly be called Scotland's heroic age.

Biblical Things Not Generally Known. A collection of Facts, Notes, and Information, concerning much that is rare, quaint, curious, obscure, and little known in relation to Biblical subjects. Second Series. London : Elliot Stock, 62 Paternoster Row.

Doubtless all readers of the first series of this work will desire to possess the second. The Preacher, the Sunday School Teacher, and the Bible Student, will each find this a treasury of illustration and information.

Bible Readings from the Acts of the Apostles, for Mothers' Meetings, etc. By Mrs. FREDERICK LOCKER, author of "Bible Readings from the Gospels," etc. London : The Religious Tract Society.

A really good book for mothers' meetings is always welcome, and the author has succeeded in making both simple and interesting her readings upon this portion of Scripture.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY 1880.

ART. I.—*Justification.*

THE justification of a sinner is a Divine transaction full of wonders. It is emphatically and eminently “the doing of the Lord,” for “it is God that justifieth,” and “it is marvellous in our eyes.” Nor can it be understood with that spiritual intelligence which calls forth our admiration and gratitude and praise, without our being led to see, as a first principle—(what is three times stated in the compass of a single verse, Gal. ii. 16)—that “a man is not justified by the works of the law.”

The justification of an unfallen, ever-dutiful creature and holy subject of God is an act most simple, involving not the slightest moral difficulty, and illustrating no marvellous or peculiar principles. It consists simply in judicially declaring the obedient and righteous one, whose case is to be disposed of, to be what he really is—obedient and righteous. It acquits of all blame or charge him who by stainless purity and innocence has incurred none; and it pronounces to be worthy of reward, or entitled to the promise, him who by his own merit and service, according to the stipulated condition, has earned his right and title and reward to the full. Nothing can be more simple in its procedure, or more obvious in its principle, than

justification in such a case as this. The innocence of the innocent is investigated and admitted : the righteousness of the righteous is brought to light and acknowledged and rewarded. The just is pronounced to be just, and accepted and dealt with as such. The just is justified.

But when we pass from the justification of the holy and unfallen to contemplate the justification of the *sinner*, it immediately becomes clear that if such a thing is not an utter impossibility—if it is not, as reason would at first sight pronounce, a contradiction in terms—it must be through the introduction of other principles—principles otherwise unnecessary and inadmissible, and indeed altogether new and astonishing.

For, let it be observed that justification in this case, precisely as in the other, is to consist in a judicial announcement that the party is free from blame and righteously entitled to reward. This is to be the import of the act performed or privilege conferred—a full acquittal from all charge or condemnation, and a full acknowledgment of a perfect right and title to all honour, inheritance, and life eternal. This is to be the deliverance from the tribunal of the Holy One—the tribunal from which no error can proceed, and from which no appeal can be taken ; and this deliverance, accurate, final, irresistible, is to be anent a sinner—a sinner guilty before God and his mouth stopped—declaring that sinner, notwithstanding that he is such, to be free from blame and entitled to favour and blessing and heaven.

Here, we again repeat, is a marvellous thing ; and the marvel is that it is not an impossibility, an unrighteousness, a contradiction. To save it from being such, it is requisite that certain principles be introduced, unknown in the simple transaction of justifying the holy and unfallen.

These principles are three—namely, Grace, Suretyship, and Faith.

We shall, in the first place, notice the manner in which they are introduced, rendering the justification of a sinner possible, holy, and real ; and, in the second place, we shall show how each of these three principles excludes the presence and influence of works or merit from this same act of a sinner's justification—thus demonstrating the thrice repeated declara-

tion or doctrine of Gal. ii. 16, that "a man is not justified by the works of the law."

I. In the first place, we propose to give a sketch of the manner in which these three principles, unnecessary and unknown in the justification of the innocent and obedient, become requisite and indispensable in justifying the ungodly.

1. And first, Grace must appear, else the sinner lies unpitied, unrelieved, beneath the sentence due to his iniquity; for "cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them," and "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men." Hence grace must interpose.

In justifying the holy and unerring, grace is not required nor admissible. "To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." Omniscient accuracy in examining his work or obedience, and then inflexible justice announcing and rewarding its faultless perfection,—this is all that is required where the law has been fulfilled and its reward been earned. Justice, simple and alone, rules this simple case. But where the subject is a sinful man, confessedly rebellious and apostate, alienated by an evil heart and by wicked works from God, and worthy of the Divine abhorrence and wrath,—if the penalty, righteously incurred, is nevertheless to be remitted, and the reward not earned is nevertheless to be conferred, this result must accrue from the grace of God; and the grace thus coming into action must obviously be absolutely sovereign and free. For the sinner, having broken a law that is holy and just and good, is in the hands and at the disposal of an offended righteous lawgiver; justice awards to him the wrath of God and the second death; it does so with unimpeachable righteousness. There can be no principle of holy government traversed, no rights in God's whole creation violated, no rightful claims dishonoured or neglected, if this guilty and condemned transgressor be forsaken to the doom he has incurred. And the Sovereign Lord is in the position therefore—a position standing out in bold relief against the dark background of the sinner's dreadful doom, strongly and sharply delineated in the light of unanswerable justice as it fills the court of heaven and discloses the rectitude of the sinner's condemnation and the terrors of the sinner's peril,—the Sovereign Lord is in the position to

vindicate his pure sovereignty and the free good pleasure of his will, and to declare that "he will have mercy on whom he will have mercy; he will have compassion on whom he will have compassion." Any dislike to his sovereignty, any appeal against his mere sovereignty, in such a case, is an infatuated retreat into the hands of justice, as it is offended by our sin, and demands our death. The one door of hope here, in this valley of Achor, is the good pleasure of the will of God—the introduction and inbringing of singular, signal, sovereign grace; the only grace, free, sovereign, and unfettered, that can be seasonable, or suitable, or sufficient for the crisis. The grace of God must appear, bringing salvation. For while the sinner stands condemned, shut up to the righteously deserved wrath of God, sovereign grace holds the key of the position, the key of David that openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth. Save for the introduction of grace, the sinner must go down into the pit.

If you are saved from going down into the pit, if you are acquitted and accepted notwithstanding your demonstrated and acknowledged guilt, if after lying in the hands of Divine justice you nevertheless appear at liberty again no more condemned but justified of God, most obvious it is that you are justified freely by his grace. In proportion to the force with which you realised the fact and the righteousness of your former condemnation, must you now be ready with the deeper emphasis to say, "According to his mercy he saved me, that being justified by grace, I might be made an heir according to the hope of eternal life" (Tit. iii. 7). Thus all throughout Holy Scripture the sinner's acquittal from guilt and acceptance as righteous are attributed to the grace, the mercy, the free love of God. "According to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted in the Beloved. In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace" (Eph. i. 5, 6, 7). Expressly, indeed, to illustrate the existence, in the glorious depths of his own nature, of this lovely attribute of grace, does God justify the ungodly, revealing at the same time its unsearchable riches, its infinite fulness, its absolute all-sufficiency, which can meet the case of literally the chief of

sinners. He willeth to make known the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy. His heart is set on demonstrating the boundlessness of the mercy he hath kept in store for them. Yea, and his grand design is not merely to show his grace in this life and in this world, during the ages of this world only, or to the inhabitants of this world only, but that in the ages to come, and unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places; in coming ages and in other worlds; he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us through Jesus Christ (Eph. ii. 7). Hence, while we were yet without strength, while we were ungodly, while we were enemies, guilty and condemned, God commendeth his love to us, in that he made provision to save us from wrath, to justify us freely, to reconcile us to himself as righteous and pleasing in his sight. And herein "God is rich in mercy, even for the great love wherewith he loved us, when we were dead in trespasses and in sins: for by grace are ye saved" (Eph. ii. 4).

Hence, the saints in Scripture, in seeking relief from the sentence of condemnation and the sense of sin, are found betaking themselves to the mercy, the grace, the loving-kindness of God. "Hear me, O God; for thy loving-kindness is good: turn unto me according to the multitude of thy tender mercies" (Ps. lxxix. 16). "Remember, O Lord, thy tender mercies and thy loving-kindnesses; for they have been ever of old. Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions: according to thy mercy remember me, for thy goodness' sake, O Lord" (Ps. xxv. 6, 7). "Where is the sounding of thy bowels and of thy tender mercies towards me?" (Is. lxiii. 15.) "Have mercy upon me, O Lord, according to thy loving-kindness; according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions" (Ps. li. 1). And having found relief, to this attribute of God and this principle in his procedure towards them, to the sovereign and free introduction of this principle of grace, of gratuitous compassion, of unclaimable, unexpected love, they uniformly attribute all the glory. "O give thanks unto the Lord, for he is good: for his mercy endureth for ever. Let the redeemed of the Lord say so, whom he hath redeemed from the hand of the enemy" (Ps. cxvii. 1, 2).

Thus in the justification of the ungodly, Grace is conspicuous. It is a free gift that comes upon sinners unto justification of

life ; abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness. And under the reign of grace alone could the ungodly be acquitted or accepted as righteous. But this principle of Grace *has* been introduced, to the praise of the glory of God, and in a measure of full sufficiency for every hearer of the gospel : for “where sin abounded, grace did much more abound” (Rom. v. 20).

2. But, secondly, it is just as clear that some other principle still must be introduced, though it were only to justify the introduction of this first principle of Grace. It cannot be supposed that the sovereignty wherewith this grace of God in the very nature of things must act is a mere arbitrary resolution on the part of God to do anything whatsoever, whether that might be worthy of himself or not. Grace, though sovereign, cannot possibly be an arbitrary principle of procedure, carrying out its purpose at all hazards, whatever damage might accrue to the interests of holiness, or whatever dishonour to the character of God. In justifying the ungodly, it must proceed on some basis of action, some understanding, some ground or reason, sufficient to justify itself. For, if some sufficient ground to which sovereign grace may have regard be not brought forward, it is impossible to vindicate or justify the grace of God in justifying the ungodly. Grace, in proposing to reverse the sentence of condemnation, must be able to justify itself to justice,—that justice which pronounced the sentence now about to be reversed. Nor can the wisdom, the faithfulness, the immutability of God be redeemed from sore aspersion, unless a new ground be brought forward sufficient to account for this change of procedure towards the guilty.

For, to condemn at one moment and justify the next, however the first may have proceeded from justice and the second from grace, must be an anomaly in government, utterly inexplicable, unless the Judge hath, in so changing and reversing his sentence, admitted into consideration or calculation a new and another principle, confessedly regarded as absent when the sentence of condemnation was pronounced. Save for this, the change must be absolutely arbitrary, reasonless, groundless ; either the former sentence of condemnation, or the new sentence of absolution, must be unjust ; they cannot both, proceeding on the same ground or basis, be righteous ; and on the supposition that the offender had been righteously condemned, his

acquittal now must be unjust and unholy. It matters not to reply that it is an act of grace; the question is, how Grace, in achieving this act, can justify herself to Justice, whose acknowledgedly righteous sentence Grace thus presumes to set aside and to reverse.

Now in reply to this the answer is, that there is another ground introduced for Grace to recognise in justifying the ungodly—a ground or basis or foundation of procedure additional to any that Justice had under consideration in condemning; and that therefore, although the sentence of the one is diametrically opposed to that of the other, still they come not at all into collision or contradiction. Grace can vindicate her own decision or deliverance, maintaining its righteousness as resting on this new element, this new foundation.

This second principle thus brought forward is the Suretyship of Christ, the introduction of a mediator, a substitute, a surety. An atoning surety, satisfying Divine justice and redeeming from the curse, himself being made a curse for us, places the work of Grace on a sure, a righteous, a holy foundation. The representation of the sinner at the bar of God by One altogether able to appear in his room, doing so of his own will, and appointed by supreme and sovereign authority to do so,—one who is holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners; a Divine person moreover, having his life in his own power as none but a Divine person could have, able therefore to lay it down of himself, in the room and stead of others, able also to expend it in obeying in the room and stead of others, thus bringing in a righteousness available for them; the blood of his ransom, likewise, being the pricelessly satisfying and all-purchasing blood of God, and his righteousness the righteousness of God; a representative and substitute such as this, releasing his clients from the death which he bears in their room and name, and releasing them from needing to achieve the title which by his obedience he secures on their behalf, may well justify the grace of God in justifying the ungodly, and demonstrate that the reversal of the condemning sentence of justice will secure the approbation of justice itself, yea, will be the very dictate and demand and doing of justice now.

We are justified freely by his grace: but it is through the redemption that is in Christ; and Grace reigns through right-

eousness. We have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins, through his blood. Yea, we are justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his justice in the remission of sins, to declare at this time his justice, in that he is both just and the justifier of him that believeth on Jesus (Rom. iii. 24-26).

Introduce this as the meritorious ground—the obedience, namely, and blood-shedding of the Lamb of God, standing in the room of his people, the responsible Head and Husband of the Church, appointed to be so by the offended Lawgiver himself, the Sovereign God,—himself God's dear Son, acquiescing of his own accord and with much delight in the position, and sustained in it by the infinite sufficiency of the Eternal Spirit;—and divine grace, having respect or regard to such a ground of procedure, appears no more an arbitrary, reasonless thing, choosing to say the opposite of what justice had solemnly said; but reasonable, righteous, and holy, itself even providing this very surety, and seeing to it that in him all the deliverances of justice shall be justified and executed, all the demands of justice owned and satisfied; providing, also, that through this holy and righteous channel, through the channel of the law made honourable and magnified in the cross and righteousness of God manifest in the flesh, a salvation free and rich, sovereign, triumphant, and unchallengeable, shall accrue to the poor and needy, without money and without price.

Such is the meritorious cause or justifying reason of justification by grace. Grace is the originating cause of justification, but the death and obedience unto death of a qualified and willing substitute is the meritorious or procuring cause. Sovereign grace is the free source, imputed righteousness the valid ground. The Father's grace is the fountain; the Son's righteousness is the foundation. The justified transgressor tastes the sweetness of the fountain, tries the security of the foundation. He tastes that the Lord is gracious, unto whom coming as unto a living stone, a foundation elect and precious, he is built up a lively stone, a member of a spiritual house, an acceptable royal priesthood.

Thus we are justified freely by his grace, but we are justified through the redemption, the propitiation, the righteousness

of Christ. And thus the sovereign Lord secures his honour, declares his righteousness, vindicates and justifies the holiness of his grace, and establishes for ever the security of his gracious procedure in justifying the ungodly that believe on Jesus.

Here, then, are two principles in the justification of a sinner, altogether new, and unknown in the justification of the un-fallen,—(*first*), Grace, sovereign free grace and love, justifying where mere justice must condemn; and (*secondly*) the surety-righteousness of Christ, making it as thoroughly just and righteous for grace to acquit and accept as for justice to condemn and disown.

And these two principles, the grace of God and the suretyship of Christ, singularly support each other. For it is grace that in seeking to justify the ungodly has provided the suretyship as a ground of justification. And it is this suretyship as the ground of the sinner's justification which justifies grace in justifying the sinner that believeth.

3. Observe, "the sinner *that believeth*." For there is manifestly a third new principle required, in order that this justification by sovereign grace through imputed righteousness may take effect, may actually take effect in each separate instance. The whole world is not justified *en masse*, simply because there is a source of justification in the grace of God and a ground of justification in the suretyship of Christ. Personally and individually, one by one, each for himself, must sinful men come under the operation of these principles if they are to enjoy actual justification before God. And what, it may be asked, is it that brings one and not another, that brings some and not all,—what is it that brings *any* into contact or connection with the grace which is the origin of this privilege, or the righteousness which is the foundation of it? Evidently there is necessity for some third new principle, not requisite, and indeed inadmissible, in the justification of the holy and un-fallen. It is the principle of Faith:—Faith, by which, as an act and habit of the heart, the sinner appeals to the grace of God; by which, as by a mental spiritual instrument, the sinner appropriates the righteousness of Christ.

And it is evident that this personal and appropriating faith on the sinner's part is required on God's part not by a mere arbitrary decree, any more than his own act of grace is a mere

arbitrary and groundless deliverance. In the very nature of the case faith is requisite in order that this justification by grace may actually take effect. For it must take effect and terminate in the sinner's own conscience. It must so transpire and be enacted there, as that he may be free from guilt in his conscience,—free from all sentence, prosecution, and condemnation there. But a justification thus taking effect in the inmost spiritual being of an intelligent responsible subject of the divine government—the first condition and commencement of his intelligent friendship with God—cannot possibly accomplish its own design, save where it is understood and acquiesced in, where it is embraced and rested on, where it is intelligently appreciated, appealed to, and appropriated by the individual. But to do this is the very office of faith. Without faith therefore it is impossible to be justified before God, impossible to please God, or be pleasing and accepted in His sight. Without faith, transferring the soul and all its confidence to the new foundation laid in Zion, to the atoning, accepted substitute, it is impossible to have any personal interest in the new righteousness of justification. Without faith confiding in the grace and free promise of God, it is impossible to lean on the new righteousness, which is itself the provision and the gift of grace. Without faith, the sinner stands alone, and aloof from the Lord our righteousness; and not being in him as the Lord *his* righteousness, the imputation of righteousness to such an one on God's part would be a mere fiction or mistake: he remains, therefore, destitute of righteousness, unjustified, condemned. So indispensable is faith as a means of bringing the sinner into the grace of justification, and under the ministration or imputation of its righteousness.

Here, then, is the *third* principle introduced, namely, Faith; securing the connection of the individual with the ground of justification, which is the righteousness of Christ, and with the source of justification, which is the grace of God.

Here we may pause with advantage, and notice in the light of these remarks the different senses in which Holy Scripture attributes our justification to three different causes,—distinct yet conspiring—distinct and therefore conspiring.

(1.) In the *first* place, we are said to be justified by the grace of God, as in Rom. iii. 24: "Being justified freely by his

grace." For being, as sinners, under the righteous wrath of God, our justification in such circumstances must be an act of eminent and singular, of free and unfettered grace. Its very origin must be in grace. Its very possibility, its very idea or conception, presupposes grace. We are justified by grace as the *originating* cause.

(2.) In the *second* place, we are said to be justified by the righteousness or obedience of Christ, including of course his death, as the most eminent act of his obedience, as in Rom. v. 19: "By the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." For, being destitute of all righteousness ourselves, and justice demanding a perfect satisfaction and impregnable title ere it remit the sentence of death, and confer the reward of life, and Jesus in our room bearing the curse, and bringing in the righteousness to which God has regard in justifying us, we are thus justified by the righteousness of Christ as the *procuring* cause.

(3.) And, *thirdly*, we are said to be justified by faith, as in Rom. v. 1: "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God," or in Gal. ii. 16: "A man is justified by the faith of Jesus Christ;" and the reason is that faith as an instrument embraces and pleads the righteousness of Christ, and appeals and gives glory to the grace of God. We are justified by faith as the *instrumental* cause.

Thus do these three causes—the originating cause, the procuring cause, the instrumental cause—conspire, each in its own place, and for its own end, to put us in possession of a merciful and holy, a pleadable and sure justification. We attribute all to the grace of God alone, as its source. We rest all on the righteousness of Christ alone, as the sure and sufficient ground. We hold all in actual possession by faith, and faith alone.

Thus much for the sketch we proposed to give of the three principles inevitably introduced into justification, if it is to be the justification of one worthy of death.

II. And now, secondly—which may now be comparatively a brief work—let us consider how each of these three principles necessarily excludes the presence and influence of "works." Nay, rather, let us show—from Scripture of course, our only

source of knowledge—how the introduction of works, even in any measure, must subvert at once the grace of God as the origin, the righteousness of Christ as the ground, and the exercise of faith as the instrument, of our justification. So that by works (1) the grace of God is frustrated, (2) the death of Christ made in vain, (3) faith itself made void.

(1.) If you introduce the element of works at all, in any measure, into the question of your acceptance with God, and the ground of your peace with God, you immediately fetter and thereby frustrate the grace of God. From this—from frustrating the grace of God—from such guilt, Paul shrunk back affrighted. “I do not frustrate the grace of God,” said he. It is as with a cry of agony that he flees, affrighted, from such guilt. And how that fearful guilt may be incurred, he shows is by resting our acceptance on our own obedience, or expecting righteousness or justification to come by the law. “I do not frustrate the grace of God; for if righteousness come by the law, Christ is dead in vain” (Gal. ii. 21). And again, in warning the Galatians against resting anything of their acceptance with God upon the law, or imagining circumcision necessary to their justification, he cries out to them with peculiar solemnity in one of those passages in which, Luther said, Paul thundered rather than spake: “I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of none effect to you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace” (Gal. v. 3, 4).

“Ye are fallen from grace:”—“Ye have frustrated grace.”

And let it be remarked, we “fall from grace”—we “frustrate grace”—not merely by excluding it altogether, but by admitting works to any rivalry or co-ordinate share of influence with it, even in the least degree. For if it is of works at all, it is no more grace. For, argues our apostle, “To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt; but to him that worketh not”—to him who in this matter, and for this end, absolutely worketh not, worketh nothing, abstains from working, obtrudes or introduces no works at all—but simply “believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness” (Rom. iv. 4, 5). Otherwise righteousness could not be imputed to him. He could not be

justified. It is his entire cessation in this matter from all works that can alone admit the action of grace. To trust in works and distrust grace are more than conjoined. Self-righteousness and unbelieving dislike or suspicion of grace are indeed identical.

Let me appeal to those whom it may concern, and ask them to examine their own hearts. Why is it that you do not take your entire and trustful and hearty appeal to the free, unfettered, sovereign grace of God? Why is it that you are not content and delighted that God should be altogether sovereign in showing mercy? Why do you feel as if something grated harshly on your ear, or your heart or hopes, when the voice of the gracious Lord is heard, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion"? Why should *that* give you pain, or give you pause? It would not do so if you felt that you have not, and can never have, any righteousness of your own. You imagine that God, in declaring he will have mercy on you simply and only if he please, is overlooking and dishonouring some claim which you possess upon his mercy, some hold upon his pity which your goodness or repentance or anxieties and prayers have given you. Oh! if you would believe it, sovereign, free mercy is much more large and unbounded—much more safe and sufficient—in its perfect freedom, which you never can bring under constraint to you, than all your fancied claim could be, though it were ten thousand times stronger than your fondest imagination can conceive. Free grace is unsearchably rich. It hath multitudes of tender mercies; and it *acteth* "according to the multitude of its tender mercies." Free grace, in virtue of being utterly unfettered and free, is precisely the grace that can omnipotently and all freely move and sway, in answer to your need; the helm, answering in the darkest night and the utmost tempest—"though the waters roar and are troubled, and the mountains shake with the swelling thereof." Free grace, most sovereign, acting on the lead, and following second to no claim or work or righteousness of yours, following second to no power in earth or hell or heaven, owning no power higher than itself, but triumphing in the absolute and independent power of its own sweet royal will, reigning on its throne—its "throne of grace,"—at which

let no sin-stained soul ever dare to unfold his offensive claim of right, and no contrite sinner ever dread to tell his tale of woe in deep and full confession,—free grace, most sovereign, is that alone that can suffice for you, for it is that of which alone it can be said, “Where sin abounded, grace hath much more abounded.” Why will you not leave the grace of God to be free and independent, royal and sovereign indeed? Why will you produce any worth or works of yours, and wield them as an instrument to arrest and constrain and fasten down this grace of God? Why will you seek to tie up the hands of love? Why not acquiesce in the free and sovereign reign of grace?

Even *sin* hath reigned: “Sin hath reigned unto death:” sin hath reigned with your own consent. It hath spurned control and brooked no interference with the freedom of its reign. Sin, in you, hath had the field unhindered, to itself. This is the real ground for any anxieties anent death and eternity and God. Sin hath reigned; and you have allowed it. And will you not allow Grace to reign?—to reign over you, and in you, and for you, unto your salvation and eternal life? Will you not allow it to reign, that by its own free and kingly and unhampered and triumphant action, it may justify you freely, and make you also free and kingly and unhampered and triumphant in the liberty wherewith Christ by free grace makes his people free? Your self-righteousnesses are but chains you forge wherewith to bind this king a captive for your service. Will he stoop to the infinite degradation? No: he will sit free on his own royal seat, his “throne of grace,” and acting from thence, he will save in his sovereign reign and pleasure, or not at all. If you yield not to the reign of grace, you are a slave beneath the reign of sin, and sin shall reign over you unto the second death. Why, then, will you not shake off every dependence on your own righteousness and works? Say not that you have really done so, unless you be content to rest on sovereign grace; and unless, being content and really resting, you find in that rest and that contentment some of the repose of soul which rest and contentment are sure to bring.

But if not yet content with sovereign grace alone, it is because you have not yet resigned every other hope; because you cling to something you have done, or still expect to have

power (or even help from God) to do ; because you desire to have something of your own by which to secure your salvation yourself, by which to tie and bind the Lord and his mercy. You cannot bear the thought of leaving God free ; with all its absurdity, you would rather lay some train that would *necessitate* and *force* the action of grace. And then it would be grace no more : its very nature would be subverted, and its action frustrated. “ But,” says Paul, “ I do not frustrate the grace of God.”

(2.) The introduction of works equally overthrows the suretyship of Christ. In that case Christ is made of none effect to you. Christ is dead in vain !

What an impeachment of the righteousness and wisdom of God !—to pursue any line of action, thought, or feeling, which, if right, must naturally tend to show that Christ is dead in vain, fruitlessly, uselessly, unnecessarily ! But if by some works or worth of yours you can entitle yourself to the justifying grace of God, then God himself cannot be justified in requiring the satisfaction and atonement of Christ to vindicate his grace in justifying you. He, in that case, demanded a sacrifice and subjected his own Son to suffering which you undertake to prove might have been dispensed with. Away with the vain and blasphemous attempt ! But how away with it ? Only if, resigning every rag of righteousness, every plea and claim, we (in the first place) justify God in thus condemning us,—and this we do when we say from the heart, “ Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest ;” and if (in the second place) we justify God in calling in the death of his Son as the only ground of our justification, and this we do when we flee to Christ as our refuge, counting *all* things but loss that we may gain Christ, and be found in him, not having our own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness which is through the faith of Christ,—the righteousness which is of God by faith.

(3.) For, *thirdly*, as resting on our own works subverts justification, both as originating in the grace of God, and as founded on the suretyship of Christ, so thereby also is “ faith made void ;” for “ if they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the promise,” to which faith looks, “ is made of none

effect" (Rom. iv. 14). And the reason is, that faith leaning in any measure on our works—looking to a promise suspended or conditional on our righteousness—a fallible, faltering, failing condition—faith, in that case, falters and fails too. Let faith rest on sovereign, unconditional grace, on a righteousness already finished and eternal, on a promise not suspended on any condition, but absolute; then "it is of faith, that it might be by grace, to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed" (Rom. iv. 16). And thus, faith, claiming God's free love, in Christ's sure and perfect work, on the warrant of God's absolute, unfailing word, abides fully "persuaded that what God hath promised he is able also to perform; and therefore it is imputed to us for righteousness" (Rom. iv. 20, 21). Every reason for suspicion of insecurity is cleared away;—every gate by which danger might enter is closed;—the glory shines forth as belonging wholly to the Lord;—the covenant stands impregnable as the everlasting and blessed home of our weary and waiting souls: and "being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom also we have access by faith into the grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God."

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ART. II.—*The New Testament a Standing Monument and
Verification of the Divine Mission of Jesus Christ.*

ONE of the most interesting and beautiful monuments of ancient Rome is the famous Arch of Titus, which was erected in honour of that Emperor, soon after his death, by the Senate and people of Rome, to commemorate especially his subjugation of the Jewish nation and the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70 of our era. The original inscription of the Arch still remains to tell that this was the occasion and design of the erection; and on one of the piers under the Arch there is still to be seen in a state of good preservation a highly interesting sculpture representing a procession of Roman soldiers bearing the spoils which had been taken from the Temple of Jerusalem, among which may be plainly recognised the table of shew-bread, the silver trumpets used by the priests,

and the seven-branched candlestick of massive gold. All these sacred objects perfectly correspond with the description of them given by Josephus, and this sculpture forms the only authentic representation of them which is known to exist. The Arch of Titus is thus both a standing *monument* and a convincing *verification* of an important historical event which was separated in date from the death of Jesus Christ by a distance of less than forty years; and no one can gaze upon that famous sculpture without a vivid feeling of being carried in thought quite across all the intervening centuries, and without realising the events thus commemorated as distinctly as if they had occurred in his own lifetime.

“The New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ” is, in like manner, a monument and a verification of his Divine mission. It is a monument, indeed, of a different kind—a work of many pens, not of many hammers and chisels; but such literary monuments have often proved more enduring than those of marble and bronze. This monument consists of a collection of writings built up into a pyramidal form—the Four Gospels lying four-square to constitute the broad and solid basis, the Acts and Pauline Epistles piled up to form the massive lower and middle tiers of the masonry, the remaining Epistles tapering gradually upwards towards the apex, and the Revelation of St. John—heaven-seeking and cloud-cleaving—forming the final apex itself. These writings began to be composed by the apostles and evangelists as early as twenty-five years after the Crucifixion. It is admitted, even by unbelievers like Renan and Strauss, that the four chief Epistles of St. Paul—those to the Galatians, the Corinthians, and the Romans—were all written within thirty years of that event, and that they are all without doubt the genuine productions of Paul. Three out of the four Gospels, and most of the other Epistles, have been held by the great majority of Christian scholars to date from the interval between the earliest Epistles of St. Paul and the Fall of Jerusalem; while the writings of St. John, which complete the collection, have been as generally held to belong to the last thirty or twenty years of the first Christian century. Later dates, indeed, have been assigned by other critics to many of these books—including both Gospels and Epistles—a fact which I do not wish to

conceal; and for the last half-century and more there has been much controversy upon critical questions of this nature, in the course of which extreme positions have been taken up by many rationalists and disbelievers. But these critics have always differed as much from one another as from the views ordinarily held by the Church at large. It is likewise an admitted fact that many extreme positions formerly taken up have been subsequently abandoned, and that a steady tendency has been manifested during the last twenty years to fall back, if not entirely, yet more and more approximately, to the old position, that the whole New Testament collection was already complete before the close of the first Christian century. The interesting coincidence is thus brought into view that the *literary* monument of the mission of Christ was approaching completion at the very same date when the marble monument of Titus was receiving the last touches of the sculptor's chisel, and that the two historical memorials were already existing side by side in Rome in the first century, which were to descend together to the present day, to commemorate—the one, the downfall of Jerusalem, and the desecration and destruction of the Temple of Jehovah; the other, the advent and Divine mission of the great world Teacher and Deliverer, who had wept over the once holy city and temple in anticipation of the approaching catastrophe, but whose tears had been ill requited by a crown of thorns and a cross of agony and shame.

But what, it may be asked, is the evidence which is relied upon by Christian scholars to sustain this very early date of the Christian Scriptures? It is only a small portion of the evidence which I can refer to within my present limits, but even that small portion of it may suffice for the purpose now in view. We can trace back the existence of this work to the century when it was written, in precisely the same manner as it is possible to trace back the existence of any of the other great works of antiquity. To begin at no later date than the fourth century, there are still two manuscripts of it in existence which can be proved to have been transcribed in that century—the one deposited in the library of the Vatican—the other, not long ago discovered in the Monastery of Mount Sinai, and now deposited in the Imperial

Library of St. Petersburg. Three versions of the book still existing—in as many different languages, of the East, and West, and South—in Syriac, Latin, and Egyptian, carry up the proof from the fourth century to the third, and from the third century to the second. In the second century we find a great number of quotations from the Book occurring in the writings not only of orthodox Fathers of the Church, but of heretical authors, who differed in many things from the great body of the Church, and even in the works of Pagan adversaries, who quoted the Gospels and Epistles only for the purpose of ridicule and abuse, but thus unwittingly left a contribution to the proof of their antiquity and genuineness. The joint effect of all these very early quotations is to carry back the date of this written monument to the beginning of the second century or near the close of the first. Beyond this date—connecting it with the epoch of the Fall of Jerusalem—the number of Christian writings additional to those of the New Testament which have come down to us is extremely small, and the chain of *external* proofs in these circumstances necessarily becomes less and less strong. But in the last two decades of the first century we already find ourselves in the apostolic age itself, for at that date the apostle John, the last survivor of the Twelve, was in all probability still living in extreme old age at Ephesus; and it was in his old age that he wrote his precious Gospel and First Epistle—writings which are so full of the apostle's strongly marked characteristics, as these are to be gathered from the other three Gospels, that we scarcely need any outside testimony to the authorship. The case of the two Epistles of St. Peter is very much the same. Comparing the traits of his temperament and character found in the Gospels with the spirit and lineaments revealed in these Epistles, we have no difficulty in perceiving that they are characteristically Petrine, as much so as the writings of St. John are characteristically Johannine. And as to the collected Epistles of St. Paul, it is the *internal* evidence of their Pauline authorship, and that alone, which has extorted even from disbelievers like Strauss and Renan the acknowledgment of the genuineness of the collection, if not as a whole, yet in its most important parts; and which has also been relied upon by Christian scholars to prove the literary authenticity of all

these writings. I should add, however, to this statement one large and important attestation of an *external* character, which applies to all those books without exception, which are now, and ever since the close of the fourth century have been, included in the New Testament canon. It came from Eusebius, the celebrated historian of the first three centuries of the Church, who directed particular attention to the question of what books had been included in the canon from the earliest Christian times down to his own age; and who found as the result of his investigations, that all the books of the New Testament, except a few, had been always and universally acknowledged in the Church as the writings of those whose names they bear, including among these the four Gospels, the Acts, all the principal Epistles, and the Revelation; and that even the few books which were disputed by some Christian writers had been accepted, along with the rest, by "the many," *i.e.* by the great majority. When Eusebius recorded these important facts, let us reflect that he had before him a much more abundant Christian literature of these three first centuries than has descended to later ages, and that this gave him advantages for investigating the question much superior to those possessed by critics of the nineteenth century, who have ventured to call in question the accuracy of his account.

I repeat, then, the affirmation that the New Testament is a standing monument of the Divine Mission of Jesus Christ. It arose out of His mission, in the very century of that mission. But for Him and His work it would never have existed. It was His great life and nothing else that called it into being; and for eighteen centuries it has stood before the world as the visible and palpable memorial and monument of that life.

But the New Testament is much more than a monument of the Divine Mission of Jesus Christ; it is also a verification of it. It is *full* of verifications of it. It is a book not only full of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, but equally full of evidences that this Gospel is the very truth of God—a veritable message from God to man, insomuch that a man does not need to go beyond the contents of the book itself in order to find ample grounds for accepting the Christian faith.

Let me refer here to the remarkable language which the

apostle John makes use of in speaking of the contents and design of his own invaluable contribution to the great biography: "And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples which are not written in this book. But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name." He speaks of his Gospel as a *Book of Signs*, i.e. of clear indications, or tokens, or evidences that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God; and claims that these existed in sufficient number and force to call forth the faith of men in His Divine character and mission. To make such "signs" competent manifestations of a Divine quality in Christ and His work they must of course have a Divine quality or attribute of some sort in themselves. Hence the New Testament use of the word "signs" (which often occurs in connection with wonders and miracles) is to denote something which is above and beyond what is merely human, or merely natural—something which transcends all the ordinary forces and phenomena of the course of nature and human life—something which can only be rationally explained by referring it to the attributes or the action of God Himself. It was such "signs" as these which John recorded in his Gospel to serve as a foundation for Christian faith or conviction. It was "many other signs" of the same kind done in the presence of His disciples which were recorded in the other three Gospels to serve the same end. Here, then, is one of the aspects in which we are taught by one of the evangelists themselves to regard the four Gospels, and one of the uses to which they were meant to be applied by us. They are all books of "signs,"—books full of "tokens" or "manifestations" of Divine attributes indwelling in the person and work of Jesus Christ—books full of "evidence" to prove that the historical man Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ of God, and as emphatically *the* Son of God as He was emphatically *the* Son of Man.

Let me proceed then to point out some of the chief groups into which these "signs" of Divine Attributes in the person and work of Jesus Christ may be distributed, or the principal heads to which they may be reduced; touching upon them however rather than treating or discussing them, not

only on account of the narrow limits at my command, but also because most of the topics now to be indicated belong to other lines of argument with which we are not at present concerned.

1. We find everywhere in the Gospels the "signs" of superhuman and Divine *purity* and *perfection* in the *character* of Jesus Christ. The Four Gospels are four original biographies of Jesus Christ, and each of these biographies is in effect a portraiture of His character and spirit both morally and religiously ;—I say in effect, because they are not portraitures in strict artistic form. In none of them is the portrait executed in a pictorial style ; in all it is left to reveal itself through the simple, straightforward narrative of the words which He spoke, and the deeds which He did, and the habits and ways of His life from day to day and from year to year. It is in all these ways that a man's character declares itself ; and when all a man's words and ways and doings are full of character, as His pre-eminently were, there is no revelation of character so effective and impressive as a plain, unadorned, inartificial record of His life. Now, with the four biographies before us, and after the most careful and oft-repeated perusal of them, as such a revelation of character, what is the conviction which they work more or less strongly in us all ? Is it not exactly the conviction which was so freely expressed by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that "Jesus was holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners" ? Have you noticed how often this same profound feeling of more than human, more than mortal, purity and sanctity was on the lips of the apostles when they first stood forth in Jerusalem to proclaim their Master as the Prince of Life and the Lord of glory ? "The God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, hath glorified His Son Jesus, but ye delivered Him up, and in the presence of Pilate denied *the Holy One and the Just*." Once and again, when "they lift up their voice to God with one accord" to pray for the martyr-gift of boldness to preach the word, the name which they love to give their Master is, "this holy child Jesus," pleading that signs and wonders may be done in the name of that Holy One. Is it not manifest from these examples that the first followers and servants of Christ saw in His spotless holiness and unstained purity a "sign," a token of

His superhuman greatness—that to them His God-resembling sinlessness and perfection was an evidence of His Divine Sonship? And so it may well be to ourselves. A man whom all His most intimate friends and confidants continually spoke of as a man without sin; “who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth,” as St. Peter testifies; “in whom is no sin;” Jesus Christ the righteous One—as St. John bears witness; a man who could challenge His enemies to their face to convict Him of a single act of sin; most amazing of all, a man who, though He prayed without ceasing, was never heard to make confession of sin before the Divine Searcher of hearts Himself, and who could calmly, face to face with His Father, say “I have glorified Thee on the earth, I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do,” acknowledging no sin, or shortcoming, or slightest mixture of evil or imperfection in His whole life-work:—such a man was surely not a mere man however separate from all others, but a man who was also more than man—a man who, if He took hold of our humanity on one side of His personality, took hold of the Divine nature on the other side—who was Son of Man and Son of God in one.

Mr. Lecky, in his *History of Rationalism in Europe*, gives expression to some admirable thoughts on the perfect ideal which Christianity holds up as a moral standard to the world in the sinless character of Christ:—

“The great characteristic of Christianity, and *the great moral proof of its divinity*, is that it has been the main source of the moral development of Europe, and that it has discharged this office not so much by the inculcation of a system of ethics, however pure, as by the assimilating and attractive influence of a *perfect ideal*. There is, indeed, nothing more wonderful in the history of the human race, than the way in which that ideal has traversed the lapse of ages, acquiring [in the eyes of men] a new strength and beauty with each advance of civilisation, and infusing its beneficent influence into every sphere of thought and action. The usual progress of mankind can never cease to be distinctively and intensely Christian, as long as it consists of a gradual approximation to the character of the Christian Founder. The divinity of the moral ideal of Christianity has been recognised by its perfection; and it is no exaggeration to say that at no former period was it so powerful or so universally acknowledged as at present. This perfect ideal is a phenomenon altogether unique in history; and to those who recognise in the highest type of excellence the highest revelation of the Deity, its importance is too manifest to be overlooked.”

2. We find everywhere in the Gospels the "signs" of super-human and divine wisdom and insight in Jesus Christ.

It was a remarkable testimony which was borne to Him by the officers of the Pharisees and chief priests—"Never man spake like this man." These men had been sent to lay hold upon him and bring him to the bar of their masters; but such was the wisdom and power with which He spake that they could not resist the fascination of His teaching, and were completely disarmed of their purpose and power to lay hands upon Him; they felt themselves laid hold of by Him by a religious and moral constraint which it was impossible for them to overcome. But it is more remarkable still to find the same testimony in effect borne to the teaching of Christ by some of the leading intellects of our own age—an age so immensely in advance of the first century as an era of philosophical speculation and scientific knowledge. "Never in history," men like John Stuart Mill and Mr. Lecky in effect admit, or rather contend, "was there a moral and religious teacher who taught like this man."

"Nothing," says the latter, "can be more erroneous or superficial than the reasonings of those who maintain that the moral element of Christianity has in it nothing distinctive or peculiar. The method of this school has been to collect from the writings of different heathen writers certain isolated passages embodying precepts that were inculcated by Christianity, and when the collection had become very large the task was supposed to be accomplished. But the true originality of a system of moral teaching depends, not so much upon the elements of which it is composed, as upon the manner in which they are fused into a symmetrical whole, upon the proportionate value that is attached to different qualities, or, to state the same thing by a single word, upon the type of character that is formed. Now it is quite certain that the Christian type differs, not only in degree but in kind, from the Pagan one."

"Whatever else may be taken away from us by rational criticism," says Mr. Mill in his posthumous *Essays on Religion*, "Christ is still left—a unique figure—not more unlike all his precursors than all his followers, even those who had the direct benefit of his personal teaching. It is of no use to say that Christ as exhibited in the Gospels is not historical, and that we know not how much of what is admirable has been superadded by the tradition of his followers. The tradition of followers suffices to insert any number of marvels. But who among his disciples, or among their proselytes, was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus, or of imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospel? Certainly not the fishermen of Galilee; as certainly not St. Paul, whose character and idiosyncrasies were of a totally different sort; still less the early Christian writers, in whom nothing is more evident than that the good which was in them

was all derived, as they always professed that it was derived, from the higher source. But about the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal originality combined with profundity of insight which must place the Prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who have no belief in his inspiration, in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom our species can boast."

These are remarkable concessions to Christianity to come from a man who was educated on a system apart from all Christian influences, and from whose precocious boyhood and brilliant youth all Christian culture was withheld; and it is perhaps more surprising that in his ripe manhood he should have learned to write in such a tone of high appreciation and admiration of Christ than that he should have preferred to speak of his *sublime genius* rather than of his Divine inspiration. We mourn that having advanced so far towards the full truth in spite of so many powerful hindrances to hold him back, he did not see his way to take one great step more. It would only have been philosophical in so distinguished a philosopher not to have rested in the use of so vague and indefinite a term as "genius" as sufficient to account for everything that appeared in a Jewish Christ, however extraordinary and transcending all Jewish example—whereas it in fact accounts for nothing. There are inevitable limits even to the creative power of genius; there are impossibilities of achievement even to the sublimest genius that could spring from the bosom of Judaism: and one of these was that a man born and bred a Jew should by mere natural genius and development become the Christ both of Jew and Gentile, the Saviour of the world, a preacher and model for all mankind; that a man with no more religious and moral and intellectual training than was to be got in a remote hill-village of Galilee, should, without the inspiration and mission of God, become the light of the whole world. For could any good thing come out of Nazareth, least of all the best of all possible things? That a member of the most exclusive, narrow, and bigoted nation on earth, being left to the mere natural forces and laws of evolution, should burst upon the world at thirty years of age, thinking such great broad thoughts, and speaking such grand universal words, and laying down such glorious world-embracing plans of salvation and eternal life, of truly divine fragrance, reaching to the uttermost bounds of earth

and time!—I think more of the natural difficulty felt by His fellow-Nazarenes to account for His unearthly wisdom, than of the glib facility with which Mr. Mill explains it all by referring it to His sublime genius. “When He was come into his own country,” we read, “He taught them in their synagogue, insomuch that they were astonished, and said, Whence hath this man this wisdom, and these mighty works?” (for they perfectly well knew all that Nazareth and its surroundings could be expected to do for a man); “is not this the carpenter’s son? is not his mother called Mary, and his brothers and sisters, are they not all with us? Whence then hath this man all these things? And they were offended in him.” That is, He was a stumbling-block to them which they could not get over, a puzzle which they could not solve, a mystery which they could not clear up, and I think their difficulty to explain Him was a truer and wiser instinct than Mr. Mill’s facility of explanation. They saw at least the hardness of the knot which was here given them to untie, though they failed in the right solution of it, and remained in unbelief. Whereas Mr. Mill sees no knot of difficulty but what he thinks himself well able to solve by the indefinite term ‘genius,’ as if mere natural genius could be mighty enough to remove mountains, and as if it were with man and nature, and not with God, that all things are possible.

3. We find everywhere in the Gospels the “signs” of super-human and Divine love.

Of all the features of these four biographies this is the one which is most prominent. They are all the biographies of a life of love; of love manifesting itself in every way; in word and in deed, in work and in endurance, in long-suffering patience and in energetic beneficence, in perpetual self-communication and perpetual self-denial, in unbounded self-surrender and limitless self-sacrifice. To enter into detailed examples of all this is impossible, and is quite unnecessary. It is enough, as to the biographical facts, to recall the comprehensive and impressive words made use of by the apostle Peter on the first memorable occasion of his preaching Jesus to the Gentiles in the house of the Roman Cornelius: “How God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of

the devil, for God was with him; and we are witnesses of all things which he did both in the land of the Jews and in Jerusalem." Here we have both the fact of His mighty unexampled love, and the apostle's explanation of it. To him such astonishing love was a sign and a wonder, revealing the presence and power of the very love of God Himself. In the presence and life of Jesus of Nazareth there was present all that was possible or imaginable of human love, but the human love lost itself like a mighty rolling river in the still mightier ocean of the love of God. The two loves blended in His every loving word and deed, in His every act of gracious self-denial and self-sacrifice, in every instance and incident of His life-long *passion* from the manger-cradle to the bitter Cross. It was a love to *adore* as well as to admire, to worship on bended knees as well as to embrace with sympathy and delight. Hear how the apostle of love adores it in the opening doxology of the Apocalypse: "Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion, for ever and ever. Amen." And recall the fervent language of St. Paul, in which he labours to give some feeble expression to what he feels to be quite inexpressible—to what is the length and the breadth, the depth and the height, of the love of Christ, a love so blessed to know that we are to strive and to pray that we may know it more and more, and yet a love so boundless and unfathomable that it passeth all human knowledge.

4. We find everywhere in the New Testament the "signs" of superhuman and Divine *power* indwelling in Jesus Christ. When we read of signs and wonders in the Gospels, or in the Acts of the Apostles, we are apt to understand them only of acts of miraculous powers. We have seen in the three preceding groupings of the signs and wonders of the great biography that they have a wider and more inclusive meaning, that they include a vast number of signs and wonders of superhuman purity, and wisdom, and love, all attributes of Christ which, as far transcending the natural limits of humanity, can only be carried up and referred to the absolute being and nature of God. But these signs, and wonders, and diverse miracles of the New Testament are in numberless instances tokens and manifesta-

tions of Divine power as well—and in all cases are instances of this power intervening among the established forces and successions of the natural order of things—and bringing to pass changes and new conditions either in the persons of men or in the framework of nature which could not have taken place without such supernatural intervention. All the four Gospels contain many examples of these *physical miracles* of Christ; and there are also not a few instances of them to be found in the Acts of the Apostles and in the allusions and appeals of the Epistles. The place and importance which our Lord assigned to these miracles of power among the “signs” or verifications of His Divine mission have often been overstated in past times, and by way of reaction against this extreme they are often understated in our own day. It was an exaggeration to say that He assigned to them a first and indisputable place among the credentials of His mission, though no man could ever be drawn to accept it as a mission from God without this particular attestation of Divine power in the form of physical miracles. It will be remembered that on one occasion when a nobleman besought Him to come down from Cana to Capernaum to heal his son who was at the point of death, He complained that except they saw signs and wonders of this physical kind they would not believe—implying that there were signs and wonders of another kind, those namely to which I have hitherto referred, which ought to have been a sufficient warrant for their faith. On the other hand, it is equally certain that He judged such palpable miracles as appealed to the bodily senses of men to be ordinarily necessary, and indispensable to the success of His ministry in awakening public attention and conciliating belief. Even when the inquirer concerning His Messiahship was the imprisoned Baptist himself, He answered his inquiries in the first instance, not by words, but by deeds, not by moral signs but by miracles of power. In the same hour He cured many of their infirmities and plagues, and of evil spirits, and unto many that were blind He gave sight; and then, “Jesus answering, said unto John’s messenger, Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and heard; how that the blind see, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and to the poor the gospel is preached;

and blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended (or stumbled) in me." Here then was a large place assigned by Him to physical miracles in a case where faith in Him was faltering under the pressure of persecution and wrong; and putting the two incidents referred to together we arrive at the reconciling conclusion touching the two classes of signs and wonders, the *moral* and the *physical*, that we follow Christ's own estimate and example *most* closely when we begin with the moral signs of His Divine mission and end with the physical signs, excluding neither and depreciating neither, but taking up each in its own place and order. It is this order which we have followed in the present argument, for it was never so necessary to follow it as at the present time and in the present state of opinion among the highly educated classes on the subject of physical miracles. In this direction infidelity, we have too much reason to fear, is making rapid progress. Men are heard saying everywhere—We never see any miracles now-a-days like those attributed to Christ. Science discovers in nature nothing but forces of invariable aggregate amount, and an order in their operation and effects of absolute uniformity. And what have we to assure us that these miracles of Christ and His apostles ever really occurred, but human *testimony*? But multitudes of miracles have in all ages been attested by human testimony, which yet were undoubtedly false. Eighteen centuries have passed away since these miracles of Christ's are alleged to have taken place, and is it possible at this distance of time to be certain that the apostles were not under a delusion in thinking that they ever occurred?—is it possible to be certain that they were not all myths and fables—the creations of men's devout imagination—the conscious or unconscious inventions of men's superstitious fancies? All this sounds very scientific and very plausible, but it is all none the less utterly unsolid and deceptive in the face of those palpable facts, both literary and historical, which within a few pages we have endeavoured to bring distinctly into view. Here is a book in our hands—the New Testament—which has a history as certain as that of any other book of the ancient world, and a great deal more so than that of many ancient books which nobody ever dreams of doubting or disputing about. And this Book, as we have seen, is a standing

monument of the life of Christ, which was set up in the very first century of our era, and which would never have existed but for that life, with its ever-memorable words and deeds and events—a literary monument which is as real and genuine as the Monument of Titus to the Fall of Jerusalem, still upstanding in the *Via Sacra* at Rome. And here, in this Monumental Book, we read a multitude of recorded words and doings of Christ which are of such a high and deep significance—of such a perfectly new as well as true significance—that even the most gifted philosophers of our scientific time confess that the words must have been actually spoken by Christ, and the moral doings must have been actually done by Christ, otherwise they could never have been written by Jewish or Christian pens as we find them written ; for there was nobody, either Jew or Gentile, in the Christian Church who could have imagined or invented such words and works—so full of moral excellence beyond all parallel—so full of wisdom and insight beyond all example—and so full and overflowing with love beyond all that was ever found in human heart or life. Here then we are in presence of a moral perfection and a consummate moral and religious wisdom, and a love immeasurable in height and depth, in length and breadth, which must all have been actually exhibited in Christ, for if they had not actually existed and been exhibited in Him, they could never have been conceived, and could never have been put on record. But what are we to think of this actual historical Personage, as real and undeniable as the historical figures of Socrates and Plato? Is He to be thought of as a merely human and natural man, as we are content to deem of them with all their eminence of gift and faculty? No! for His moral and spiritual perfection of character, and His unparalleled endowment of moral and spiritual wisdom, and His exuberance and ocean-fulness of love and grace were “wonders and miracles” of personal endowment compared with theirs; *i.e.* were such endowments as surpassed the bounds and capabilities of unassisted human nature, as human nature has been known or observed or chronicled since the world began. And must not these “wonders and miracles” of moral and spiritual attribute in Christ be regarded as “signs” of the Divine in Christ? Are they not rationally and wisely

to be taken as the out-shinings and manifestations of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, as St. Paul took them to be? And if they are to be so taken and understood, then see where we stand now in reference to the physical miracles attributed to Christ by the same biographers who relate His moral miracles. What is there incredible, or even improbable, in the idea of a miraculous man doing miraculous works? of a Divine man, a God-man doing works which only God can do? Here is a man of divine endowments, of perfection, wisdom, and love, living in our world and sojourning among men, what more natural to a man of such a nature than to add to His other wonders and miracles of moral and intellectual quality, wonders and miracles of power? What was to be expected from such a God-man, a man-God, but that He should do such miracles of power if they were to be serviceable to the ends of His miraculous wisdom and love. I find it in such conditions easy to believe them all. I am not indeed to believe them without evidence, not even without abundant evidence. That evidence can only be the testimony of the men who saw the miracles done before their own eyes, or the testimony, besides, of those who were informed of them by those who were eye-witnesses. But evidence of both these high degrees of quality is at hand in abundance. I repeat, therefore, that I find it easy under all the conditions now stated to believe them all. I see with admiration in them, each and all, so many fresh revelations of the glory of God indwelling in the man Jesus Christ, and therefore bidding away from me all unbelief as a delusion and a snare, I fall down like the once sceptical apostle Thomas at His feet, and in answer to His loving expostulation, "Be not faithless, but believing," I cry out to Him from the very bottom of my soul, "My Lord and my God! Lord, I believe; forgive my past unbelief!"

PETER LORIMER.

ART. III.—*Hymnology as a Reflection of Christian Doctrine and Life.*

WE propose in these pages to conduct the reader along the course of sacred song in various ages, that we may indicate some of the aspects in which Christian truth has successively presented itself to the minds and hearts of Christian men. For it seems to us that few more lifelike portraits of doctrine could be given than those which are to be found in many of our hymns; portraits in some respects even more striking than those which are to be found in theological treatises, in confessions—in some respects even in creeds. And for ourselves, if we were desirous to know what was the living faith of the Church at any time, we should be inclined always to ask, What hymns expressed its feelings in the public assembly? as well as, What did its theologians write? If, moreover, we should find one line of religious thought running through the prose writings of the Church at any time, and another line—consistent with, but different from, the other—running through its poetry, we should make sure that in the life the Church's faith was made up of these two—entwined “as warp and woof.” Indeed we might go further, and plead that while creeds may be described as forming the majestic framework of our faith, and while the great theologians have given to it muscle and form, hymns and other devotional writings express the spirit which breathed through all, and ever by their ceaseless adoration and aspiration lead us to Him in whom our faith's breath is, in whose presence is its motive and its fulness. Thus the study of hymnology in its relation to Christian doctrine and life is a very important one, and it is mainly with the view of vindicating its importance that we have written what follows. We have only further to say, by way of preface, that the translations from which we quote are mainly those given in the works of Neale, Schaff, and Miss Winkworth.

In these sketches we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of these three points :—I. The belief in Christ, with special reference to early hymnology. II. The hope of heaven, with

special reference to mediæval hymnology. III. The relation of the individual soul to God, with special reference to modern hymnology. We have chosen these three lines of illustration, first, in order that by the very variety of their subjects they may the more show the wide sweep of the relationship to which we have referred; and second, because the subject chosen under each age of this threefold division is peculiarly characteristic of that age.

I. To write of early hymns is to write of hymns made and sung when creeds were in the making, and this may account for the fact that so many of them are doctrinal in their form, while it may also explain, and so far excuse, the occasional confusion of ideas with regard to theology which is apparent in not a few. For it is to be observed that ages in which a church is dealing with theological definitions are often in their very nature ages when some measure of awkwardness is to be found in informal doctrinal statement. Be this as it may, however, these hymns were the expression of a doctrinal age. They were often, indeed, made the vehicle for dogmatic teaching, and not seldom we find them chosen as weapons by controversialists. Early in the third century, Bardesanes and his son, Harmonius, who held views at least allied to Gnosticism, sought to circulate them by means of some form of verse; and it was in order to counteract their influence that, somewhat later, Ephraem Syrus wrote his countless hymns, hymns which bore the mark not only of poetic feeling but of express orthodoxy. Again, when Chrysostom became bishop of Constantinople, he found it necessary to make use of the same weapon against Arianism. The Arians, it seems, were in the habit of forming processions and marching through the city, singing as they went: and how better, thought Chrysostom, could he neutralise their influence than by getting up rival processions and teaching the crowds other songs? In this case it was not deemed necessary to look much to refined sentiment, if only the doctrine was expressed in a rhythmical form; and, consequently, a member of the Empress's household was employed to provide the hymns along with the crosses and torches! Still further, if we turn to the Western Church, we know how the popular practice of hymn-singing was promoted, if not originated, in the diocese of Milan. The Empress Justina had

sought to secure one of the basilicas in Milan for the purpose of establishing in it an Arian service; but Ambrose, who was then bishop, naturally resisted the attempt. He was thereupon ordered to leave Milan; but he was no hireling bishop, and he chose, in face of imperial sentences, to remain with his flock. His beloved people, anxious lest any harm should come either to him or to his church, kept constant watch over both. And St. Ambrose, fearing lest the long watching might induce an idle spirit, composed hymns which they might sing, as well as prayers which they might offer, while thus they kept guard. Thus it was to theological exigencies, and even theological strife, that we owe the general introduction of Christian song as the utterance of the great body of the people. And when it is borne in mind that these old controversies mainly gathered around the person of our Lord, we need not wonder that these hymns seem so constantly to have had that subject as their burden.

Systematised hymnology may be said, then, to begin with the person of Christ, and, as we have to go back to history to show why this should have been, the historian must come to the hymns for a full understanding of the light in which Christ was regarded by the early believers. And what does he learn? Broadly this: that Christ Jesus, as Divine yet Human, the Incarnate God, awakened and sustained the enthusiasm of the early Church; for this doctrine of God-Incarnate is that which wells up from the depths of a profound conviction in which mind and feeling commingle. Other ages have placed other parts of the Christian system in the forefront; the doctrine of the Atonement, for instance, attained much greater prominence at a later time than it received in the days of early Greek and Latin singers. For them everything led to thoughts of "the Word made flesh:" in this doctrine they gloried, for this they were ready to die.

Let us try then to construct for ourselves some idea of what Christ, as realised in this doctrine, was to these early saints. First of all, we can see that they laid the foundation of their faith in the truth of His Deity, for His Divine nature is expressed in their hymns from the first. We may take the hymn which is perhaps the very earliest known, namely, that which is referred to in the writings of Basil, beginning with the words *Φῶς*

ἱλαρόν, and from them taking its title. It is now generally believed that this belongs to about the end of the second century, and here is its testimony :¹—

“ We hymn the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit Divine !
Worthiest art Thou at all times to be sung
With undefiled tongue,
Son of our God, Giver of Life, alone.”

We may turn to the song of Clement of Alexandria, and we find there the faith ring out with equal clearness ; or we may listen to the notes of Ephraem Syrus, and we shall hear him sing :—

“ The sea exults to feel Thy footsteps,
The land Thy tread, Lord, knoweth well :
Our human nature brings thanksgivings,
Because Thy Godhead there doth dwell.”

But best of all it will be if we can get an indirect, so to say accidental, testimony, and this is what we have in that hymn of Anatolius which Dr. Neale has rendered with so much sweetness :—

“ Fierce was the wild billow :
Dark was the night :
Oars laboured heavily,
Foam glittered white :

Trembled the mariners :
Peril was high :
Then said the *God of God*,
‘ Peace, it is I.’ ”

To these old singers He was no mere man, only somewhat diviner than His brethren ; nor was He any angel merely, pure and bright, yet limited in power : He was “ God of God,” “ Light of Light,” “ Truth of Truth.”

If we were to refer to the old doxologies, it would but serve to show more abundantly how firm was their faith in His Godhead.

Following the process of construction, we next notice what was most elementary, yet also all-important, in their doctrine of Christ : namely, the intense regard paid to the Incarnation as a miraculous event. As we read some of these ancient

¹ See Canon Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*.

utterances, we seem as if we were standing by the still older shepherds, and listening to them as they say, "Let us now go even unto Bethlehem, and see this thing which is come to pass, which the Lord hath made known unto us." The Incarnation was to men of old, at the very outset, *the* miracle; in it they find the wonder of the universe, the central fact of history. All things seem to draw around the cradle of Jesus, and as they contemplate this their wonder still grows apace and they sing

"A great and mighty wonder,
A full and holy cure :
The virgin bears the Infant
With virgin-honour pure.

The Word becomes Incarnate,
And yet remains on high ;
And cherubim sing anthems
To shepherds from the sky."¹

God had given them a sign, the Sign to which all previous ones had pointed, in which all these were fulfilled. As we listen to their song we begin to grow conscious of the paradox that many things were solved in this insoluble mystery. The long cry of heathendom, in shriek and sacrifice and psalm, had been almost as much "Will God indeed dwell with men on the earth?" as "How shall man be just with God?" And sometimes heathendom had attempted to solve the riddle by deifying men, and sometimes by degrading the gods. But here the true solution was found in the yet insoluble mystery of an Incarnation,—God dwelling among men, and yet infinitely above them; and the heavenly cherubim who chanted in the ears of the earthly shepherds made for the moment a union of heaven and earth which was symbolic of the union of natures in the one Lord Jesus Christ. These men did not seek to clear up the mystery of this union; for them it was enough that it was a blessed fact. It meant so much that was good to them, and they might well fear lest they should miss alike its meaning and its purpose, and suffer much loss besides, if they "broke through unto the Lord to gaze." It is interesting to note—in connection with what we have said before as to hymns having sprung out of controversy—that this one which we have quoted was written by

¹ *Hymns of the Eastern Church*, p. 9.

Anatolius, bishop of Constantinople, who lived in the days of the Monophysite controversy. His strong opposition to the heresy which bore that name finds gentle expression in some of the lines of the hymn, from which we now pass not without the thought that strifes have not been altogether useless if they have led to such tender utterances of faith as some of those which hymnology thus reveals to us. They have sprung up noiselessly from the field of battle like flowers from the sod "where warriors sleep."

The hymn which we next quote leads us a step further:—

"In Bethlehem is He born; Maker of all things, Everlasting God;
He opens Eden's gate, Monarch of ages! Thence the fiery sword
Gives glorious passage; thence, the severing mid-wall o'erthrown,
The powers of earth and heaven are one!
Angels and men renew their ancient league: the pure
Rejoin the pure in happy union!"

This gives us a new element in the construction of the early belief as to the Incarnation. Now it is not merely a miraculous union of two natures in One Person, it is a *reconciliation* between God and man, between heaven and earth; and under this thought we may be right in supposing that a belief in Atonement lay. "The fiery sword gives glorious passage" to Him who comes forth from the Heavenly Eden, and thus heralds man's salvation, which is completed when He returns, and, "having overcome the sharpness of death," "opens the kingdom of heaven to all believers." It may be that these old men saw in His first breaking-through into our world the assurance of the fact that the way from heaven to earth was free: at least this hymn would lead us to think so. Now let us stand for a moment on this stone and see to what the building is rising. We have begun with Deity, for these men sang of the Lord Jesus Christ as God. Next we have come to miracle, for they sing of the Incarnation as a wonder, a mystery which they do not try to settle, glad only if they may be honoured to believe it. Then we have come to union; first union of distinct natures in Jesus, and union through that between God and man. And as thoughts of this blessed union pass upon the wings of early song into our hearts, it seems as if the lapse of centuries were but a dream, for that song finds its echo instantly in the words of Charles Wesley:—

“ Hark how all the welkin rings
 Glory to the King of kings !
 Peace on earth and mercy mild,
 God and sinners reconciled !

But we pass on to a further stage in the construction, and we see how the early believers beheld in the Incarnation not merely a union between God and man, but a union or meeting-place of all creation. We take in evidence of this a hymn, apparently earlier than some of those we have quoted, but yet belonging to the same period of history,—that of Prudentius, “*Corde natus ex Parentis*.” In this wonderful song, which we regret that we cannot quote at length, these lines occur :—

“ Of the Father’s love begotten,
 Ere the worlds began to be,
 He is Alpha and Omega,
 He the Source, the Ending He,
 Of the things that are and have been,
 And that future years shall see,
 Evermore and evermore !”

It is a wonderful vision which thus meets the singer’s eye. He takes his stand, as have done the others, by the child of Bethlehem, and he marvels as he discovers in this child the source of all things. From Him time has taken its rise, and, circling round through its little centuries, it returns again to lose itself in His eternity. And thus all men and things that time has borne with it have come from Him, and men and things go their round also, and at last, for weal or woe, return to His presence again. It is the vision of a poet’s eye, not the exact statement of a dialectician ; but it points none the less to the exact truth that in the manifestation of the Son of God we have the point at which men may meet, and in the name of this same Jesus, may greet one another as brethren.

But although we may trace in these early hymns all that of which we have spoken, it would be a sad mistake to suppose that these writers saw no need for the sufferings and death, resurrection and ascension, of our Lord. It might seem by the fervour of their words as if the cry, “It is finished !” might have been uttered at His birth ; but they deemed far otherwise. One need which they specially saw in His sufferings and death was the dire need of grappling with, and overcoming, the Evil One.

To them His death was especially a battle for man, and His resurrection was a victory. They saw humanity left on the world's wayside, plundered, maimed, and half-dead, and they saw in Christ the Divine Samaritan coming to the rescue. They saw in themselves sick and weary man lying at the gate of mercy, but outside; and they saw in Christ One who came to touch and heal. Doubtless they saw all this; but above all they saw the terrible onset made by Satan upon the human soul, and in Christ they saw the Deliverer. And so we find their faith uttered in the words of Fortunatus, words, old as the sixth century, but which seem to us the echo of others older still—

“Sing, my tongue, the glorious battle,
Sing the last, the dread affray,
O'er the cross, the Victor's trophy,
Sound the glad triumphal lay,
How, the pains of death enduring,
Earth's Redeemer won the day.”

What do these words echo? Is it not “the song of Moses the servant of God”?—“I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously: the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea.” The mission of Jesus was, to the early Church, a rescue from worse than Egyptian thralldom, and of that rescue they never wearied to sing. And we can understand what a mighty faith this was, a faith which carried everything before it. It told them that He who had availed to pass through to earth had humbled Himself to fight His way back for the sake of sinners, that through the breach they also might pass with Him. It told them, that fighting their lesser battles with sin in His strength, they could not fail finally to overcome; it must even have given them courage for the last conflict, and caused them to sing in the “valley of the shadow of death.” What indeed had they to fear while they could sing with St. Ambrose such words as these:—

“Son of the Father! might Divine,
Proceeding from His virgin-shrine:
Maker, Redeemer, Bridegroom, He
The giant of His Church shall be.
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He the dark cup of death shall drain
Ere He unloose the guilty chain.”

Christ was their spiritual Hercules. Nay, the comparison is too poor. He was the Deus-Homo, the Infinitely Strong One, and at His feet all their foes were destined to lie. With this faith in them they could hold up their heads,—a faith which meant no less than this: “for this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.”

At this point we stop. We might have referred to the way in which Christ’s resurrection and ascension are celebrated, but this can be gathered from the tone of the hymns about His death. We can only expend a few words upon the lack of anything like fulness of allusion to Christ’s death as an atonement. We cannot fail to note this omission, and we can only attempt an explanation by saying that the time in which these hymns were written were battling times, that the hymns were frequently of the facts and doctrines around which the battle raged, and that these contests were mainly around the person and nature of Christ. The Church has never fought for all truth at once, and sometimes when she is straining every nerve to strengthen herself on one side, she may be weakened on another. Need we wonder altogether that when men had to fight for God, for His unity, for the Trinity in the Godhead, for the Person of Christ, ay, and for their own lives too, oft singing their songs amid the fires of persecution,—need we wonder that the doctrine which could be perhaps most easily received—intellectually at least—as having a counterpart in all prevailing religious systems, should have obtained for the time less frequent utterance? But, whilst this may be said, we see no reason to suppose that the early Church did not believe in vicarious sacrifice. We turn indeed to that same great hymn of Fortunatus, from which we have already quoted, “Pange lingua gloriosa,” and we find the following verse:—

“Now the thirty years accomplished,
Which on earth He willed to see,
Born for this He meets His passion,
Gives Himself an offering free;
On the cross the Lamb is lifted,
*There the sacrifice to be.”*¹

Had the old theory as to the date of the *Te Deum* been correct which gave it an Ambrosian origin, we might also have

¹ “Agnus in cruce levatur, immolandum stipite.”

quoted it in evidence ; but it really can only be traced to a much later time. Yet it is not improbable that its various parts were separate songs handed down from generation to generation, and only in the eleventh or twelfth century thrown together ; and if so, who shall tell how early arose that prayer —“ We therefore pray thee, help thy servants, whom thou hast redeemed with thy precious blood ”? In any case we find in the early Church, even in its declarations about the incarnation and its purpose, as we have noticed, many an expression which leads us on to Calvary and to the Lamb that was slain ; God is everywhere recognised as, in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, and there is no evidence to show that the difference in view as to the atonement is more than a difference of standpoint. Yet all the same, we recognise a lack which we cannot but regret, and we turn away from our contemplation of early Christology with a sense of incompleteness. Shall we not thankfully write over against the blank the words, “ God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect ”?

II. We pass now to speak of another theme : viz., the hope of heaven with special reference to mediæval hymnology, but as we pass, we may be pardoned if we cast a side-glance at Christology as it developed in mediæval times. We have seen the almost exclusive attention which had been given to the doctrine of the incarnation in the early centuries ; we now discern various lines of change. In one direction this change is a happy one, for we cannot forget that it is to the earlier middle ages that we owe Anselm and the final definition of Satisfaction, as of a doctrine which had been held from the first, but never so exactly formulated. So also, as we should expect, we find growing reference to the cross, and from these ages we have received some of the grandest hymns of the crucifixion, amongst others that of St. Bernard, “ To the face of Jesus on the Cross.” It passed into German song through the refining soul of Paul Gerhardt, and there is no devout German who does not know “ O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden,” while it comes to us in sweet English garb in the well-known hymn,—

“ O Lamb of God, once wounded,
With grief and pain weighed down ! ”

But shadows of error deepened, darker and still darker, around the Saviour and the Cross, and these mainly tended to materialise and limit the doctrine about both. Gradually the belief in Christ as of our "flesh and blood" grew into adoration of the "Sacred Flesh," and herein is seen the danger of too exclusive attention to one truth. Men had talked so much about the Son of God taking our flesh, and about that alone, that they began to think of His very flesh and blood as needing to be continually imparted: we must be partakers of His flesh as He of ours. All spiritual interpretations of the benefits to be received from partaking were discarded, and the communion thus became very early—even before the middle ages—a real presence. Onward this tide of sacramentarianism rolled, till men were hailing the Sacramental Table as an altar and a shrine, and were singing with Thomas Aquinas—

" Word-made-Flesh true Bread He maketh
By His Word His Flesh to be ;
Wine His Blood : which whoso taketh,
Must from carnal thoughts be free."

Strange to say, this hymn begins with the words "Pange lingua gloriosa," as if to show unwittingly how the Church had wandered from the simplicity of those earlier days when Fortunatus began his song with "Pange lingua gloriosa" also, but called upon his tongue to sing, not the sacrifice of the altar, but the glory of the cross. And thus gradually the Saviour, in whom early saints had triumphed, was hidden under growing error and corruption, and it remained for the Church of the Reformation at length to recall men's minds to the "simplicity of Christ."

We pass, however, now to the discussion which is more properly before us, concerning the hope of heaven in relation to mediæval hymnology.

When we turn to those hymns which usher in mediæval days, we find that their ideas are of the most simple kind. Evermore we find them regarding heaven as a city, and thoughts of civic unity and splendour occur throughout. Heaven was to these singers a kind of metropolis, for which they had learned to sigh as did the Israelites of old for the city of Jerusalem. And thus one of the oldest hymns of heaven—that beginning "Urbs beata Jerusalem," and coming

to us from the eighth century—bursts forth in strains like these :—

“Blessed city, heavenly Salem,
Vision dear of peace and love,
Who of living stones art builded,
In the height of heaven above,
And with angel hosts encircled
As a bride to earth dost move.”

Again it is the voice of Hildebert, archbishop of Tours, that we hear, and his song is—

“Mine be Sion’s habitation,
Sion, David’s calm foundation :
Built by Him, light’s source immortal,
To whose streets the cross is portal :
Oped by Peter’s brave confession ;
Joyous burghers in possession ;
Her whose gems build up her story :
Her whose King is King of Glory.”

Many writers have concerned themselves with tracing the source of these songs of the “city,” and have found it in Augustine’s “*Civitas Dei* ;” and certainly there are in his poetic prose not a few thoughts which seem to have passed into the hearts, and from thence to the lips, of these later singers. But the fact seems to us simply to be this : that they betook themselves to Holy Scripture, and found in its civic symbols the matter of their song. Nay, it may be that we shall have to search still deeper for the idea, and find it in a divinely-implanted instinct which Scripture laid hold of, purified, and elevated ; and for our own part we are inclined to believe that a “city” has from the first been to man a sign and symbol of that idea of unity which he lost in the Fall. And hence we find that so soon as the race has begun in any part to show signs of growth and progress, it has built cities to be the homes of the people. The New Testament, tracing this custom to its Divine source, leads it forward to heaven and to God. It pictures even the old patriarch, who wandered his lone way through deserts wild, as seeking a city ; for he “looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God.” It speaks of the justification of the hopes of God’s people as found in the fact that “He hath prepared for them a city,” and then it carries forward the same thought

into the life of New Testament saints, teaching them to say, "Here we have no continuing city, but we seek one to come." So comes, in natural course, all the imagery of the book of the Revelation of St. John,—the city, its foundations, its gates of pearl, its streets of gold,—the city where dwell all God's holy ones, and where He Himself is king. Doubtless, symbols tend to grow and multiply, and hence the inspired figures of St. John were drawn out further by Augustine, and still further by Gregory and by the mediæval singers; but at root we must trace, we think, the idea of the City back to Scripture, and through Scripture to that divine love of unity which has been implanted in the heart of man. And this seems to us all the more certain from the fact that heaven was ever to the hymnists a place of high communion, where saints lived in happy intercourse not only with their Saviour, but with each other. However in later days men may have doubted such communion, they at least did not doubt it. So in the grand hymn of Peter Damiani—"Ad perennis vitæ fontem," the saints are pictured as rejoicing together, and in their safe shelter recounting their battles with the enemy, and by and by follow these lines, which we quote from Neale's translation:—

"Knowing Him who all things knoweth,
What is there they fail to know?
For into the deepest secrets
Of each others' souls they go;
One in willing, one in nilling,
Unity their spirits show."

It is but following up this line of thought to show how prominent in these hymns were the ideas of a King and a kingdom; for the "city" was the centre of the kingdom, and the throne of the King was the centre of the city. Here, also, we do not need to seek elsewhere than in Scripture, and in human nature as God designed it to be, for the source of these high thoughts. They spring from the heaven-born thought of a Divine Kingship, which even the Fall has not obliterated. Sometimes, indeed, men had profaned the thought, and, holding to the kingship without the divinity, had sought their ideal in earthly rulers; but even this lower ideal had been taken by God, refined and purified, until the nations to whom He had given a king in His anger had the promise that they should see

“the King in His beauty.” And so again, the New Testament caught up the thought and led it still further onward, until it closed with a final picture of heaven, in the words: “And the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it: and his servants shall serve him.” The hymn-singers catch up the strain, and they turn ever and anon from rejoicing in the glory of the city to glorying in its King. Any one who knows aught of these hymns, will be able to recall such passages, and we therefore do not refer to them further; rather we pass on to note that, apart altogether from the relation of kingship, the thought of Jesus is never absent from these hymns. Long before those centuries of which we are writing, Gregory Nazianzenus had well sounded the key-note:—

“Thy will be done, O Lord! That day shall spring,
When at Thy word this clay shall reappear!
No death I dread but that which sin will bring;
No fire or flood without Thy wrath I fear:
For Thou, O Christ my Lord! art Fatherland to me,
My wealth and might and rest; my all I find in Thee.”

And that key-note was never altogether lost. It sounded again in the Venerable Bede's hymn for martyrs, where the Heavenly Shepherd is pictured as leading the “Innocents” to “heavenly pastures ever new;” whilst later still, in the hymn of Bernard of Clugny, it is heard again and again. Throughout the later middle ages, it comes forth again in songs of heaven, this name of Jesus, not lost—though heard it may be less clearly amid the sad increase of virgin-worship, and saint-worship, and eucharistic adoration, until it passes into the song of the Churches of the Reformation. Thus Gregory Nazianzenus's “Thou, O Christ, art Fatherland to me” dies into Bernard's hope that “they who know and see Him” “shall have Him for their own;” and that again blends with the German chorale, “Jesu, meine Zuversicht,” and ripens in James Montgomery's “For ever with the Lord!”

Up to this point we have seen elements of Christian hope, pure and beautiful; but a study of mediæval hymnology, even though it be not very deep, causes us to be conscious of certain elements less pure and beautiful—less heavenly, we might say, which begin to mingle with these. From the eleventh century

at least we note these features ; and perhaps they come out nowhere more strikingly than in that well-known hymn of Bernard of Clugny, which we have already referred to, and which is best known from the part of it beginning "Jerusalem the golden." The more we study this hymn, and compare it with other hymns, the more we become conscious of a difference between these and the earlier hymns, which perhaps we cannot very well express—a difference which is not one of tone or of accident, but of view and conviction. If we were to use the word *sensuousness*, it might serve to indicate what we mean. The fact is, that the hope of heaven will always bear some definable relation to the earthly circumstances of him who hopes. To the invalid, it will be a place of release from sickness ; to hard and weary workers, a place of rest ; to "men who have failed," as some one puts it, a place of success ; to captives, a land of liberty. For hymns are often as really a reflection of outward circumstances as of inward moods ; and in Bernard's and other songs of those centuries, we certainly have such a reflection. Two influences, as everybody feels, are specially traceable—that of the monastic life and that of the Crusades. Monasticism had indeed taken its rise long before ; but it may be said to have been coming to its height about the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and it was gathering into itself more and more the piety and culture of the Church. It certainly drew to itself the poetry of the time ; for the two Bernards were monks, Bonaventura was a monk, and Thomas of Celano was a monk, as also, later, was Jacopone, the author of the "Stabat Mater." It was a time when it seemed as if Manicheism was reviving again, and in which men were getting the idea that life in the world and life for God were mutual contradictions ; and, fleeing as it were from material things, men went into monasteries to lead the "religious life." And we can easily conceive how, in that secluded life, outward things would grow more distasteful. The monk had begun, perhaps, by mourning as he saw how, in the world, bishops were worldly statesmen, and priests were politicians, and how even ecclesiastical affairs were tinctured with intrigue and corruption ; and his imagination never halted till "the world" became to him a theme only for scorn and contumely. A favourite subject, therefore, in the hymns of the middle ages, is

“ the contempt of the world ; ” and we may hear some unknown poet singing—

“ Alas, alas ! oh, worldly life !
Why so greatly please me ?
Since with me thou canst not bide,
Why should I so love thee ?
Life ? nay, rather death thou art,
Why for good entreat thee ?
Since of good thou hast no store,
Only ill to give me.”

Or again, it is that same Jacopone, of whom we have spoken, whom we hear, as he asks, “ *Cur mundus militat sub vanâ gloriâ ?* ”

“ Why fights the world for empty glory,
For success so transitory ?
Little doth her strength avail,
As a potter’s vessel frail.
Trust ye more in lying men
Than in this world’s wretched treasures ;
Mad they are, deceitful, vain,
False her prizes, false her pleasures.”

This, then, was what it came to : these recluses did not rest when they had said men were bad, but, as in this hymn, they grew into the belief that the material world itself was worse than the men who were in it. And it is at this point that we get some light on the natural history of their conceptions about heaven. They had been schooled into hating everything connected with the earth, as being under the dominion of the Evil One ; and the duty of the pious monk became that of crushing natural affections, curbing every motion of sense, and closing his eyes even to the vision of the beautiful. Let us picture to ourselves, then, a mediæval monk as in imagination we have sometimes seen him. With wan visage, unkempt hair, and ungainly attire, he sets out some morning. You see him plucking some flower in his path, scanning its beauty, and then all at once you see him throw it away, as he curses it and mourns because it has led him to sinful thoughts. Next you see him entering some home where little children are at play. For a moment he enters into their glee, and feels the heaven that lies in the face of little children, but suddenly

his cheek grows pale, and a tear glistens in his eye, as he remembers that this "heaven" is a paradise into which he may not enter. And so his day wears on, and it is curbing and crushing at every point, until at length night comes and he returns to his cell, weary of life, and fain to die. Such was really the working of monasticism ; and what came of this effacement of sense, this living suicide? The story of the dissolution of the monasteries tells us what resulted in the case of grosser natures ; curbed human sense burst its bonds, and lapsed into sensuality. And what of the finer, the devout natures? They resigned themselves for this life and said, What we have renounced here we shall have in heaven. Nay, they seem to have even looked upon themselves as purchasing these delights by renouncing them here ; and in this strain two lines of Dr. Neale's translation of Bernard's hymn occur to us :—

"Jerusalem demands them ; they paid the price on earth,
And now shall reap the harvest in blissfulness and mirth."

With a growing hatred of a material earth, there was a growing liking for a material heaven. It is only to the most superficial student of human nature that this can seem strange ; to such the man who wrenched the material out of this world would seem likely to have an intensely spiritual view of the next. But nothing is more certain than this, that you cannot refuse natural affections their natural place with impunity ; they will punish you by claiming a place where they have no right to be. And it is equally certain that the man whose hope of heaven is most pure and spiritual will be the man who has not evaded the world but faced it, who has rejoiced to find the presence of his Father and his Saviour in its beauty and its wisdom, and has regarded with thanksgiving every creature that He has made. We cannot help viewing such a hymn as "The Rhythm of Bernard," then, as embodying in the form of its thought a monk's idea of heaven, and that to an extent of which those who have rejoiced to sing those beautiful fragments of it, "Brief life is here our portion" and "Jerusalem the golden," can have little notion. Even in these, indeed, we may find some traces of undue depreciation of earth and most material views of heaven. There are many of us, for

instance, who would show much thanklessness if we constantly kept singing of this life, full as it is of Divine help and comfort, as if it were full of "sorrow" and "care"; and some might feel a sudden descent from the thought of a Saviour's presence in the lines :—

" The Prince is ever in them,
The daylight is serene ;
The pastures of the blessed
Are decked in glorious sheen."

Poetic licence, however, might cover these ; but there are other parts which such licence had need to be very broad indeed to cover. Of what can we think, for example, but of Tennyson's " Lotos-Eaters," when we read such lines as these—

" Who, fed with heavenly nectar
Where soul-like odours play,
Draw out the endless leisure
Of that long, vernal day" ?

And to our mind it would be simply impossible to sing those stanzas in which the Heavenly Bridegroom is described as saluting the bridal soul. Indeed, no hymn could better show than this what the monastic life did in lowering, even to pious souls, the glories of the heavenly inheritance. But let us not forget that this hymn had in it other and far different elements, strains which told how under a monk's garb the heart could still beat true to its Saviour and King, strains which rise from the hearts of Christian men to-day as the utterance of their brightest and purest hopes.

Another influence which we have spoken of as being at work was that of the Crusades. It was in the year 1093 that Peter the Hermit visited Palestine, from which he returned full of zeal for the deliverance of those who were suffering under Mohammedan sway. Every one knows how France, and even all Western Europe, caught the fire of his eloquence, and how from all manner of motives, good, bad, and indifferent, people rushed into the ranks of the Crusaders. It was a time of " holy wars," and we can see from the song of those days how, not among kings and nobles only, nor only among men who could wield a sword or wear a helmet, but among such obscure monks as Bernard the influence was felt. Heaven even received new colour from it, and, as amid the struggles of

earlier days, so again in the middle ages, heaven became expressly the rest and home of those who had been victorious in the earthly strife; and as early Christians had sung "if we suffer we shall also reign with Him," so Brother Bernard taught his fellow-monks to sing—

" And they who with their Leader
Have conquered in the fight,
For ever and for ever
Are clad in robes of white."

On other influences which are traceable in these hymns we have not time to dwell. Much might be said, for instance, with reference to ideas borrowed from "the Church." These singers delighted to sketch for themselves the choral service of heaven, and the parts which each would play, and so we find a hymn of the fifteenth century in which Adam is represented as "leading the chorus," and it is only in harmony with this that the lines occur in the first version of that hymn, which, though belonging to a later time as a Roman Catholic hymn, might find its natural place here—"Jerusalem, my happy home":—

" Te Deum doth St. Ambrose sing,
St. Austin doth the like ;
Old Simeon and Zachary
Have not their song to seek."

But enough. Let us not part from these matters, however, without saying that, while seeking thus to trace in these hymns the sometimes unhappy influences of the time, we do not estimate them lightly. Let us not forget that if these men looked forward to material delights, and had somewhat crude conceptions of the heavenly inheritance, they at least ever looked forward to these with true, often childlike, innocence of heart, and surely most of them regarded Christ Himself as the spring of all their joys. None the less, however, let us be thankful that the Reformation has called us to more manly thoughts and to a deeper understanding of heavenly hope. Nothing could better illustrate our growth out of childish materialism than the career of that hymn to which we have already referred—"Jerusalem, my happy home." In its first form it seems to have appeared early in the seventeenth century, and seems to have been the work of a Romish priest. In this form it was full of odd conceits, such as that which we have quoted

above. The Virgin was represented as singing "Magnificat," while choirs of virgins sat around her feet, and the detailed descriptions of Paradise are such as to provoke a smile. Thus—

"There's nectar and ambrosia made,
There's musk and civet sweet ;
There many a fair and dainty drug
Are trodden under feet."¹

But amidst all this the piece had many noble thoughts, and these were gathered up and thrown into new and less quaint form by David Dickson, the Presbyterian divine, who flourished later in the seventeenth century. Much, however, of the more external element of description remained ; and it was only with this century that there was a return to more Scriptural simplicity, in the brief hymn beginning with the same line, which is most in use among us to-day. All this is a parable of what has been going on ; an increasing spirituality in our hopes of heaven, and a clearer understanding as to the prevalence of symbolic teaching in the Revelation of St. John. Our heaven is "to be with Christ." Paradise is wherever communion with Him is perfect, and our cry is

"Heaven is, dear Lord, where'er Thou art."

We are rising thus to ever higher and higher strains, and it seems as if our views of the "Land beyond" were growing nobler in proportion to our growing realisation of what the presence of God can make even this present world. As we think of the variety of later songs of heaven, it seems as if we Christians of these days were passing through manifold gates "into the city," and as if at each a harper stood tuning his harp to some new strain. Now the quaint Puritan accent falls on our ear, and we listen to old Samuel Crossman's song—

"Jerusalem on high
My song and city is."

And anon we hear the finer notes of Richard Baxter—

"My knowledge of that life is small,
The eye of faith is dim ;
But 'tis enough that Christ knows all,
And I shall be with Him."

¹ For a full account of this hymn see Dr. Bonar's *New Jerusalem*, a delightful volume.

Passing onwards it seems as if a new gate were opening, and as it opens we hear of

“ . . . the land of pure delight,
Where saints immortal reign.”

And now voices crowd in upon us, Cowper, Newton, Wesley, Montgomery, and many more, until we come to almost the last, and listen to one whose song has cheered many a gloomy day as she sings of the glory in “Immanuel’s land.”

We pass from these thoughts with the lines of Dr. Donne’s “Hymn to God, my God”—

“ Since I am coming to that holy room,
Where with thy quire of saints for evermore
I shall be made thy music, as I come,
I tune my instrument here at the door,
And what I must do then, think here before.”

III. We now come to our third point,—the relation of the individual soul to God, with special reference to modern hymnology. Having dwelt so long on the first two sections, we do not purpose to say much here, and we are the more willingly brief inasmuch as the ramifications of modern hymnology are so numerous that discussion of them in anything short of a lengthened treatise would be hopeless. In this case we rather view the community of modern sacred songsters from an outer circle than from within. In the few following paragraphs we shall devote ourselves to showing how the Reformation was reflected in its song, and then how the grand issue of the Reformation battle, immediacy of relationship and communion between God and the soul, is also the grand characteristic of modern hymns.

We begin then with the songs of the Reformation. Any one who should look into these, hopeful of finding any great proportion of hymns of a doctrinal kind, would be sadly disappointed. But in this they reflect the time none the less, for in Germany, to which we must look for the poets of the movement, the Reformation was not so largely a dogmatic movement as might seem. True, it had such a side, as everybody knows : nay more, it had its root in the discovery of the long-lost doctrine of Justification by Faith, and our contention in favour of hymns as mirrors of doctrine would break down

did we not find some hymns correspondingly doctrinal. But we are in no danger, for one of the noblest hymnic exhibitions of Justification is to be found in that chorale of Luther's which begins "Nun freuet euch, lieben Christeng'mein !" and which contains the lines :—

" My good works could avail me nought,
For they with sin were stained,
My will against God's justice fought,
And dead to good remained.
My anguish drove me to despair,
For Death, I knew, was waiting there,
And what but Hell was left me ?

To me Christ spake : ' Hold fast by me,
And thou shalt conquer now ;
Myself I wholly give for thee,
For thee I wrestle now :
For I am with thee, thou art mine,
Henceforth my place is also thine,
The foe shall never part us.' "

But the movement was mainly a battle, fought on the ground of doctrine indeed, but in all its main features practical and polemical rather than dogmatic. It fought with strong arms against superstition, against priestcraft, against everything that could hinder perfect freedom of access between the human soul and the God who alone could justify and save it. Luther's theses were a declaration of war for " Mansoul ;" his nailing of them to the gates was like the waving of a banner, and every act of his life was an incident in a campaign. And even when he rhymed the creeds, or Germanised old hymns, or made chorales out of the Psalms, or wrote new songs for the people, it seems as if he had ever in his mind the purpose of giving them as soldiers fresh " Kraft" for the battle against evil and the Evil One, for God and the soul. Foremost in that battle he sees Christ, the Captain of Salvation, and he cheers his comrades on by the assurance of victory : ever and anon he gets awful glimpses of the cohorts of evil, but again he turns to Christ, and to the Holy Spirit, and to God the Father, and he finds in the Triune God a cure for all boding fear. Especially he keeps the eye fixed on Him who has already striven with Satan, and he sings—

“ Of our own might we nothing can,
Full soon were we downriden :
But for us fights the proper Man,
Whom God Himself hath bidden :
Ask ye who is this same ?
Christ Jesus is His name,
The Lord Sabaoth's Son :
He and no other one
Shall conquer in the battle.”

We miss the whole meaning of the Reformation unless we find its prime utterance in “*Ein' feste Burg* ;” and this, we shall now say, not of Germany only, but of Western Europe. It was something far deeper than a mere settling of theological points : when it did turn to these, it was to battle for those which were vital, which entered into the very essence of spiritual life. It was a struggle then for life against the powers of hell ; and the kingdom for which it struggled was the inward kingdom of the soul. Hence men entered the lists to do deadly work, and men like Erasmus, who had to go down on their knees and refresh themselves delicately, had to be left behind. At length the warfare-stage passed over, but the warriors left behind them as a heritage that immediacy of communion and relationship between the soul and God, of which we have spoken, and which seems to us specially characteristic of post-Reformation hymnology, as of post-Reformation Christianity.

Thus the hymns of the Protestant centuries are widely different from those of earlier times. In the first period, the Church seemed to be looking at the side-face of Christianity, studying its features, and we therefore find in early song much prominence of outline. In the second period, the Church was leading a life among shadows, and it regarded the Christian life on earth as very much a thing of types and shadows ; consequently there is the inevitable tendency to exaggeration of features and general darkness, with hints of light beyond. But the Church of these centuries has been called to stand as it were in the light of the face of God, and its best hymns have their peculiar beauty because they are the breathings of those who are “ beholding the face of the Father.” References to communion high and close with God, to the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, to the vivid realisation of a present Saviour,—these, and such as these, are continually occurring in one form

or another in those hymns ; and the union and communion on earth are so close that their pictures of heaven are as of earth's spiritual joys intensified. We open, let us say, the poems of George Herbert, and our eyes fall on the lines—

“ Whether I fly with angels, fall with dust,
Thy hands made both, and I am there ;
Thy power and love, my love and trust
Make one place everywhere.”

We turn to Henry Vaughan, and this is the burden of his song :

“ Not one minute in the year
But I'll mind Thee :
As my seal and bracelet here,
I will bind Thee.”

It seems sometimes as if the paradisaic time had again returned, when man might hear “the voice of the Lord God amidst the trees of the garden in the cool of the day.” No doubt there were dangers attendant upon this new relationship. Subjectivity as to the soul, over-familiarity as to God—these were the perils ; and these are the errors we find in the various forms of mysticism. But it must be borne in mind that this mysticism, in cases like those of Madame Guyon, Tersteegen, Silesius, Zinzendorf, and generally the Moravian Brethren, was only an overstraining of a great truth—a truth for which Madame Guyon had to suffer, viz., that of our direct relation to God in Jesus Christ and by the one Spirit. And notwithstanding their eccentricities, these singers sang often so truly, uttered this truth so beautifully, that we have felt constrained to unite our voices with theirs. How many there are to whom the hymn of Madame Guyon has brought unspeakable comfort and given a theme for new song ! We mean the hymn beginning

“ O Thou by long experience tried,
Near whom no grief can long abide.”

And there have doubtless been thousands who have had their souls stirred as they have joined in Tersteegen's lines—

“ Thou hidden love of God, whose height,
Whose depth unfathomed no man knows,
I see from far Thy beauteous light,
Inly I sigh for Thy repose ;
My heart is pained, nor can it be
At rest till it find rest in Thee.”

The limits of this paper will not allow of our showing how largely the same element has entered into the general body of great hymn-writers, English and German, into Watts and Cowper and Newton, into Montgomery and Lyte and Bonar and Ray Palmer and Charlotte Elliott, and many more. We can only take a glance at the great movement which, for England and America at least, has specially stamped this development of Christian life—the movement which bears the names of John and Charles Wesley.

It seems to us, then, that the Methodist movement has been characterised throughout by the recognition of that immediate communion of which we have been speaking. Certainly, we admit, it has never lost sight of the visible Church as the natural centre where all individual life should find a meeting-place; and there is much reason for supposing that the Wesleys themselves never entirely lost, although they greatly modified, those high views with regard to Church authority with which they set out. It does not, however, come within our purpose to treat of this, and we only refer to the fact as having some influence on their hymns. The tendency of this somewhat pronounced ecclesiasticism was not, as regarded these, altogether unfortunate; rather we should regard it as having been of the utmost use in modifying the egoism which we associate with what we may call the "Moravian" side of the movement. To us it seems that these two opposite influences have been acting and reacting throughout the whole history of Methodism, and in this action and reaction it has found its strength. It has been saved, on the one hand, from those dangers into which the Oxford movement has so visibly run, and, on the other hand, it has been secured against such separatist tendencies as we witness growingly among the more subjective Christians of to-day. So far as the hymns are concerned, the result is, to a large extent, that lofty realisation of personal relations with God, personal communion, personal faith, personal service, tempered by the thought that in this relation we are brought into fellowship with all believers, which has made the greatest of these hymns so dear to the universal heart of Christians. Now, the more individualising tone sounds forth, and yet somehow we feel that the great congregation can join in it as well as the solitary soul; and

bodies of Christian people have thus, we are sure, often realised the true "communion of saints" in such a personal hymn as this—

"Jesus, Thy boundless love to me
No thought can reach, no tongue declare ;
O knit my thankful heart to Thee,
And reign without a rival there !
Thine, wholly thine alone, I am,
Be Thou alone my constant flame."

Again, expression is given to the thought of heaven, and this time it is the general thought of the Church on earth and in heaven which is uppermost ; yet there is something in the tone which forbids the fear that the individual is lost in the great gathering of redeemed and glorified saints. We begin, perhaps, by singing,

"One family, we dwell in Him,
One Church, above, beneath ;"

but we close with words which bear within them the thought of an individuality none the less real that it is knit to an endless brotherhood—

"Our spirits too shall quickly join,
Like theirs with glory crown'd ;
And shout to see the Captain's sign,
To hear His trumpet sound.
Oh that ~~we~~ now might grasp our Guide !
Oh that the word were given !
Come, Lord of hosts ! the waves divide,
And land us all in heaven !"

Of these two elements we think the stronger is throughout the personal in all Wesleyan hymns, just as in Wesleyanism. We have used the word "Moravian" in this connection, and we repeat it, for the influence which the Moravian Brethren exerted over the brothers Wesley at the first, coinciding as it did with the natural temperament especially of Charles, only deepened with years. Changes occurred indeed in their relations with Zinzendorf and the others, and by and by these changes, aided by the process of assimilation, altered the expression of thoughts and feelings, perhaps, both in hymns and in other productions of the Society. But the spirit-to-spirit communion with God, which was the grand kernel of Moravian

faith, remained to make Wesley's songs, "take them for all in all," one of the grandest constituents in the hymnology of modern English faith.

From Wesleyanism one naturally turns to the Oxford movement to ask whether it has reflected the same mode of Christian thought and feeling. But the question involves too large a round of other questions to be capable of full answer here, and a categorical answer would be well-nigh impossible. In the hymns of Faber, for instance, there is much of individualism, but, much though we love some of his verses, and gladly though we have sung them, we feel increasingly that they indicate a descent from the strong manhood which characterised the individualism of the Wesleys. There is a decided Roman flavour about them, and we see in them the utterances of one who was being drawn towards Rome, not, like Madame Guyon, who was drawn from it. In Keble, again, this element does not come out prominently at all, save in one or two hymns, being at its highest in his immortal song,

"Sun of my soul ! Thou Saviour dear,
It is not night if Thou be near."

On the whole, the tendency of the Oxford movement has *not* been to reflect the life of the individual soul. This is our impression. It has rather chosen to find its ideal of Christian life, and so also of praise, in those ages when personal spiritual life was but as a drop in the ocean of the life of the Church. Such hymns as that great one of Newman's, "Lead, kindly Light," may seem to point to another direction. It is the hymn of one who has ever been, to use his own words, "conscious of two realities, himself and God;" but it is an exception, and the great wave of Anglo-Catholic song sets in the other direction.

It may have seemed to some that in these pages some broad distinction should have been drawn between hymns and sacred songs or lyrics, but this we have advisedly avoided. For our own part, we deem it simply impossible to draw any line, and to say that nothing is a hymn which is beyond it ; for, while worship must ever be the prime element, the form will vary, and sometimes the praise will ascend through hymns of adoration, sometimes through hymns of experience, sometimes even through hymns historical and didactic, and the promin-

ence of one or other will follow the spirit of the time. We have read the unique, the grandest praise-book of all—the inspired Psalter—sadly wrong if we err in saying that we find in it all these and more.

We close this survey, dreaming of the old legend which represents an angel-choir as suddenly appearing and singing an unknown hymn in the ears of St. Cecilia and her band. The earthly musicians broke their lyres and stood mute to listen to the nobler choir of heaven.

“ Too faint our anthems here,
Too soon of praise we tire ;
But oh, the strains how full and clear
Of that eternal choir !
A little while, and then
Shall come the glorious end ;
And songs of angels and of men
In perfect praise shall blend ! ”

ANDREW CARTER.

ART. IV.—*Christ's Death : what was it ?*

WHAT was Christ's death, physically? It was the separation from each other of his soul and his body. Death was to the man Christ Jesus what it is to any other man—separation of soul and body.

But even in death, neither was separated from his Godhead. His Godhead held his soul in union with itself, and thereby in union with his Divine Person. So, also, his Godhead held even his dead body in the grave, in union with itself, and thereby in union with himself, the same Divine Person, the Son of God, the very God, Second Person of the Godhead.

If this is not correct, then, say that the soul of Christ crucified was not in union with his Godhead, and let us look at the consequence.

Either his soul, when separated from his Godhead, was a person, or it was not.

Say that it was *not* a person. Then what was it? Was it a thing? It could in that case have no duties, no obligation, no graces, no virtues, no enjoyments, no sorrows, no conscious-

ness. Was it a corruptible thing, such as silver and gold? Then it was not by giving his soul a ransom that he redeemed his people; for "they are not redeemed with corruptible things such as silver and gold." Besides, if this thing was not in union with his person, by what right, or unto what end, did he give it more than he had to give, or had in view in giving, any other soul, any person's soul? He was not in the one case giving *himself* any more than in the other.

If it was not a thing, but still what we call a soul, whose soul was it? It was not *his* soul by any specification or propriety. It became his soul when he took it to himself—when he took a true body and a reasonable soul into union with his Godhead—took them to himself, the Second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God. When that union should cease then that soul (as well as body) should cease to be his. And then whose should it be? Whosoever soul it was, not being his, still less could it be he. And in giving it he could not be giving himself.—This follows from thinking it not a person.

Suppose it *was* a person. Then what person was it? It was not the Christ. The Christ of God is in such union with Godhead as to be entitled to be called God; but what union this soul, this person, once had with Godhead is cancelled, by what we must call our present vicious supposition. And this person, whatever he may be called, cannot be called God, or the Son of God; for the one only distinct idea that we seem able to form concerning him is, by the original supposition, the negative one, that he is separate from God. There are now therefore two distinct natures, and two distinct persons, instead of two distinct natures and one person for ever.

It is as far from being true that his body was separated from his Godhead. While it lay in the grave it was *his* body, not the body which *had* been his; but, then and now, *his* body, yea, himself: "*He* was buried."

If not his, whose was it? Was it nobody's? Was it a cast-away? Was it a body for the Morgue, or for the dead-house, for friends to look after, and identify, and claim? Was it anybody's? Who shall dare to claim the body which we have been accustomed to call the body of our Lord? The soul of the Lord Jesus has no hold upon it; for he is really dead. The meaning of his being dead is, that his soul has no

hold upon it, no more connection with it, or power over it, than over or with any other dead body. His Godhead has of course almighty power over it, but exactly as, and no otherwise than as, over any other dead body;—not at all as over *his own* body; for *that* it is not, being separated from the Godhead, and therefore from his person, the seat of which the Godhead is.

These reasonings are irresistible; and where do they necessarily land? They necessarily land in this, that by the supposition of either the soul or the body of Christ being separated from his Godhead, the Incarnation is undone and reversed; the Atonement nullified and obliterated; and the death of Christ becomes not a laying down of his life, but a succumbing to death; not a breaking of his body (“my body broken for you”), but an abandonment of it; not a giving of his soul, a judicial and victorious giving of his soul a ransom for sin, but a physical relinquishment of it.

But it is certain that as he will not cease through all eternity to be the Son of Man, so he did not cease upon the cross, or in the grave. He died—not in semblance, but in truth. But for the man Christ Jesus to die in truth required nothing more than for any other man truly to die—that is, to have his soul and his body separated from one another. Every case of death that has hitherto occurred in the human race has been this and (physically) nothing more. There never, till this moment, had been a case in which either a soul or a body could be separated from the Godhead; and now, in the very first case of its possibility, it is impossible to affirm its necessity. There could be no necessity, no requirement; it could not possibly be called for; and assuredly it was not realised. The Son of God was in his Godhead still united to his body, so that not only was his body crucified, not only was his body dead, not only was his body buried; but *he* was crucified, *he* died, *he* was buried. The Son of God—to wit, our Divine and infinitely precious Saviour—the Son of God, in his Godhead, was in union with his soul, so that the Son of God, our Divine Redeemer, committed *himself*, in dying, to his Father when he committed his *soul*; saying, “Into thy hands I commit my spirit” (Ps. xxxi. 5).

While, therefore, he was a dead man, he was a living, powerful, almighty Christ; so a living Christ, that even in

dying he livingly offered up himself—a slain Lamb, but a living Priest.

Living! of course, he was : this is the true God and Eternal Life. How could Life die? especially Eternal Life?

Did he become—did he require to become—incarnate a second time? Was his resurrection a second incarnation? Was the Word *twice* made flesh?

In taking Christ's body, therefore (of course, by faith), in the Lord's Supper, we take himself. We take himself; for his body, though broken, being indivisibly connected with his Godhead, in taking his body we necessarily take his Godhead; and in taking his Godhead we take himself, his Person, for in the Godhead is the seat of his personality. Moreover, in taking his Godhead we cannot fail to take his soul, which is indissolubly connected with his Godhead. Thus we take all of Christ, whole Christ, when we take Christ in his death: *i.e.* his Godhead, his soul, and his body also—his soul and his body in their separation from each other. That is, we take Christ and him crucified. *Him*—not his soul only; not his body only; nay, not his human nature only; for, aside from his Godhead, that human nature is not a person, and certainly not *he*—not *this* person—not the Christ. For he is the Son of God—just the person from whom this human nature is, by this supposition, supposed to be both distinct and separate. Nor, separate from his Godhead,—and therefore from him,—can this human nature be the Son of Man. For the Son of Man is unquestionably a person (no doubt the same person as the Son of God is). The Son of Man, we repeat, is a person; and that cannot be his human nature as separated from his Godhead, for that was not a person. In his human nature, separately and by itself alone, he was not a person, because in his human nature separately and alone *he was not*. In his Godhead it was that he was the Son of God, not in his manhood. In the manhood, no doubt, he was the Son of Man; but if he had not been the Son of God in the Godhead, he would not at the same time have been the Son of Man. For a human person he was not; and never would have been even a man, save for being God and the Son of God. There was no place in the universe, no standing in the race of human beings, for a person called Jesus, except on the ground of that person

(Jesus) being, not a new and newly introduced person, but the Eternal Son of God (no doubt, in his person, newly constituted), but just the Eternal Son of God, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, whose goings forth have been of old, from everlasting.

The following inferences flow from the doctrine now maintained :—

(1.) Jesus Christ was at once a slain Lamb and a living Priest.

(2.) *He* was buried : not his *remains*. The Son of God, the Second Person of the Godhead, lay in the grave. This is the carefully asserted doctrine of Scripture : “and that he was buried” (1 Cor. xv. 4). And while no doubt the phrase “my flesh shall rest in hope” is used as quite correct so far as it goes, it is of the person that that other proposition is affirmed, “Thou wilt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption.”

(3.) Neither his soul nor his body was for one moment in any one’s power but his own : “I have power to lay it down ; and I have power to take it again.” This, indeed, was the special ground of his Father’s wondrous love to him : “Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again.”

(4.) This was his defeat of him that had the power, and his deliverance of them that had the fear, of death. And while death’s work was done, not in semblance, but in reality, on Christ’s person ; and while it could not possibly be said that death was cheated—it is nevertheless true that in being successful, death failed ; that Christ’s person, by being in the grave, was death’s grave—that in separating Christ’s soul from Christ’s body, these separated twain became the mill-stones of omnipotence, between which, triumphantly dying, Christ ground death to powder, and, in the instant of death’s success, proclaimed death’s eternal failure, and poured through earth and hell the insulting cry, “O grave, where is thy victory ? O death, where is thy sting ?” Halleluiah !

(5.) Not merely was he raised by the glory of the Father, and according to the Spirit of holiness, and by his own Divine power ; but *he rose*. Not merely did he raise himself, as he might by Divine power raise another—Lazarus, for instance,—but in all the literality and exactitude of the expression—*he rose*.

(6.) Christ is not less *whole Christ* for being crucified: "Is Christ divided?" (1 Cor. i. 13.)

(7.) The person of Christ constitutes the same check, or limit, on death's work and power in our case, as in his own. As he himself in his Godhead, in which is the seat of his personality, was a bond of connection between his soul in paradise and his body in the grave, so that, even while truly dead, *he* was in heaven, and *he* was in the grave: so the souls of believers are at death made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory, and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection. Thus Christ's person is a bond of union between glorified souls and their respective dead bodies—to that extent checking the separation which death makes, and delivering them who, through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage; just as the like wonderful issue concerning Christ himself—the permission of separation of the parts of his human nature, consistently with the undividedness of his person—defeated him that had the power of death. This was the Death of Death in the Death of Christ: and Christ abides to say, "I am the Resurrection and the Life." "Believest thou this?" μ.

ART. V.—*Spain and Ireland : Resemblances and Contrasts.*

ALTHOUGH the ancient names of these two countries are somewhat similar in orthography and sound, there is no conclusive evidence to show that they are derived from the same root.

Iberia, the ancient name of the Peninsula, took its origin from the river *Iberus* (sometimes written *Hiberus*), the modern Ebro, which drains the southern slopes of the Pyrenees, and may be considered as dividing the highlands from the lowlands of Northern Spain.

The origin of the word *Hibernia*, and its connection with the above, is referred to in a letter of the Irish nobles addressed to Pope John XXII. in 1318, in the following terms: "Be it known unto you, most Holy Father, that our ancient progenitors, the three sons of Milesius the Spaniard, came by

Divine Providence with their fleet of thirty ships, from Cantabria, a city of Spain, on the banks of the river *Hiberus*, whence we derive our name—Hibernian," etc. I give this quotation for what it is worth, without being able to appreciate its value from a philological point of view.

But apart from this apparent resemblance of name, there are many palpable points of similarity between Spain and Ireland. Considered geographically, they are the most western countries of Europe, and from their wide extent of seaboard, and their numerous and natural harbours, are favourably situated for commerce with the East and West, and even with each other.

That there must have been, at one time, a considerable trade between Spain and the west coast of Ireland is clearly shown from history, topography, and ancient remains. In the old town of Galway, in what might be termed the Spanish quarter, I have seen houses as purely Andalusian, in the type of their architecture, as if they had been erected in Cadiz or Sevilla; and in spite of their having suffered from "the tooth of time," they still show traces of taste and opulence.

It is also worthy of being noted, that the small island of Valentia, on the west coast of Kerry (the starting-point of the Transatlantic Cable), bears the name of a Spanish province, and it is more than probable that it received this name from Spanish colonists. The date of their immigration is very uncertain. That it must have been at a very remote period we may infer from the account given by Dr. Killen, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, of the ancient inhabitants of this Emerald Isle. He says: "All accounts concur in representing them as a mixed population. Those who maintain that a portion of them came from Phœnicia can support the statement by a variety of very plausible arguments, . . . some came from *Spain*, some from Gaul, and some from Scandinavia."

But however obscure may be the history of the first settlers in these two countries, however different the aborigines of each, there is one circumstance which is common to both, one element which exercised such a marked and permanent influence upon the national character that we must notice it at some length.

At a time so remote that we cannot ascend to it, the inhabi-

tants of both countries were disturbed in their possessions by the *Celts*—a race whose origin is wrapped in impenetrable darkness, and whose migrations have been, and still are, the subjects of much ingenious but fruitless disputations. Whether they started from Gaul, now France, spreading their incursions to the mouths of the Danube, across the Bosphorus, and into Asia Minor, or, starting from Asia, carried their conquests to the most western coasts of Europe, is a question which it does not concern us to discuss. One thing at least is certain, that whether this Celtic tide set first in a westward direction, or was simply a reflux, it broke in successive waves upon the shores of Spain and Ireland with ever-increasing force, and probably about the same time.

This stream of Celtic migration which flowed over Europe from the Bosphorus to the British Isles, along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, may be reasonably supposed to have entered the Peninsula by the Pyrenees, and the Celts thus firmly established themselves in the mountain-fastnesses throughout the vast regions that lie between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and as far south as the river Ebro. Here they would encounter the Iberians in all their strength. Dissimilar, as history tells us, in language and manners, the numerous tribes into which the two peoples were subdivided were long hostile to each other. Whether contending for the possession or supremacy of the country, and finding by experience that their strife was fruitless, they seem to have consented to an amalgamation, or at least to a peaceful partition of the country between them, and the united people were from that time called *Celtiberians*. And although Spain was subsequently and successively dominated by the Phœnicians, Romans, Visigoths, and Arabs, and no doubt received fresh blood through intermarriage with the dominant races, yet the great stream of national life continued to flow from the union of the Celts with the Iberians.

The regions inhabited by this mixed race were unequal, but, at least till the period of the Roman invasion, they seem to have occupied the greater part, if not the whole, of the Peninsula. As the Celtiberians were thus an amalgamation of the Celts and the Iberi, their character and habits may be naturally expected to partake of both. This was indeed the case, but

not in an equal degree; for the characteristic features of the Celts were more predominant, and have contributed largely to the formation of the national character.

Owing to the absence of authentic records, it is not so easy to form an opinion as to how the Celts became rooted in Irish soil. Whether on their arrival they found it a deserted or an inhabited country, or, finding it inhabited, whether they exterminated, or united with, their predecessors, is merely a subject of conjecture. The tradition that they found it unpeopled is probably not far short of the truth, and would receive considerable support from the consideration that, perhaps, in no other country have the distinctive characteristics of the race been preserved unchanged to such a degree as in Ireland; so much so that the terms "Celt" and "Irish" are almost synonymous.

We have thus seen that, however dense may be the obscurity in which the origin of these peoples is wrapped, this much is certain, that in both the Iberian and Hibernian races there is a strong Celtic element, though less mixed in the Irish than in the Spaniards; but even where the tribes were numerically equal, the Celtic character strongly predominated. It follows, therefore, that the peculiar characteristics of a people so conservative can be easily traced in their descendants, wherever located; and this is precisely the task which we propose to undertake in the following pages.

The first point of resemblance, worthy of note, between these two countries is, that while there is a large infusion of Celtic blood, and a predominance of the Celtic character throughout the nation, *there is a particular locality in each country which seems to be the peculiar home of this ancient race.* It is a curious and instructive fact that this remarkable people seem to have permanently settled down in the same geographical position in the countries to which they have migrated. If we trace them back to the supposed cradle of their existence, we find them occupying the highlands on the north-west coast of Asia Minor, secure in their mountain-fastnesses, and retaining a certain rude freedom under the leadership of their own chieftains. Following them in their migrations westward, we shall find them located in precisely the same geographical position in the various countries of Western Europe in which they settled.

The province of Brittany, in the extreme north-west of France, is to-day the most Celtic of that fundamentally Celtic nation. If we cross over to England, we find the race settling in, and giving their name to, the western highlands of that country—for Wales is simply Gaul *Anglicè*. We need only glance at the highlands of Scotland to see the name preserved in the (Gaelic) language of the highlander, and topographically inscribed on the town of Galloway, on the west coast. And although both the people and their language are more widely scattered throughout the Emerald Isle, there is no doubt that Galway was once, and still is, the capital of the most Celtic province in Ireland. And Spain forms no exception to the general rule. Its most north-west province is named Galicia, the inhabitants of which are called, in Spanish, *Gallegos*, and bear a striking resemblance, both in their physical and moral features, to their Irish cousins. Whether the Celts may have selected these localities on entering the various countries, or been driven to them by the superior force of dominant races, is a question we need not at present consider, but the uniformity of that law which seems to have governed their permanent location in the countries of their adoption is too striking to escape the notice of the most casual observer.

Another feature of resemblance between Spain and Ireland is, *the social position of the pure Celt in both countries*. While in England and Scotland the Welsh and the Gaels retain many of their distinctive characteristics, they have at the same time kept pace with their Saxon neighbours in the march of intelligence, industry, and social progress. But in Ireland and Spain there is a marked difference in the character and social position of the Celtic population. Throughout the Spanish Peninsula the Gallego is literally "the hewer of wood and drawer of water" for his more fortunate fellow-countrymen. In Madrid, and in all the provincial cities, they may be seen standing in groups at the corners of the principal streets, waiting for any job that may turn up. Occupations that would be considered degrading by a Castilian of the same class, are all filled by Gallegos. Thus they do the menial work of the nation, and constitute the lowest stratum of the Spanish society of our time.

It will be almost superfluous to point out to our readers the similarity of position occupied by the Celt in Ireland. If we trace "the Irish" in their migrations throughout the English-speaking world, we may discover the same tendency to locate in cities and herd together in clans. The status they occupy in such cities as London, Liverpool, Glasgow, and New York, is precisely the same, in the social scale, as that of the Gallego in the cities of the Spanish Peninsula. Unskilled labour, menial employment, is the lot for which the Irish Celt is fitted, and with which he is generally content,—at least as content as he would probably be with any other lot.

But not only is this the state of things in "the land of the stranger;"—on his own soil the Irishman's position is relatively the same. In almost every class of labour, or department of business, the Irish are distanced in the race by their "Saxon invaders." If there is any occupation in which the Irish might be supposed to excel, it is that of agriculture; and yet it is generally conceded that they are about the worst farmers on the face of the earth. Should any one feel disposed to question this statement, I would ask—How then can the fact be accounted for, that there is scarcely an estate in Ireland, where practical farming is carried on, that is not under the superintendence, sometimes of an Englishman, generally of a Scotchman, but rarely of an Irishman? I know of no country in Europe where a parallel to this state of things can be found except Spain, whose mines are worked, whose railways were constructed and are principally managed, and whose commerce is almost wholly conducted, by their neighbours, the French and the English.

A third point of resemblance is found in the social condition of these two countries, as illustrated by the *habits and pursuits* of the people. If we begin with the upper classes, we find among them extravagance, combined with foolish notions about rank and a fondness for display. If we could inquire into the history of those decayed families whose patrimonies have passed into the Encumbered Estates Court, we should find that, for generations before, they had been living above their station and beyond their means. The passion for display which beggared them continues as strong as ever, without the

means of indulging it. We know of several who are struggling to keep up former appearances on the mere salvage of the wreck, and others who are living at the expense of their "friends and the public," and would consider it a greater humiliation to stoop to any kind of honest industry than to beg or borrow from those who may feel disposed to give or lend.

Habits are said to travel downwards, or, to put it differently, the tendency of the lower classes is to imitate the upper. In so far as there exists a middle class among the Irish or the Spaniards, we see repeated in them the weakness and vices of their betters,—an extravagant style of living prompted by a desire for display. This has been especially conspicuous among the farming class, in the years of plenty which preceded the present hard times. Young men who ought to have been following the plough were following the hounds. Men who barely could write their names expected to be addressed as Esquires. Farm-houses were sometimes named "villas," "lodges," and even "manors." The drawing-room contained many a piece of furniture of which they scarcely knew the name, and the education of "the young ladies" was directed more towards enabling them to shine *there* than to fit them for useful work in the kitchen or in the dairy.

And what shall we say of the peasantry? Do we not see in them the same extravagant, thriftless habits,—an indolence in acquiring, a recklessness in spending, and an antipathy to saving—as if they aimed at fulfilling to the letter the New Testament precept, "Take no thought for the morrow"? Alongside of this thriftlessness, we see an utter disregard of all comfort or cleanliness in their dwellings or persons. "This entire class, from whatever cause, has for ages stood still on the borders of civilisation, manifesting scarcely a sign of that upward tendency which is the spirit of the age, but clinging to a perverse conservatism of habits, as if they were under the guidance of instinct rather than of reason and conscience."

The above will equally apply to the Spaniards, class for class, only in a still more aggravated form. A Spanish Caballero lives and moves in the atmosphere of show and glitter. He has generally more on his back than he has in his purse, and his balance at the banker's is usually on the wrong side. Should he find it impossible to gratify at once his

appetite and his love of display, he would not hesitate to go without a meal and spend the price of it in keeping up appearances. The same passion for outward grandeur marks their very nomenclature. Language itself becomes used up by their love of hyperbole. In more primitive times the title *Don*, a contraction of *Dominus*, was given only to the nobility ; now if the faithful Squire of the immortal Quixote were to the fore, he would be dubbed Don Sancho, while his master would be styled Señor Don. On the same principle, every shop is a store, and the small trader a merchant ; every school is styled a college, and the schoolmaster a professor. Every college is a university, and its professors are distinguished by a title which indicates that they are always speaking *ex cathedra*. The vices which we have noticed in the lower orders of the Irish are still more marked in the same class of Spaniards, viz., indolence, thriftlessness, uncleanness, and begging as a profession. Except in Dublin, I have never met anything equal to the number and the pertinacity of Spanish beggars.

We must notice, further, a strong resemblance between the *character* and *temperament* of the Irish and the Spaniards. If it be true, as we have already asserted, that the Celtic element predominates in both countries, it follows that they will possess in common, though somewhat modified by local circumstances, the fundamental characteristics of the Celtic race. Nowhere in history do we find the peculiarities of that people so truly and strikingly portrayed as in Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. And wherever Pagan writers have touched upon the character of European Celts, their description corresponds in every particular with the apostle's, and with what is known of the character of Celtic races both of mediæval and modern Christianity.

All testimony goes to prove that the Celts are a *warm-hearted, impetuous, affectionate, generous people*. They are eminently social, affable, and friendly ; possessed of a natural courtesy, and an obliging disposition, not generally found in the Teutonic races. These latter require *to learn* those qualities, which seem inborn in the Celt and the Oriental.

The planting and progress of the gospel among the Celts of Asia Minor forcibly brings out these traits of their character. They received the apostle with open arms and open hearts.

They would have plucked out their eyes and given them to him. And this strong affection he fully reciprocated. For none of his spiritual children did he seem to cherish the same intense affection. He could never forget their enthusiastic reception of him, and the readiness with which they embraced the gospel.

Equally clear is the testimony, on the other hand, that the Gauls are peculiarly *fickle in their affections and vain in their pretensions*. Some have not scrupled even to charge them with insincerity, but that was because they did not understand them. They have ever been a people of extremes, and to others a puzzle,—a people in which may be seen a strange medley of vice and virtue, of blunders and cleverness, a mixture of the comic and the tragic. But it would probably not be further from the truth to assert that the cold steel was never really hot, even when it glowed in the furnace, than that the Celt's friendship was unreal at the moment when he made such a profuse demonstration of it. The true explanation is, that his character is fickle. Thus Cæsar tells us in his History of the Gallic Wars, that on one occasion he shrank from committing himself by treaty to some Celts of Gaul, avowedly on account of the fickleness of the race. Livy also testifies that they were valiant in the assault of battle, but if their first shock were successfully resisted, they were grievously lacking in pertinacious firmness.

But beyond and above all this, we have the testimony of an inspired apostle—of “the greatest man that ever knew and loved the Celtic race,”—to this fickleness as something marvellous, evidenced as it was by their conduct towards God in His gospel. In Galatians i. 6 he says to them, “*I marvel* that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of Christ,” etc. “And this fickleness was closely allied to vanity. The Celtic race is characteristically clever and gifted,” but also too easily puffed up with a consciousness of their superior talents. Hence through their vanity they are always exposed to that “fascination” which by their warmth of feeling and urbanity of manners they are enabled to practise upon others. It is to this that the apostle refers when he says, “O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched (*fascinated*) you?” etc.

“This vanity the apostle exposes under two aspects—(1) a childish delight in what fills the eye or the sensuous imagination, *e.g.* a ritualistic form of religion : and (2) silly self-conceit, which even in religion asserts itself by claiming for one’s own good works a place as ground of acceptance with God.” This accounts for the readiness with which many of the Galatians turned to that Judaism which the apostle denounced, and “which, while characteristically addressing itself to the eye, to sensuous imagination, ministered to silly self-conceit, by proceeding on the theological ground, relatively to justification before God, that man can work out a righteousness of his own by external conformity to law.” The Galatians were “fascinated” by this teaching, because it pampered their vanity, and the fickleness of their character was displayed in their so readily abandoning evangelical truth for these plausible and deadly errors. “And it is noteworthy that at this hour the grand apostasy, whose theological ground is self-conceit, while its working system is showy and sensuous, has its most devoted adherents in the Celts of Ireland, and Brittany, and of Spain.”

And before leaving this point it may be remarked that evangelical Protestantism has also had its warmest and most devoted adherents among the Celtic people. In proof of this we point to Wales, to the Highlands of Scotland, to the Evangelical Churches of France, to the numerous Christian congregations gathered in Spain since 1868, and to many a convert in Ireland, who, in the face of the bitterest persecution, has boldly confessed Christ, and patiently suffered for His name’s sake. “These might be said to represent the fever-heat of the Galatian Church, while their cousins on Irish and Spanish soil represent its fever-chill—the revulsion to the opposite extreme”¹—apostasy from the simplicity of the gospel to the vain show of a sensuous worship, and the self-conceit of a legal righteousness.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length upon the special features of Spanish character which coincide with the general description just given of the Celtic people ; but from the experience I have gained by living and labouring among them for some years, I have come to the conclusion that, in every particular, it is a true delineation of the Celtiberians of our

¹ Professor James M’Gregor, D.D.

time. It may with equal truth be affirmed that, in so far as it goes, it is a faithful description of the Hibernian Celt, who perhaps more than any other can prove his claim to kinship with the Galatians of the New Testament.

There are many other points of resemblance between the Irish and the Spanish people to which we might allude if space permitted. Both possess a strong love of conversation, a natural fluency of speech, and a readiness of expression which forms a striking contrast to the more deliberate and sometimes drawling tones of the Northern races. Both are easily excitable, always demonstrative, and prone to give vent to their feelings in vehement language, and sometimes to their opinions in a manner more emphatic than convenient for those who may differ from them. But in all this bluster and bounce there is, on the whole, not so much real, and far less enduring, wrath than often lurks in another man's frown.

Both Irishmen and Spaniards agree in having a turn for humour, a keen sense of the ludicrous, considerable powers of imitation, and a ready eagerness "to tell and hear something new." The country that produced *Don Quixote*, and furnished materials for *Gil Blas*, must possess a rich vein of wit and humour. And is not the typical *Paddy* as celebrated for his intelligence and wit as for his rollicking and rags? Expressions ever upon the tip of his tongue, and to him the most commonplace, you hear detailed as gems of sparkling wit by the delighted tourist.

Unfortunately they also agree in other particulars of a less pleasing character. There is in both a lamentable laxity as regards truth, a rather low standard of morality in their dealings and transactions with each other, an utter disregard of law, and an irksome attitude towards the regularly constituted authorities of the country. Still, it would be scarcely fair to regard these blemishes as inherent in the race; rather are they to be attributed to the miserably defective moral teaching of a corrupt form of Christianity, on the one hand; and on the other, to centuries of political serfdom under unrighteous penal laws, or iniquitous, despotic governments. In both cases the results have been the same. A rankling recollection of wrongs inflicted in the name of justice has engendered an instinctive dislike of all law and rule, even long after the cause has been

removed, and when equal law and justice are being administered impartially to all.

I have referred to the low state of morality which is common to Ireland and Spain, and charged it to the corrupt form of Christianity which is the numerically dominant religion in both countries. That I am authorised to connect these as cause and effect is proved by the fact—a fact which has often been demonstrated by figures—that in every country where Roman Catholicism predominates, the criminal class are found to be fully in the proportion of three Roman Catholics to one Protestant of equal numbers. We willingly admit that there are in the Church of Rome men as intelligent, upright, and honourable as are to be found in any Church, but that does not in any way affect the question at issue. The facts of history go to prove that when Rome was in the zenith of her power Europe was shrouded in darkness. If we look to Ireland's history, we shall see that during the ante-Papal period, when her religion was purely evangelical, she was the light of the West and the centre of missionary enterprise—sending forth her sons to evangelise the Continent. But from the hour that the treachery of Pope Adrian and the tyranny of Henry II. subjected her to the thralldom of Rome, her light was quenched and her influence began to wane. Then in Ireland, as throughout Europe, the mightier the Church of Rome grew the denser became the darkness. At last the dawn of the Reformation broke on the horizon. Now, mark those countries and that race which were foremost to embrace its heavenly principles. Germany, Holland, Britain start into new life and enter upon a glorious career. Spain and Ireland maintain their allegiance to Rome, and continue either stagnant or retrograde. Saxon and Celt change places in the social scale. For just as the decline of Celtic Ireland and of Celtiberia dates from their absolute submission to the malignant influences of Romanism, so the rise of Germany and of Britain dates from the hour when they were emancipated from its political and spiritual bondage. To-day we find the Anglo-Saxon race at the head of civilised and Christian peoples, whereas the Celts (except in Wales and Scotland) have not only remained stationary, but actually degenerated. What is the cause? We point to Spain and Ireland for a solution of this problem. It is beyond

all question that, precisely in those districts of Ireland where Rome holds all but undisputed sway, will you find most poverty, crime, lawlessness, and bloodshed. Equally certain is it that throughout all those centuries during which Rome held absolute dominion in Spain, never was her moral degradation so complete, and never were her people so ignorant and immoral as in the days of Philip III., surnamed the Good, when the proportion of bishops, priests, and friars to the rest of the population was *one in every forty-five* !

I could still enlarge on this division of the subject, but having already exceeded the limits I had proposed to myself, I would pass on to notice briefly a few points by way of contrast.

Let us begin with the Reformation, and observe, first, that in Spain *the Protestants were persecuted and exterminated in the name and by the power of Romanism wielding the arm of the State*. Perhaps in no other country in Europe did the principles of the Reformation make more rapid, though silent, progress than in Spain. And the work was all the more real from the fact that it was wholly free from political aims and influences. But when this movement was discovered the fury of the Inquisitors was all the fiercer as the Reformed religion had for such a considerable time been making rapid progress in their midst without their being aware of it. We need not dwell upon the process of that extermination. It is all comprehended under that word of diabolical import—the *Inquisition*. We shall merely quote here a single passage from Prescott, in which he summarises the results :—

“Never was there a persecution which did its work more thoroughly. The blood of the martyrs is commonly said to be the seed of the Church. But the storm of persecution fell as heavily on the Spanish Protestants as it did on the Albigenses in the thirteenth century, blighting every living thing, so that no germ remained for future harvests. Spain might now boast that the stain of heresy no longer defiled the hem of her garment. But at what a price was this purchased ! Not merely by the sacrifice of the lives and fortunes of several thousands of the existing generation, but by the disastrous consequences entailed for ever on the country. Folded under the dark wing of the Inquisition, Spain was shut out from the light which, in the sixteenth century, broke over the rest of Europe, stimulating the nations to greater enterprise in every department of knowledge. The genius of the people was rebuked, and their spirit quenched, under the malignant influence of an eye that never slumbered, of an unseen arm ever raised to strike.”

In Ireland, on the contrary, it was *the Roman Catholics who were subjected to persecution, on the part of the State, and in the name of Protestantism.* This is a fact so well known to every student of Irish history that we do not consider it necessary to support the assertion by any lengthened reference to authorities. It is not meant that there was any parallel between the persecutions of Irish Catholics and Spanish Protestants at the Reformation. For the honour of our common humanity we are happy to think that there was only one country in the world where such an infernal machine as the Inquisition could be set in operation. Nevertheless we cannot conceal from ourselves the lamentable fact that Irish Roman Catholics have suffered much at the hands of a political Protestantism in days gone by, the effects of which are powerfully and keenly felt till this day.

This principally accounts for another difference in the circumstances of the two countries which well deserves notice. In Spain, *liberalism in politics* is always hostile to Romanism and favourable to Protestantism. That the great majority of Spaniards still continue ardently attached to Catholicism is freely admitted; but the *upper* classes are blindly devoted to a despotic government, and are so conservative as to dread any change from "the good old times," and the religion of their ancestors. On the other hand, the intelligent, well-educated liberals in the community—those who desire freedom, improvement, and national progress—associate Romanism with tyrannical government and retrograde policy; and even when totally unbiassed by the influence of any religious belief, they detest that Church which goes hand in hand with despotism and many a foul abuse. They despise their priests, often with good reason; and a witty squib against a *cura* is relished much as boys relish a practical joke at the expense of an unpopular schoolmaster.

Precisely the contrary is the case in Ireland. The intolerant policy of successive illiberal Governments towards the Roman Catholic religion had the effect of making the people cleave to it all the more, and of driving them in a body into the Liberal camp. Thus, among Irish Roman Catholics, Liberalism in politics, instead of being associated with dislike of their Church, is generally accompanied with ardent attachment to it.

And this leads to the only other point of contrast which at present we have space to notice, viz., *the facility for, and success attending, mission-work among Roman Catholics in Spain as compared with Ireland.* This is proved by an appeal to actual results. It is little more than eleven years since religious liberty was established in Spain. Till then the only religion tolerated in the country was the Roman Catholic. As late as 1868 it was supposed that there was not a single *native* Protestant in Spain. Only a few years before a number of men, chiefly young men, had been arrested, tried, and condemned to the galleys, for no other offence than that of having portions of the Word of God in their possession, and for having met together privately for mutual edification. But after their banishment it was supposed that the country was free from Protestant heresy; and certainly it was not the fault of the authorities if any of the leaven remained. The Revolution came in the autumn of '68, and with it the proclamation of liberty of conscience. The banished Protestants, some of them converted priests, returned all the better for their exile, having learned "the way of God more perfectly" among the Christian people who had befriended them. Then the various foreign Churches, Missionary Societies, Bible and Tract Societies, entered the field. Many of the principal cities became centres of gospel preaching, tract distribution, and colportage work. The Word of God was eagerly purchased and earnestly studied by the people. Churches have now been formed and schools established in many centres; and whereas some eleven years ago there was not a single native Protestant in Spain, we shall not exceed the mark when we say that, at this moment, there are not less than 20,000 who profess to have seen and abandoned the errors of Romanism, and who rejoice, some of them in the face of great opposition, in the name and privileges of evangelical Christians. And that this number has not been doubled or trebled is owing to the simple but lamentable fact that the Christian Churches of the Continent and of Britain have not entered this promising field in the force and spirit in which they ought. After nearly five years' residence in the country, constantly engaged in various departments of mission-work, I may be allowed to express my conviction that there are very few towns of any importance in the Peninsula, and cer-

tainly no city, where there might not have been to-day a vigorous Protestant Church had the means been forthcoming to sustain the work until it became self-supporting.

How striking is the contrast when we turn to Ireland! The fact is notorious that *direct* access to Irish Roman Catholics is very limited indeed. We have already referred to some of the causes which account for this aversion to Protestant truth, and in which they differ so widely from their co-religionists in Spain. In addition, I would say that, as a result of my experience, Irish Romanists have greater respect for, and are more amenable to, ecclesiastical authority than Spaniards are, *i.e.* they are more priest-ridden. A book forbidden by a Spanish priest would have a special attraction for many of his flock, and in this way the sale of the Scriptures has been often greatly furthered. Nothing has contributed more to fill our Protestant chapels, at first with curious onlookers, who afterwards became earnest seekers of Truth, than altar-denunciations. We know that the very opposite is the case in Ireland. There is nothing an Irish Romanist dreads more than to be denounced from the altar. When it comes to that, his prudent course is to migrate as speedily as possible to safer quarters. Doubtless there have been cases of bitter and brutal persecution in Spain, instigated on all occasions by the priests; but if all such cases that have occurred during the past eleven years were summed up, they would not amount to the one-third of the outrages committed last year in connection with the Irish Church missions in Connemara.

Another striking difference is that the Irish Romanist is much better instructed in his religion than the Spaniard. If I were asked to describe in a sentence the Catholicism of Spain, in its outward forms of worship, I would not hesitate to say that it is Paganism baptized. And as for the worshippers, beyond a few superstitious and mechanical performances, their mind is for the most part an utter blank as to the nature and privileges of true religion. The Irish Romanist, on the other hand, has a much more fervent attachment to and an intelligent grip of the doctrines of his Church. He at least *knows* what he believes, and clings to every item of his creed with persistent tenacity. With the Spaniard and the Italian he would undoubtedly say, "I believe what the Church believes;"

but in being further questioned as to what "the Church believes," while nine-tenths of them would reply, "The Church believes what I believe," the Irish Romanist can tell you what both he and the Church believe, and will be prepared to defend every separate article of his faith, and even when beaten on most points, will return to the attack with unflinching courage. I will not say how far he is indebted to Protestantism for the very weapons with which he combats her forces, but that mission-work in a country where Protestants and Roman Catholics have for centuries commingled is much more difficult than in countries exclusively Papal, is a palpable and incontestable fact.

A further difficulty, rarely recognised by those not experienced in dealing with Romanists, is the habit prevalent in Ireland of using the watchwords of the Christian faith in a specially Romish sense. This difficulty, generally speaking, is not found in Spain. The expressions, "justified by faith," "receiving Christ," "saved by grace," "peace with God," etc., would with most Spaniards be mere words conveying no clear ideas. To the Irish Romanist they convey clear and definite ideas, but all erroneous. To him to be "saved by faith" means to be within the pale of the Church, "receiving Christ" is to receive the wafer, and to be "at peace with God" signifies practically to stand well with his Church. Irish Romanists have to unlearn their mother tongue, so to speak, before they can fully learn the gospel. With Spaniards this difficulty does not exist to the same extent.

But just as in ordinary matters, that which is acquired most slowly and with greatest difficulty is generally retained with most tenacity, so it is found that Irish Roman Catholics who *have* embraced evangelical doctrines from conviction, are firmer, clearer, and more fervent in their faith than converts of any other nation. The very struggle it has cost them seems to root their convictions of truth more deeply, and to lay the basis of a Christian character that does not easily bend before the blandishments or the persecutions of Rome. There are therefore many elements of hope in a mission carried on among such a people. As compared with the condition and prospects of Spain only twelve years ago, Ireland at this moment may be considered a most hopeful field. In the former there was

then not a single copy of the Word of God in the hands of the common people, and probably not one out of every hundred of the priests had ever handled the Sacred Volume. Notwithstanding, at the hour when least expected, the day of her deliverance dawned, and upon thousands of her benighted people "the Sun of Righteousness arose with healing in his wings." How different is the condition of Ireland at this moment! Many hundreds of copies of the Douay Testament, *without notes*, have been sold by our colporteurs, besides numerous other Christian publications. The influence of evangelical doctrine and Christian life is being brought to bear upon our erring fellow-subjects day by day. Is it likely that the God who has said, "My word shall not return unto me void," will allow all this precious seed to perish? Assuredly not. Sooner might we question His very existence than distrust or deny His faithfulness. His promise is that the isles shall wait for His law. Ireland is one of those isles, and we believe that the day of her redemption draweth nigh. Believing this, we pray for its speedy advent, and we labour for its accomplishment. And when, through the almighty agency of the Spirit of God, our beloved country shall shake off the yoke which Rome has bound about her neck, her emancipated sons will have this advantage over the Spaniards, that they will find in their very midst open doors, open arms, and open hearts to receive them,—brethren to speak to them in their own language, adapting the truth to their peculiar modes of thought, and seeking in the fulness of sympathy to be helpers to their faith.

Thus we long to see realised in our island-home that glorious conception of the prince of apostles, sketched in his Epistle to the Galatians, where his large and liberal mind contemplates the scattered races and classes of men fused into one harmonious family—one compact body—where there is neither Jew nor Greek, Saxon nor Celt, Protestant nor Romanist, but Christ all, and in all.

WM. MOORE.

ART. VI.—*Buddhism.*

ATTEMPTS have at various times been made to displace Jesus Christ from the unique position which he occupies in the estimation of his followers. His rival, his peer, a man worthy of equal honour and reverence is the great *desideratum* of unbelievers; but where to find any one fit to be compared with him has been, ever since his Church was established in the earth, a puzzle to those who would not acknowledge his claims. The Neo-Platonists vainly attempted to dispute Christ's title to pre-eminence by pointing to Pythagoras. A more elaborate effort was made by Philostratus, and afterwards by Hierocles, to exhibit a contemporary of our Saviour, Apollonius of Tyana, as a mightier theurgist than Christ, and as deserving of even greater veneration. The English Deists were fond of drawing a parallel between Apollonius and the Founder of Christianity, and it was with the view of discrediting Christ's claims that Blount published with copious notes a translation of part of the Life of Apollonius Tyanæus by Philostratus. Comparisons have frequently since been instituted, for the purpose of depreciating the moral grandeur of Jesus Christ, between him and such rulers of the spirits of men as Socrates, and Mohammed, and Confucius, and Hillel. In an age in which unwonted attention is bestowed on the life of Christ, in which his glorious person is put in the foreground by the defenders of the Christian faith, and as Von der Alm bitterly complains, "Christ and Christ and Christ again is the theme of religious discourses," the provocation to infidels has been strong to seek out some one from the great of old who might prove a match for Him whose name, by the verdict of the civilised world, has been set high above every name. A hero is needed to contest Christ's title to be regarded as surpassing in moral excellence and in his beneficent influence on the world every one known in the records of history. "Our age is feeling more and more the need of getting rid of this shameful super-

stitution of worshipping a Jewish man as God."—(Von der Alm.) The hero of the hour is Buddha. In him not a few of the opponents of Christianity think that they have succeeded in finding a worthy competitor of Christ for the place of pre-eminence among men, one whom they need not fear to set up in opposition to the claims of Jesus.

It would, however, be an error to suppose that Buddha is now for the first time placed on a line with Christ. One of the vagaries of the Manicheans was to identify Christ with Buddha, as well as with Zoroaster, Mani, and the Sun.¹ During the conflict of the Christian Church with Manicheism the name of Buddha was so well known that in the form of renunciation prescribed to Manichean heretics they were required expressly to anathematise *Bóddas*, Buddha.²

The study of Buddhism and its founder is now forced upon Christians by an apologetic interest. Since Renan at the close of his *Life of Jesus* spoke somewhat doubtfully as to which of the two, Jesus or Shâkya Muni, had the better title to be regarded as the world's greatest benefactor, there has been many comparisons made between Christianity and Buddhism and their respective founders; and there has not been unanimity in rendering a decision. We will not quote here some of the blasphemies that have been uttered. But, apart from controversy, we cannot afford to be indifferent touching the real nature and merits of Buddhism. Its influence in the world, not only in past ages, but in the present time, should awaken a curiosity to ascertain its true character. It is positively culpable for an educated man to be content to remain ignorant of what it teaches. If we are to believe one of the latest writers on Buddhism (Rhys Davids), forty per cent. of the human race, or five hundred millions of people, are at this day moulded by Buddhist doctrine. This estimate is indeed far too high. Mr. Davids exaggerates the entire population of several countries in which Buddhism is predominant, and he seems to forget that not all the Chinese and Japanese profess to be Buddhists. Gützlaff did not consider that the Buddhists

¹ See Neander's *Ch. Hist.*, Torrey's transl. vol. i. p. 480. The account which Neander, in treating of Manicheism, gives of Buddhism, is very defective and erroneous. But this is not the place to criticise it.

² See Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. iii. p. 415.

formed more than two-thirds of the population of China. And it is not to be overlooked that Buddhism, like Taouism, has found its adherents "almost entirely among the uneducated classes, and even these reject all doctrines which are inconsistent with the teaching of Confucius. No educated man would admit for a moment that he was a follower of either Buddhism or Taouism."¹ In like manner in Japan the people of education look with contempt on the followers of Buddha. Shintuism, not Buddhism, is the State religion in Japan, and Japanese Buddhists cannot be reckoned at more than twenty millions. We do not think that we are warranted to hold that the number of Buddhists of every shade throughout the world exceeds the aggregate of those who bear the Christian name. But even on the most moderate calculation of the adherents of Buddhism, the number is so vast that ignorance of the religion which they profess would be unpardonable in those who take an interest in the study of mankind.

The attempts made to explain the principles of Buddhism might well perplex and discourage ordinary readers. They may have seen it stated that the true orthodox doctrine regarding Buddha is that he was an *avatâr* or incarnation of the second person of the Hindu Trinity, and that the Christian doctrine of the person of Christ has been borrowed from the Buddhists. This fable respecting Buddha is now universally admitted by Indian archæologists to have been an invention of the Brahmans many centuries after the rise of Christianity. But, perhaps, no one has so completely misrepresented the true nature of Buddhism, as a very influential writer, who has hardly ceased to be looked upon by many as an oracle; we mean the late F. D. Maurice. In his Boyle Lectures on the Religions of the World, he makes these statements:—

"The word Buddha, it seems to be admitted on all hands (!), means Intelligence. That men ought to worship pure Intelligence must have been the first proclamation of the original Buddhists. . . . Buddhism is an attempt at the highest, least material idea of divinity. Buddha is clear light, perfect wisdom."²

The slightest knowledge of Sanskrit would have enabled

¹ *Confucianism and Taouism*, by Professor R. K. Douglas, p. 153.

² Lecture III.

Mr. Maurice to perceive that Buddha could not mean intelligence, or clear light, perfect wisdom. The Buddha is in fact not conceived to be a being who from the beginning possessed the true knowledge, but is held to have gradually attained to it. Mr. Maurice's view of the origin of Buddhism is utterly false; and it is not surprising that he draws strange conclusions from his premises. But it almost makes the intelligent reader distrust his eyesight when he meets with these statements in the lecture referred to:—

“To the Buddhist the belief in God is the most awful, and at the same time the most real of all thoughts; one, not thrust back into the corner of a mind which is occupied by everything else, but which he thinks demands the highest and most refined exercise of all the faculty that he has. It is something which is to make a change in himself, which is at once to destroy him and to perfect him.”

It is some consolation to know, as indicating the progress of Buddhistic studies of late years, that such an entire misrepresentation of Buddhism would not now be tolerated; though even when Mr. Maurice wrote he had access to sources of information that might have rendered it impossible for him to mistake so totally the nature of the system whose fundamental principles he undertook to expound.

The name Buddha is spelt in various ways. As many as fifty different forms of the word have been reckoned up. It appears in Chinese as *Fo-to*. This is the nearest approach to the utterance of the name of Buddha of which the Chinese are capable. The latter syllable in *Fo-to* being omitted, *Fo* became the common Chinese equivalent for Buddha. Buddha is not strictly a proper name, but an appellative, meaning “the Enlightened,” or, as Max Müller and others prefer to render it, “the Awakened.”¹ The word has acquired the force of a proper name; but it is still perfectly justifiable to treat the term as an appellative or a title, and to speak, as some do, of *the Buddha*, just as we can use the term Christ with or without the definite article. At first, it is well known, Jesus was called *the Christ*, *the Anointed*. It was some time before Christ was written without the article, and treated as a proper name. It may be mentioned that in the Buddhist

¹ On the various ways of explaining the name Buddha, comp. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 71, note.

Scriptures in Sanskrit and Pâli,¹ the word Buddha is invariably employed as an appellative, and not as a proper name. Gautama Buddha, or Shâkya Muni, is the last of a series of Buddhas who appear in different cycles through which the world is held to pass. Twenty-four Buddhas are said to have appeared in the world before the Buddha known in the present cycle of the universe. They have all taught the same system. "After the death of each Buddha, his religion flourishes for a time, and then decays, till it is at last completely forgotten, and wickedness and violence rule over the earth. Gradually then the world improves, until at last a new Buddha appears, who again preaches the lost *Dharma* or Truth."²

What can we know with certainty regarding the Buddha who is said to have last appeared in the world, and who is to have no successor till 5000 years have elapsed from his discovery of the way of truth and salvation? It is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to distinguish in what is told of him between history and legend. M. J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, in his very interesting book on *Le Bouddha et sa Religion*, treats of the life and the legend of Buddha in separate chapters. But his critical judgment has not been sufficient to enable him to discriminate between fact and fiction. Indeed, one of the most learned and judicious Orientalists, Professor H. H. Wilson, looked upon Buddha as a purely imaginary being, and would not allow him a real historical existence. He expressed this opinion after the investigations of Eugène Burnouf had seen the light. We have to remember that Buddhism is a production of the Hindu mind, and that India has been the birthplace of no ancient writings that can be regarded as proper history. The old Hindus were indifferent to common mundane occurrences. The sober record of them was worthless in their view. Those Hindus who believed in the popular mythology took an all-absorbing interest in the exploits of their gods, and the more extravagant a fable was, the greater the charm which it possessed for them. Those, again, who were attached to a

¹ Pâli is related to Sanskrit as Italian is to Latin. It is the language in which Buddha taught, and in which the Buddhist sacred books have been preserved in Ceylon. It has long ceased to be a living tongue. The Buddhist Scriptures have been preserved in Nepal in a Sanskrit translation.

² Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 179.

philosophy which taught the unreality of the world, and regarded it and its phenomena as having only an illusive existence, were above the earnest study of actual events, and were absolutely devoid of all historical sense.¹ There is extant no trustworthy Life of Buddha, and few indeed are the real facts regarding him which can be discovered amid a mass of legendary matter. They who extol Shâkya Muni as the greatest name and most perfect character that has ever appeared in the world, should say definitely on what historical documents they rely. But authentic records of his life are not available. Buddha committed nothing to writing. The Nepalese tradition, it is true, ascribes to him the composition of the first of the three divisions of the Buddhist canonical Scriptures. But the very form of these writings is opposed to this view, and it is contradicted by the Singhalese and the Tibetans, who relate that it was Buddha's three principal disciples who collected in these three distinct works the doctrines taught by their master. One fact cannot be disputed, that in the reign of King Ashoka, who stands to Buddhism in the same relation in which Constantine stands to Christianity, and who made Buddhism the religion of the State, a great council was held for determining the authoritative Buddhist Scriptures. This council, commonly called the Third Buddhist Synod, was convened in Pâtaliputra, the modern Patna, the Palibothra of old Greek writers, about the middle of the third century B.C. We have rock inscriptions certifying the holding of this synod, as well as other testimony regarding it. At it the Buddhist Canon was fixed, though the books comprehended in it were not then committed to writing. The Singhalese annals mention expressly that the teachings of Buddha were preserved and transmitted orally, and were not reduced to writing till the reign of Vattagâmani, who flourished 88-76 B.C. Then for the first time they were recorded in books. When we consider the voluminous character of the canonical books of the Buddhists, whatever we may think of their original worth, we may well doubt the power of oral tradition to keep them pure and entire for several hundred years. If we assume, in accordance with the Singhalese authorities, that Buddha died 543 B.C., we have

¹ On the Brahmanical view of history, comp. Lassen, *Ind. Alt.* ii. p. 2, etc.

a period of nearly 500 years during which memory was the sole custodian of the extensive documents that now form the Buddhist Scriptures. We have, however, a test by which we can ascertain the principles and views prevailing among orthodox Buddhists in the middle of the third century B.C. At that time, by order of the great council already referred to, Mahendra, or Mahinda, the son of King Ashoka, was sent as a missionary to Ceylon. He learnt, we are told, the whole of the Buddhist Canon in three years, and promulgated it orally in Ceylon, whence it was subsequently carried to Burmah and Siam. Now these three countries, Ceylon, Burmah, and Siam, form what is called the Southern School of Buddhists, as distinguished from the Northern School, which comprehends the Buddhists of Nepâl, Tibet, China, and Japan. There has been little communication between these two schools. They have exerted little influence on one another. And when the sacred writings which both schools possess are in accordance, we may be pretty sure that we have in their common teaching the orthodox faith of the Buddhists when Mahendra carried that faith to Ceylon. It is a pity that we have not yet translations of all the canonical books of both Northern and Southern Buddhists. Portions of them have been given to the world.

We are told that after the death of Buddha a council was held at Râjgriha in Magadha or Behar, and that then the three divisions of the Buddhist Scriptures were formed, the *Tripitaka*, or three *baskets*, as they are called. The compilation of the first, namely, the Sûtras or discourses of Buddha, was intrusted to his disciple Ananda; that of the second part, Vinaya, or discipline, to another disciple named Upâli; and that of the Abhidharma or metaphysical portion to another disciple named Kâshyapa. We must be content to learn from these three *baskets* the original doctrines of Buddhism. "It is useless," as Max Müller acknowledges, "to try to cast a glance beyond the boundaries of the Buddhist Canon. What we find in the canonical books, in the so-called 'Three Baskets,' is orthodox Buddhism, and the doctrine of Buddha."¹ It may be added that the Canon of the Southern Buddhists is shorter, and is generally held to be purer, than that of the Northern. Our information in regard to the original doctrines of Buddhism

¹ *Science of Religion*, p. 177.

is more satisfactory than in regard to the founder of the system. There is room for rational scepticism in regard to most things that are commonly related of Buddha. Even his age we cannot definitely determine. The year of his death was, according to his Southern adherents, 543 B.C.; according to the Chinese and Japanese, it was 400 years earlier. Max Müller assigns reasons for thinking the year 477 B.C. a more probable date, while Rhys Davids comes to the conclusion that Buddha died within a few years of 412 B.C. Westergaard and Weber agree in making his death to have happened between 368-370 B.C. The question has not yet been decided; but most scholars have been inclined to think that the tradition of the Southern Buddhists which makes the year of Buddha's death to be 543 B.C., is to be preferred to any of the results reached by calculation. The proper name of Buddha is Siddhârtha, and it is said to have been given to him in his childhood. But this name is significant. Its import is, "he who has accomplished his aim;" which suggests a later origin for it. Even the reputed city of his birth, Kapilavastu, is treated by Professor H. H. Wilson as mythical. It is certainly remarkable that the first aphorism of the philosopher Kapila is in these terms: "The complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds, is the highest aim of man." Buddha's doctrine assumes this aphorism as its starting-point. From the coincidences between Buddhism and the teaching of Kapila, Professor Wilson sees an allegorical reference to this philosopher in the birthplace of Buddha, Kapilavastu. Nor is Professor Müller successful in establishing the reality of Kapilavastu as the birthplace of Buddha, by telling us that two Chinese pilgrims, Fahian in the fifth, and Hiouen-Thsang in the seventh centuries of the Christian era, saw the actual ruins of this city Kapilavastu. Hiouen-Thsang is hardly a credible witness in such a matter. He has testified to having visited the place where Buddha in a former birth, out of pity, gave his body to be devoured by a starving tigress, and has reported that the ground when he saw it was still red with the blood of Buddha, and that the trees and flowers had the like colour! We may, however, assume Kapilavastu, though otherwise unknown, to have been a real city, the birthplace of Buddha, and the capital of a kingdom of the same name,

situated at the foot of the mountains of Nepâl. In the Buddhist legends Siddhârtha appears as the son and heir of a magnificent king. The object of such exaggeration is to enhance the sacrifice which he made in devoting himself to an ascetic life. But it is evident that his father could have been only a petty prince or raja, very inferior in power and rank to the first great Buddhist King Ashoka, whose son was the celebrated apostle of Buddhism to the Singhalese. The name of the father of Siddhârtha was Suddhodana. He belonged to the tribe of the Shâkyas. Hence Buddha is frequently designated Shâkya Muni, the sage or saint of the Shâkya race. His family name was Gautama, which, under various forms, appears in the designations given to him. The mother of Buddha is called Mâyâ or Mahamâyâ; but this name is treated as allegorical even by writers who believe in Buddha as a historical person. Mâyâ is, according to Hindu philosophy, the power which creates the world of illusion, and Buddhism adopted that principle of early Hindu philosophy that the world has no real existence. The mother of Buddha is said to have been childless till she, in the forty-fifth year of her age, gave birth to Buddha. The earliest and simplest stories of Buddha's life contain a great deal of absurd and incredible matter, which criticism unceremoniously rejects. But the later accounts of him far surpass in extravagance those of an earlier date. We have no space for specimens of these legends. In due time Siddhârtha was married. According to the Southern Buddhists he had only one wife; according to the Northern Buddhists he had three. We need not give a description of his personal appearance, which is represented as faultless. He had the thirty-two principal signs characteristic of a great man, and the eighty secondary marks.¹ He had everything desirable in this world. But in his twenty-ninth year he determined to withdraw from it, and to devote himself to the study of the means of emancipation from all the ills that flesh is heir to. The story of the way in which he was led finally to become an ascetic is touchingly told. It had been predicted

¹ These signs are laboriously investigated and explained by Burnouf in an appendix to his translation of *Le Lotus de la bonne Loi*. Burnouf there remarks that the Buddhist ideal of manly beauty was very different from the European. We should look on the person possessed of these characteristics of a great man as presenting quite an effeminate appearance.

at his birth by the astrologer that he would become either a mighty monarch or an ascetic who should attain to Buddhahood. His father dreaded the fulfilment of the latter alternative of the prophecy. He, therefore, studiously endeavoured to keep the young prince aloof from everything that might inspire him with a distaste for the enjoyment of life. He surrounded him by all the objects that might contribute to his happiness. He was not suffered to witness the sight of distress or sickness or death. These precautions were in vain. One day the prince, while taking a drive to his pleasure-garden, saw an old man tottering on his staff, exhibiting all the visible indications of old age. He asked his coachman, "Who is that?" The latter, after dilating on the misery of old age, spoke of it as the inevitable lot of man. The young prince was deeply affected by what he heard; he could not continue his drive, and desired the coachman to return at once to the city. On another occasion, while taking a drive for pleasure in a different direction, his eye caught sight of a young man lying on the road in a burning fever, unattended, in great pain, and terrified at the approach of death. Siddhârtha, on witnessing this sad spectacle, made inquiry of his attendant, and was informed by him of the uncertainty of health, and of the trouble which is excited by the apprehension of evil. The young prince was thrown into melancholy contemplation, and ordered his coachman to take him back to the city.

While taking a drive by another road he was shocked by the sight of a dead man placed on a bier, surrounded by weeping friends. This led him to moralise on the vanity of youth, which old age comes to destroy, of health which so many maladies ruin, of life which endures so short a time. He gives himself to meditation to try to discover a way of deliverance from bondage to such evils.

He took his fourth famous drive, during which he encountered a religious mendicant, calm and peaceful and self-disciplined. He admired the appearance of this man, and on interrogating his faithful coachman, was told that he was an ascetic who had subdued his passions, and was free from desire and envy. The young prince resolved to take this ascetic as his model. His father strove to prevent him from leaving his home; but he at last succeeded in accomplishing what is called

“the great Renunciation,” by abandoning his family and riches and honour, and devoting himself to asceticism, depending on alms for his support. We need not comment on this story of the four drives, of which we have given an epitome. Its fictitious character is unmistakable. But so attractive has the legend of this prince, tearing himself from an Indian court to lead the life of a devotee, been found, that it has formed the basis of the life of a saint whose name has a place in the Roman Calendar. The story of St. Josaphat by John of Damascus has evidently been borrowed from the legend of Buddha. The points of resemblance are too close and numerous to be explained as the result of accidental coincidence, and the right of the story of Buddha to be considered the original cannot be questioned.

Buddha, having forsaken his home, attached himself to a famous Brahman teacher. He left him after a time, and sought another instructor. The doctrine which he learned did not satisfy him; so he withdrew into retirement, and for six years addicted himself to mortification and study to such a degree that he was reduced to a shadow. Then he changed his way of living. He gave up fasting and penance, and began to indulge moderately in food. This seemed to indicate moral weakness in the eyes of his disciples. They took offence at his renouncing the practice of austerities, and abandoned him for a time, but he steadfastly pursued his aim. We read of the conflicts which he sustained with Mâra, the demon of love, of sin, and of death, the tempter and the enemy of Buddha. At last he proved worthy to bear the name of Siddhârtha, “the one whose purpose has been accomplished.” Seated under a pipal tree (*ficus religiosa*) at Gayâ in Behar, he arrived by meditation at supreme wisdom. Beneath this sacred pipal, afterwards called by his followers the Bodhi or Bo tree, the tree of wisdom, he became the Buddha, the Enlightened. He discovered the secret of deliverance from the evils of old age, disease, and death. The way of emancipation which he had found out he proceeded to preach as long as he continued in the world. He laboured for forty-five years, never going far from the place of his birth. He succeeded in attaching to himself a multitude of disciples, who became religious mendicants, and helped to propagate his doctrine. He triumphed

over Brahmans who ventured to dispute with him, enjoyed the protection of kings, and, at length, at the age of eighty, terminated his career.

The legendary life of Buddha is puerile and extravagant in the extreme. We cannot, indeed, refuse with Professor Wilson to admit that there ever was any such person as Shâkya Muni. But it is impossible to settle how much of what is related of his personality should be received as true and authentic. It is admitted on all hands that it is easier to determine the doctrines originally associated with his name than the particulars of his life, though in regard to all the original doctrines of Buddhism there is not unanimity among Orientalists. We can fix with tolerable accuracy the time of the rise of Buddhism. It was during the Sutra period—the period of the philosophic schools in India, which began about 600 B.C. according to Max Müller. The authority of the Veda was questioned in those schools. Buddha was not the first to oppose the teaching of the Veda. He rejected the Veda principally because of the bloody sacrifices which it enjoined. But long before he took up this attitude of formal antagonism, the sacrifices and hymns of the Veda had been treated in the ancient Upanishads as useless,¹ and the attainment of the knowledge of our identity with the Supreme Spirit had been set forth as the only proper aim of the truly wise. Buddha had likewise been preceded in the rejection of a Creator and a Providence. As for the doctrine of transmigration, which has such prominence in Buddhism, it had long before his day been the common faith of the Hindus. How to be delivered from the necessity of undergoing future births was also a problem that had engaged much attention. It had been solved by showing the way to reach absorption into the Supreme Spirit. But this solution did not satisfy Buddha. He formed his own idea of what should be regarded as salvation, and of the means of attaining it. In developing and carrying out his views on these subjects he became the originator of a new system.²

¹ Comp. Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 134. (Am. Ed.)

² “*Philosophe et moraliste, il croyait à la plupart des vérités admises par les Brâhmanes ; mais il se séparait d’eux du moment qu’il s’agissait de tirer la conséquence de ces vérités et de déterminer les conditions du salut, but des efforts de l’homme, puisqu’il substituait l’anéantissement et le vide au Brahman unique dans la substance du quel ses adversaires faisaient rentrer le monde et l’homme.*” —Burnouf, *Introd.*, p. 155.

To the honour of Buddha it must be said that his teaching laid stress on the necessity of practical morality; and in this respect it compares very favourably with Brahmanism in every form. The higher Vedânta philosophy teaches the worthlessness of the practice of virtue, nay, its mischievousness, as delaying the time of emancipation; seeing that every one is doomed to enjoy the fruit of his good works before he can attain the *summum bonum* of becoming absorbed in the one truly existing Brahma. The popular Indian religion, again, makes little account of morality, and is certainly not promotive of purity of mind and life. But Buddhism appears from the beginning to have emphasised the practice of morality as a necessary factor in accomplishing the great end aimed at. Meditation does, indeed, play a still more important part in Buddhism; but it has not been suffered wholly to supersede the obligation to virtue.

The essence of primitive Buddhism lies in what is called the *four sublime or noble truths* (in Sanskrit, *âryâni Satyâni*; in Pâli, *ariyâni Satchchânî*). These *sublime truths* are acknowledged by both Northern and Southern Buddhists, and the theory of them deserves to be reckoned to the most ancient Buddhistic doctrine. They are—(1.) Suffering exists as is seen in decay, disease, and death. (2.) The cause of suffering is desire or thirst (Sanskrit *Trishnâ*, Pâli *tanhâ*). “Men driven on by thirst, run about like a snared hare; held in fetters and bonds, they undergo pain for a long time again and again.”—(*Dhammapada*, ver. 342.) (3.) Sorrow is destroyed by the extinction of this thirst or desire. “The extinction of thirst overcomes all pain.”—(*Dhammapada*, ver. 354.) (4.) The fourth noble truth exhibits the way (Sanskrit *Mârگا*, Pâli *Magga*) of effecting the extinction of this thirst or desire. This way is one—the way preached by Buddha. “This is the way, there is no other that leads to the purifying of intelligence. Go ye on this way! Everything else is the deceit of Mâra.”—(*Dhammapada*, ver. 274.) This way, which every one who would make an end of sorrow must enter on, is eightfold.¹ It consists of—(1.) Right Sight or Orthodoxy. (2.) Right Intention or Right Vow. Burnouf (*Le Lotus*, p. 519) remarks that we are to understand

¹ Comp. Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 519. Burnouf gives the technical terms in Sanskrit and Pâli.

the expression used (*Sankalpa*), in the religious sense, as, according to the *Lalita Vistara*, it dissipates all doubt and hesitation. (3.) Right Language. This means, according to Burnouf (*ut supra*), the exact and faithful reproduction as an echo of all the sounds and all the voices which we have heard. (4.) Right Conduct. (5.) Right means of subsistence. By this is to be understood religious mendicancy, or a profession in which, according to the *Lalita Vistara*, a man would be free from every kind of ambition. Begging is still described by the Brahmans as the only fair and pure employment. (6.) Right Application. (7.) Right Memory. (8.) Right Meditation, which brings a man to perfect inward tranquillity. It was, we are told, when Shâkya Muni attained the knowledge of these sublime truths that he became the Buddha or the Enlightened.

There are different versions of the so-called ten commandments of Buddhism. We give them as contained in the vow taken by the candidate for admission into the order of Mendicants in Ceylon :—(1.) Not to destroy life. (2.) Not to steal. (3.) To abstain from impurity. (4.) Not to lie. (5.) To abstain from intoxicating drinks, which hinder progress and virtue. (6.) Not to eat at forbidden times. (7.) To abstain from dancing, singing, music, and stage-plays. (8.) Not to use garlands, scents, unguents, or ornaments. (9.) Not to use a high or broad bed. (10.) Not to receive gold or silver. Some of these precepts are obviously intended for ascetics and not for laymen. Such a distinction among his disciples was, it is thought, not contemplated by the founder of Buddhism.¹ He wished to convert all whom he could influence to a complete renunciation of the world in order to attain to a speedier entrance into Nirvâna. All were urged to enter the holy order of Mendicants. Buddhism, at first, was opposed to anything like a distinct priesthood. But its rules were of such a nature as to necessitate the formation of a separate order that had the special duties and prerogatives of priests.

What led Shâkya Muni to devise a new system? It was

¹ “ Il ne faut pas oublier que dans les premiers temps du Bouddhisme le principal objet de l'enseignement était de faire des Religieux, et qu'alors les règles de la morale applicable à tous les hommes se confondaient avec les prescriptions spéciales de la discipline religieuse.”—Burnouf, *Le Lotus*, p. 445.

the contemplation of the evils of life. He fixed his attention on the miseries of man, on old age, disease, and death. Pascal has said that it is dangerous to set forth man's misery and degradation without pointing at the same time to his greatness. The example of Buddha illustrates this danger. He saw only evil in human existence. Life had for him no redeeming feature. It was a dream, a burden. He answered the question—Is life worth living? with an emphatic No. He was a pessimist in the strongest sense of the term. One reason for the strange disposition now manifested to extol Buddhism lies in the pessimistic view of life to which not a few unbelievers are at the present time inclined.

In studying the system of Buddha we are struck by observing how he brooded over the pain and sorrow, the physical evil that is in the world, rather than over the moral evil or sin which prevails. He had no deep view of human depravity. He could not appreciate this great sad fact, which, once admitted, explains so many mysteries. He could not recognise man's apostasy and alienation from God, since he ignored entirely the existence of a Creator. He was incapable, therefore, of understanding the true source of the misery which he felt so deeply, and so bitterly deplored.

Was Buddha an atheist? is a question which it is not difficult to answer. He admitted both gods and demons. The existence of superhuman and infrahuman beings in this world of illusion he did not call in question. "There is only one idea," says Max Müller, "the idea of a personal Creator, to which Buddha seems merciless. It is not only denied, but even its origin, like that of an ancient myth, is carefully explained by him with the minutest detail." In his preface to the translation of Buddha's *Dhammapada*, and in his lecture on Buddhist Nihilism, Professor Müller makes this very decided statement, repeating in both essays the same strong language. But, wonderful to say, in his latest work on the Origin and Growth of Religion (p. 294), he tells us that it is doubtful whether Shâkya Muni was really an atheist. But no place in the Buddhist canonical Scriptures has been discovered which indicates his faith in a Creator or Providence; while there are passages utterly inconsistent with his belief in a Supreme and Eternal God. Shâkya Muni, after attaining Buddhahood,

affirmed that in the world of gods he had no equal. The gods whom he allowed to exist, but whom it would not be proper for him to honour, as they were far inferior to him, came into existence like other beings, and were subject to decay. It is generally believed that it was not till the tenth century¹ of the Christian era that there arose in Nepâl and Tibet the doctrine of an infinite, self-existent being called Adi-Buddha. But this doctrine is in opposition to the Agnostic Atheism of primitive Buddhism, and it has never been considered orthodox even in the places where it prevails. Other heterogeneous elements have in those countries been appropriated by Buddhists.²

Perhaps our readers might be interested in seeing a specimen of the way in which Buddhists argue against the doctrine of a Creator. We give, therefore, an extract furnished by Burnouf from a Sanskrit work existing in manuscript called the *Abhidharma Kosavyākhyā* :—

“Beings are created neither by God, nor by Spirit, nor by Matter. If, indeed, God were the sole cause, or any other principle such as Spirit or Matter, it would be necessary from the very fact of the existence of this cause for the world to have been created at once in its totality. For we cannot admit a cause without its effect existing also. But we see beings come into the world in succession, some from a womb, others from a germ. Whence we conclude that there is a succession of causes, and that God is not the only cause. But it is objected, this variety of causes is the effect of the will of God who said : Let such a being be born now in such a way that such another being may be born hereafter. It is in this way that the succession of beings is explained, and God is proved to be the cause of them. The answer to this explanation is, that to admit many acts of will in God is to admit many causes ; and this is to overturn the first position that there is only a single cause. Moreover, this plurality of causes must have been produced at one time ; since God, source of the distinct acts of will which have produced this variety of causes, is one and indivisible. Here the objection just made reappears again, namely, that it would be necessary to admit that the world was created at once. But the sons of Shâkya maintain the principle that the revolution of the world has no commencement.”³

This stock objection of atheists which is here urged, that a cause cannot exist without its effect, is a mere quibble. “Aliud est esse causam sufficientem actu, aliud verò in actu : Deus

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 206, and Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 573. Lassen (*Indische Alt.* ii. p. 849) contends for its origin at an earlier date, though long after the age of Buddha.

² Comp. Burnouf, *Introduction*, Section v.

³ *Introduction*, pp. 572-3.

fuit causa sufficiens actu ab æterno, quia semper fuit et semper voluit creare mundum, sed non fuit ab æterno in actu, quia non voluit creare ab æterno, sed tantum in tempore." These words of Turretin will suggest all that need be said in refutation of this argument so much relied on against the possibility of the world having a Creator.

Spence Hardy gives an extract from a Singhalese work, which relates that when the question was put to Buddha whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, he simply made no reply. He discouraged the raising of such a question. And yet he was not averse to speculating on the secret relations of causes and effects. There was a very potent mysterious cause which he did acknowledge. That cause was *Karma*. Faith in a Creator would seem an easy matter compared with a belief in *Karma*. This word means literally *deed*, and it is applied to the aggregate of merit or demerit which is the result of our works. *Karma* has determined our present condition, and it will create our future state of being. It is owing to *Karma* that we are what we are. A man may hereafter exist as an ant or a white elephant, as a clod or as a god, he may go to one of the many hells or to one of the many heavens of Buddhism, but his destiny in every case is ruled by *Karma*. Only the Buddha, the Enlightened, is free from the law of *Karma*, and from the necessity of a future state of existence in which to receive the punishment or reward of *Karma*. Buddhism, as we have already remarked, is honourably distinguished from Hinduism by the stress which it lays on the obligation to perform moral duties. Virtue has in it a terrific sanction. Its *Karma* is like Matthew Arnold's impersonal power which makes for righteousness, and is certain to punish the guilty. It insures a due recompense to every act and every thought. On this subject the Buddhist doctrine is very explicit. The opening verses of the *Dhammapada* tell us: "If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows as the wheel follows the foot of him who draws the carriage." And, on the other hand, "If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him like a shadow that never leaves him." Suffering may not immediately succeed misconduct, nor happiness virtue; but these results are pronounced inevitable, as we read (*Dhammapada*, ver. 119), "Even an evil-doer sees happiness

as long as his evil deed has not ripened; then does the evil-doer see evil." And the complementary law is thus set forth: "The good man sees evil days as long as his good deed has not ripened; but when his good deed has ripened, then does the good man see happy days." As to the exactness with which retribution ensues according to our conduct we are told: "Some people are born again; evil-doers go to hell, righteous people go to heaven, those who are free from all worldly desire enter Nirvâna."—(*Ibid.* 126.) Of the impossibility of escaping our just doom we read: "Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed."—(*Ibid.* 127.) Further, we are told of certain punishments succeeding certain actions between which there is no sort of natural connection. Take an example from chapter x. of the *Dhammapada*, which treats of punishment: "He who inflicts pain on innocent and harmless persons will soon come to one of these ten states: He will have cruel suffering, loss, injury of the body, heavy affliction, or loss of mind, or a misfortune of the king, or a fearful accusation, or loss of relations, or destruction of treasures, or lightning-fire will burn his house; and when his body is destroyed, the fool will go to hell."—(*Ibid.* vers. 137-140.) To us it seems that there must be an intelligent Moral Governor of the world in order to punish injury done to an innocent being by destruction of the guilty person's house by lightning, or by the wretch having hell for his portion after death. Some vices produce their own punishment in what may be called the way of natural consequence. Every one can perceive the relation between drunkenness, gluttony, and certain bad effects. But how the doom of hell, or the loss of property by the elements, should be the punishment of cruelty is inconceivable, unless we believe in a Divine Ruler of the world, who watches over men and rewards them according to their doings. We are not surprised, then, at being told that "only a Buddha can comprehend how effects are produced by *Karma*." Certainly the ordinary human understanding cannot grasp the mystery. But it should not astonish us to find him who does not own the necessity of an intelligent Creator from a perception of the orderly adjustments in nature showing his consistency by

refusing to admit a Moral Governor of the world from the acknowledged perfect relation that exists between moral actions and their rewards. Our wonder is most called forth by the energy and tenacity with which this belief in retribution is maintained in Buddhism. When a man dies, when his sentient being is dissolved, his *Karma*, the aggregate of his previous conduct, remains, and has power to reproduce him in another state of existence, and actually places him in the condition of being of which he has made himself worthy. This *Karma* is called "the maker of the tabernacle," *i.e.* of the body. It supplies "the link between one life and another." But when we examine into it, it proves to be a chimera, a nonentity. It is a hypothesis devised to save morality, to lend a sanction to virtue, and to supply the place of a Moral Governor and Judge of the world.

Buddha found the principle assumed as an axiom in every school of Hindu philosophy, that our past actions in a former birth have determined our present condition, and that the effect of our conduct in this life will extend to our future life. He accepted this theory as unquestionable, and, philosopher that he was, he wrought it into his system. Had he studied the moral law in man, the law written in the heart, the feeling of obligation, of responsibility, he must have been led to the belief in a Moral Governor. But he did not investigate man's moral nature, and failed to assert the supremacy of conscience. He made what is equivalent to an impersonal fate govern all beings save the Buddha, over whom it has no power. Existence in any form, even in the highest heaven, was not in the view of Buddha desirable. The last words of Buddha to his disciples are said to have been: "Beloved, that which causes life, causes also decay and death. Never forget this. Let your minds be filled with this truth. I called you to make it known to you." Life is necessarily succeeded by decay and death, and can under no form be the final consummation. This is complete extinction of being, which is expressed by *Nirvâna*, literally, a *blowing out*. The way of gaining annihilation is not suicide, as the vulgar Western materialist dreams. Suicide only introduces a man into another state of being. Buddha's remedy for destroying the necessity of undergoing future births is the persistent continuance in the eightfold path which has

been described, and which is the only way that conducts to Nirvâna. We have no room for a discussion of the import of this term, on which so much has been lately written. It has been made out that Nirvâna is frequently used in Buddhist books to denote the extinction, the "blowing out," of the fires of passion. But it has also been shown that this extinction of the fires of passion is necessarily followed by utter death, with no life succeeding. He in whom desire is extinct may still exist for a time. But he passes away and ceases to be. "The supreme Buddha is like a fire which has been extinguished. He only lives in his discourses." *Parinirvâna* is death, utter death, complete extinction of being, which inevitably results from the extinction of desire.¹ Mr. Edwin Arnold, in his preface to the *Light of Asia*, expresses the "firm conviction that a third part of mankind would never have been brought to believe in Nothingness as the issue and crown of Being." Who affirms this? All who are classed as Buddhists do not receive primitive Buddhism. As we do not hold Buddha responsible for every doctrine and practice adopted by his followers in the course of time, so we are not to seek to learn from the modern Chinese idea of Nirvâna the original doctrine of Buddha. We must ascertain this from the canonical Scriptures of Buddhism. What do they teach? is the question. Even Max Müller has to admit that "no person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the Nirvâna contained in the third part of the Buddhist canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, namely, that Nirvâna, the highest aim, the *summum bonum* of Buddha, is the absolute Nothing."² Nirvâna, in its final issue, is for Pantheists absorption of the individual life in God; for Atheists, it is a destruction of the elements of existence. Where existence is esteemed an evil, where the great problem is to escape from the necessity of living again, and God is not acknowledged, annihilation, and nothing short of annihilation, gives the quietus sought for. Those scholars whose aim has been to present Buddhism in the most favourable light, have not been able to resist the evidence that the logical outcome of the philosophy of Shâkya Muni can have

¹ See Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 113, etc.

² *Science of Religion*, p. 179.

no other salvation than that which lies in complete extinction of being ; and they find this doctrine clearly set forth in orthodox and primitive Buddhism. One who has studied the aberrations of the human mind will be slow to conclude that because a doctrine seems to us unattractive, nay, repulsive and absurd, it cannot have been extensively embraced. People can, under the influence of a false philosophy, overcome the natural horror of annihilation. There is no reason to think that Miss Harriet Martineau was insincere in writing, a short time before her death, "I see everything in the universe go out and disappear, and I see no reason for supposing that it is not an actual and entire death ; and for my part, I have no objection to such an extinction." Miss Martineau was not so singular in her judgment as some might imagine. Was not the doctrine that death is an eternal sleep ostentatiously proclaimed and gloried in by French atheists of the last century ? And do not materialists of the present day treat as a pitiable weakness the belief in a personal immortality ? Do we not find even now not a few atheists, whose best hope for the future is annihilation, zealous in propagating their opinions ? We once saw at a famous German watering-place an old Graf distributing leaflets among the crowd on the promenade. We received one. It contained simply that well-known verse by Byron, accompanied by a German translation—

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free ;
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better not to be."

That German nobleman, was doing in part the work once performed by Buddhist missionaries. He omitted to explain how we could cease to be.

Buddhism has been often described as bearing more striking resemblances to Christianity than any other religion does ; and a comparison of the two systems has of late years been frequently made. We may note, therefore, the principal points of similarity between them, as well as the still more striking contrasts which they present.

Buddhism, as far as we can ascertain, may be said now to have about the same number of adherents that Christianity has. It was not propagated by force. It disregarded caste

distinctions. It cherished from the beginning a strong missionary spirit. It very strongly inculcated pity and benevolence and self-sacrifice. These are remarkable similarities between it and Christianity. Each system professes to exhibit in its founder a model of moral perfection. Buddha, like Christ, is said to have wrought many miracles; but, unlike the mighty works of Christ, the reported miracles of Buddha were mere exhibitions of power—not works of benevolence and mercy. Buddhism arose among the Aryans, and now it prevails chiefly among the Turanians. Is not this a remarkable parallel to the course which Christianity has taken? It had its birth among the Jews, a Semitic nation. But it now counts comparatively few adherents among the Shemites. The great mass of its votaries we must seek among the Japhetic race. We might add that the ordinance of preaching was made much of by the early Buddhists. It was by preaching that both Buddhism and Christianity were spread abroad. By both religions priesthood in the strict sense, and sacrifice, were discarded.

And if we compare a corrupted Buddhism with a corrupted Christianity, the points of resemblance are still more astonishing. Dr. Nevius, in his *China and the Chinese*, gives this summary of the correspondences between them:—

“Both have a supreme and infallible head, the celibacy of the priesthood, monasteries and nunneries, prayers in an unknown tongue, prayers to saints and intercessors, prayers for the dead, repetition of prayers with the use of the rosary, works of merit and supererogation, self-imposed austerities and bodily inflictions; a formal daily service consisting of chants, burning of candles, sprinkling of holy water, bowings, prostrations, marchings and counter-marchings. Both have also fast and feast days, religious processions, images and pictures of fabulous legends, and revere and worship relics real and pretended.”

This enumeration is certainly fitted to excite astonishment; yet it is by no means exhaustive. We might append to it the tonsure, the confessional, the doctrine of purgatory, and the performance of rites and ceremonies in which the laity figure only as spectators. Common, too, to Romanism and Buddhism, are such clerical paraphernalia as the crosier, the mitre, the dalmatica, and the cope, which, as the Abbé Huc informs us, the grand Lamas wear in travelling, or when they perform a ceremony outside of a temple. He who studies

these correspondences, and takes into consideration also certain borrowed doctrines of later Buddhism, cannot doubt that Christianity and Buddhism in their developments, or rather in their corruptions, have reciprocally influenced each other. We are not yet in a position to point out accurately the relation subsisting between them in respect of giving and receiving. But that the two systems at various times came in contact and modified one another seems hardly to admit of question.

But the effort has been made of late to show that even primitive Christianity, the religion of the New Testament, has borrowed what have been hitherto regarded as some of its characteristic and peculiar features from the system of Shâkya Muni. The hardly disguised object of this attempt has been to discredit Christianity as a divine revelation; and to accomplish this end disingenuous methods have been resorted to. We could give examples in which an unwarranted meaning has been put upon the sayings ascribed to Buddha, in which his words have been purposely misinterpreted with the view of rendering them more accordant with the teaching of Christ. And where there has not been this bad faith practised, some of the similarities instanced are such as on closer examination are seen to be only apparent. The truth is that there is a far more profound and real correspondence between the Christian faith and the philosophy of Seneca than there is between the religion of the New Testament and any form of Buddhism. Yet in the case of Seneca, too, notwithstanding startling coincidences in thought and expression, the differences and contrasts are essential, and cannot be explained away.¹

A writer in a late number of the *Westminster Review* has, with an unmistakable aim, made Buddha resemble Christ to such an extent that the credulous reader might be ready to conclude that Buddha is the original of which the Christ of the Gospels is the copy. How little reliance, however, is to be placed upon his representations we may illustrate by a few examples. He tells us that in the Buddhist Scriptures Buddha is described as "that great man who, unaided, works out salvation for the world;" and as the authority for this statement we are referred to Burnouf, *Lotus de la Bonne Loi*,

¹ Compare the essay on St. Paul and Seneca attached to Lightfoot's *Commentary on the Philippians*.

p. 332. But when we examine the reference we can find neither in the original text which Burnouf gives, nor in his translation of it, any warrant for saying that "Buddha is described as 'that great man who, unaided, works out salvation for the world.'" Neither these words nor equivalent expressions are met with in the place quoted. But we are told in it how Buddha accomplishes Nibbâna (Nirvâna) for all creatures. This he does by extinguishing fire, the conflagration of vices, "with the rain of the ambrosia of his teaching." It is simply by "teaching the way of happiness and rectitude" that Buddha is said to help "beings consumed by these eleven species of fires, namely, the fire of passion, that of sin, that of error, that of birth, that of old age, that of sickness, that of death, that of pain, that of lamentations, that of grief, and that of despair." Is it fair to tell people accustomed to Christian ideas that one who is set forth in no other character than that of teacher "is described as 'that great man who, unaided, works out salvation for the world'?"

When again the *Westminster Review* relates that the Buddhists have taught that the founder of their religion was born of a virgin, that "the Holy Ghost descended into the womb of his holy mother," that he was "her first, her only son," that he was born "to give joy and peace, to give light to those in darkness, and sight to the eyes of the blind," and other details, the inexperienced reader might be tempted to suspect that there can be little substantial difference between the account of Buddha's birth and that of Jesus Christ—that in their principal points they are strangely identical. But the truth is far otherwise. If we assume that in an old Chinese translation of a Buddhist Scripture the precise statement is found that "the Holy Ghost descended into the womb" of Mâyâ, the mother of Buddha; yet every one who has the slightest acquaintance with Buddhism knows that such a statement cannot have any real resemblance to the Christian doctrine that Christ was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary. No Buddhist could admit our doctrine of the Incarnation. If any Buddhist could speak of the Holy Ghost descending into the womb of Mâyâ, he must understand by the Holy Ghost Buddha himself. The *Lalita Vistara* or the Life of Buddha tells us how he before his

last birth was a Bodhisattva¹ in the heaven of Tushita, from which he descended in the form of a white elephant. The prodigies which attended his coming into the world are quite unlike the signs accompanying our Saviour's birth. He entered into the body of Mâyâ, and we are told of his "precious exercise" there, while he remained always in her right side, distinctly visible in the womb, pure and spotless, with his legs crossed, and preaching to the angels who guarded him. The truth is, the narrative of the facts connected with our Lord's incarnation appears divinely simple and free from the creations of a sickly imagination when compared with the legend of the birth of Buddha. The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ has nothing to dread from being compared with what is written of Buddha's coming into the world. The story of Buddha having been born of a virgin does not belong to pure Buddhism. It was probably borrowed from a Christian source. However Jerome may have learned this fable, we know that according to the most primitive teaching of Buddhism which we possess, the mother of Buddha had been long married, and was in her forty-fifth year when she gave birth to a son.

When, for the purpose of making Buddha more closely resemble Christ, he is spoken of as "taking on him all the sins that have been committed in order that the world may be delivered," it is enough to remember that the idea of an atoning sacrifice cannot be tolerated by Buddhism. It is most emphatic in asserting that the sinner must in every case himself bear the fruit of the evil which he has done, and that the penalty of sin cannot be transferred to another.

Much has been made of the fact that Christianity is like Buddhism in not prevailing now in the race in which it had its origin. But in the case of Christianity this is easily accounted for. There was a providential preparation made for its spread among the Japhetic race. The Jews, though Shemites, were, when Christianity was first preached, scattered everywhere among the Aryans. The books of the New Testament were written in Greek, and Greek civilisation prevailed in nearly all the countries in which the Apostles laboured.

¹ Bodhisattva is the name given to a being that has only another birth or human form of existence to undergo before becoming Buddha.

For a millennium after Buddha's death India was the home and stronghold of his system. Pâli, an Aryan tongue, was the sacred language of Buddhism, and it was not till several centuries after it was first taught that it appeared that its influence would be felt chiefly by the Turanian families of mankind. A similarity of result has thus been reached by entirely different ways. There is no more senseless and degrading superstition in the world than popular Buddhism. In China men will spend years in repeating the expression *O-me-ta-fuh*, in the virtue of which they have unbounded confidence. We can connect these words with the Sanskrit, and ascertain their meaning to be simply—"Immeasurable Buddha." The only prayer which the common Tibetans and Mongols seem to know is, *Om mani padme hum*,¹—*Ah ! the jewel is in the lotus*. This mystical sentence is regarded by them as a prayer, and as containing the essence of all religion. It is written countless times on cylinders, and these cylinders are turned by the hand, by the wind, or by water; and the revolution of the prayer written on the wheel is as efficacious as its utterance by the worshipper. These praying cylinders, it should be mentioned, are unknown to the Southern Buddhists. With the true Buddhists meditation takes the place of prayer. To them we may apply, without qualification, the words "having no hope, and without God in the world." They are destitute of all religious consolation. They cannot regard the afflictions of life as ever administered for a gracious purpose, as in any case fatherly chastisements conducive to our moral amelioration. They have no comfort in sorrow. They can only submit to inexorable *Karma*. We might take a parable that has been often quoted and much admired, as revealing the best consolation which Buddhism has to offer to the afflicted. It is called *The Parable of the Mustard-Seed*. A young girl named Kisâgotami gave birth to a son. The child, when just able to walk, died. In her distress the mother carried the dead boy from house to house seeking medicine for his recovery. She was directed to Buddha. She begged him for medicine for the restoration of her boy. He told her that he knew of some. He said—"I require some mustard-seed taken from a house

¹ Lassen (*Ind. Alt.* iv. 728) strangely takes these words to mean a salutation to a Dhyâni Bodhisattva called *Manipadmi*.

where no son, husband, parent, or slave has died." Mustard-seed she could obtain everywhere, but such a house she vainly sought for. At last she became alive to the truth that everywhere children are dying, parents are dying. "Thinking thus, she was seized by fear, and *putting away her affection for her child*, she summoned up resolution, and left the dead body in a forest; then she went to Buddha and paid him homage. He said to her, 'Have you procured the handful of mustard-seed?' 'I have not,' she replied; 'the people of the village told me, "the living are few, but the dead are many."' Buddha said to her, 'You thought you alone had lost a son. The law of death is, that among all living creatures there is no permanence.'" Once again Buddha made to this bereaved mother this communication: "All living beings resemble the flame of these lamps—one moment lighted, the next extinguished. Those only who have arrived at Nirvâna are at rest." What followed this speech? "Kisâgotami, on hearing this, reached the stage of a saint possessed of intuitive knowledge." Will it be believed—Professor Max Müller, in his lecture on Buddhist Nihilism, after reciting this parable, proceeds to speak of it in these terms?—

"Gentlemen, this is a specimen of the true Buddhism: this is the language, intelligible to the poor and the suffering, which has endeared Buddhism to the hearts of millions . . . the beautiful, the tender, the humanly true, which, like pure gold, lies buried in all religions, even in the sand of the Buddhist Canon."

This "specimen of the true Buddhism" it might be interesting and instructive to contrast with the record in the Gospel of Luke of Christ meeting near the gate of the town of Nain a widow weeping over her only son, whom they were carrying to his grave. But the reader can be left to make his own reflections on the two incidents. We will content ourselves with letting Voltaire speak, and show by a parable which he has written, entitled *Les deux Consolés*, that Buddha was a miserable comforter. The substance of Voltaire's well-known parable, as far as it illustrates our subject, is this:—The great philosopher Citophilus tried to console a female friend, who was in great distress, by recounting to her the stories of the most unfortunate women mentioned in history. In vain! Her melancholy was not relieved. The same philosopher the

next day lost his only son, and was plunged thereby in the deepest sorrow. "The lady got a list made out of all the kings that had lost their children, and carried it to the philosopher. He read it, found the list to be very accurate, and did not weep the less." This fable exposes the inefficacy of the medicine with which Buddha strove to minister to a mind diseased. The sorrow of the bereaved is not dissipated by repeating to them the truism that "among all living creatures there is no permanence." This is only to tell them that their misery is universal. And then how shocking it is to find a young mother praised for "*putting away her affection for her child*"! This is true Buddhism. But the gospel enables Christian mourners to cherish undying love for departed friends. It tells them not to sorrow as those who have no hope, "for if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." The best thing which the Buddhist can anticipate is utter death, with no life to follow. Not till then can he be at rest. But the Christian has faith in One who will make all things new, who will swallow up death in victory, and then there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain.

Mr. Edwin Arnold, in the fourth book of his *Light of Asia*, represents Siddhârtha in parting from his young wife, in order to lead the life of a recluse, as thus addressing her:—

"Comfort thee, dear!" he said, "if comfort lives
In changeless love;"

"Be sure I loved and love Yasôdhara."

But the poet has falsified Buddhism in making his hero assure his weeping wife of his changeless love. Buddha was above such weakness. "So long," he teaches, "as the love of man towards women, even the smallest, is not destroyed, so long is his mind in bondage, as the calf that drinks milk is to its mother."—(*Dhammapada*, ver. 284.) These words have the genuine ring of Buddha. How then could the poet so far mistake his subject as to attempt to glorify Buddha by putting into his mouth assurances of unalterable affection for a woman? A Buddhist ascetic dare not suffer his soul to be disturbed by love for any woman. He must guard against talking with women, or even looking at them. Such a snare is woman sup-

posed to be to the man who is intent on obtaining Nirvâna, that even if his own mother should fall into a river, and be on the point of drowning, he may not draw her out with his hand; he may reach a pole to her to grasp, but must take good care not to touch her.

The much-lauded charity of Buddhism, when inquired into, loses its practical value. It embraces all creatures equally, brutes as well as men. It makes it the height of sin to eat animal flesh. It would force all men to become vegetarians. We have marked the still remaining influence of Buddhism in Gujarat, a province of India in which we long resided, in making the occupations of the potter and of the farmer to be regarded as sinful, because they involve the destruction of the life of insects. We have repeatedly heard Jains, who are Buddhist sectaries, declare that the killing of an ant is a greater sin than adultery. There is a wide difference between Christian charity and the love which Buddha inculcated; and the fruits which they have produced are very dissimilar. Buddha taught humility. He despised worldly distinctions. But he most effectually nurtured pride. No expounder of Buddhism, after declaring the way of deliverance which it teaches, could ask, Where is boasting then? Buddhism does not exclude boasting, but encourages it. It knows nothing of a doctrine of salvation by grace. "By one's-self the evil is done, by one's-self one suffers, by one's-self one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to one's-self; no one can purify another."—(*Dhammapada*, ver. 165.) What a contrast this to the teaching of the New Testament respecting expiation by the sacrifice of Christ, and regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Ghost!

There is great diversity in the forms of worship practised by Buddhists in different countries. But with all this variety of ceremonial they are everywhere idolaters. They even acknowledge the false gods of the Hindus, and pay them honour, because they are held to have rendered useful service to the founder of Buddhism. But the proper objects of worship among Buddhists are the image and the relics of Buddha. Buddha is indeed set forth as an ideal which any man may in the course of time become. But the common people worship him as a personal God, however much the practice may be inconsistent with orthodox Buddhism.

The Buddhist is a High Churchman. He sums up his religion in saying, "I take refuge in Buddha, the Law, and the Church." The *Sangha*, or church, is with him the society of Buddhist monks or devotees. To these he is enjoined to pay due homage.—(*Ibid.* ver. 195-6.) It was this institution of the Sangha, this organised association of ascetics that Buddha formed, that contributed most to the propagation of Buddhism. It produced a numerous band of zealous missionaries who spread the faith far and wide. Buddhism is not the only example of the power of organisation in securing success.

Buddhism does not satisfy man's conscience. It does not answer his deepest wants. It has no Heavenly Father in whom its votaries can find their refuge and strength and a very present help in trouble. It supplies no support and consolation amid the trials of life; and the highest hope which it holds forth is a mockery and delusion. As we rise from the study of this religion, which has exerted so potent an influence in the world, and which is now in Europe set up in competition with the gospel of Jesus Christ, the words of Pascal rise to our recollection and awaken our hearty appreciation: "That Christianity is not the only religion is no real objection to its being true. On the contrary, this is one of the means of proving that it is true." Buddhism, like every other false religion, serves as a foil to set off the divine lustre of the truth as it is in Jesus.

We only need a more intimate and thorough acquaintance with Buddhism as it was and is, in order to see that it is not the most formidable foe that Christianity has had to encounter. *Nos passi graviora.*¹ We have had to endure heavier assaults than any which we need fear from this quarter. Brahmanism has proved victorious over Buddhism in India; and there is not satisfactory evidence of its having achieved the triumph by relentless persecution, as was once generally supposed. In China Buddhism is giving way before the secularism of Confucius; and in Japan Shintuism has been gaining on it. If we may trust the latest information regarding the forbidden land of the Corea, as furnished by Ernest Oppert, Buddhism has been of little benefit to the people of that country. The Coreans, he tells us, by disregard of their own religion hardly

¹ "O passi graviora, dabit Deus his quoque finem."

rise above the level of savages. The bonzes or priests he represents as in a state of utter degradation, causing by their dissolute behaviour and bad conduct so much public annoyance as to necessitate the interference of the Government. Nor in other secluded countries do the moral fruits of Buddhism testify in its favour. In Eastern Tibet, where it reigns supreme, adultery is not considered disgraceful. It is acquiesced in by husband and wife, and not reprobated by society. In Tibet, as the Abbé Desgodins relates (*La Mission du Thibet*) chastity seems to be unknown. His description is too shocking to admit of translation. He affirms that the prevalent "dévergondage de mœurs est cause d'une stérilité générale." And all through Tibet the disgusting custom of polyandry is common, one woman having at the same time several husbands who are usually brothers. In other lands where Buddhism prevails, it has been powerless to suppress female degradation, infanticide, cruelty, and torture. It is opposed to social progress. Instead of hymns of hope, it can only chant the dirge: "All is transitory, all is misery, all is void, all is without substance." It has not promoted the cause of freedom. Despotism has nothing to fear from it. M. J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire (who passed a most extravagant eulogy on the character of Buddha, which has been frequently quoted, but which facts do not substantiate, and which a perusal of Saint-Hilaire's own work corrects) has testified that tyranny is the infallible result of the teaching of Shâkya Muni.—(*Le Bouddha*, p. li.) This scholar, who proved by his conduct during the Napoleonic régime his own strong attachment to political freedom, is constrained to pronounce this sweeping condemnation of Buddhism: "In the doctrine of Buddha, and in the wretched governments which it has contributed to form, there is no more room for liberty than for God. The true idea of man being absent, all liberty perished with it, both in practice and in theory."

While in its history Buddhism has been able to offer no effectual resistance to tyranny and oppression, it is remarkable that in its commencement it professed to be a movement in favour of the rights of men against the yoke of Brahmanism. Here a parallel,—hitherto, so far as we are aware, unnoticed,—between Buddhism and modern European atheism suggests

itself. During that great atheistic movement in France in the last century the rallying cry of its promoters was : *Les hommes sont égaux*—the very doctrine which the atheist Buddha of old is said to have emphatically proclaimed. But atheism in France in these last days, like atheism in Asia for more than two thousand years, whatever may be its pretensions, has proved impotent to secure the rights of man for which it professed to contend. History records that it was men who feared God, and who loved the gospel of Jesus Christ, who most successfully resisted tyranny and oppression, and who laid the best and surest foundations for civil liberty.

DUNLOP MOORE

ART. VII.—*The Body an Argument for the Soul.*¹

IN the controversy in 1853 and the years following, led by Karl Vogt as the representative of Materialism, and by Rudolph Wagner as the vindicator of the spiritualistic construction of nature, a host of books made their appearance ; for, in a fight of principle, whether the battle is on paper or on the field, the Germans may claim a fair share of pugnacity. Amid this host of books not one has seemed to us more thoroughly to combine depth with attractiveness—the charm which draws the reader and the ability which rewards him—than the work of Julius Schaller on *Body and Soul*.² It towered up among the books of its day, and nothing has been written since which can fairly claim to have superseded it. Among the fifteen chapters of this book none is, on the whole, richer than the one he devotes to the bodily distinctions of man, considered as separating him from the animal world, and marking his position as a being of intellectual and moral endowment. He first shows that the human body is the organ of personality ; then that the bodily differences between man and the animals are analogous to the differences between them

¹ From *Stoddart's Review*.

² *Leib und Seele*. Zur Aufklärung über "Kohlerglauben und Wissenschaft." Dritte Vermehrte Ausgabe. Weimar : Hermann Böhlau, 1858.

which arise from man's intellectual and spiritual prerogatives. The brain of man is more particularly considered in this connection; the human senses are shown to correspond with the differences; the vegetative processes connected with the growth and conservation of life have differences corresponding with the physical; the original helplessness of man is the token of his perfection; and there is a realisation through the mind of the plan presupposed in the body. In this line of thought the reader will at once see in what sense the body becomes an argument for the existence of the soul, and a voucher for its supremacy. He will see that our whole conception involves a far more intimate relation between body and the soul than that which is accepted in the current dualism which makes bodies and souls antagonists, or relates them as the prison and the captive, or leaves us to wonder why two such incompatibles have been joined by nature in such an unhappy marriage, from which there is no divorce but death. We shall regard them as in personal unity, the reflections of a common idea, at once the most wonderful, the closest, and the happiest conjunction in nature—made for each other.

“The scientific consideration of the human body can reach no higher solution of the problem of its association with the soul than to regard the body as ‘the personalised’ *organ of the soul*.” This is the key to the meaning of the human body. The essential character of our body, the fundamental idea in which all the aspects of its phenomena, all the special processes which go on in it, are comprehended, summed up, and brought into unity, is that the body is meant to be the organ of the conscious spirit.

Assuming, as a common ground, that the terms *body* and *soul* mark a difference of some kind, whether of substance or function, of independent force or phenomenon, and, on the other hand, that they are in some kind of unity, whether as the two elements of a real person, or as part and whole, producer and product—the question, no matter how or where we stand on these points, equally presses itself upon us: Has this unity any meaning and aim, or is it fortuitous, without any demonstrable end? Is the soul meant for the body, or the body for the soul, or each equally for each, in absolute co-

ordination of values? To this question the answer given by the body itself is very explicit. The body, considered at first simply as an organism, shows in its centralising structure that the self-conscious element which acts and is acted upon in the brain, through the nerve-system, as motory and sensitive, is that for which the whole plan of the body is formed. Everything within the body is a means to an end, except the eventuating result in the brain, which has nothing beyond in the organism, and is for it an end in itself. Nothing in motion starts back of the brain in the organism; the brain begins motion. Nothing in sensation gets back of the brain in the organism. The brain, therefore, is the organic centre, and its work and intent unify the organism. Whether the brain-force be native and original and thought a mere function of it, or the mind-force be native and original and the brain instrumental to it, matters not as to the precise point now before us, which is that the brain-work, be it what it may, is that from which and by which the organic unity of the body is effected. The most marked respect in which man differs from the animal is that man possesses personal consciousness; that is, he not only distinguishes between himself and things, and himself and other men, but he can mentally separate between the strictly conscious something which is supremely himself, and the midway something (his organism) which is but derivatively himself. With this power are bound up free-will, the moral law, and religion. The animal distinguishes himself from inanimate nature or from other animals, but neither by direct proof nor by anything that justifies an inference does he give any token that he can start in the pathway of personal recognition, with the postulate *Ego cogito, ergo sum*. Yet even in the vertebrate animals, the psychic, of which the brain and nervous system are the centralising and unifying factors, is the something for which the animal exists, so far as it has an existence for itself. *A fortiori*, then, in man, where the psychic is so lofty and the centralisation so perfect, the organisation is meant for his psychic, and his psychic is the personal mind. The question, then, of the organic distinction between man and animals is one of intense interest; for the body, in the point of view we are now taking, sheds light upon all the problems of the mind. It is a permanent organic reflection of

the spirit. We cannot see the spirit directly, but we can see its reflection in its abiding mirror.

It is a favourite tendency of one class of physicists to represent the bodily distinction between man and the animals most nearly akin to him as unimportant. The popular eye is called in by the aid of pictures to cast its vote on scientific questions, and to confirm dicta which are quite as philosophical as the renowned one of old, that man is a chicken without feathers. A skilful artist can make the proposition more than plausible to a child or a theorist. The higher species of the ape are taken, for anatomical reasons, as next akin to man, and the differences are represented as quite unessential. Now value is a purely subjective term ; it depends on the mind that accepts it as completely as colour depends upon the conscious subject which translates it from waves of ether into vision. Positive, or strictly intrinsic value, value apart from all mind, is a contradiction in the adjective ; it would be like an unfelt pain, an unseen vision, an unthought idea. Value is mental estimate, and the importance or non-importance of anything will be settled, not purely by the nature of the thing,—even though it be something which every one *ought* to value,—but by the character of him who judges. We know what value the cock in the fable put upon the pearl. The idea of God is unimportant, valueless, to the practical atheist ; education is held in no esteem by the boor. On the estimate which accepts the soul as the great thing in man, the bodily differences between man and the animals most like him are of very high importance. Only the spiritual puts the proper estimate on the material. The bodily differences are essential to the human body as the organ of personality. If on a strict construction with reference to the adaptation to the psychic, the bodily differences between the ape and man should be found trifling, we should feel that the lower apprehension of man had found a strong support. Man could not rise intellectually and historically, as he has risen above the ape, without a bodily organism correspondent with his higher nature.

Let us come within the total organism of man and of the ape, and fix our attention on a single point. Mark the distinction between the human foot and the hind-foot or hind-hand of the ape,—both foot and hand, and therefore neither foot nor

hand. The foot of man is perfect for man's ends, and would be misery and failure for the ape. The dubious organ, adapted by its midway position between hand and foot for the very life which belongs to the ape, would be ruin to man. The true question here is, not whether the foot of man and the lower hand of the ape show similar chemical elements, or even the same primary organic products, nerve, blood, sinew, and bone; but whether their functions, their range of power, their adaptations agree. We discover at once that the erect walk is the natural thing for a human foot, just as clearly as that an arch is not meant to be laid on its side; just as clearly as that a bridge is meant to span a stream. The foot corresponds in its structure with the physical wants of man, which make it imperative that he should walk upon his feet upright. On the other hand, the walking upright in the strictest sense is impossible to every other animal. No animal but man walks with the spine so nearly at right angles to the line of the feet. The attempt at walking which most nearly approaches it in the ape soon becomes the source of violent constraint and fatigue. His hind-hand is unadapted to it; he walks not on its sole but on its side. The walk of the ape can be called erect only with relation to the walk of other animals; compared with man's walk, it is erect no more. Man's erect position is in the highest degree conducive to the demands of his spiritual nature. Were there two races of men on earth, perfectly alike in all other endowments, the one with the human foot, the other with the animal foot most nearly like it, the human foot alone would settle the sovereignty of the race that possesses it. Think of those distorted forms—the result of accident, or born into their hapless condition—which compel some of our race to forego the erect position, and mark their relative helplessness. Whatever may be their intellectual gifts, or the advantages with which wealth or social position endows them, we look upon them as objects of tender pity. Not even the moral beauty and beneficent usefulness of such a character as Dinah Mulock Craik has painted in *A Noble Life* can relieve the darkness of a mystery which simply touches man's power of moving with human perfection on the earth, of which he is lord. Most emphatically the head *cannot* say to the foot, "I have no need of thee"

The question, then, of the importance of the bodily distinctions is not to be settled by putting the fragments of bodies into the various laboratories of physics; nor by submitting them to a mechanical anatomy which eyes the bones as a girl eyes her beads on a string; nor to a merely technical physiology, which runs humanity on the principles of a sausage-machine. We must mark the ends subserved by these differences in the economy of the living being, in which the physical is most clearly meant for the psychical. We must cease confining our study of the engine to the time when it has gone to pieces, or its fires are extinguished. We must study it in its full living play. If the psychic value of a man be little or nothing beyond that of a brute, the whole question as to the bodily differences connected with the psychic differences is, of course, possessed of no absolute importance, and has but little relative value. It is a less part of a little question, involving the unimportant cause of an unimportant effect. Over against the sublime indifference of that style of physicism, both man and ape are so little, that their differences, whatever they may be relatively, are absolutely atomic. These little things, which are so great to little man in the mass, are no more to these magnificent dwellers in the clouds than they are to the apes themselves. But to those to whom the soul has a value, who regard man as an intellectual being, with his supremacy in his spiritual endowments, these differences seem of the highest importance. In self-consciousness, in consciousness of personality, the merely animal life in its fixed limitation is transcended. If the human body be the organ of the spirit, it must correspond with the internal universality of man. It must show itself as the personalised organ of an essential personality.

The brain is supreme amid nature's characteristic miracles of simplicity ruling in complication. Most marvellous in its products, it seems most marvellous in its structure, and most defiant of all conjecture as to its ends which would be based purely on an external examination of it. An examination of the heart might create some suspicion of its general functions; a close acquaintance with the character of the lungs might suggest something of their possible object; but who will pretend that an inspection of the brain would excite even the

faintest foreboding of its aim? Or if we waive all this as conjectural, is it not certain that while we understand how heart contractions—be their cause what it may—do contribute to the circulation of the blood, and how the structure of the lungs and their play—be *their* cause what it may—do purify and vitalise the blood; on the other hand, granting that the brain is the organ of thought, emotion, and will, we see no shadow of relief to the question *how* the brain does all this? In the others we see a physical organ producing physical results: in this we see a physical organ producing meta-physical results.

Amid the various facts and conjectures bearing on the solution of the acknowledged supremacy of the human brain, it is very manifest, so far as its special powers depend upon its distinctive structure, and on its material characteristics, that its sovereignty as an organ is derived from no one of its peculiarities as isolated.

Büchner, the fugleman of the vulgar materialism, assures us, indeed, that “man, the being who stands highest intellectually, has a brain which both absolutely and relatively is largest.” But neither of these assertions is true. It is not true that the greatest minds have always been associated with the largest brain. Very often, beyond all dispute, great intellects are associated with the capacious brain; but Andrew Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy, Des Cartes, Cromwell, and not a few other men of renown, had noticeably small skulls. The skulls disinterred in Rome and on the Acropolis are, as a class, smaller than those of the Ural Cossacks, or of some of the negro tribes. But not only as between man and man is Büchner’s statement false. It is conspicuously untrue as between man and the animals. On an average, the brain of man weighs from three to three and a half pounds; the brain of woman about three ounces less; the brain of a horse weighs about two pounds; that of the whale (*Balaena mysticetus*) five pounds and a half; and that of the elephant nine pounds. These figures correspond neither with the relative psychical relation of the animals to each other nor to man. The whale is not nearly twice as intellectual as man, nor the elephant nearly three times as much so. So much for the claim Büchner makes of the absolute size of the human

brain. Nor is he any more reliable in his statement as to the relative size. In the adult man, the proportion of the brain to the whole body is about as one to forty-eight; in the domestic mouse, the proportion is as one to thirty, and by all odds, on the principle of brain proportion, he ought to set traps for Büchners and catch them. In the song-birds, the general proportion is about as one to fifteen, and in the blue titmouse, or tomtit, is as one to twelve. How little the whole material structural character of the brain as an isolated thing amounts to is clear from the fact that the fishes and amphibia, whose brains are much nearer to the analogy of man's brain than are the ganglionic nerve arrangements of the invertebrates, make no approach to the amazing psychical power revealed in the instinct of ants and bees, which have been to man himself an insoluble marvel and source of admiration. And birds, for example the carrier dove, the trained canary, surpass in docility and in psychical quickness the great mass of the mammalia.

Nor do the convolutions of the brain, apart from the synthesis of organ for the synthesis of mental powers, aid at all. Erasistratus, the father of cerebral anatomy, in the fourth century B.C., maintained that the convolutions in a human brain surpass in number those of any other animal. Galen, one of the most illustrious ornaments of a noble profession (born in the second century after Christ), contradicts the statement. Modern comparative anatomy tells us that, at least as between animal and animal, the brain convolutions are not determinative. Conspicuous among the mammalia for the number of their brain convolutions are the hog, the sea-cow, the Right whale. The dolphin has a brain approaching the human in its convolutions. The hunting-hound has only six brain convolutions, and those of a very undeveloped character.

The chemical composition of the brain in the relative comparison gives little aid. Frederick the Great had said: "Matter may just as well think as become electric." Mole-schott's "without phosphorus no thinking" has been accepted as nearly identical with the proposition that phosphorus is thinking, or thinking is phosphorescence. The proportion of phosphorus in the brain increases or diminishes with the amount in the bones. In the rickets (*rachitis*) there is a

deficiency of phosphorus, and at the same time, very frequently, mental precocity. Nor is the difference between the amount of phosphorus in the brain of an idiot and of a very sharp man sufficient to shed any light on the psychic differences of the two. The two animals in which the greatest amount of phosphorus, the matter of material thinking, has been found, are the sheep and the goose.

These facts demonstrate that the glorious powers of the human brain are the result of its total organisation as the embodiment of a plan, into which nothing is put simply for itself, but everything is graded with reference to a common result, and toned down to it. The powers of the human brain are derived from its composition, its proportion, its average, its unifying harmony. It is not its parts as separate on which its music depends. It is not the preponderance of one stop, however beautiful, but the combination and range of the whole which makes it the organ whose touch is the diapason of universal nature. And in the oratorio which it guides it is not left to one voice, however fine, to assert itself ambitiously at the expense of the others, but there is the mutual dependence, the mutual deference of the powers, the music of a matchless symphony.¹

Materialists and spiritualists are equally ready to grant that there is a connection between the corporeal character of the brain and its psychic phenomena; and on the main fact here it makes not the slightest difference whether we take for our ground that the differences of the brain are conditioned by the difference of the idea of man, or invert the process and suppose the idea to be conditioned by the brain. In any case we have the idea of man, and a brain in organic harmony with it.

The comparison of the diverse forms through which the embryonic unfolding of the human brain passes, with the typical forms of the animal brain, only strengthens the evidence; first, that man's brain is such as he needs to be the crown of

¹ These facts are sustained by scientific proofs in Longet, *Anatomie und Physiologie des Nervensystems*, übersetzt von Heine (2 vols. 1847); E. Huschke, *Schädel, Hirn und Seele* (Jena, 1854; 2 Thle.); Joseph Hyrtl (one of the most distinguished comparative and technical anatomists of our century), *Die materialistische Weltanschauung unserer Zeit* (Wien, 1865); Friedrich Kirchner, *Die Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik* (Cöthen, 1880, pp. 205-207).

the earthly creation; second, that this brain transcends the animal brain in a specific human character and human degree; and third, that it comprehends in it all the lower forces that are needed for its organic power. It not only summarises the grand forces of the world, but repeats their history. Touching, in the broad generality needed to unity of plan, the brain of the animal world in certain respects, it yet has powers which are in none of those brains singly, nor in all of them combined. The human brain argues a human soul.

The senses correspond with the psychic differences of man. In discussing the senses we seem to go forth from the labyrinthine darkness of the brain. Nothing appears to be better known to us than our senses. We accept them as the luminaries of the body, and as gauges of its highest powers. Are the senses of man distinctively human senses, arguing a human soul? In answering this question it is not to be denied that, on a hasty examination, many of the animals seem to have the advantage of man in the sphere of the senses. There are in the animal world illustrations of acuter sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste than man possesses. The subtlety of some of the animal perceptions is so wonderful as to have excited suspicion—never, however, verified—that they have senses not given to man at all. In regard to the conceded superiority in sense-acuteness, it is to be observed, however, that there is no possibility of sharply drawing a line beyond which man cannot educate himself in this very acuteness. His reason controlling his organs can bring them to an exquisiteness before which many of the most extraordinary illustrations of fine instinctive sensibility must yield. The eye can be educated until its wonders of achievement seem almost miraculous. The finger-points of the blind can be trained almost to a practical rivalry with the sensitiveness of the retina. The Indian in his forest education learns the sense-guided sagacity of the animal he pursues, and takes him by improving on it.

The acuteness of the senses of animals is, furthermore, invariably in a certain measure isolated. It is relative exaggeration of one sense, or of a few senses, at the expense of the others. This lack of internal harmony in the senses is connected essentially with the limitation which characterises the particular

animal. It is the sense expression of this very limitation. It makes the animal the slave of its controlling sense, not its master. On the other hand, it is characteristic of the senses of man that in their normal condition they stand in a harmonious relation with each other. In this symmetrical perfection of all the organs of sense is revealed again the freedom of the human organism from the limited nature, the bounded sphere of the animal life. The pre-eminence of man is shown not in the isolated tendency of this or that part of sense-perception, but in the exquisite combination and compensation of all the forms of sensation.

But we can go further. Not merely in the relation of the senses to each other, but in the sphere of each particular sense, the unlimited nature, the essential universality of the human organism holds good. The power which a falcon has to see a mouse from a great height is no proof that it has a more perfect vision than man; though, in a loose popular way of thinking, it might be claimed as such. That eye is most perfect which is able to take in, in the largest degree, all the phenomena by which it is possible that vision should be affected. The eye is not simply to distinguish between darkness and light, but also to distinguish between colours. To perfect vision belongs the power of free movement of the eyes in different directions; the power of fixing them in common on a single point; the power of rapid transition from one thing to another. And when all the qualities that are possible in vision are considered, it will be found that the vision of man is the most perfect in the world.

It is not easy—is, perhaps, indeed impossible—to determine some very interesting questions in regard to animal vision. It has been doubted whether the animals mark the distinction of colours. It is certain that animals seem indifferent to the most marked changes of colour. It has been thought that the peculiar influences which certain colours exert upon animals, as, for instance, the sight of red upon a bull, seem to show that it is not the colour impression as we receive it, but something of a different kind. It has been thought that colour-blindness, which is abnormal among men, may be largely normal among animals, or that they do not see the colours as we see them. The differences in colour are produced by the differences in

the number of vibrations to the second in the luminiferous ether. The red ray makes 481 billions of vibrations to the second; the violet, 764 billions; the others are intermediate in number betwixt these extremes. To these motions in the ether must correspond, not necessarily number for number, but in a certain proportion, the nervous organism of vision. Any abnormal density, less or greater, in the nerve substances, or in the brain, will tend to make this proportion abnormally less or greater; so that, according to its degree, there may be total or partial colour-blindness, or the substitution of one colour for another. Very intimately, and probably most intimately connected with the perception of colour, are the cones, which, with the layer of rods, form Jacob's membrane, which is the first beneath the surface of the retina. Taking the human eye as the standard, there is scarcely an anomaly consistent with the generic character of the eye which is not found among the animals which have distinct organs of vision. In some of the animal eyes making the nearest generic approach to man's, the cones, in others the rods, are entirely wanting. The yellow spot of Sömmering (its discoverer), which lies on the concave inner surface of the retina, at the back of the eye, in a direct line with the axis of the globe, is the point at the central part of which the pigment of the eye is most intense in colour; it is the point on which the rays fall from an object on which the eye is sharply fixed; and in it sight is remarkably perfect. The apes are the only animals besides man who possess this yellow spot. The inference from all these facts in the comparative anatomy of vision—and they might easily be multiplied—seems to be justified, that in its relation to colour the eye of man has prerogatives which mark it as the proper organ of a human soul.

Acute hearing is not necessarily perfect hearing. That hearing is most perfect which grasps in largest measure all the distinctions of which sound is capable. The wild animals have acute hearing; but its range and character are narrowed by its object to the animal, the supply of its wants and its protection from danger. The horse, the dog, and the cat can hear what is too delicate for the human ear; but they hear in this degree only what is useful to themselves, or helps to make them useful to man. We repudiate the old teleology which, in a prosy mechanical way, seemed to see no object in anything

below man except for man's use. Every conscious being is relatively an end to itself. On its consciousness depends all the pleasure of which it is capable, and consciousness is the voucher of God that the being which possesses it, however low in the scale, is meant, in part at least, for itself. On the other hand, no creature, not man even, is meant wholly for itself. But whether for itself or for other ends, the range of hearing in the animal shows the limitations which mark it, from beginning to end, as animal only.

The great quality of the organs, for example, by which musical sound is made possible is confined to man, with exceptions which, so far as the vital part of the fact is concerned, are only seeming. What seems like a susceptibility to music in some animals gives no evidence that it is accompanied by that psychic process which, in man's mind, makes music something more than mere pleasant vibration. We do not, of course, mean that the vibrations associated by us with music are unheard by animals, or do not in any way affect them, and are accompanied in no case by pleasure. They hear music, and some of them make music in some sense; but the most gifted of them do not have any conception of what music is in the human sense and degree, and yet less are capable of producing it. Of harmony and symphony, of all that makes music the embodiment, the stimulant, and the food of the profoundest passions of the soul, the animal possesses no more consciousness than it does of the passions themselves.

In the case of man acute hearing and the musical ear are distinct things. A man may have very acute hearing and no sense for music. The musical ear is, at most, but a ministrant organ for a musical mind. The ear of the musician may, by disease or old age, lose the power of hearing; but the music of the mind survives. From 1796, for thirty years, the deafness of Beethoven grew until it became almost total. His glorious compositions, which thrilled the world, were unheard by their great author. At the height of his calamitous condition (1823) he composed his Choral Symphony, "the work which for grandeur, pathos, fantastic vivacity, and the ultimate development of an idea, and, in all these, for intensity and power, better represents the fully-matured genius of the master, in its greatness and its individuality, than any other." At its first

performance, which took place at Vienna, May 7th, 1824, the tumultuous applause at its conclusion led to an incident which has been characterised as "perhaps the most pathetic in the whole history of art. He whose renown had called the multitude together, he whose genius had kindled the general enthusiasm, stood in the midst insensible to the sounds that stimulated the delight of all around him, insensible to the vociferations that expressed it, until Sontag and Ungher, who had been singing the principal parts, turned his face towards the public, and proved, by the waving handkerchiefs and the universal motions of excitement to his organs of sight, the genuine triumph of which his ears refused him testimony. The pealing cheer this spectacle drew from the very hearts of all who witnessed it penetrated even to Beethoven's deafness, and he must have quitted the scene with the consciousness of having set the seal upon his immortality." But had Beethoven never heard, had he never possessed an ear in accord with the soul within him, or had there been no human ears to receive the appeal which through them he made to human souls, that mighty music had remained mute for ever, locked in the rugged cells of silence.

The birds of prey have acuter hearing than the song-birds. It has been conjectured that the absence of speech in animals arises not from the defect of a vocal apparatus so much, as from their inability readily to note the articulated distinction of words. The successful attempts which, it is asserted,—without scientific verification—have been made to teach a few words to animals, prove, if we grant their reality, that the observation of words in animals is very slight and difficult to arouse. No animal has language proper of its own. A few gestures and a few cries form no language. No animal, not even the parrot of genius, has ever acquired a language. The most renowned parrots have had but a scanty vocabulary. Animals can neither speak nor understand a language. The few intelligent perceptions they have in connection with words are all in their own bounded sphere. A few words belonging to sense-perception they understand; but since man began to notice his lowly fellow-creatures of the wild and of the home, he has never seen evidence that the animal can grasp a term of conception or of abstraction. Perhaps the best solution of the

fact that animals do not talk is that they have nothing to say ; but if they had the human ear, with the psychic which it organically represents, they would have much to say. Could we endow them with the ear of man we would begin to make them men. The ape, the anthropoid pet of modern science, is specially fond of imitating man ; but it is not claimed that he has yet attempted to utter a word. It matters not as regards the main argument, whether the organs of hearing, or of articulation, or, as we believe, both, are involved. The psychic conditions of man, as a being of language, find their analogies in the separate or conjoint conditions of the organs of hearing and of speech.

The same principle holds in all essential respects with the other senses. A dog who can by scent follow the winding track of a hare or of a fox, or reach his master by paths that have been trodden by many feet, is utterly unsusceptible to the thousand delicate odours of which man has perception. A dog has no measure of smell which makes him discontented with being a dog. A few of the coarser natural odours have an attraction for some of the animals, but none draw the animal out of itself. The odours of its food or medicine awake its chief susceptibilities. The swine is easily trained to hunt for truffles, but it might be difficult to teach him to hunt for violets. The dog never pauses in the heat of the chase, or after it, to inhale the fragrance of a wild-flower. The animal devours its food with a voracity which implies that food is pleasant to it, never with the human deliberation which refines and exalts even the appetites. The specific distinctions in their almost infinite range and delicacy, which can be traced and enjoyed by the human tongue and palate, are unknown to the animal. The household animals can, indeed, be educated to an enlargement of their circle of food ; but they never prepare it for themselves. The extent to which they can be trained out of themselves into human ways is very slight. A dog may learn to eat pound-cake and drink coffee ; but he bolts the one as he would bolt a mass of meat, and gulps the other as he would gulp water. He shows appetite, but never the gusto of the epicure. The dog feeds, he never dines. He fixes no hours for his meals, but, except when he is satisfied, takes his food whenever he can get it. It is true that the lower human races are very

coarse in their tastes, and modes of taking food; but the human measure is the one given us in the most highly developed of our race—the most human men, not the most animal men. The impulses and possibilities which belong to man, even on this seemingly common plane which he occupies with the brute, as a being dependent on food, are associated with the psychic character which has its expression in the organs of taste.

Why there should be differences between the sense-functions of animals compared with animals, or of all animals as compared with man, is a question which physical science cannot answer. Genuine metaphysics can determine with the highest probability that the psychical is in each case the cause of the difference; and this answer holds equally valid whether we maintain that the psychical has the internal force that enables it, in each specific case, to do what is done with a relative independence of the organ itself, or whether we believe it to be most probable that the psychic determines the very sort of organ best fitted for its ends. A Paganini and a bar-room fiddler make very different music with the same violin; but the difference is still more marked if a Paganini has a violin worthy of him, and a musical scraper has a fiddle worthy of him. The human soul is Paganini with a matchless set of Cremonas for the production of its music.

The distinction between human sensation and the animal sensation is very marked when we come to different processes of handling and feeling. As regards feeling, the animal body, however clothed, is able at comparatively few points to mark the finer changes of temperature, the more 'delicate distinctions made by pressure, the lighter grades of touch. The skin of man is throughout susceptible to the fine impressions at every point. In a measure great even where it is least, it has the power of imparting the impression to the nerves, which are the media of feeling. But above all, in the human *hand*, touch and feeling are combined with the power of handling in a degree to which all the organs of feeling and handling in animals are extremely imperfect. All the organs of touch and handling possessed by animals, however delicate they may be as to particular impressions and special powers, bear no comparison with the finger-points of the human hand as instruments

of touch, and with the hand itself as the organ of that to which the hand alone gives adequate name. Man alone can *handle*. If that which most nearly approaches his power of handling in the entire animal world could be unified, it could not do what the hand of man does. In the human organ of handling we are again struck with the characteristic of the unlimited nature of its range, the harmony of its functions with all the other functions, its broadness and its narrowness, its telescopic sweeps, its microscopic nicety. It helps to hold the balance in which the stars are weighed. It helps to direct the eye as it ranges from the infinitely vast down toward the infinitely little.

CHARLES P. KRAUTH.

ART. VIII.—*The Exclusiveness of Christianity.*¹

ARE the claims of the religion of Christ absolutely exclusive of those of all other religions? Have we or have we not the right to speak of it as the universal religion? Granting that Christianity is the best religion for us, grant even that it is really the best in itself, alone and incomparably superior to all the other religions of men, is it true that in the present state of the nations of the world, it is practically the best for all peoples, and has any exclusive claim upon the faith and allegiance of all mankind? This is one of the questions of the day. And it is to be observed that neither of the assumptions made is such as in itself to compel an affirmative answer to the question. It is, without doubt, quite conceivable that of two or more religious systems one should be essentially superior to the rest, and yet not be the best, all things considered, for a particular people or age. We shall easily be able to see this if we take, for example, any two non-Christian religions, as, *e.g.* Islam and Buddhism. And the same thing may be true as regards two religions admitted to be supernatural revelations. As Christians, we believe what is implied in the statement of the apostle Paul, that Christ was revealed

¹ From *The Presbyterian Review*.

in "the fulness of time;" that for a former dispensation, Judaism, although a form of religion inferior to Christianity, was better for the time then present. Paul states in a single sentence both the fact and the reason of it as follows: "When we were children, we were in bondage under the elements of the world." Judaism had a mission; the fulness of time had not come for the revelation of the Christ of God, and Judaism, though not better than Christianity for our time, was better for that time. This we shall all admit as regards Judaism and Christianity. May we not extend the application of the principle, and suppose that in like manner, although the religion of Christ may be both best for us and best in itself, yet other religions, as, *e.g.* Islam, Buddhism, Taouism, although far inferior in themselves, and unsatisfying to *our* minds, may still be best adapted to the people who receive them?

Many are ready with a prompt affirmative to this question. It is plausibly urged that the very fact that a particular religion has secured acceptance with any people, is *prima facie* evidence that it has met their conscious wants and satisfied them; if not, why did they receive it? That it does not satisfy us does not prove, it is said, that it cannot satisfy them, but only that with that other people the religious consciousness is less developed, or developed differently from what it is with us.

This view of the case very naturally commends itself to all, whether atheists, agnostics, or deists, who agree that there is no such thing as a supernatural revelation, and that, of consequence, all religions alike are of merely human origin and authority. Thus Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *First Principles*, pp. 115, 117, 119, argues that all religions, although all alike false, may yet be useful and even necessary in their place. He says: "We shall be under the necessity of contemplating the ultimate existence as *some* mode of being;" "and," he adds, "we shall not err in doing this so long as we treat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to that for which it stands." This forming erroneous notions about God, only in due time to reject them, he thinks may yet be very useful as an intellectual discipline. Moreover, although no religion gives us anything like the truth about God, yet, he argues, "a real adaptation

exists between an established belief and the natures of those who defend it." In fact, the false belief or system of belief may be a real necessity, meeting a real need. He says: "As certainly as a barbarous race needs a harsh terrestrial rule . . . so certainly does such a race need a belief in a celestial rule that is similarly harsh." Indeed, he thinks that "even now, for the great mass of men, unable through lack of culture to trace out with due clearness those good and bad consequences which conduct brings round through the established order of the unknowable, it is needful that there should be vividly depicted future torments and future joys." Whatever may be our opinion as to the truth of his statement that a savage race of men really need to think of God as "savage" and "diabolical," we must at least admit, that in the views set forth as to the relative claims of various religions, Mr. Spencer is at least for this once not inconsistent with himself.

It is, however, a matter of more wonder when we find men who are neither atheists, agnostics, nor deists, but who profess to believe that the religion of Christ is a supernatural revelation from God, hasten, in the exceeding breadth of their charity, to express similar opinions. In the winter and spring of 1874, a series of four lectures on "Mohammed and Mohammedanism" was delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, by a Mr. Bosworth Smith. The course was shortly published in a book with the above title, which met with such a degree of acceptance that in about a year a second edition was required. This work affords an excellent illustration of the line of thinking to which we refer. Mr. Smith is far enough from Mr. Spencer in his philosophical position. In a word, he is careful in the most emphatic terms to declare his faith in the Christian religion as a true revelation from God to man. Comparing the religion of Mohammed with that of Christ he says: "The religion that he taught is below the purest form of our own, as the central figure of the Mohammedan religion is below the central figure of the Christian—a difference vast and incommensurable."¹ The character of Mohammed he admits to have been "weak and erring;" and, in contrast with this, goes on to say, that the challenge of Christ, "'Which of you convinceth me of sin?' has never yet been fairly met,

¹ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, p. 344.

and that at this moment the character of Jesus of Nazareth stands alone in its spotless purity and unapproachable majesty." Nor is this all; for he continues: "Is there one thoughtful person among us who has ever studied the character of Christ, and has not, in spite of ever-recurring difficulties and doubts, once and again burst into the centurion's exclamation, 'Truly, this was the Son of God'?" Finally, he admits that "the methods of drawing near to God are not the same in the two religions;" that, in fact, the Mohammedan "can hardly be said to approach God" at all; but he "gains the knowledge of God by listening to the lofty message of God's prophet." "The Christian," on the other hand, "believes that he approaches God by a process which, however difficult it may be to define, yet has had a real meaning to Christ's servants, and has embodied itself in countless types of Christian character—that mysterious something which St. Paul calls a union with Christ."¹ For all this, Mr. Smith denies that Christianity has any exclusive claim to the allegiance of men. On this point, he states his views as follows: "No religion is exclusively good, none exclusively bad; any religion which has a real and continuous hold on a large body of mankind must satisfy a real spiritual need and be so far good. . . . What we have to do is to feel after God in each and all, assured that He is there, even if, haply, in our ignorance we can find no trace of Him."² And so he thus speaks of Islam: "Sublime, eternal, unchangeable as its god, Islam appears to its votaries a religion worthy at once of the worshipper and of the being they worship. And is it for us to say that it is not?"³ And again he expresses the conviction that "the highest philosophy and the truest Christianity will one day agree in yielding to Mohammed the title of a prophet—a very prophet of God."⁴ Hence we are told that "there are two factors to be considered in testing the value of religion in any given case—the creed itself, and the people who receive it."⁵ That is, although Christianity is incomparably superior to every other religion, yet before we can decide whether it be on the whole the best religion for a given people, we must first know the people. Thus he tells us that "under the peculiar circumstances, historical, geo-

¹ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, pp. 293-295.

² *Ibid.* p. 63.

³ *Ibid.* p. 306.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 344.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 296.

graphical, and ethnological," which we find in Africa, not Christianity, but Islam, "is the religion most likely to get hold on a vast scale of the native mind, and so in some measure to elevate the native character."¹ In like manner he regards Islam, and not Christianity, as the religion which is likely to prove the permanent faith of India. "Buddhism and Brahmanism may be driven out of India, but Mohammedanism never, except by the Mohammedan's method of the sword."² Indeed, in another place, this apostle of a universal charity expresses the opinion that Mohammedanism is "perhaps the nearest approach to Christianity which the unprogressive portion of humanity can ever attain in masses;" and, he adds, suggestively, "how large a part of the whole human race are unprogressive!—progress is the exception and not the rule with mankind."³ What all this means is summed up in the preface to the first edition, where he tells us that he "believes that there is a unity above and beyond that unity of Christendom which, properly understood, all earnest Christians so much desire; a unity which rests upon the belief that the children of one Father may worship Him under different names; . . . that they may all have one hope, even if they have not one faith."⁴ Thus, though by different roads, the agnostic and the Broad Churchman reach the same practical conclusion. With Mr. Spencer and his school, Christianity is the best of many religions, all more or less false; with Mr. Smith, it is the best among many religions, all more or less true. Both agree that in any case the religion of Christ has no claims exclusive of those of other religions; and that the question as to what religion may be best adapted to a particular people is one which can only be answered when we know the people themselves. But that a religion prevails among a given people is of itself *prima facie* evidence that it really meets and satisfies their needs.

We have set forth these views with somewhat of fulness and detail, and not, we venture to think, without some reason. We suspect that they are much more common than many would imagine, and, in a form half-defined, influence the thinking of not a few who pass with themselves and others for

¹ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, p. 56.

² *Ibid.* p. 295.

³ *Ibid.* p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. xxv.

orthodox Christians. Whatever may be any one's opinion as to their essential correctness or otherwise, there can be no doubt as to the importance of the question raised. This is true whether we regard them in their bearing upon our doctrinal belief or upon our practical duty. In the first place, if we take even the scantiest fragments of the New Testament, which a certain type of modern criticism would leave us, it is plain that the writers of our Gospels and first preachers of the religion of Christ had no such views as we have set forth. According to their account, the charge which they received from Jesus Christ ran thus: "Go teach all nations!" "Be my witnesses unto the ends of the earth!" They were, moreover, to demand instant faith in the message under the penalty denounced by the authority of Christ, of the condemning wrath of God in the day of judgment. If, however, Mr. Bosworth Smith is right in the views which he advocates, then one of two things is true: either Christ taught this Broad Church gospel, in which case all His first disciples misunderstood Him; or they did not misunderstand Him, in which case Christ Himself was mistaken. In the former case we cannot trust Christ because we are not sure enough of the record to know what He really taught; for who knows how much else may have been misunderstood? If we accept the record, then we know that Christ made a mistake in giving His disciples the great commission. Thus, in the second place, it will follow, on the above supposition, that the charter and commission, on the strength of which the Church has done, and is still doing, her great missionary work, and which has ever been, and still is, the inspiration of her most heroic deeds, is utterly invalid, and her work, however benevolent in intention, has behind it no divine warrant. We dare not any longer preach, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be damned," for we do not know whether this be true or not. This modern interpreter of the gospel of Christ gives the missionary a very different charge; he says that no serious-minded person could wish the Mohammedans to give up their unfaltering belief in the divine mission of their prophet; and tells Christian missionaries that "if they are ever to win over Mohammedans to Christianity, they must alter their tactics; . . . must not discredit the great

Arabian prophet, nor throw doubts upon his mission, but pay him that homage which is his due,"¹ which, whether it be true or not, again we insist, is in obvious contrast with that which the Church, for the past eighteen hundred years, has understood to be her message to the nations.

After this full statement of opposing views, we return to the question with which we started: Do the claims of the religion of Christ exclude, or not, those of all other religions? In so far as the negative of this question is argued from atheistic, agnostic, or deistic premises, it is plain that the validity of the conclusion stands or falls with the validity of those premises. If either there be no God, or if He cannot be known, or if, for any reason, a supernatural revelation from God be impossible, then, of course, it is perfectly clear that Christianity can have no exclusive claim upon the faith of men. On any of these suppositions Christianity, in common with all the other religions of the world, is a purely human thing, and can have no more authority than is possible to any set of fallible human opinions. On this assumption, Mr. Spencer's conclusion is quite reasonable, that as one form of civil government may be best adapted to one time or people, and another to another, so also it may be in religion; and that the whole question as to what form of religious belief, if any, may be the best for a certain people, is purely one of expediency. From this point of view it is plain that any argument for the exclusive character of the claims of the religion of Christ must be, first of all, an argument for theism as opposed to anti-theism, or for supernaturalism as opposed to naturalism. Till these questions are settled, it is clear that all other arguments are irrelevant. If, however, we assume here the validity of the argument for theism, and against deistic naturalism; if, for example, as against Mr. Spencer, God, though not to be comprehended, may yet be really and truly known to exist and to be possessed of certain attributes; if, moreover, as against the deist, it be granted that it is inconceivable that a free, personal, and almighty Spirit, the creator of the world, should not have the power of revealing Himself in a manner supernatural to His intelligent creatures, then we at once confront the question whether there has ever been such a

¹ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, pp. 336, 342.

revelation of the will of God to man ; and, granting that we have such revelation in the religion of Jesus Christ, the question whether it be the only revelation of divine authority to man is now before us. In the present article we propose to deal with this question as to the exclusive claims of the religion of Christ, not as raised by unbelievers, but by professed believers in that religion as a divine and supernatural revelation. In the comparison of religion, which may be necessary to our argument, we shall restrict ourselves to the three religions of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Islam. There is abundant reason for this selection. They represent severally three distinct lines of anti-Christian opposition, namely, Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism ; with the exception of Christianity and Judaism, they will be admitted to represent the highest existing types of religion ; and finally, as a matter of fact, the three, between them, stand pre-eminent in the number of their votaries, which, according to the latest estimates, can hardly be less than 800,000,000 of the human race.

What precisely is the question before us ? It is not, on the present occasion, whether Christianity be a true revelation from God. This is admitted on both sides. It is not whether or not all religions have in them somewhat of essential moral truth. This again is freely granted. It is often persistently assumed that those who affirm the exclusive claims of Christianity ignore or deny the existence of spiritual truth in other religious systems ; but the assumption is utterly false. The writer has had abundant opportunity to observe that, in India for example, both native and foreign missionaries continually avail themselves with gladness of the many testimonies to the truth of God which are scattered through the sacred books of the people. But it is to be further remarked that it seems to be constantly forgotten on the other side, that the mere presence of truth in an alleged revelation is not enough to prove that it is really such, except it can be shown that the knowledge of such truth, in any case, could only have been obtained in a manner supernatural. God has revealed Himself in the physical universe. "The heavens declare His glory." He has revealed Himself in the moral nature of all men, so that Paul expressly says, that in this way they who have not the written law "are a law unto themselves." It is

perfectly plain that the recognition and expression in any religion of truths revealed in nature to all mankind cannot of itself warrant us in inferring that the religion in question is, in any proper use of the terms, a supernatural revelation from God. Nor should we forget that truth supernaturally revealed may easily be borrowed by one religion from another. But its presence in that religion, under such conditions, obviously gives us no reason to speak of that religion as a divine revelation. Not only is this hypothesis quite possible, but it is the notorious fact that the Koran in particular is full of ideas which indeed could not have been derived from the revelation of God in nature, but which have been taken directly from the Christian revelation. Mr. Smith's whole argument to prove that Mohammedanism is entitled to be regarded as no less truly than Christianity a revelation from God, is marked by entire forgetfulness of these almost self-evident principles. He comprehends his whole argument to prove that Mohammedanism might almost be called "another form of Christianity," under the three following heads : its monotheism ; its spirituality, as opposed to all sacerdotalism and idolatry ; and, finally, its reverence for Christ. But when we apply the simple test above suggested, the argument at once collapses. For, as regards the monotheism and the spirituality of Islam, to say nothing of the influence of Jewish and Christian tribes scattered in those days throughout Arabia, Mohammed could certainly have learned all that, and doubtless did in the first instance, from the works of God without him and within him, as did the Hanifites and seekers after God, such as Zaid and Waraka, who appeared in the moral darkness of Arabia in those days. As for his reverence for Christ, it requires surely no hypothesis of a supernatural revelation to explain that. His familiar intercourse with Christians is a quite sufficient explanation. To sum up this part of the argument, we may safely challenge any one out of all the treasures of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Islam, to produce any moral sentiment or truth or religious idea which cannot be accounted for except on the hypothesis of a supernatural revelation within the sphere of that religion ; a single fact or truth which might not have been learned either from the light of nature, or, as in the case of Mohammedanism, from either Christianity or Judaism.

The contrast in this case with the gospel is too evident to need more than a mention.

Nor, in the third place, is the question before us whether or not other religions than the Christian or the Jewish may not have been, or still be, in some sense schoolmasters to bring men to Christ. This is freely admitted. In such a case, of course, it will be true that they will have a certain adaptedness to the peoples among whom they prevail. But adaptedness to the requirements of the divine government is by no means the same thing with adaptedness to the spiritual needs of sinful men. Thus we may freely admit that the non-Christian religions have an indispensable and necessary place and function in the plan of the divine government. But it does not follow that they were therefore from God, or that their place and function is to lead men into peace and reconciliation with God. "Behold, is it not of the Lord of Hosts that the nations shall labour as in the very fire, and weary themselves for very vanity?" But that does not prove that the "vanity" is from God.

But the question is precisely this: whether Christianity is or is not the only revelation from God of present authority, which has come, not in any way of mere nature whatsoever, but in a way above nature, as a direct communication from God to man; and whether, this being so, its claims upon the faith and allegiance of men are instant, universal, and exclusive of those of every other religion whatsoever.

The first and most obvious fact which bears upon the answer to this question is the simple fact that the Christian religion indisputably claims for itself just this position. The truth of this statement does not depend upon our views as to the nature or extent of inspiration of the New Testament, or of any part of it. Whatever any one may think about these matters, the fact remains that the New Testament is at least the highest extant historical authority as to what Christ and His apostles may have believed and taught. And it lies on the very face of this record that the religion of Christ, as therein set forth, claims an authority which is utterly exclusive of all like claims made from any other quarter whatsoever. It claims to be, not one of many more or less full and complete and divinely given religions, but, in its historical connection with

Judaism, the one only religion supernaturally revealed from God to man. It claims to set forth, not *a* way of salvation, not the *best* way of salvation, but the *only* way of salvation. This is indeed involved in the very command to preach this gospel to, not some, but "all nations." If that gospel be not equally adapted to the needs of all nations, then Christ herein made a great mistake. In denouncing damnation against all who, hearing, should reject it, He was guilty of the greatest injustice. But this is not merely inferred, but it is again and again broadly and categorically asserted. "There is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved." "There is one God and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus." "The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils." "He that believeth on the Son hath life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life." "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God; and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God." Such, then, are the undisputed facts of the record. What is to be done with them? The religion of Christ, judged by the only documents which profess in any authoritative way to expound them; judged, moreover, we may add, by the whole history of its early propagation, makes a claim explicitly excluding all other religions from the same category with itself. Instead of teaching us to regard Mohammed, Buddha, Confucius, and other leaders and founders of the ethnic religions, as Mr. Smith and his like would have us, as prophets of God, Christ and His apostles stigmatise all such as "false prophets," "antichrists," and "thieves and robbers," who "come, not to save, but to kill and to destroy." What, again we ask, is to be done with these facts? If it be asserted that we have not in such sentiments a part of the original teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, we demand the evidence to prove the assertion. We ask for so much as a trace of the contrary doctrine in the New Testament or in the history of the early Church. Moreover, since, on this hypothesis, it is apparent that the New Testament is not a reliable source of information as to the content of the revelation which it is admitted Christ brought to men,

we demand that a more reliable source be pointed out. If this cannot be done, then what has become of the revelation? But if we admit the historical accuracy of the New Testament, even in so far as it purports to be an account of the actual teaching of our Lord and His apostles, then, beyond all controversy, Christ and His apostles preached Christianity as exclusive of all other religions whatsoever. If that be true, then it settles the question, and books like this *Mohammed and Mohammedanism* need to be re-written throughout in the light of that fact. Let us not misapprehend the issue. This claim is not a claim to the exclusive possession of all moral truth, but a claim to be the only supernatural revelation from God to man, and, as such, to present the only possible way of salvation. If this claim be denied, it can only be either on the ground that Christ was mistaken, or that we have not in the New Testament a reliable account of what Christ really taught. In either case our ground of faith in Christ is but a shifting sand. To affirm in lofty terms upon the glory of Christ and the supreme perfection of His religion as a revelation from God to man, and in the same breath to assert that, though the best, it is not the only revelation, is only to evince one's ignorance as to what the religion of Christ really is.

But not only is the position we assail logically incompatible with the claims of the gospel itself, and with any real faith in it as a revelation from God: we may go still further. We affirm that the differences which exist between Christianity and the various ethnic religions are such as to make it absolutely certain that they cannot all alike be revelations from a God of truth. We admit freely that there are certain moral truths which are recognised more or less distinctly in all alike. We admit that there may be real differences which are not incompatible with the hypothesis of a common divine origin. We admit that different religions may differ greatly in their fulness and completeness, or in the proportion which various truths occupy in the revelation; and yet, both be from God. Of this fact Judaism will occur to every one as a familiar illustration. But for all this, it remains true that to prove that all religions are, in any true sense of the words, from God, they must not teach contradictories. One may tell

more, another less, of God, but they must not affirm contradictions concerning Him. If one such contradiction be proven in the original form of any two religions, then no amount of moral truth that we may notwithstanding find in both, will warrant us in saying that both religions as such are from the God of Truth. We affirm that this is precisely the case as between Christianity and all other religions, without a single exception.

The following illustrations will abundantly establish this assertion. First, as to the being of God, Christianity affirms that there is one God and Father of all, "of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things," and declares the belief of this to be absolutely fundamental and essential: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." This the Buddha ignored or denied. We are told that he recognised no Supreme Deity;"¹ that he regarded the question whether the world owed its existence to God or not, as "an inquiry that tended to no profit."² Brahmanism, going to the opposite extreme, affirms that all that is, is God :—

"Nothing exists but Brahm ; when aught else
Appears to be, 'tis like the mirage, false."

Here, then, to go no further, Christianity, Buddhism, and Brahmanism stand in blank contradiction, each to the others, and that as regards the most fundamental of all questions. Whichever one be true, the other two are *ipso facto* false. Are all three revelations from God ? The case does not improve if we inquire further. As to the attributes of God, Buddhism, of course, is silent ; Brahmanism says :

"Imperishable, without form, unbound
By qualities, without distinctive works,
Without a name, know that indeed as Brahma."³

How is it with Islam ? Mr. Smith will be no prejudiced judge. What does he say ? "Mohammed's notion of God had never been that of a great moral being who designs that the creatures He has created should, from love and gratitude to Him, become one with Him, or even assimilated to Him."⁴

¹ *Indian Wisdom*, Monier Williams, p. 57.

² *Buddhism*, Rhys Davids, p. 87.

³ *Atma Bodha*, trans. in *Indian Wisdom*, p. 123.

⁴ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, p. 199.

Can the teachings of all three of these be reconciled with each other or with Christianity ?

As to the nature and condition of man, the fact of sin and misery cannot be well denied ; but Buddhism and Brahmanism agree in denying that man is a free agent, and therein deny that personal responsibility for sin on which the Christian Scriptures so strenuously insist. And Islam also, as is well known, though arguing from different premises, reaches the same practical conclusion. Are the doctrines of freedom and of necessity, of responsibility and non-responsibility, both revealed by God as truths ? Finally, as in all these other fundamental matters, so in regard to the method of salvation, each of these three stands in irreconcilable contradiction both with each of the others and with Christianity. Buddhism proposes that man shall save himself by moral and ceremonial observances ; Brahmanism, that he shall save himself by a transcendental intuition of the unconditioned Brahman and various ritual observances, supposed to be more or less helpful thereto. Islam declares repentance to be the ordinary, but not the necessary, condition of salvation.¹ Salvation by a substituted victim it emphatically denies. As these are in contradiction to each other on the one question which of all others is of the most transcendent personal importance, so do they all alike directly contradict therein the most explicit testimony of the gospel of Christ. Therein we are taught that no man can save himself in any way ; that “ without the shedding of blood,” and that the blood of the incarnate Son of God, “ there is no remission of sin ;” that before even this can avail to the individual he must be made over by the power of God—in a word, be “ born again,” and “ believe in the Lord Jesus Christ” that he may be saved. It declares, finally, no less explicitly, that this is not only *one* way of salvation, but the *only* way of salvation. There is not to be found a solitary exception or limitation to those solemn words : “ He that believeth not shall be damned.” “ He that believeth on the Son hath life, and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see

¹ “ By repentance, all sins may be pardoned, and it is God’s prerogative if He please, without repentance to pardon all sins, except that of imputing plurality to Him ; or again, if He please, to visit His wrath upon the very smallest of all transgressions.”—*Masslavi Syed Ahmad Khan*, in *Introduction to Commentary on the Hebrew text of the Book of Genesis*.

life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." But this will suffice. How or on what principle, with the utmost stretch of charity and latitude of interpretation, these four religions, which thus contradict each other on matters the most fundamental to all religion, can all alike be called more or less full revelations from the God of righteousness and truth, we leave to others to show. Most, we believe, will grant our conclusion from such facts as these, that if Christianity be in very truth a revelation from God, then it is certain that neither Buddhism, Brahmanism, nor Islam can be such a revelation; and that if it have any claim at all to the faith and allegiance of mankind, that claim, in the very nature of the case, must be for ever exclusive of all others.

But it is argued by those against whom we contend that Christianity is not in point of fact adapted to all men. It is suited, say some, only to the higher races; to the Western, as distinguished from the Eastern races, say others. That while no doubt it would be good for other races to receive the gospel, still, as a matter of fact, it appears to be beyond them, or, in some of its essential ideas, foreign to their line of thinking. Under these circumstances, we are told, Buddhism, Islam, or some other form of faith must be accepted, as may best meet the case. As to the capacity of these other creeds to meet and fill man's sense of need, we are told, that while they do not meet *our* sense of need, they may yet satisfy races of a different type or an inferior moral development. To all this much might be said. And first, the truth of the Christian religion being admitted, it is to be observed that all this stands flatly opposed to the teaching of Christ. If anything is clear, alike from the New Testament and from all history, it is this, that Christ professed to be a Saviour, not for *some* men, but for *all* men. He told His disciples to go, not to certain races, but "into all the world," and preach His gospel "to every creature." If the gospel be not adapted to all races, then Christ was mistaken, and the great commission is but the language of an erring enthusiasm, little to be trusted as a guidance for eternity.

But we affirm, in the second place, that it is a moral impossibility that even the three religions above considered, confessedly the highest and best of the non-Christian religions,

should ever satisfy the needs of any race of men, however low in the scale of moral development, or sprung from whatever stock. Take Buddhism, for example. Not the attractive character of its founder, nor the high morality which he inculcated, can compensate for the stubborn fact that Buddhism, as delivered to the world by Sakya Muni, was a religion without a God. But a religion without a God, a religion which denies the existence of the soul, and holds forth annihilation as the final issue of all the struggles of life—surely it is too much to be asked to believe that such a religion can be adapted to the needs of any creature which has a soul, or a single longing, however vague and transient, for a life after death. What better can be said of Brahmanism, which as a system offers the worshipper no personal God, and teaches him that all his fears and aspirations are born of illusion and end in eternal unconsciousness? Is it possible, can any one believe that weak and sinful man, reaching out in the dimness for the strong arm of a personal God, can be satisfied when he finds that he has grasped after all but a shadow in a dream? Is it a moral possibility that any man who has ever felt a longing to be anything better than he is, can be satisfied when he is told, as the Brahman will tell him, that all he is and all he is to be, all his sins and crimes, and all their distressing sequences of pain and anguish, are for him eternally fixed by an eternal, necessary, inexorable, and most irreversible fate? Can any man soberly believe that under any conceivable conditions the dreary negations and illusions of atheism or pantheism should satisfy the heart better than the faith of a personal God and Father? And Islam—can even Islam satisfy the heart of a sinner, when it tells him in the words of the Koran that “nothing shall be imputed to a man but his own labour”? Can it really be better for any sinful man to be told that, than to hear the gracious words, “The Lord hath laid upon Him the iniquity of us all”?

Again, granting, as we safely may, that all peoples have not developed in them the sense of moral and spiritual need which we have, does it follow that the gospel is not therefore so well adapted to them? Surely, in all reason we should rather argue that the lower in the scale of moral development a people may be, the more urgent and imperative the need of

the stimulus of the great ideas of God, and personality, and eternity, and atoning love, to rouse into consciousness, if possible, the dormant sensibilities of the soul. That an ignorant man, with a malaria-breeding pool behind his house, is not conscious of any harm to himself as resulting from it, scarcely proves that for that man the most wholesome thing is a stench.

But it is asserted that the actual reception of any form of religion proves that it did meet their conscious needs, else it would not have been received. But we venture in reply the affirmation, that the history of the development of doctrine in every religion goes to prove the contrary. It is indeed admitted that each religion, as it has first presented itself for the acceptance of men, has contained and offered to men certain elements of truth, to the power of which it has owed much of its success. Such, notably, was the case with Buddhism. In its doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man, as opposed to the tyranny of caste, it met a great need of the time. Such was the case again with Islam, in its emphatic proclamation of the great truth of the essential unity of God as opposed to the everywhere prevailing idolatry. But this does not prove that these really *satisfied* the spiritual needs of those who first received them. A sinner looking for some sufficient hope for the future could not rest with a knowledge of either the brotherhood of man or the unity of God, however good these might be in their place. And so it has come to pass that while Christianity, after eighteen hundred years, in all its various forms, Eastern or Western, Greek, Roman, or Protestant, retains still all the great fundamental truths of the personality and unity of God, the Deity and atonement of Christ, and is essentially the same body of doctrine which was first delivered by our Lord and His apostles, of the non-Christian religions there is not one of which this can be said. There has been not merely logical development of doctrine, as in the case of Christianity, but an addition of elements utterly foreign to the original system. But it is not the mere fact of such changes that concerns us so much as the character of those changes. As a matter of fact, it would appear that these have to a great extent consisted in efforts to supply those lacking

elements of faith which are the distinguishing characteristics of the religion of Christ.

The personality of God, a divine incarnation for human salvation, the remission of sin by the shedding of blood, these are the special and most essential doctrines of the Christian system ; and if in any religion any of these ideas have at first been wanting, there has been, in the case of each of the three great historic religions to which we have referred, an attempt in some way to supply the lack. If such doctrines have had a logical place in the system, so much the better ; if not, they have sooner or later been added, even in defiance of logical consistency, and sometimes in direct contradiction to the fundamental articles of the original creed. Taught by no one, led, as it were, by a kind of spiritual instinct, a faintly recognised sense of need, the disciples of each of these religions have sought to supply, often indeed in crude and superstitious fancies, those special and peculiar ideas which the Christian religion alone possesses as matters of blessed fact and abiding reality. And herein lies our argument : that all this goes to show, not that these religions have been felt to meet the conscious needs of those who first received them, but the exact reverse. Even those blind efforts which the adherents of various religions have made to adapt them more closely to their necessities, bear involuntary testimony to the adaptedness and necessity to all men of those great doctrines which in their full historical form are the distinguishing truths of the Gospel of Christ.

In illustration, first let us take the case of Buddhism. The original system as propounded by Sakya Muni was very simple. Fundamental are the so-called four noble truths, viz., that sorrow is inseparable from existence ; that its cause is desire ; that sorrow is therefore to be removed by the extinction of desire for all things, either good or evil, which is *nirvāna* ; and that the path to this is eightfold, as follows—rightness in belief, thoughts, language, actions, mode of livelihood, application, memory, and meditation. And the final issue of all this is *parinirvāna*, annihilation. This, in merest outline, is original Buddhism. Sakya Muni did not himself profess to be anything more than a man. As he entirely ignored the existence of a God, he could not profess to have received his

doctrine by any manner of divine revelation or supernatural illumination. He did not propose himself to save men, but only to teach them how to save themselves, and that, not from sin, but from sorrow, by walking in the eightfold path. Was it possible that this should satisfy the heart of man even in India? that men should accept and quietly rest in a religion absolutely without a God? History answers, No! Scarcely had this new religion been given to the world, when men began to add to it ideas wholly alien, thereby to meet if possible the crying wants of the soul. Materialism, even when dressed up like Buddhism, in the garb of a religion, could not satisfy. First, men needed a personal God; then they needed, not so much a teacher as a Saviour, and a Saviour, moreover, sinless and divine. And so men, working no doubt unconsciously, set themselves to incorporate these ideas into the religion of Sakya Muni. In Southern Asia this process is witnessed in the gradual growth of the legend of the Buddha. First, the Buddha, Sakya Muni, was declared to have been without sin, omniscient and almighty. Then men said that he had pre-existed for ages in the heavenly glory, and that for the salvation of men he came into this world in the form of a god of light, and became incarnate in the womb of a virgin. And so the son of the king of Benares was at last practically made into an incarnate God and Redeemer. The Northern development of Buddhism was much more elaborate, but testifies to the sense of the same wants. Sakya Muni had taught that he was but one of a succession of religious teachers appearing in the history of the world from time to time, to point men to the path of righteousness. Others were to come after him, and to do in their turn a work like his. In particular, the faith and expectation of the Thibetan Buddhists fixed upon the so-called Maitreya Buddha, who, as they believe, is to appear and conquer sin and sorrow. This Maitreya Buddha, and all others yet to come, are supposed to be existent through ages in the heavenly world, as Bodhisatvas, exalted beings yet to be manifested on the earth. Of these Bodhisatvas, three, called *Vajrapáni*, *Manjusrí*, and *Avalokiteswara*, came at last to be regarded as three gods, severally representing the ideas of wisdom, power, and mercy. And even thus the blank atheism of Sakya Muni

was left far behind. But if the heart of man could not rest in atheism, neither could it be content with tritheism. And so, in due time, some at least of the Thibetans reached the conception of one supreme spiritual being whom they term the *Adibuddha*—"Primal Buddha." This Primal Buddha is affirmed to be infinite, self-existent, and omniscient. Not, indeed, immediately, but mediately, after the manner conceived by the ancient Gnostics, by a threefold succession of emanations, he created the worlds. In particular, all the earthly Buddhas are manifestations of his eternal essence. As the *Avalokitesvara*, the Lord of providential mercy, he is believed to be continually incarnated in the person of the Grand Llama on the throne of Lhasa in Thibet.¹ Such, in the merest outline, has been the doctrinal development of Buddhism. Superstitious as it may seem to us, it is none the less profoundly instructive. It teaches that Buddhism, as delivered by its founder, did not meet and satisfy the needs of men. The soul cries out for a personal God and hearer of prayer; for an incarnate God and Redeemer. There was indeed no logical place for these conceptions in the religion of Sakya Muni. But, logical or not, the heart of man demanded and obtained a place for them in the popular religion. Thus the history of Buddhism is a confession of want, want of a personal God and incarnate Saviour; and if it be admitted that Buddhism has not yet found these, then it is plain that Buddhism is not, and cannot be, adapted to the needs of man.

Such has been the history of an atheistic religion. Let us now take the case of a pantheistic faith. When, about the year 600 or 700 of our era, Buddhism disappeared from the place of power in India, modern Brahmanism, a system of pure pantheism, took its place. Its fundamental principles are as follows: God, Brahm, is the only real and true existence. The human soul and the world are, therefore, truly God. Personality and free will are illusions; so also, by necessary consequence, are sin and righteousness. Salvation, therefore, consists simply in deliverance from the necessity of repeated births into this illusory world of personality, and reabsorption in the infinite deity. This salvation is to be reached by means of *jñāna*, knowledge, *i.e.* the intuition of our identity with God.

¹ *Buddhism*, Rhys Davids; chap. viii.

These propositions express the essential principles of modern Hindu theology. Has this satisfied the people? As in the case of Buddhism, history answers, No! The people want a personal God; nor are they equal to any transcendental intuition. And so it was that Shivaism, or the doctrine that Shiva was the true personal God and Creator of the world, and that men were to raise themselves to God, not by knowledge, but by works of a painful asceticism, became a popular form of faith. But neither could Shivaism satisfy. For man craves a God who is accessible and merciful. And Shivaism is only terrible. Man, moreover, is not equal to the task of saving himself by works any more than by knowledge; and so the next development of Hinduism, still feeling its way after those truths which the gospel alone reveals, was Vaishnavism, or the worship of Vishnu as the Supreme Lord and Creator of the world. The Vaishnavist holds that salvation is to be attained, not by knowledge or by works, but by *bhakti*, or devotion to Vishnu, and that to Vishnu as incarnate in Ram or Krishna, who are to-day the favourite gods of the Hindus. And still the heart of the Hindu is apparently not yet satisfied. For all these incarnations, it is admitted, were sinful like ourselves. Hence we are told that yet another incarnation of the Deity is still to come, the *nishkalank avatâr*, or sinless incarnation, who in the end of time, being born of a virgin, is to appear riding on a white horse, with a two-edged sword in his hand, for the destruction of all wickedness and the establishment of righteousness in the earth. Thus the history of Hinduism, like that of Buddhism, shows that men cannot rest long in a religion which does not tell of a personal and incarnate God and Saviour. But the testimony to this truth is still more clear; for all through the course of modern Hinduism men have from time to time arisen, like *Madhava*, *Kabîr*, *Tulsi Dâs*, and others, who gave expression, often with great power, to sentiments utterly foreign to the pantheism in the midst of which they lived. In a life of *Tiruvallara*, the author of the *Cural*, a poem in the highest repute among the Tamul people of South India, we find language which has no force except the personality of God be assumed. Thus:—

“Though God cannot be seen, he knoweth all
Our many needs. .He feedeth every day

The frog that on the forest rock doth crawl :
 And from our birth till now hath found a way
 To give us day by day our daily food.
 If thus it pleaseth him to do us good
 Will not the future bring us plenitude ?”¹

“ Such strife
 With God is wrong. On earth all things that are,
 Are those that ought to be. We may not bar
 The course of things, else we God’s world may mar.”²

And in North India Tulsi Dás has said,—

“ In darkness deep men practise their religion
 With fast and alms, and sacrifice and repetitions vain.
 If God himself rain not upon the earth,
 For all man’s sowing there will be no grain.”

And Kabîr also had complained,—

“ Lord, Lord, all men are saying,
 But I have another concern ;
 I’m not acquainted with the Lord ;
 Oh, whither shall I turn ?”

And again,—

“ With what face can I approach Thee ? Shame cometh unto me !
 I have sinned, and Thou hast seen it ! How canst Thou delight in me !”

Such illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely, but these will suffice. It should be plain enough that, according to history itself, it is not true that a pantheistic religion, any more than an atheistic creed, has been able to satisfy the heart of man. The whole history of Hinduism witnesses to a continual effort to adapt the prevailing creed to the unsatisfied needs of the soul. In attempting to do this, men have added, often at the expense of all logical consistency, those elements which Christianity alone supplies in fact ; or, when too clear-sighted for that, have taught such doctrines in the form of a protest against the hollow worthlessness of the popular system.

It has been thus with the history of Buddhism and Brahmanism ; how has it been with Islam ? Mohammed, we shall all admit, offered the world a creed as much purer and nearer the truth, as theism is nearer the truth than atheism or pantheism. We may also freely admit, without any prejudice to

¹ *Folk Songs of Southern India.* Gover. p. 208.

² *Ibid.* p. 210.

our argument, that Islam has in some instances improved the state of society in idolatrous countries where it has become the religion of a people formerly idolatrous. But that is not the question. The question is whether Islam has *satisfied* the realised needs of peoples who have embraced it? What light does the doctrinal history of Islam cast upon this matter? As is well known, the original creed proclaimed by Mohammed was very simple: "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet." And there is much in the Koran as regards the being and the attributes of the one God to which no Christian can possibly take any exception. The most devout and orthodox Christian in the world can join with all his heart in the Fātiha, the first chapter of the Koran:—

"Praise be to God, the Lord of all the worlds!
The compassionate, the merciful,
King on the day of Judgment!
Thee only do we worship, to Thee only cry for help!
Guide Thou us in the straight path,
The path of those to whom Thou hast been gracious,
With whom Thou art not angry,
And who go not astray."

As for himself, Mohammed claimed only to be a man sent from God to preach His truth. Anything approaching to divine honours for himself, or for any prophet, he emphatically forbade. Said he, in the Koran, "It becometh not a man that God should give him the Scriptures, and the wisdom and the spirit of prophecy, and that then he should say to his followers, Be ye worshippers of me as well as of God."¹

He admitted himself to be a sinner. He says that God had found him erring and guided him,² and prayed to be forgiven him "his former and his latter sin."³ Any power of working miracles he utterly disclaimed.

But as regards the doctrines distinctive of and essential to Christianity, the Incarnation and the Atonement of our Lord, he explicitly rejected and repudiated them. We read in the Koran, "God begetteth, and He is not begotten, and there is none like unto Him."⁴ He admitted no intercession as prevailing with God for a sinner. We read, "A soul shall have

¹ Sura iii. 73.

³ Sura Al Fath, Abraham.

² Sura Tirba.

⁴ Sura Ikhlas.

no patron or intercessor with God.”¹ And the doctrine of salvation by substitution is denied in the following words:—
 “A burdened soul shall not bear the burden of another.”²

Such, in its most important features, was the religion first preached to the world by Mohammed—a religion of pure and lofty theism, but a religion without a Mediator, an Incarnation, or divine sacrifice for sin. Did it meet the needs, as is alleged, of those to whom it was given? Here, again, history answers, No!

Even Mohammed himself, inconsistent though it was with the doctrine which he taught, found himself compelled to recognise the demand of the human conscience for the shedding of blood as the condition of the remission of sins, and accordingly enjoined an annual sacrifice, which is still observed throughout the Mohammedan world. But even this was not enough, and after the death of Mohammed, his followers proceeded in various places to add to his religion those elements which they felt to be wanting in the original system. A great body of tradition appeared to give sanction to the new doctrines. Men feel the need of an intercessor with God. It was said that Mohammed had been appointed of God to that office. In the great day of resurrection and judgment, all the sinful sons of men shall appear before God to hear their doom, and then Mohammed shall stand up in the presence of God and cry, “*Ummati!*” (it is my people), and God shall thereupon hear him and accept the persons of all true believers in Islam and save them, while all unbelievers shall be driven from his presence into the fire of hell. But it was in Persia especially, among the Shias, that doctrinal development went to an astonishing length in the same general direction. Not only to Mohammed himself, but to the Imams, or divinely ordained successors of the prophet, and spiritual heads of Islam, were by degrees ascribed the same attributes which in the New Testament are ascribed to Christ. The Imam, it was said, must be impeccable, omniscient, and be appointed of God Himself to his high office. Next some began to affirm the pre-existence of Mohammed and his immediate successors. God, we are told, took out of His bosom a single ray of His divine light, which He then united to the bodily form of

¹ Sura Anaam.

² Sura Najur.

Mohammed, and called upon the angels to recognise and submit to him as the elect of all God's creatures. This spark of the divine light was also communicated to the Caliph Ali, and so on. Others went further still. Ali, said they, never died. Indeed, he and his two sons, Hassan and Hassain, together with Mohammed and Fatima, were jointly sharers in the uncreated glory. And finally, whereas men felt that the blood of a goat, as ordained by Mohammed, could not avail to take away sin, it has come to be maintained by many among the Shia sect, that Hassain, who perished upon the battle-field of Kerbela, in conflict with the rival Caliph, Muavia, died there in expiation for the sins of men. And so at last was added to the original creed of the Arabian prophet, an imitation of every doctrine distinctive of the Christian system.¹ That all Muslims have by no means accepted these doctrines, that, in particular, the Sunnis detest these heretic Shias, does not affect our argument. It remains true, that if men had felt satisfied with the original creed of Islam, we cannot well conceive that they would have ventured to make changes and additions such as these.

Thus, as regards Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Islam alike, has neither of them ever afforded a permanent resting-place for the soul. Along each of these so different roads have men groped, seeking after three things—a personal God, an Incarnate Saviour, and a sufficient atonement for sin. In Buddhism, men found neither; Pantheism in India attempted to show man an Incarnate God. Mohammed alone proclaimed a personal God, but nothing more. Sooner or later, however, each of these three religions sought to find some place in itself for this transcendent trinity of truths, and has thus testified that no creed without them could meet the needs of men in any land or age.

And thus we are brought to answer affirmatively the question with which we began. If Christianity be, in any true sense of the words, a revelation from God, it is involved in that very affirmation that other religions are excluded from the category. This exclusive claim is an integral and inseparable part of the revelation; its teachings on the most fundamental

¹ See *Islam under the Arabs*, Osborn, Part II. chap. i., for a full account of these developments.

questions are in such irreconcilable contradiction with those of other religions, that it is logically impossible that they should also be from God. Finally, it is not more clear that the gospel of Christ has really met and satisfied all the spiritual needs of man than it is that no other religion ever has or ever can. Charity in its place is very well; but when in the name of Christian charity we are asked to "trace God" and "see His workings" in religions which deny His being or His personality, or to welcome as our "best ally" in our labours for the salvation of men, a religion which, like Islam, denies the Godhead and atonement of our Lord,¹ it is time to remember that not only charity but also righteousness and loyalty to the revealed truth of God, are Christian virtues. Just at the present time, if we mistake not, the Church needs less to learn a larger breadth of charity than a sterner intolerance of error and falsehood.

S. H. KELLOGG.

ART. IX.—*Haeckel on the Evolution of Man.*²

ERNST HAECKEL is an eminent comparative anatomist and physiologist, who has earned a wide and deserved reputation by his able and laborious studies of the Calcareous Sponges, the Radiolarians and other low forms of life. In his work on "The Evolution of Man" he applies this knowledge to the solution of the problem of the origin of humanity, and sets himself not only to illustrate but to "prove" the descent of our species from the simplest animal types, and even to overwhelm with scorn every other explanation of the appearance of man, except that of spontaneous evolution. The book is full of important facts, well stated. The great reputation of the author is likely to give it a wide currency, and there can be little doubt that it will exercise an important influence, more especially upon young men of the educated classes. It merits

¹ *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, pp. xvi. and xxv.

² From the *Princeton Review*.

therefore a careful examination, both as to its data and the manner of treatment of the subject. To understand the latter, it will be necessary in the first place to glance at Haeckel's personal position with reference to the study of Nature.

He is not merely an evolutionist but what he terms a "monist," and the monistic philosophy, as defined by him, includes certain negations and certain positive principles of a most comprehensive and important character. It implies the denial of all spiritual or immaterial existence. Man is to the monist merely a physiological machine, and nature is only a greater self-existing and spontaneously-moving aggregate of forces. Monism can thus altogether dispense with a Creative Will, as originating nature, and adopts the other alternative of self-existence or causelessness for the universe and all its phenomena. Again, the monistic doctrine necessarily implies that man, the animal, the plant, and the mineral, are only successive stages of the evolution of the same primordial matter, constituting thus a connected chain of being, all the parts of which sprang spontaneously from each other. Lastly, as the admixture of primitive matter and force would itself be a sort of dualism, Haeckel regards these as ultimately one, and apparently resolves the origin of the universe into the operation of a self-existing energy having in itself the potency of all things. After all, this may be said to be an approximation to the idea of a Creator, but not a living and willing Creator. Monism is thus not identical with pantheism, but is rather a sort of atheistic monotheism, if such a thing is imaginable, and vindicates the assertion attributed to a late lamented physical philosopher that he had found no atheistic philosophy which had not a God somewhere.

Haeckel's own statement of this aspect of his philosophy is somewhat interesting. He says :—

"The opponents of the doctrine of evolution are very fond of branding the monistic philosophy grounded upon it as 'materialism,' by comparing *philosophical* materialism with the wholly different and censurable *moral* materialism. Strictly, however, our 'monism' might as accurately or as inaccurately be called spiritualism as materialism. The real materialistic philosophy asserts that the phenomena of vital motion, like all other phenomena of motion, are effects or products of matter. The other opposite extreme, spiritualistic philosophy, asserts on the contrary that matter is the product of motive force, and that all material forms are produced by free

forces entirely independent of the matter itself. Thus, according to the materialistic conception of the universe, matter precedes motion or active force ; according to the spiritualistic conception of the universe, on the contrary, active force or motion precedes matter. Both views are dualistic, and we hold them both to be equally false. A contrast to both is presented in the *monistic* philosophy, which can as little believe in force without matter as in matter without force."

It is evident that if Haeckel limits himself and his opponents to matter and force as the sole possible explanations of the universe, he may truly say that matter is inconceivable without force, and force inconceivable without matter. But the question arises, What is the monistic power beyond these, the "Power behind Nature"? and as to the true nature of this the Jena philosopher gives us only vague generalities, though it is quite plain that he cannot admit a spiritual creator. Further, as to the absence of any spiritual element from the nature of man, he does not leave us in doubt as to what he means ; for, immediately after the above paragraph, he informs us that "the 'spirit' and 'mind' of man are but forces which are inseparably connected with the material substance of our bodies. Just as the motive power of our flesh is involved in the muscular form-element, so is the thinking force of our spirit involved in the form-element of the brain." In a note appended to the passage, he says that monism "conceives nature as one whole, and nowhere recognises any but mechanical causes." These assumptions as to man and nature pervade the whole book, and of course greatly simplify the task of the writer, as he does not require to account for the primary origin of nature, or for anything in man except his physical frame, and even this he can regard as a thing altogether mechanical.

It is plain that we might here enter our dissent from Haeckel's method, for he requires us to assume many things which he cannot prove, before we can proceed a single step in the evolution of man. What evidence is there, for example, of the possibility of the development of the rational and moral nature of man from the intelligence and instinct of the lower animals, or of the necessary dependence of the phenomena of mind on the structure of brain-cells? The evidence, as far as it goes, seems to tend the other way. What proof is there of the spontaneous evolution of living forms from inorganic

matter? Experiment so far negatives the possibility of this. Even if we give Haeckel, to begin with, a single living cell or granule of protoplasm, we know that this protoplasm must have been produced by the agency of a living vegetable cell previously existing, and we have no proof that it can be produced in any other way. Again, what particle of evidence have we that the atoms or the energy of an incandescent fire-mist have in them anything of the power or potency of life. We must grant the monist all these postulates as pure matters of faith, before he can begin his demonstration; and as none of them are axiomatic truths, it is evident that so far he is simply a believer in the dogmas of a philosophic creed, and weak as other men whom he affects to despise.

We may here place over against his authority that of another eminent physiologist of more philosophic mind, Dr. Carpenter, who has recently said:—

“As a physiologist I must fully recognise the fact that the physical force exerted by the body of man is not generated *de novo* by his will, but is derived directly from the oxidation of the constituents of his food. But holding it as equally certain, because the fact is capable of verification by every one as often as he chooses to make the experiment, that in the performance of every volitional movement physical force is put in action, directed, and controlled by the individual personality or *ego*, I deem it as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is no place for a God in nature, originating, directing, and controlling its forces by his will, as it would be to assert that there is no place in man's body for his conscious mind.”

Taking Haeckel on his own ground, as above defined, we may next inquire as to the method which he employs in working out his argument. This may be referred to three leading modes of treatment, which, as they are somewhat diverse from those ordinarily familiar to logicians, and are extensively used by evolutionists, deserve some illustration, more especially as Haeckel is a master in their use.

An eminent French professor of the art of sleight-of-hand has defined the leading principle of jugglers to be that of “appearing and disappearing things,” and this is the best definition that occurs to me of one method of reasoning largely used by Haeckel, and of which we need to be on our guard when we find him employing, as he does in almost every page, such phrases as “it cannot be doubted,” “we may therefore

assume," "we may readily suppose," "this afterwards assumes or becomes," "we may confidently assert," "this developed directly," and the like, which in his usage are equivalent to the *presto* of the conjurer, and which, while we are looking at one structure or animal, enable him to persuade us that it has been suddenly transformed into something else.

In tracing the genealogy of man, he constantly employs this kind of sleight-of-hand in the most adroit manner. He is perhaps describing to us the embryo of a fish or an amphibian, and as we become interested in the curious details, it is suddenly, by some clever phrase, transformed into a reptile or a bird; and yet without rubbing our eyes and reflecting on the differences and difficulties which he neglects to state, we can scarcely doubt that it is the same animal after all.

The little lancelet, or *Amphioxus*, of the European seas, a creature which was at one time thought to be a sea-snail, but is really more akin to fishes, forms his link of connection between our "fish ancestors" and the invertebrate animals. So important is it in this respect that our author waxes eloquent in exhorting us to regard it "with special veneration" as representing our "earliest Silurian vertebrate ancestors," as being of "our own flesh and blood," and as better worthy of being an object of "devoutest reverence" than the "worthless rabble of so-called 'saints.'" In describing this animal he takes pains to inform us that it is more different from an ordinary fish than a fish is from a man. Yet as he illustrates its curious and unique structure, before we are aware the lancelet is gone and a fish is in its place, and this fish with the potency to become a man in due time. Thus a creature intermediate in some respects between fishes and molluscs, or between fishes and worms, but so far apart from either that it seems but to mark the width of the gap between them, becomes an easy stepping-stone from one to the other.

In like manner the ascidians, or sea-squirts, molluscs of low grade, or, as Haeckel prefers to regard them, allied to worms, are most remote in almost every respect from the vertebrates. But in the young state of some of these creatures, and in the adult condition of one animal referred to this group (*Appendicularia*), they have a sort of swimming tail, which is stiffened

by a rod of cartilage to enable it to perform its function, and which for a time gives them a certain resemblance to the lancelet or to embryo fishes; and this usually temporary contrivance, curious as an imitative adaptation, but of no other significance, becomes, by the art of "appearing and disappearing," a rudimentary back-bone, and enables us at once to recognise in the young ascidian an embryo man.

A second method characteristic of the book, and furnishing indeed the main basis of its argument, is that of considering analogous processes as identical, without regard to the difference of the conditions under which they may be carried on. The great leading use of this argument is in inducing us to regard the development of the individual animal as the precise equivalent of the series of changes by which the species was developed in the course of geological time. These two kinds of development are distinguished by appropriate names. *Ontogenesis* is the embryonic development of the individual animal, and is of course a short process, depending on the production of a germ by a parent animal or parent pair, and the further growth of this germ in connection more or less with the parent or with provision made by it. This is of course a fact open to observation and study, though some of its processes are mysterious and yet involved in doubt and uncertainty. *Phylogenesis* is the supposed development of a species in the course of geological time, and by the intervention of long series of species, each in its time distinct, and composed of individuals each going regularly through a genetic circle of its own.

The latter is a process not open to observation within the time at our command; purely hypothetical, therefore, and of which the possibility remains to be proved, while the causes on which it must depend are necessarily altogether different from those at work in ontogenesis, and the conditions of a long series of different kinds of animals, each perfect in its kind, are equally dissimilar from those of an animal passing through the regular stages from infancy to maturity. The similarity in some important respects of ontogenesis to phylogenesis was inevitable, provided that animals were to be of different grades of complexity, since the development of the individual must

necessarily be from a more simple to a more complex condition. On any hypothesis, the parallelism between embryological facts and the history of animals in geological time affords many interesting and important coincidences. Yet it is perfectly obvious that the causes and conditions of these two successions cannot have been the same. Further, when we consider that the embryo cell which develops into one animal must necessarily be originally distinct in its properties from that which develops into another kind of animal, even though no obvious difference appears to us, we have no ground for supposing that the early stages of all animals are alike; and when we rigorously compare the development of any animal whatever with the successive appearance of animals of the same or similar groups in geological time, we find many things which do not correspond, not merely in the want of links which we might expect to find, but in the more significant appearance, prematurely or inopportunately, of forms which we would not anticipate. Yet the main argument of Haeckel's book is the quiet assumption that anything found to occur in ontogenetic development must also have occurred in phylogenesis, while manifest difficulties are got rid of by assuming atavisms and abnormalities.

A third characteristic of the method of the book is the use of certain terms in peculiar senses, and as implying certain causes which are taken for granted, though their efficacy and mode of operation are unknown. The chief of the terms so employed are "heredity" and "adaptation." Heredity is usually understood as expressing the power of permanent transmission of characters from parents to offspring, and in this aspect it expresses the constancy of specific forms. But as used by Haeckel it means the transmission by a parent of any exceptional characters which the individual may have accidentally assumed. Adaptation has usually been supposed to mean the fitting of animals for their place in nature, however that came about. As used by Haeckel it imports the power of the individual animal to adapt itself to changed conditions, and to transmit these changes to its offspring. Thus in this philosophy the rule is made the exception and the exception the rule, by a skilful use of familiar terms in new senses; and heredity and adaptation are constantly paraded as if they were two potent

divinities employed in constantly changing and improving the face of nature.

It is scarcely too much to say that the conclusions of the book are reached almost solely by the application of the above-mentioned peculiar modes of reasoning to the vast store of facts at command of the author, and that the reader who would test these conclusions by the ordinary methods of judgment must be constantly on his guard. Still it is not necessary to believe that Haeckel is an intentional deceiver. Such fallacies are those which are especially fitted to mislead enthusiastic specialists, to be identified by them with proved results of science, and to be held in an intolerant and dogmatic spirit.

Having thus noticed Haeckel's assumptions and his methods, we may next shortly consider the manner in which he proceeds to work out the phylogeny of man. Here he pursues a purely physiological method, only occasionally and slightly referring to geological facts. He takes as a first principle the law long ago formulated by Hunter, *Omne vivum ex ovo*—a law which modern research has amply confirmed, showing that every animal, however complex, can be traced back to an egg, which in its simplest state is no more than a single cell; though this cell requires to be fertilised by the addition of the contents of another dissimilar cell, produced either in another organ of the same individual or in a distinct individual. This process of fertilisation Haeckel seems to regard as unnecessary in the lowest forms of life; but though there are some simple animals in which it has not been recognised, analogy would lead us to believe that in some form it is necessary in all. Haeckel's monistic view, however, requires that in the lowest forms it should be absent, and should have originated spontaneously, though how does not seem to be very clear, as the explanation given of it (vol. ii. p. 391 *et seq.*) amounts to little more than the statement that it must have occurred. Still, as a "dualistic" process it is very significant with reference to the monistic theory.

Much space is of course devoted to the tracing of the special development or ontogenesis of man, and to the illustration of the fact that in the earlier stages of this development the human embryo is scarcely distinguishable from that of lower animals. We may indeed affirm that all animals start from cells which

in so far as we can see are similar to each other, yet which must include potentially the various properties of the animals which spring from them. As we trace them onward in their development, we see these differences manifesting themselves. At first all pass, according to Haeckel, through a stage which he calls the "gastrula," in which the whole body is represented by a sort of sac, the cavity of which is the stomach, and the walls consist of two layers of cells. It should be stated, however, that many eminent naturalists dissent from this view, and maintain that even in the earliest stages material differences can be observed. In this they are probably right, as even Haeckel has to admit some degree of divergence from this all-embracing "gastræa" theory. Admitting, however, that such early similarity exists within certain limits, we find as the embryo advances that it speedily begins to indicate whether it is to be a coral animal, a snail, a worm, or a fish. Consequently the physiologist who wishes to trace the resemblances leading to mammals and to man has to lop off, one by one, the several branches which lead in other directions, and to follow that which conducts by the most direct course to the type which he has in view. In this way Haeckel can show that the embryo *Homo sapiens* is in successive stages so like to the young of the fish, the reptile, the bird, and the ordinary quadruped, that he can produce for comparison figures in which the cursory observer can detect scarcely any difference.

All this has long been known, and has been regarded as a wonderful evidence of the homology or unity of plan which pervades nature, and as constituting man the archetype of the animal kingdom—the highest realisation of a plan previously sketched by the Creator in many ruder and humbler forms. It also teaches that it is not so much in the mere bodily organism that we are to look for the distinguishing characters of humanity as in the higher rational and moral nature.

But Haeckel, like other evolutionists of the monistic and agnostic schools, goes far beyond this. The ontogeny, on the evidence of analogy as already explained, is nothing less than a miniature representation of the phylogeny. Man must in the long ages of geological time have arisen from a monad, just as the individual man has in his life-history arisen from an embryo cell, and the several stages through which the individual passes

must be parallel to those in the history of the race. True, the supposed monad must have been wanting in all the conditions of origin, sexual fertilisation, parental influence, and surroundings. There is no perceptible relation of cause and effect any more than between the rotation of a carriage-wheel and that of the earth on its axis. The analogy might prompt to inquiries as to common laws and similarities of operation, but it proves nothing as to causation.

In default of such proof, Haeckel favours us with another analogy derived from the science of language. All the Indo-European languages are believed to be descended from a common ancestral tongue, and this is analogous to the descent of all animals from one primitive species. But unfortunately the languages in question are the expressions of the voice and thought of one and the same species. The individuals using them are known historically to have descended by ordinary generation from a common source, and the connecting links of the various dialects are unbroken. The analogy fails altogether in the case of species succeeding each other in geological time, unless the very thing to be proved is taken for granted in the outset.

The actual proof that a basis exists in nature for the doctrine of evolution founded on these analogies might be threefold. *First*, there might be changes of the nature of phylogenesis going on under our own observation, and even a very few of these would be sufficient to give some show of probability. Elaborate attempts have been made to show that variations as existing in the more variable and the domesticated species lead in the direction of such changes; but the results have been unsatisfactory, and our author scarcely condescends to notice this line of proof. He evidently regards the time over which human history has extended as too short to admit of this kind of demonstration. *Secondly*, There might be in the existing system of nature such a close connection or continuous chain of species as might at least strengthen the argument from analogy; and undoubtedly there are many groups of closely allied species, or of races confounded with true specific types, which it might be not unreasonable to suppose of common origin. These are, however, scattered widely apart, and the contrary fact of extensive gaps in the series is so frequent that

Haeckel is constantly under the necessity of supposing that multitudes of species and even of larger groups have perished, just where it is most important to his conclusion that they should have remained. This is of course unfortunate for the theory, but then, as Haeckel often remarks, "we must suppose" that the missing links once existed. But, *thirdly*, these gaps which now unhappily exist may be filled up by fossil animals; and if in the successive geological periods we could trace the actual phylogeny of even a few groups of living creatures, we might have the demonstration desired. But here again the gaps are so frequent and serious that Haeckel scarcely attempts to use this argument further than by giving a short and somewhat imperfect summary of the geological succession in the beginning of his second volume. In this he attempts (in Table XVI.) to give a series of the ancestors of man as developed in geological time, but of twenty-one groups which he arranges in order from the beginning of the Laurentian to the modern period, at least ten are not known at all as fossils, and others do not belong, so far as known, to the ages to which he assigns them. This necessity of manufacturing facts does not speak well for the testimony of geology to the supposed phylogeny of man.

In point of fact it cannot be disguised that, though it is possible to pick out some series of animal forms, like the horses and camels referred to by some palæontologists, which simulate a genetic order, the general testimony of palæontology is on the whole adverse to the ordinary theories of evolution, whether applied to the vegetable or to the animal kingdom. This the writer has elsewhere endeavoured to show; but he may refer here to the labours of Barrande, perhaps unrivalled in extent and accuracy, which show that in the leading forms of life in the older geological formations the succession is not such as to correspond with any of the received theories of derivation.¹ Even evolutionists, when sufficiently candid, admit their case not proven by geological evidence. Gaudry, one of the best authorities on the Tertiary mammalia, admits the impossibility of suggesting any possible derivation for some of the leading

¹ Those who wish to understand the real bearings of palæontology on evolution should study Barrande's *Memoirs on the Silurian Trilobites, Cephalopods, and Brachiopods*.

groups, and Saporta, Mivart, and Le Conte fall back on periods of rapid or paroxysmal evolution, scarcely differing from the idea of creation by law, or mediate creation as it has been termed.

Thus the utmost value which can be attached to Haeckel's argument from analogy would be that it suggests a possibility that the processes which we see carried on in the evolution of the individual may, in the laws which regulate them, be connected in some way more or less close with those creative processes which on the wider field of geological time have been concerned in the production of the multitudinous forms of animal life. That Haeckel's philosophy goes but a very little way toward any understanding of such relations, and that our present information even within the more limited scope of biological science is too meagre to permit of safe generalisation, will appear from the consideration of a few facts taken here and there from the multitude employed in these volumes to illustrate the monistic theory.

When we are told that a moner or an embryo cell is the early stage of all animals alike, we naturally ask, Is it meant that all these cells are really similar, or is it only that they appear similar to us and may actually be as profoundly unlike as the animals which they are destined to produce? To make this question more plain, let us take the case as formally stated: "From the weighty fact that the egg of the human being, like the egg of all other animals, is a simple cell, it may be quite certainly inferred that a one-celled parent form once existed, from which all the many-celled animals, man included, developed."

Now let us suppose that we have under our microscope a one-celled animalcule quite as simple in structure as our supposed ancestor. Along with this we may have on the same slide another cell which is the embryo of a worm, and a third which is the embryo of a man. All these, according to the hypothesis, are similar in appearance, so that we can by no means guess which is destined to continue always an animalcule, or which will become a worm or may develop into a poet or a philosopher. Is it meant that the things are actually alike or only apparently so? If they are really alike, then their destinies must depend on external circumstances. Put

either of them into a pond and it will remain a monad. Put either of them into the ovary of a complex animal, and it will develop into the likeness of that animal. But such similarity is altogether improbable, and it would destroy the argument of the evolutionist. In this case he would be hopelessly shut up to the conclusion that "hens were before eggs," and Haeckel elsewhere informs us that the exactly opposite view is necessarily that of the monistic evolutionist. Thus, though it may often be convenient to speak of these three kinds of cells as if they were perfectly similar, the method of "disappearance" has immediately to be resorted to, and they are shown to be, in fact, quite dissimilar. There is indeed the best ground to suppose that the one-celled animals and embryo-cells referred to have little in common except their general form. We know that the most minute cell must include a sufficient number of molecules of protoplasm to admit of great varieties of possible arrangement, and that these may be connected with most varied possibilities as to the action of forces. Further, the embryo-cell which is produced by a particular kind of animal, and whose development results in the reproduction of a similar animal, must contain potentially the parts and structures which are evolved from it, and fact shows that this may be affirmed of both the embryo and sperm cells where there are two sexes. Therefore it is in the highest degree probable that the eggs of a snail and of a man, though possibly alike to our coarse methods of investigation, are as dissimilar as the animals that result from them. If so, the "egg may be before the hen;" but it is as difficult to imagine the spontaneous production of the egg, which is potentially the hen, as of the hen itself. Thus the similarity of the eggs and the early embryos of animals of different grades is apparent only: and this fact, which embodies a great and perhaps insoluble mystery, invalidates the whole of Haeckel's reasoning on the alleged resemblances of different kinds of animals in their early stages.

A second difficulty arises from the fact that the simple embryo-cell of any of the higher animals rapidly produces various kinds of specialised cells different in structure and appearance and capable of performing different functions, whereas, in the lower forms of life, such cells may remain simple or may merely produce several similar cells little, or

not at all, differentiated. This objection, whenever it occurs, Haeckel endeavours to turn by the assertion that a complex animal is merely an aggregate of independent cells, each of which is a sort of individual. He thus tries to break up the integrity of the complex organism, and to reduce it to a mere swarm of monads. He compares the cells of an organism to the "individuals of a savage community," who, at first separate and all alike in their habits and occupations, at length organise themselves into a community and assume different avocations. Single cells, he says, at first were alike, and each performed the same simple offices of all the others. "At a later period isolated cells gathered into communities, groups of simple cells which had arisen from the continued division of a single cell, remained together, and now began gradually to perform different offices of life."

But this is a mere vague analogy. It does not represent anything actually occurring in nature, except in the case of an embryo produced by some animal which already shows all the tissues which its embryo is destined to reproduce. Thus it establishes no probability of the evolution of complex tissues from simple cells, and leaves altogether unexplained that wonderful process by which the embryo-cell not only divides into many cells but becomes developed into all the variety of dissimilar tissues evolved from the homogeneous egg, but evolved from it, as we naturally suppose, because of the fact that the egg represents potentially all these tissues as existing previously in the parent organism.

But if we are content to waive these objections or to accept the solutions given of them by the "appearance and disappearance" argument, we still find that the phylogeny, unlike the ontogenesis, is full of wide gaps only to be passed *per saltum*, or to be accounted for by the disappearance of a vast number of connecting links. Of course it is easy to suppose that these intermediate forms have been lost through time and accident, but why this has happened to some rather than to others cannot be explained. In the phylogeny of man, for example, what a vast hiatus yawns between the ascidian and the lancelet, and another between the lancelet and the lamprey! It is true that the missing links may have consisted of animals little likely to be preserved as fossils; but why, if they ever

existed, do not some of them remain in the modern seas? Again, when we have so many species of apes and so many races of men, why can we find no trace, recent or fossil, of that "missing link" which we are told must have existed, the "ape-like men," known to Haeckel as the "Alali," or speechless men?

A further question which should receive consideration from the monist school is that very serious one: Why, if all is "mechanical" in the development and actions of living beings, should there be any progress whatever? Ordinary people fail to understand why a world of mere dead matter should not go on to all eternity obeying physical and chemical laws, without developing life; or why, if some low form of life were introduced capable of reproducing simple one-celled organisms, it should not go on doing so.

Further, even if some chance deviations should occur, we fail to perceive why these should go on in a definite manner producing not only the most complex machines, but many kinds of such machines on different plans, but each perfect in its way. Haeckel is never weary of telling us that to monists organisms are mere machines. Even his own mental work is merely the grinding of a cerebral machine. But he seems not to perceive that to such a philosophy the homely argument which Paley derived from the structure of a watch would be fatal. "The question is whether machines (which monists consider all animals to be, including themselves) infinitely more complicated than watches could come into existence without design somewhere;"¹ that is, by mere chance. Common-sense is not likely to admit that this is possible.

The difficulties above referred to relate to the introduction of life and of new species on the monistic view. Others might be referred to in connection with the production of new organs. An illustration is afforded, among others, by the discussion of the introduction of the five fingers and toes of man, which appear to descend to us unchanged from the amphibians or batrachians of the Carboniferous period. In this ancient age of the earth's geological history, feet with five toes appear in numerous species of reptilians of various grades. They are preceded by no other vertebrates than fishes, and

¹ Beckett, *Origin of the Laws of Nature*.

these have numerous fin-rays instead of toes. There are no properly transitional forms either fossil or recent. How were the five-fingered limbs acquired in this abrupt way? Why were they five rather than any other number? Why, when once introduced, have they continued unchanged up to the present day? Haeckel's answer is a curious example of his method:—

“The great significance of the five digits depends on the fact that this number has been transmitted from the Amphibia to all higher vertebrates. It would be impossible to discover any reason why in the lowest Amphibia, as well as in Reptiles and in higher vertebrates up to man, there should always originally be five digits on each of the anterior and posterior limbs, if we denied that heredity from a common five-fingered parent form is the efficient cause of this phenomenon ; heredity can alone account for it. In many Amphibia certainly, as well as in many higher vertebrates, we find less than five digits. But in all these cases it can be shown that separate digits have retrograded, and have finally been completely lost. The causes which affected the development of the five-fingered foot of the higher vertebrates in this amphibian form from the many-fingered foot (or properly fin) must certainly be found in the adaptation to the totally altered functions which the limbs had to discharge during the transition from an exclusively aquatic life to one which was partially terrestrial. While the many-fingered fins of the fish had previously served almost exclusively to propel the body through the water, they had now also to afford support to the animal when creeping on the land. This effected a modification both of the skeleton and of the muscles of the limbs. The number of fin-rays was gradually lessened, and was finally reduced to five. These five remaining rays were, however, developed more vigorously. The soft cartilaginous rays became hard bones. The rest of the skeleton also became considerably more firm. The movements of the body became not only more vigorous but also more varied”—

and the paragraph proceeds to state other ameliorations of muscular and nervous system supposed to be related to or caused by the improvement of the limbs.

It will be observed that in the above extract, under the formula “the causes . . . must certainly be found,” all that other men would regard as demanding proof is quietly assumed, and the animal grows before our eyes from a fish to a reptile as under the wand of a conjurer. Further, the transmission of the five toes is attributed to heredity or unchanged reproduction, but this, of course, gives no explanation of the original formation of the structure, nor of the causes which prevented heredity from applying to the fishes which became amphibians, and acquired five toes, or to the am-

phibians which faithfully transmitted their five toes but not their other characteristics.

It is perhaps scarcely necessary to follow further the criticism of this extraordinary book. It may be necessary, however, to repeat that it contains clear, and in the main accurate, sketches of the embryology of a number of animals, only slightly coloured by the tendency to minimise differences. It may also be necessary to say that in criticising Haeckel we take him on his own ground, that of a monist, and have no special reference to those many phases which the philosophy of evolution assumes in the minds of other naturalists, many of whom accept it only partially or as a form of mediate creation more or less reconcilable with theism. To these more moderate views no reference has been made, though there can be no doubt that many of them are quite as assailable as the position of Haeckel in point of argument. It may also be observed that Haeckel's argument is almost exclusively biological and confined to the animal kingdom, and to the special line of descent attributed to man. The monistic hypothesis becomes, as already stated, still less tenable when tested by the facts of palæontology. Hence most of the palæontologists who favour evolution appear to shrink from the extreme position of Haeckel. Gaudry, one of the ablest of this school, in his recent work on the development of the mammalia, candidly admits the multitude of facts for which derivation will not account, and perceives in the grand succession of animals in time the evidence of a wise and far-reaching creative plan, concluding with the words: "We may still leave out of the question the processes by which the Author of the world has produced the changes of which palæontology presents the picture." In like manner the Count de Saporta, in his *World of Plants*, closes his summary of the periods of vegetation with the words:—

"But if we ascend from one phenomenon to another, beyond the sphere of contingent and changeable appearance, we find ourselves arrested by a being unchangeable and supreme, the first expression and absolute cause of all existence, in whom diversity unites with unity, an eternal problem insoluble to science but ever present to the human consciousness. Here we reach the true source of the idea of religion, and there presents itself distinctly to the mind that conception to which we apply instinctively the name of God."

Thus these evolutionists, like many others in this country and in England, find a *modus vivendi* between evolution and theism. They have committed themselves to an interpretation of nature which may prove fanciful and evanescent, and which certainly up to this time remains an hypothesis, ingenious and captivating, but not fortified by the evidence of facts. But in doing so they are not prepared to accept the purely mechanical creed of the monist, or to separate themselves from those ideas of morality, of religion, and of sonship to God which have hitherto been the brightest gems in the crown of man as the lord of this lower world. Whether they can maintain this position against the monists, and whether they will be able in the end to retain any practical form of religion along with the doctrine of the derivation of man from the lower animals, remains to be seen. Possibly before these questions come to a final issue, the philosophy of evolution may itself have been "modified" or have given place to some new phase of thought.

In some places there are in Haeckel's book touches of a grim humour which are not without interest, as showing the subjective side of the monistic theory, and illustrating the attitude of its professors to things held sacred by other men. For example, the following is the introduction to the chapter headed "From the Primitive Worm to the Skulled Animal," and which has for its motto the lines of Goethe beginning :

"Not like the gods am I ! full well I know ;
But like the worms which in the dust must go."

"Both in prose and poetry man is very often compared to a worm ; 'a miserable worm,' 'a poor worm,' are common and almost compassionate phrases. If we cannot detect any deep phylogenetic reference in this zoological metaphor, we might at least safely assert that it contains an unconscious comparison with a low condition of animal development which is interesting in its bearing on the pedigree of the human race."

If Haeckel's reading of Scripture had been sufficiently thorough, he might have quoted here the melancholy confession of the Man of Uz : "I have said to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister." But though Job, like the German Professor, could humbly say to the worm, "Thou art my mother," he could still hold fast his integrity and believe in the fatherhood of God.

The moral bearing of monism is further illustrated by the following extract, which refers to a more advanced step of the evolution, that from the ape to man, and which shows the honest pride of the worthy Professor in his humble parentage:

"Just as most people prefer to trace their pedigree from a decayed baron, or if possible from a celebrated prince, rather than from an unknown humble peasant, so they prefer seeing the progenitor of the human race in an Adam degraded by the fall rather than in an Ape capable of higher development and progress. It is a matter of taste, and such genealogical preferences do not therefore admit of discussion. It is more to my individual taste to be the more highly developed descendant of an Ape, who in the struggle for existence had developed progressively from lower mammals as they from still lower vertebrates, than the degraded descendant of an Adam, God-like but debased by the fall, who was formed from a clod of earth, and of an Eve created from a rib of Adam. As regards the celebrated 'rib,' I must here expressly add, as a supplement to the history of the development of the skeleton, that the number of ribs is the same in man and in woman.¹ In the latter as well as in the former the ribs originate from the skin-fibrous layer, and are to be regarded phylogenetically as lower or ventral vertebrae."²

There is no accounting for tastes, yet we may be pardoned for retaining some preference for the first link of the old Jewish genealogical table—"which was the son of Adam, which was the son of God." As to the "debasement" of the fall, it is to be feared that the aboriginal ape would object to bearing the blame of existing human iniquities as having arisen from any improvement in his nature and habits; and it is scarcely fair to speak of Adam as "formed from a *clod* of earth," which is not precisely in accordance with the record. As to the "rib," which seems so offensive to Haeckel, one would have thought that he would, as an evolutionist, have had some fellow-feeling in this with the writer of Genesis. The origin of sexes is one of the acknowledged difficulties of the hypothesis, and using his method we might surely "assume," or even "confidently assert," the possibility that, in some early stage of the development, the unfinished vertebral arches of the "skin-fibrous layer" might have produced a new individual by a process of budding or gemmation. Quite as remarkable suppositions are contained in some parts of his own volumes, without any special

¹ It was scarcely necessary to refer to this childish conception, unless the individual skeleton of Adam had been in question.

² Rather, "vertebral arches."

divine power for rendering them practicable. Further, if only an individual man originated in the first instance, and if he were not provided with a suitable spouse, he might have intermarried with the unimproved anthropoids, and the results of the evolution would have been lost. Such considerations should have weighed with Haeckel in inducing him to speak more respectfully of Adam's rib, especially in view of the fact that in dealing with the hard question of human origin the author of Genesis had not the benefit of the researches of Baer and Haeckel. He had no doubt the advantage of a firm faith in the reality of that Creative Will which the monistic prophets of the nineteenth century have banished from their calculations. Were Haeckel not a monist, he might also be reminded of that grand doctrine of the lordship and superiority of man based on the fact that there was no "helpmeet for him;" and the foundation of the most sacred bond of human society on the saying of the first man: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh." But monists probably attach little value to such ideas.

It may be proper to add here that in his references to Adam Haeckel betrays a weakness not unusual with his school, in putting a false gloss on the old record of Genesis. The statement that man was formed from the dust of the ground implies no more than the production of his body from the common materials employed in the construction of other animals: this also in contradistinction from the higher nature derived from the inbreathing or inspiration of God. The precise nature of the method by which man was made or created is not stated by the author of Genesis. Further, it would have been as easy for divine power to create a pair as an individual. If this was not done, and if after the lesson of superiority taught by the inspection of lower animals, and the lesson of language taught by naming them, the first man in his "deep sleep" is conscious of the removal of a portion of his own flesh, and then on awaking, has the woman "brought" to him, all this is to teach a lesson not to be otherwise learned. The Mosaic record is thus perfectly consistent with itself and with its own doctrine of creation by Almighty Power.

I have quoted the above passages as examples of the more jocose vein of the Jena physiologist; but they constitute also a

serious revelation of the influence of his philosophy on his own mind and heart, in lowering both to a cold, mechanical, and unsympathetic view of man and nature. This is especially serious when we remember how earnestly, in a recent address, he advocated the teaching of the methods and results of this book as those which, in the present state of knowledge, should supersede the Bible in our schools. We may well say, with his great opponent on that occasion, that if such doctrines should be proved to be true, the teaching of them might become a necessity, but one that would bring us face to face with the darkest and most dangerous moral problem that has ever beset humanity; and that so long as they remain unproved, it is both unwise and criminal to propagate them among the mass of men as conclusions demonstrated by science.

J. W. DAWSON.

ART. X.—*Current Literature.*

IT is difficult to over-estimate the value and the interest of studies in the Comparative Science of Religion; and whilst such *magna opera* are warmly and gratefully acknowledged as the "Sacred Books of the East," it is also suitable that more concise and digested works should appear from the hands of specialists. Bunsen laid down the golden rule for specialists when he said to Max Müller, "Let us have from time to time some chips from your workshop." The Professor of the Chinese Language and Literature in the University of Oxford has therefore done good service by embodying the lectures he delivered before the Presbyterian Church of England in more permanent form, and thus presenting to a larger audience some popularised results of those gigantic and long labours, which have already given us the "Chinese Classics," and are now giving us the Chinese section of the great Oxford series. In his *Religions of China* (1), Dr. Legge takes a rapid survey of two out of the three religions of China, that is to say,

(1) *The Religions of China, Confucianism and Tâoism, described and compared with Christianity.* By James Legge. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

a survey of the indigenous religions, viz., of the State-religion or Confucianism, and of the plebeian religion or Tâoism. The account of Confucianism, possibly from the circumstances of the case, is considerably the clearer and more fascinating. Defining Confucianism to be that ancient religion which Confucius rather preserved than created, Dr. Legge gives a brief but lucid statement of the growth or development of this primitive Chinese faith. A curious philological study opens the discussion, by means of which Dr. Tiele's well-known opinion upon the early Fetishism of China is at least rendered suspect. Dr. Legge gives linguistic evidence for believing that the earliest phase of religion in China was monotheistic. Advancing from the prehistoric times, a monotheistic faith is shown to have existed in the twenty-fifth century at any rate before our era. The gradual beclouding of that ancient and simple faith by a pantheon of lesser deities and by the worship of ancestors is then depicted. Thus, by a few well-directed strokes, the whole Chinese theory of salvation by intellect is made readily comprehensible. This description of Confucianism is far the best part of the book. An intelligible idea of Tâoism can scarcely be gained from the few and confused details afforded. As for the comparison between Christianity and the religions of China, surely too much regard is paid to minor points. Of course differences are seen in the doctrines of God, of Atonement, and of a Future State, but, with all his minute reference to varying doctrinal and ethical views, why has Dr. Legge not mentioned the one central and fundamental distinction? Can either Confucianism or Tâoism afford any parallel to the Christian consciousness? Can any "sacred book" outside the Bible match, what every Christian knows to be true experimentally, the eighth chapter of the Romans? To the closing remarks of so eminent a missionary upon the practical and deterrent influence of the divisions among Christians, of the selfishness and greed of Christian commerce, of the inconsistencies of those who bear the Christian name, of the ambition and selfish policy of so-called Christian nations, and of the iniquitous opium traffic, too close an attention can hardly be drawn.

Of a very different character is Dr. Caird's *Introduction to*

the Philosophy of Religion (2), a revised edition of the Croall Lecture for 1878. In Dr. Caird's book we pass from the field to the study, from the practical missionary to the speculative philosopher. It might be not unjustly said that Dr. Caird's is another attempt at popularisation; for the aim is to introduce the English-speaking nations to that charmed circle of thought which has hitherto been cultivated, somewhat esoterically, by the pupils of Kant and Hegel. Kant may be said, in fact, to have founded the so-called Philosophy of Religion by his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen des bloßen Vernunft*, whilst that philosophy has received its greatest augmentations from the followers of Hegel from Baur to Pfleiderer. Dr. Caird acknowledges his very large indebtedness to Hegel's *Philosophie der Religion*. For those who are unfamiliar with such studies, it may be said that the book before us might be fairly called—"a purely rational inquiry into the fundamental religious ideas." It is a sort of philosophic forecourt to the great fortress of Christian teaching. In other words, the Philosophy of Religion may be defined as the contribution of pure reason to the problems of theology. What Dr. Caird would say to such a definition it is difficult to say; he is not great at definitions. To answer succinctly from his book what he means either by philosophy or by religion would be no easy task. He is wont to perambulate about his theme, and to regard it from a distance, instead of walking straight up and claspings. But whatever vacillation there is in obeying the great logical laws of definition, there is no hesitancy in the keen and persistent pursuit of the purpose in view. Having assaulted at the outset those barricades to all advance which have been erected by such thinkers as Fichte and Spencer, the opposition offered by the doctrines of the relativity of knowledge and of the immediate and authoritative character of religious knowledge is overcome with thoroughness and apparent ease, and the philosophical counterparts of Herod and Pilate, to be found in Empiricism and Idealism, which, sworn enemies of each other, are ever ready to enter into an alliance against definite religious knowledge, are readily disarmed. The whole discussion of these preliminary objections is conducted with argumentative

(2) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. By John Caird, D.D. Glasgow: James Maclehose.

force and many a surprise. Proceeding to the main theme, the Necessity of Religion is first treated, by which is meant, it would seem, the rational necessity for thinking a Divine Being ; for an attempt is made to show that mind has something of infinitude about it, and that thought presupposes absolute intelligence ; in other words, the contention is, that, quite apart from the physical world, the very constitution of the human mind argues the existence of a Divine Being. There naturally follows a criticism of the so-called proofs for the Divine Existence. Able as all this is in its grasp and its occasionally crisp expression, it is probable that Dr. Caird will see grounds for recasting the argument of this section of his work when he has read the subtle and invaluable synthesis of the Divine Idea in Dr. Dorner's *System der christlichen Glaubenslehre*. Moving rapidly and surely onwards from thought to embodiment, from the constitution of the reason to that of the universe, there come successively into view the Religious Consciousness, the Inadequacy of Religious Knowledge in the Unscientific Form, the Transition to the Speculative Idea of Religion, the Relation of Religion to Morality, and the Relation of the Philosophy to the History of Religion. In these chapters again very many of the statements, and not a little of the philosophy, appear questionable. There seems far too little reference to the real world of existences as a counteractive to the speculative tendency ; nor can we distinguish as our author does between the Science and Philosophy of Religion. Nevertheless, the book remains *sui generis*, as a filiated, critical, and lucid exposition of some of the principal results of carrying the speculative process into the realm of religion.

Turning from speculation to practical theology we are glad to see that Dr. Pope's *Discourses on the Lordship of the Incarnate Redeemer* (3), have reached a third edition. Originally delivered in the chapel of the Wesleyan Theological Institution at Didsbury, they were certainly deserving of being more widely known. If they do not convey startlingly original views, they are full of suggestiveness ; and if they do not sparkle with that Homeric simplicity and vitality of language

(3) *Discourses, chiefly on the Lordship of the Incarnate Redeemer*, by the Rev. W. B. Pope, D.D., Wesleyan Conference Office.

which make some modern sermons so attractive, they have a soberness and chaste beauty, now and again relieved by the thrill of a warm desire for the salvation of the sinner and the perfection of the saint. They have, as regards this matter, two of the characteristics of good sermons. They have a thorough groundwork of exegetical, doctrinal, and experimental knowledge, so that they are both full and ripe; and they are conspicuously evangelical.

A choice *brochure* in the sermon line has just been given to the world by Dr. A. Dorner (4) of Wittenberg. The son of Dr. Dorner of Berlin, he is already favourably known in the theological world by his scholarly and useful work upon the "Theological System and Standpoint of Augustine." These sermons are only eleven in number, and have been preached at places as widely apart as Lyons and Göttingen, Marseilles and Wittenberg, during the course of ten years. They are as select in style as in number. Strictly in accordance with their title, they are all devoted to aspects of the Kingdom of God. They treat of such subjects as the following:—John as the Forerunner, contrasting the greatest under the Old Covenant with the least under the New; the Internal vanquishing the External, in which the Pharisaic and Christian conceptions of the Law are emphasised; the Inwardness of the Kingdom of God, where the nature and basis of the inward life come into view: the Variety and Unity of the Kingdom of God, treating, firstly, of human life and avocations, secondly, of the unity which binds these together, and thirdly, of the source of that unity; the Kingdom of God and Earthly Possessions, with the nature and peril of Mammon-worship; the Peace of the Kingdom of God; True Forgiveness; Righteous Judgment; the Temptation of Christ as a pattern for us; the Inward Freedom and the Right Rejoicing of the Christian. We should like to give some extracts we have culled, but after all they would have to be regarded as suggestions rather than samples. The language is so clear as to seem shallow at times; but if the sententiousness of the proverb is absent the simplicity of great wisdom is everywhere visible. These sermons are essentially wise

• (4) *Predigten von dem Reiche Gottes*, von Dr. A. Dorner, Professor der Theologie in Wittenberg. Berlin: Hertz.

sermons. They have the satisfying qualities of full corn in the ear. And they are, let it be distinctly stated, kindly and simple expositions of the great themes of Christian ethics, eloquent because earnest, and riveting because sincere. If the great need of our time is an ethical revival in the highest sense of the word, such sermons must have an incalculable influence.

Amongst the select band of scholars who have devoted themselves to Rabbinic studies, Dr. August Wünsche's (5) is no mean name. He has written quite a series of tractates, throwing the light of the later Hebrew literature upon Biblical Exegesis. In 1868 he published an illustration of Hosea from the Talmud and Midrash; in 1870 appeared his scholarly *Sufferings of the Messiah*, now superseded, however, by Neubauer's more complete treatise; in 1874 a companion to his Hosea was issued upon Joel; in 1878 he supplemented Lightfoot's invaluable *Horæ Hebraicæ* by an elucidation of the Gospels from Rabbinic sources, worthy to stand beside the similar works of Delitzsch and Castelli; whilst he has given us this year a translation of the Haggadistic sections of the Jerusalem Talmud. He has now undertaken what he designates a *Bibliotheca Rabbinica*. It is a collection of the ancient Midrashim translated into German. According to his prospectus, the intention is to translate the *Midrash Rabboth* first, that is to say the Rabbinic commentaries upon the Pentateuch, Ruth and Esther, the Writings of Solomon, and the Lamentations; and if these meet with adequate support additional translations will follow. Three parts of the work have already appeared, embracing the whole of Ecclesiastes and the earlier chapters of Genesis. At present we must content ourselves with recommending what cannot but be of great value to the exegete, the historian, and the student of folk-lore. When the promised Prolegomena appear, we may be able to give a more discriminating notice.

It is now more than three hundred years (6) since Milton wrote that "the egregious labours of Wiclif are not to be

(5) *Bibliotheca Rabbinica; eine Sammlung Alter Midrashim zum ersten Male ins Deutsche übertragen*, von D. Aug. Wünsche: Leipzig, 1880.

(6) *De Christo et suo adversario antichristo, ein Polemischer Tractat Johann Wiclif's, zum ersten male herausgegeben*, von Dr. Rudolf Buddensieg. Gotha, 1880.

neglected." Alas! they have been very sadly neglected. We are very fond of small talk about the good pastor of Lutterworth, but that most worthy monument to a great man, a collected and critical edition of his works, has not been given to the world. Chaucer rejoices in the life-long devotion of a Skeat, a Morris, and a Furnivall; Chaucer's great contemporary is but an airy nothing, with a local habitation and a name. As for Melanchthon, the Germans have not shrunk from the labour and expense of carefully editing and reprinting every letter he wrote and every lecture he gave, until the voluminous collection reaches twenty-eight quartos; whilst as for Wiclif, even his most systematic work, his *Summa Theologica*, has never found a printer. After all the labours of the short-lived Wiclif Society and the Oxford Press, the best life of the first Reformer is in German, and a German scholar has issued, with English aid it is true, the best edition of the *Trialogus*. At this day the principal Latin treatises of Wiclif remain buried in the cases of public libraries. They could settle many a disputed point in Wiclif's life; they could throw a brilliant light upon his doctrinal and historical position; they might even clear up many of the difficulties of his English writings; but they are only accessible after much travel, and close and wearisome deciphering of manuscripts. It is with unfeigned pleasure, therefore, that we have perused Dr. Buddensieg's *editio princeps* of the polemical tractate upon "Christ and Antichrist." It has been collated and edited manifestly *con amore*. All the extant codices have been compared, and their various readings weighed; and very complete and valuable prolegomena and annotations have been added. Are we mistaken in inferring from the size of the publication, that the author has been limited by lack of funds? It is now fifteen years since Dr. Shirley, of Wadham, aroused the bibliographic appetite by his large catalogue of the original works of Wiclif; might not the University of Oxford continue the good work it began with Dr. Shirley, Mr. Arnold, and Dr. Lechler, and secure the assistance of Dr. Buddensieg and other scholars in publishing the *opera omnia* of the greatest of the Masters of Balliol?

Among the publications recently received from the Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton, are some which now need only to be

named in order to carry their commendation along with them. Mr. Hood's collection of *Illustrations and Incidents gathered from the Words, Thoughts, and Deeds in the Lives of Men, Women, and Books* (7), as the volume is described in the sub-title, has reached its fifth thousand. It was prompted by the very favourable reception given to a previous gathering—*The World of Anecdote*. In this compilation, which is executed with much taste and discernment, Mr. Hood aims at vindicating for anecdote a much greater value, both historical and biographical, than is usually allowed it. Writers like Böhringer have proceeded on the idea that the history of the Church may be most effectively told in the form of a series of biographies. Mr. Hood thinks that it might not be amiss to give it largely in the shape of anecdotes. There is perhaps more than the usual exaggeration of the epigram in the assertion that "anecdote is the only history." But there is some truth in the remark that "a better idea of Church life in every epoch might be obtained from an incident than from a dissertation." Neander himself, as Mr. Hood is careful to remind us, has given us two fascinating volumes, his *Light in Dark Places*, and *Memorials of Christian Life in the Early and Middle Ages*, which indicate the importance he felt to attach to this region of inquiry. The well-assorted selection here prepared by Mr. Hood shows at least how the statement of truth and the exposition of historical movements may both be brightened by the observance of these flashing lights of incident and story.

Nothing that proceeds from the pen of Mr. Spurgeon requires formal introduction to the Christian public. A book in which the great preacher addresses himself to the task of describing "*the progress of the Soul in the Knowledge of Jesus*" (8), is sure to make its own way, and that rapidly. It will be enough to say of it that it contains discourses or studies, conceived in Mr. Spurgeon's happiest vein, and executed with his accustomed combination of unction with good sense, on subjects of such perennial interest as *Jesus Desired*, *Jesus Pardoning*, *Joy at Conversion*, *Love's Logic*, etc. This volume is yet another wit-

(7) *The World of Moral and Religious Anecdote*, etc., by Edwin Paxton Hood, 1880.

(8) *The Saint and his Saviour*, etc., by C. H. Spurgeon. Hodder and Stoughton, 1880.

ness to the fidelity with which its author has striven to keep his exceptional ministry true to its early key-note. It is characteristic that he should choose as one of the mottoes of his book Sibbes's definition of the special work of the ministry as being "to lay open Christ, to hold up the tapestry and unfold the mysteries of Christ."

In his *Homilies* (9) Dr. Stanford has brought together a series of addresses delivered chiefly at meetings of the London Baptist Association. The themes discussed are of the gravest importance,—*The World in the Church, Prayer for Signs and Wonders, Strength for Tired Workers*, etc. We have been specially struck with the chastened wisdom of the chapters entitled *To Sunday School Teachers, How to cheer Pastors*, and *The Law of Liberty in the Matter of Total Abstinence*. The present volume exhibits the tenderness of feeling, refined perception, lucid diction, and illustrative genius which have secured a large and appreciative audience for the author's previous volumes, his *Symbols of Christ* and *Central Truths*. All Christian workers, particularly pastors and teachers, will find here much for them to ponder, but also much to encourage them when the hands droop and the time for work seems shortened.

Mr. Sandlands has broken ground afresh in a field which has received too scant consideration (10). His object is to "notice and explain those principles which . . . underlie the rhetorical art." So great an adept in pulpit-discourse as Adolphe Monod did not think it beneath him to give directions, which descended to the minutest details of respiration, on the art of public speech. Mr. Sandlands only follows this great master when he solicits attention to such important though neglected subjects as the management of the voice, the catching of the key-tone, the grouping of words in public utterance, the method of breathing in set discourse. The book abounds in shrewd practical suggestions. Specially valuable will those be found which relate to articulation and pronunciation. The author's sobriety of judgment may be inferred from his discussion of the difficult question of "action," to which he allows a high

(9) *Homilies on Christian Work*, by Charles Stanford, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

(10) *The Voice and Public Speaking*, by J. P. Sandlands, M.A., Vicar of Brigstock. Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

place, while he is far from admitting it to be, what it is often vaguely affirmed to be, the whole of oratory. To the question as to what is the "principle to adopt in speaking or reciting," he thinks no better answer can be given than what Shakespeare put into Hamlet's mouth,—"*Let your discretion be your tutor. Suit the action to the word, the word to the action, with this special observance, that you overstep not the modesty of nature.*" Nothing superior to this, our author believes, can be laid down as a guiding principle. "The speaker's intelligence must be his guide." He wisely abjures, therefore, the idea of prescribing a multitude of rules, and leaves each speaker to judge for himself. In this he is at one with Monod's favourite maxim, that it is the soul that must speak.

In the year 1874 a Society was formally constituted which owed its origin to a few London clergymen, who were impressed with a sense of the need of raising the standard of preaching. Notwithstanding its humble beginning, this Association promises to be of great service to the Church of England. The first efforts of this body, the Church Homiletical Society, were directed to the preparation of lectures addressed to the clergy on preaching. The discourses delivered under its auspices in the chapter-room or trophy-room of St. Paul's Cathedral during the last five years are now issued in a handsome volume, with preface by Bishop Ellicott (11), after having been first published in the *Clergyman's Magazine*. It is claimed for them by the dignitary who introduces them to the public, that "the golden thread that runs through them all is essential instruction, combined with that clear common-sense and knowledge of the human heart which are both so vitally necessary in any true and effective teaching of Homiletics." This claim may be in large measure conceded. The lectures, however, are of very different degrees of merit. Those on pastoral work are of decidedly inferior value to those on the preparation and delivery of the sermon. Much good matter will be found in Dean Howson's *Homely Hints on Preaching*, and Archbishop Thomson's discourse on *The Emotions in Preaching*. Fertile and suggestive above all, to our feeling, are those which have attached to them the names

(11) *Homiletical and Pastoral Lectures*, etc. Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

of Canon Barry, Dean John James Stewart Perowne, and Archdeacon Thomas Thomason Perowne. We strongly commend to the notice of all preachers what these well-known writers have here to say on *Study in its bearing on Preaching*, on *The Study of Holy Scripture, with a view to the Preparation of Sermons*, and on *Texts, their Interpretation, Misinterpretation, and Misapplication*. A corrective is here offered for errors which are too prevalent in the pulpit, and which cannot but prove a serious offence to every educated hearer.

In a considerable volume Mr. Griffiths attempts a "brief survey of the Bible in the interest of its claim to be the Word of God" (12). It is divided into two very unequal parts, entitled respectively *Inductive and Objective*, and *Deductive but Subjective*. The division at once discloses the chief defect of the book, its faulty method. There is a want of precision both in the object proposed and in the plan adopted. There is a failure in exact appreciation of the different kinds of evidence, what is dealt with as *internal* evidence at times covering what does not properly belong to it. The discussion of prophecy, also, betrays a want of familiarity with those larger views of the subject which have been among the best gains won from the criticism of the present century, and the writer's apologetical standpoint is that of last century rather than our own. But notwithstanding these serious defects, and the too discursive character of its statements, the book contains not a little that deserves perusal. It often succeeds in presenting in a telling form those "credentials which appear on the very face of Scripture," and which "have been the study and delight of the thoughtful reader in every age." In a popular way it travels over many of the literary and spiritual characteristics of the Bible, as well as some of the outstanding problems raised by the account of Creation in Genesis, the narrative of Israel's history, the function of the Mosaic Economy, the antiquity of Man, the question of Angelology and Demonology. Occasionally it rises to a high and solemn strain of meditation, as is conspicuously the case in the chapter on *The Final Outlook*, and the observations on the Scripture teaching on the future

(12) *Divine Footprints in the Field of Revelation*, etc., by William Griffiths, M.A. Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

destiny of the impenitent. It is distinguished by an intelligent apprehension of the progressive character of revelation, and is often successful in exhibiting in a happy form the deeper harmony between Science and Scripture which underlies their apparent variance.

The re-issue of Pressensé's History of the Christian Church in a handy four-volume edition will be a boon to many (13). His *Life of Jesus Christ* had marked merits which gave it a good title to the popularity which has carried it through edition after edition. It still occupies a distinguished place among recent Lives of Christ, excelling most of these in the completeness of its introductory matter, its apt statement of the religions which preceded Christianity, its insight into the genius of Judaism and the sects, its fair and scholarly discussions of the credibility of the records, its graphic style. The narrative which the same brilliant representative of French Protestantism has now completed is not less successful either in form or in substance. It is something to obtain a reading of the early years of the Church of Christ from one who is at once so fully informed, so free from dogmatic prejudice, in such spiritual sympathy with his subject, and the master of so fascinating a pen. Not that this History, indeed, can be called a great or original work. It is not in Pressensé's way to toil through those siftings of the primary sources, and those independent researches into the most ancient archives of historical fact, which have been the special vocation of one or two of his Protestant predecessors. It is his gift rather to master those of the original authorities which are sufficient for a broad representation of the course of events, and to act the part of interpreter of results slowly reached by many inquirers. This he does with all the power of a genuine artist. Inaccuracies may sometimes be detected, as in his reproductions of some of the more technical statements in the Fathers. Doubtful portions may occasionally be assumed, as when he infers from some words of Basil that the Ante-Nicene liturgies were "still indeterminate, and had not assumed a strictly defined form." These, however, are very subordinate defects.

(13) *The Early Years of Christianity: A Comprehensive History of the First Three Centuries of the Christian Church*, by Edmond de Pressensé, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

He has, on the other hand, the enviable talent of making almost everything which he touches, even the Novation heresy, full of interest. He has also the rare faculty of grasping the vital elements in great movements, and grouping the multitude of details so as to exhibit through these the animating spirit and genuine character of epochs. He excels in the estimate of dominant modes of thought and master minds. Nothing better could be desired than the representation given us in these volumes of the great schools which flourished in these opening centuries, the Greco-Asiatic, the Alexandrian, the Greco-Roman, the Carthaginian. It would be difficult to find more just and sympathetic descriptions of the powerful personalities, Justin Martyr, Clement, Origen, Irenæus, Tertullian, connected with these several schools. Above all, the author's strength comes out at its best when he has to deal with the moral life of the early Church, and when he has before him the congenial task of showing how the new influence of Christianity told gradually on all sections of the old Pagan life, upon the family and all social relations, upon the idea of the State and the duty of the citizen, upon slavery and the rights of labour. Nowhere is the glory of these wonderful centuries, during which the struggle proceeded between the old religions and the new faith, told with greater vivacity, accuracy, and appreciation, or with more artistic skill.

To the same author we are indebted for a volume of a less ambitious but not less attractive order. It consists of a number of articles on notable characters of our own time collected from various French journals (14). Thiers, Strauss, Arnaud de l'Arrége, Dupanloup, Adolphe Monod, Alexandre Vinet, Vernet, and Frederick Robertson of Brighton, are thus passed under review. A large portion of the book is devoted to an examination of the Catholic crisis. This is studied as it is "represented in some of the most eminent men of the Catholic Church." The essay on the *Antecedents of the Vatican Council* deserves great attention. Even more valuable is the paper on the *Cultur-Kampf* in Germany, which makes telling use of the principles stated by Geffcken. Pressensé's own conclusions are these two, that "the course pursued by the Ultramontanes

(14) *Contemporary Portraits*, etc., by E. de Pressensé, D.D. Translated by Annie Harwood Holmden. Hodder and Stoughton, 1880.

is one fraught with danger to our social interests," and that it is "both unjustifiable and unwise to attempt to combat Ultramontaniam with its own weapons." His verdict upon Prince Bismarck's policy is for the most part adverse. With Geffcken he holds it chargeable with invading the proper province of the Church, and misinterpreting the nature of the conflict into which the State has been driven. He pronounced it therefore doomed to failure. Those who have less interest in political and ecclesiastical questions than in those touching the inner life of the Church, may safely turn with high expectation to the articles on representative men of the Evangelical Protestantism of France. The sketches of Vinet and Monod are done in Pressensé's most effective style. In these, and still more in the parallel lives of Verny and Robertson, he gives decided expression to the conviction which has been growing on him for years, that a peculiar danger for the Protestant Churches lies in "too exclusive absorption in questions of organisation." He recognises the importance of ecclesiastical questions, round which, especially in Scotland, the struggle for liberty has been waged. But he is wise enough to see that the time has come when Protestantism must go back upon a reconsideration and reassertion of its deepest and most essential principles. Few men have greater title to write, or have written to better purpose, on the all-important problem of how the Church must adapt itself, in consistency with fundamental principle, to the new spirit of a strongly scientific era, so as to retain its hold upon the age and leaven with Christian truth the new culture of this century, as it did the old culture of Paganism and the revived culture of the Renaissance.

The substance of a series of articles contributed to the *Bible Educator* by Dr. Stainer, which attracted some notice at the time, is now reprinted in a neat, admirably illustrated, and very readable volume (15). The subject is a somewhat unfamiliar one, so far as the popular literature of England is concerned. It is here treated with the ability of an expert. The discussion of the probable sources of ancient Hebrew music, and the various influences which modified it, is brief but suggestive.

(15) *The Music of the Bible, with an Account of the Development of Modern Musical Instruments from Ancient Types.* By John Stainer, M.A., Mus. Doc. Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co.; Novello, Ewer, and Co.

The author allows something to the early intercourse between the Hebrews and the Canaanites, and something to Syrian connections, but most to the Egyptian residence and subsequent Egyptian relations. Any account of the origin of Hebrew music must be largely hypothetical. But it is at least a reasonable hypothesis that the Hebrews owed to Egypt in great measure the art of setting their songs to tunes, music being a "recognised branch" of the learning of the country into which they immigrated, while confessedly the pastoral habits to which Jacob's descendants were accustomed are not so favourable to the development of constructive art as is the highly-educated life of great cities. Dr. Stainer is far from denying to the Hebrews any native genius for music. He admits that their harmonies must have had a character of their own, which was never lost, but only modified by the variety of foreign constructive influences to which they were subjected. But he affirms, with good reason, that the internal condition of the Jews, at least in the earliest period of their history, presented but a "poor nursery for art," while their external relations with the several branches of the Semitic race which had peopled Syria, Phœnicia, Arabia, Chaldea, and Mesopotamia, were such as rendered "an incorporation of the arts of their neighbours inevitable." After Carl Engel and D. J. Sola, he points out, too, how the melodies which have been in use in modern synagogues make it clear that "ever since the dispersion of the nation their art has been influenced by that of the people amongst whom they have settled." This is specially true of their residence in Spain, the influences of the Moors being still discernible in the harmonies to which many of the hymns of the Sephardic Jews were set. Dr. Stainer gives us an account of every musical instrument mentioned in Scripture. These notices are full of interest, particularly those of the dulcimer and harp. The *Kinnor*, which is the first instrument named in Scripture, and which formerly was thought to have been a kind of Trigon or three-cornered harp, he inclines to take to have been either a lyre or guitar, an instrument of that nature having special aptitude for the kind of uses to which the *Kinnor* is devoted. The *Nebel* he holds to have been a moderate-sized harp, the *Sabeca* a harp of larger size, the *Khalil* an oboe. At the close of the volume we find some good remarks on the musical value of accents.

The *Donnellan Lecture* has produced some notable volumes, among the best of which may be reckoned Macdonell's treatise on the Atonement. The lecturer for the year 1878-9 has made a contribution of some value(16). Dr. Chadwick's position is, that "there is no truth in Christianity, unless the Person of its Founder is great enough to be distinguished from all others, and His words and deeds as far above imitation as the Sermon on the Mount is above the Epistle to Abgarus." He maintains that the Christianity, the origin of which is recorded by the New Testament writers, stands this scientific test, the lofty conception of its Founder thus supposed being "so manifest and so vital" all throughout the Gospel histories, that "ordinary culture and unbiassed judgment should everywhere identify the conception, and be conscious of the life in it." With the view of showing how true it is that the Gospels everywhere present the same great Personality, and that this Personality is self-consistent in every part of them, and how impossible it is to account for this phenomenon on any other hypothesis than that of allowing Him to be in reality what He claims, and is there affirmed to be, the author fixes on certain characteristics which lie out of the range of art, and are not sufficiently prominent to arrest attention or tempt invention. Tact, sensibility, quick insight into the varied desires and motives of men, prompt apprehension of emergencies, are among the less obtrusive features which everywhere distinguish this Personality, which appear alike in the miraculous and the non-miraculous sections of the evangelical narrative and in the Gospel of John, as well as in the Synoptists. It cannot be said, as Dr. Chadwick reasons, that these are characteristics of the kind to commend themselves to the inventive art of the ambitious constructors of a Messianic Figure. On the other hand, they make the Gospel picture a still more wonderful unity, exhibiting the entire and beautiful humanity of this Personality as ever true to itself, and capable of enduring the severest tests, even in those passages where His supernatural claims are most decisively stated. Remote and underlying characteristics like these, therefore, add fresh force to the contention that the conception which the Gospels present of Jesus of Nazareth defies explanation as the result of art or the growth

(16) *Christ bearing witness to Himself*, etc., by Rev. George A. Chadwick, D.D. Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co.

of myth, and is itself the evidence that He must have been what He there appears. Dr. Chadwick has dealt in a bright and attractive style with a somewhat novel section of the great argument which men like Dorner, Ullmann, and Horace Bushnell have done so much to develop and popularise.

We may say that the two theological questions of present-day interest are (1.) the historical reality of the person and work of the Living Word, and (2.) the historic reality and character of the written word. Hence we find many writers on the life, character, and work of Christ, and on the composition, editorship, genuineness, and inspiration of the Scriptures. Prebendary Row has issued a second edition of his excellent work (17) "*The Jesus of the Evangelists: His Historical Character Vindicated; or an Examination of the Internal Evidence for our Lord's Divine Mission, with Reference to Modern Controversy.*" His theme is "Whether Jesus Christ was an historical reality?" And his inference is, "If so, His divine mission is established." The unity of the four portraiture in the Gospels is the proof. It would be an unfair representation of the value of this volume to limit its usefulness to the proof of the above thesis. In carrying forward his proof, the author takes a wide survey of the providential preparations made in the Jewish and Gentile world, as well as in the constitution of the human mind, for the introduction of Christianity through a personal teacher and actor. Further, he exhibits the nature and character of the mythic Gospels, and finally shows that there are many simple touches of truth and features of unconscious sincerity which are inconsistent with a supposition of mythical or unhistorical origin. The argument is of permanent value.

Mr. Symington (18) has sought to keep the character of Jesus steadily before his readers. Though his book is made up of a series of studies, detailing what is known and imagined of each of the Apostles, the author never loses sight of his great object. In the family circle we have no doubt this neat volume

(17) *The Jesus of the Evangelists*, by Rev. C. A. Row, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul's. London: Frederick Norgate.

(18) *The Apostles of our Lord*, by Alexander Macleod Symington, B.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

will be highly prized, as containing graphic and simple sketches of our Lord's first associates, and as conveying not only much instruction, but many practical lessons. It conveys valuable information in a simple, clear, and interesting manner.

Perhaps the strongest and most convincing proof of the divine origin of Christianity lies in the nature and history of its results. Protestant Foreign Missions received prominent attention at the Basle Conference, 1879, at which Professor Christlieb read a paper giving a sketch of their extent. The work, of which a translated copy(19) is before us, was undertaken at the request of friends interested in missions, and satisfied of the competency of the author. The book is much more than a report. It is full of well-arranged information, but it is also rich in suggestions as to the practical working of missions, and as to promoting and fostering an interest in missions. We should like to see a copy of this work in every congregational library, and in many a home. It is an excellent handbook of the most recent information and thought on missions.

The Rev. C. F. Chase, M.A., has had two great ideas suggested to him by the Cross of Christ: the one, that "Jesus is the Son of God," found enlargement in a previous volume entitled *The Trial of Jesus Christ*; the other, that "He thereby accomplished the salvation of the world," is treated in the book before us (20) in what we must confess to be an imperfect manner. Salvation is regarded as revealed in the Old Testament and accomplished in the New, but the review of Old Testament proof is confined to the histories of Adam, Noah, Lot, and the Exodus, and then, *per saltum*, our author reaches Part II., and says—"We come now to 'the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.'" The second and third chapters of this Part seem to us to have but small direct relation to the treatment of the great theme, and would naturally, we suspect, by most people be placed as an appendix. From a certain point of view this volume may seem practical and edifying,

(19) *Protestant Foreign Missions: Their Present State.* A Universal Survey. By Theodore Christlieb, D.D., Bonn. Authorised translation from the German, by David B. Croom, M.A. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(20) *The Truth of God's Salvation*, by Rev. C. F. Chase, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

but we fear it would hardly be so regarded by systematic theologians.

In the *Bible of Christ and His Apostles* (21), Professor Roberts popularises his argument that our Lord used the Greek language. He has made a strong case, but prejudice is wholly against his proof, and even Archbishop Thomson, while noticing Dr. Roberts' argument, declines to discuss it. We have here, however, a valuable contribution to the solution of a most interesting question.

The various aspects of the *Anglo-American Bible Revision* (22), are given as instalments to gratify the curiosity of the public, in a series of Essays by Members of the Committee. The little book is handy and useful permanently for its discussions on the necessity, and its suggestions of Biblical improvements. Dr. Schaff, in a prefatory note, distinctly warns all concerned that the final conclusions of the Committee are not yet before us. The volume contains essays on—"The Authorised Version and English Versions on which it is based;" "The English Bible as a Classic;" "The Current Version and Present Needs;" "The Hebrew Text of the Old Testament;" "Hebrew Philology and Biblical Science;" "Inaccuracies of the Authorised Version of the Old Testament;" "Inaccuracies of the Authorised Version in respect of Grammar and Exegesis;" "True Conservatism in respect to Changes in the English and Greek Text;" "The Greek Verb;" "Archaisms," etc. etc.

In *The Words of Christ* (23), we have a most useful collocation of the sayings and discourses of Jesus. The plan of the book shows at a glance the harmonies, discrepancies, and omissions of the Evangelists. The study of our Lord's words will be greatly facilitated by the use of this help. It is, so far as we know, unique, and the importance of a *conspectus* thus arranged, of all the words uttered by Him "who spake as never man spake," cannot be over-estimated.

(21) *The Bible of Christ and His Apostles*, by Alexander Roberts, D.D., St. Andrews. London: Cassell, Petter, Galpin, and Co.

(22) *Anglo-American Bible Revision*, by Members of American Revision Committee. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(23) *The Words of Christ*, by T. B. London: James Nisbet and Co.

The title of the next book (24) only partially suggests the contents. There are four divisions within the boards, viz., Addresses, Discourses Ecclesiastical and Doctrinal, Scenes and Studies from the Earlier Ministry of our Lord, and Educational Addresses. Principal Rigg is no novice in dealing with phases and current forms of belief or unbelief. Since the days of his *Modern Anglican Theology* his place has been granted. This volume will not detract if it will not greatly add to his fame. The first discourse is interesting and valuable. It treats of the relations of Theism to Philosophy and Science. A striking comparison, and one very helpful to the "possessing of the soul in patience," is made between the attitude of worldly culture and pseudo-culture towards Christianity in the first part of last century, and in the last half of the present. This comparison, of course, introduces Positivism, and in a few scathing sentences he exposes the pretence, contradictions, and want of logic in the high priests of that vaunted system. He admits that its true name is Agnosticism. But how a word such as this can be a synonym for Positivism he cannot imagine. The second discussion is on Pantheism. But we will not go further. We content ourselves by saying generally that all Dr. Rigg's work has the merit of perspicuity and force.

The Book of Revelation sometimes attracts, and sometimes repels, by the obscurity of many parts and passages. Some minds with great preponderance of sentiment, and, consequently, with oftentimes brilliant imagination, are fascinated by the reading (we do not say study) of this book. Others, with little fancy, and less poetical feeling, are content to regard the Book of Revelation as containing on the surface many plain lessons for the needs of Christian life, and some precious helps and encouragements to Christian hope. But for the most part these readers do not ponder the "dark sayings," and allusions, and prophecies. They are content to wait God's time of fuller revelation. Mr. Gregory (25) on the whole belongs to this class. He is pleased to be wise after the event, and to take

(24) *Discourses and Addresses on Leading Truths of Religion and Philosophy*, by Rev. J. H. Rigg, D.D. London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1880.

(25) *Discourses on the Book of Revelation*, with an Introduction, by the Rev. Alex. Gregory, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1879.

the issue of Providence as the real interpretation of the Word. He grasps principles, and only suggests times and places; he does not dogmatise. Hence we do not find any eloquent passages about Constantinople being the great battle-field of the world. Armageddon is with him, as with most sensible people, a scene of not only physical, but also spiritual conflict. "The real conflict will be one of principles—light and darkness, truth and falsehood, goodness and sin, Christ and Satan, fighting for the mastery in the minds of men, and closing in a final struggle for the possession of this world—that is, of the human race." This we take to be the interpretation of good common sense, which has far more poetry in it than the weak efforts of a rash sentimentalism. In sixty pages of introduction, Mr. Gregory discusses the usual prolegomena in a popular manner. Thus the work will be serviceable to the common reader, for whom, we imagine, it is primarily intended.

The *Modern Scottish Pulpit* (26), sermons by ministers of various denominations, is a wholesome antidote to another volume which has been issued as representative of the style and matter of Scotch preaching. In the *Modern Scottish Pulpit* we listen to the most orthodox of the orthodox divines of Scotland. Doctrine and practice are brought before us in the usual terms of the Puritan theology, and we fancy that Drs. Begg and Kennedy, though here associated with Dr. Marshall of Coupar-Angus, will not object in present circumstances. The sermons are of unequal merit: some of them very good; others, not so good.

For some years back the Scottish press has been advancing. We are pleased to find that much encouragement is given to the growth of local publication by the enterprise of Mr. David Douglas. A handy and business-like book is entitled *Christianity confirmed by Jewish and Heathen Testimony, and the Deductions from Physical Science* (27), by Thomas Stevenson, F.R.S.E., F.G.S. Mr. Stevenson's effort has been so far appreciated (though he says that from some adverse criticisms of his work, his argument has, he fears, not been apprehended) that

(26) Edinburgh: James Gemmell.

(27) Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1879.

his original pamphlet has reached a larger and worthier form in this second edition. We have no doubt, from the reverent and scriptural manner in which he handles his material, and above all, in which he commends the fundamental doctrine of the atonement in a closing chapter, that his toil, which has been not inconsiderable, has been a labour of love. In the conduct of his argument he has kept apart from the testimony of Scripture to itself, and has steadily aimed at collecting and collating evidences from external and independent sources.

Let us have as many histories of nations and of states as may be, of one history the world and the Church never tire. The Bible history holds its place, not *inter pares*, but unique. From the pen of Dr. Edersheim we have another instalment of his work (28). We need not at this time of day say more than that, in this portion of the history, the usual carefulness and competency of our author appears. Much valuable information and many lucid explanations are introduced by the hand of a ready, well-informed, and sympathetic scribe.

Messrs. Macniven and Wallace have projected "The Household Library of Exposition," and have made a fair start with a most excellent work (29) from the pen of an eloquent preacher. Many years ago we heard a lecture on the life of David from Dr. (then Mr.) Maclaren of Manchester, and we can say that to this hour there lingers in our memory a vivid recollection of the stirring fervour of his language and delivery. We therefore hail this volume, and are certain that many also will give it a hearty welcome. This is no hurried production, as so many volumes are in this age of light literature. It is, we are convinced, the expression of a lifetime of study and careful analysis. Chapter xiii., entitled "The Tears of the Penitent"—an analysis of the experience which dictated the 51st and 32d Psalms—is specially suggestive and sympathetic.

(28) *History of Judah and Israel, from the Birth of Solomon to the Reign of Ahab*, by Alfred Edersheim, D.D., Ph.D. The Religious Tract Society.

(29) *The Life of David, as reflected in his Psalms*, by Alexander Maclaren, D.D. Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace, 1880.

Memorials of Frances Ridley Havergal. By her Sister, M. V. G. H.
London : James Nisbet and Co.

The many readers who have found strengthening and refreshing in Miss Havergal's works will welcome with pleasure this record of her life, in which, as stated in the preface, "no attempt has been made to write a biography, but rather to allow her to relate her own life-story," which she does in autobiographical fragments and letters, while the connecting links are supplied by a sister's hand. We rise from the perusal of this book, feeling that we have been in the presence of one who lived very near to the Master of whom she sung so sweetly, and whose loyalty to her King was true and thorough. Hence doubtless the secret of the fruitfulness of her efforts in the service of God, and of the blessing which accompanied her spoken and written words. The closing words of her Consecration Hymn seem to give the key-note to her character—

"Take myself and I will be
Ever, only, ALL for Thee."

A History of Christian Doctrines. By the late Dr. K. R. HAGENBACH.
With an Introduction by E. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D. Vol. i. (Edinburgh :
T. and T. Clark, 1880.

If the history of the world be, as it is said, the judgment of the world, the history of doctrine is the judgment of the Church. Every age has produced its crystals, and these remain things of beauty and value when the physical forces that produced them have themselves been disintegrated; and every century of the Church has left a permanent legacy of formulated Christian truth, crystallised and precious, although the Church itself has been transformed in the process of their production. Dogmatic truth is the result of settled controversy. Like the stones of the brook, its form has become smooth and rounded by the friction and storm-floods of ages. It is thus all the more serviceable in the hands of a skilled slinger for entering the brain of an opponent; or, if beautiful, for adorning the

vestments of the "Daughter of the King." Dogmatic theology therefore, although the least popular department of the science, is not the least valuable and important.

In this first volume of Dr. Hagenbach's History we have a valuable instalment of an invaluable work. It is the result of many years' practical teaching, and the soundness and serviceableness of its method have been tested by experience. All practical students will appreciate his plan of stating in a few clear and carefully weighed sentences, at the commencement of his chapters, the points to be established and illustrated in subsequent paragraphs; offering a comprehensive glance over the entire landscape to begin with, and leaving particular localities for further and systematic research. Thus he sums up "The Economy of Redemption" in nine pregnant sentences, and the controversies on the Last Supper in eleven. Some of the author's references, however, indicate a want of carefulness, as, for example, when for the doctrinal significance of certain Greek terms, such as *βάπτισμα*, *λουτρόν*, etc., we are asked to consult "the Lexicons"! and for proof of certain religious customs we are referred to Dr. Smith's *Dictionary*, where again the references do not appear to have been verified. In spite of these small defects, however, common to most Church Histories, the Messrs. Clark have issued, in handsome style, a work of permanent value to every minister and student of theology.

Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Gospels of Mark and Luke, by HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, Th.D. Translated from the Fifth Edition by Rev. R. E. WALLIS, Ph.D. Revised and Edited by Professors DICKSON and STEWART, Glasgow. Vols. i. ii. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Every student interested in the critical study of the New Testament will hail with satisfaction this admirable revised translation of Dr. Meyer's valuable work. It had the advantage of the great scholar's own corrections and additions, and differs from some other editions in being the genuine and unaltered production of its professed author. In critical acumen and exegetical skill the great German commentator had perhaps no rival. No one therefore was better fitted for dealing

with the peculiar features of these Gospels. The difficulties of authorship, style and language, harmony with the other Evangelists, the spurious ending of Mark's Gospel, and the relation of Luke's Gospel to the Acts of the Apostles, as well as the many textual obscurities that occur in the course of the narratives, required the mastery of "research, the philological, archæological, and biblico-theological" experience which Meyer above most exegeses possessed. The volumes have been ably and carefully edited, and are attractively published.

Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. By F. GODET, D.D.
Translated from the French by Rev. A. CUSIN, M.A., Edinburgh.
Vol. i. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

We can only judge of this work by the author's treatment of the first six chapters of the Epistle which Coleridge has somewhere characterised as "the profoundest book in existence." In many respects, however, we prefer this commentary to any other we have seen on the subject. Dr. Godet, with that peculiar tact which his nation inherits, has been able to indicate more clearly and comprehensively the object of the inspired author; he is more in harmony with the spirit of the Letter, he has displayed more scholarship and judgment in dealing with the controversies of the book—justification and baptism, for example—than any of his predecessors. Dr. Godet will not have, with Meyer, Chalmers, Beck, and others, "baptized into Christ" (Rom. vi. 3) as the equivalent of *plunged into Christ*. "In the similar formula, 1 Cor. x. 2, εἰς τὸν Μωσῆν βαπτίζεσθαι, the meaning is certainly not *to be plunged into Moses*. The word *baptized* is to be taken in its technical sense: *to be baptized with water* (by the fact of the passage through the sea and under the cloud), and the regimen ought consequently to signify *in relation to Moses*, as a typical Saviour,—that is to say, in order to having part in the divine deliverance of which Moses was the agent. Such is likewise the meaning of being baptized into Christ Jesus in our passage: 'Ye received *baptism with water* in relation to the person of Jesus Christ, whose property ye became by that act.' " In our own view it may be open to question whether that greatly con-

troverted passage, "buried with him in baptism unto death," does not refer to "baptism for the dead," one of the oil-baptisms of the early Church, and not to Christian water-baptism at all. In the parallel passage (Col. ii. 12-15), the apostle speaks of a *disanointing* process in connection with it (*ἐξάλειψας*); and Mary *anointed the Lord "for his burial ;"* and the elders were to *anoint* the dying saints in the name of the Lord (James v. 14). "Know ye not that *so many of us* as were baptized into the *anointed* Jesus were baptized into his death? buried with him in *the baptism unto death.*" In no other passages is Christian baptism compared with interment. Dr. Godet does not commit himself to the immersion theory, we are glad to notice; but here as elsewhere exercises a clear and independent judgment. The translator has done his work well. We have great pleasure in recommending the volume as not only rendering invaluable aid in the critical study of the text, but affording practical and deeply suggestive assistance in the exposition of the doctrine.

The Tiberiad; or, the Art of Hebrew Accentuation. A didactic poem, in three books. By JOHN GEMMEL, A.M., senior Minister of the Free Church at Fairlie. Glasgow: James Maclehose.

Since the controversies of the seventeenth century, the prevalent opinion has been that the vowel-points and the accompanying accents in the Hebrew Bible are no part of the text, but are a record of the traditional pronunciation and punctuation of that text. The learned and accomplished author of this poem obviously inclines to think that though the written form of these vowels and accents may be only twelve or fourteen hundred years old, yet it represents something which belonged to the sacred text from the beginning. Nevertheless, he is no bigot to the "Hebrew verity" in such a way as to despise and reject the evidence of the ancient versions in favour of certain various readings. He has ventured on a poem of eighty pages, which is mainly a description of the importance of these accents and an exposition of their precise nature; the title containing an allusion to the fact that Tiberias was one of the greatest seats of medieval Jewish

learning. One scarcely knows whether to admire more his boldness in selecting a subject so remote from common interests, or his skill in handling it in verse, notwithstanding its intractable nature, as he pursues his statement with accurate details through the complicated systems of punctuation for the poetical books as well as for the books of prose. As a specimen of his manner we give some lines in p. 76 :—

As sacred scutcheons here and there annexed,
The accents guard the outposts of the text :
With special tones the mystic signs supply
The very titles of the Psalmody.
In hymn of triumph, or lone exile's song,
Respective honours to each word belong.
And yet those accents by no means accord
With points that Western languages afford.
Those signs a higher object realise,
Importing pathos, force, and emphasis :
Whilst Music, Song, and Rhetoric display
The sum of wisdom that they all convey.
The pictured page of emblematic sounds
In mind's emotions multiplied abounds :
Wonder and awe, and joy and grief, are there,
And gentle love, and hate, and grim despair,
Translated and presented to the eye,
In one sage scheme of rare orthoepy.

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ART. I.—*Professor Robertson Smith and the Pentateuch.*

THE notorious article on the “Bible” in the second volume of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has been followed by another in the eleventh volume upon a kindred theme. To judge by this later article, upon the “Hebrew Language and Literature,” the views of Professor Smith upon the age and composition of the Pentateuch have undergone little change. If anything, some crucial points are now expressed with somewhat less reserve. The former opinion, that the whole Pentateuch is “not the uniform production of one pen, but that in some way a variety of records of different ages and styles have been combined to form a single narrative,” is retained. The “earliest date of written law-books” is still stated to be “uncertain.” If Deuteronomy was regarded in the earlier article as “a prophetic programme . . . put forth for the first time in the days of Josiah,” the same assertion is now repeated in not very dissimilar words. The previous opinion that there could be “no reasonable doubt that the priests possessed written legal collections of greater or less extent from the days of Moses downwards” is now expressed less guardedly, for “it may fairly be made a question,” it is said in the later article, “whether Moses left in writing any other

laws than the commandments on the tables of stone." So also the hesitant suggestion as to the priority of Deuteronomy to Leviticus is now proposed categorically. And if, five years ago, Professor Smith not only denied the unity of authorship of the so-called Books of Moses, but traced three distinct strata in their composition,—the popular, prophetic, and priestly narratives,—he refers no less confidently to-day, *first*, to the stratum of popular literature—"the admirable prose narratives . . . eminently fresh and vivacious, full of exact observation of nature and of men . . . the authors (of which) are too intent upon the story to interpose their own comments or point a moral, . . . (although) it can hardly be said that the writings of this period have a specifically religious purpose;" *secondly*, to the subsequent manipulation and enlargement of these prose narratives, which were "taken over and incorporated by a later (prophetic) historian with a distinctly religious purpose;" and, *thirdly*, to the inference that this prophetic version formed in turn the material for a priestly manipulation "in the age of the systematisation of the ceremonial law." There is a weighty proverb about "half truths," and an excellent and unusual opportunity was certainly afforded by this later article to Professor Smith for removing misapprehensions by clearly stating what he believed to be "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;" but, so far from modifying or completing the views previously expressed, the reader is begged to fill up any hiatus in the later article by reference to the earlier one. The two articles, it is manifest, are substantially at one, first, upon the composite character of the Pentateuch; and secondly, upon the analysis of that composite character.

Professor Smith's analysis of the Pentateuch is as follows. A succession of writers is, he thinks, traceable. First, there was the non-Levitical Elohist, partly the author and partly the compiler (from oral tradition and previous writings) of the so-called popular literature, who certainly wrote before the eighth century before Christ. Next came the Deuteronomist, who, somewhere about the time of Josiah, re-wrote the ancient ordinances of Israel, "difficult to suppose as old as Moses," in a prophetic spirit. Thirdly, there was a prophetic writer, the Jehovist, only possibly the Deuteronomist, who "finally

shaped" the historical books "after the fall of Jerusalem," with the intentional design of enforcing "prophetic teaching." In their turn these writers were succeeded by a priestly scribe who penned "the Levitico-Elohistic document, which embraces most of the laws of Leviticus, with large parts of Exodus and Numbers." "At length in Exile a final redactor completed the great work." Or this analysis may be presented from another standpoint, confining the attention to the great legal system of the Pentateuch. Professor Smith thinks that, at the death of Moses, the only laws left in writing were the Ten Commandments; that for some centuries the only additional laws were "the oral decisions of priests;" that in the eighth century B.C. at the latest, the written code received the accession of several collections of old laws, which now form Exod. xx.-xxiii.; that in the days of Josiah Deuteronomy came to light, wherein the ancient ordinances already mentioned were "written in a popular and prophetic spirit;" that it is "probable that legal provisions, which the prophets and their priestly allies felt to be necessary for the maintenance of the truth, were often embodied in legislative programmes by which previous tradition was gradually modified; that Ezekiel commenced the construction of an enlarged and systematized ceremonial code; that "the systematisation of the ceremonial law on lines first drawn by Ezekiel marks the commencement of the third and last period of Hebrew literature;" and that when Ezra came to Jerusalem professedly armed with the Book of the Law of Moses, all he meant was that this book, the Pentateuch, *the recent production of an exilic scribe*, "expounded and developed Mosaic principles in relation to new needs," whereas "the public recognition" of this book by Ezra "was the declaration that the religious ordinance of Israel (we may be pardoned for putting the words in italics) *had ceased to admit of development*." To state this theory in broad terms, it is this briefly: that the Ten Commandments are alone Mosaic; that Exod. xx.-xxiii. was written before the days of Hosea and Isaiah; that Deuteronomy belongs to the time of Josiah; whilst the remainder of the written law did not become public property till after the Exile.

Of course, these views are neither original nor novel. They are the logical outcome of principles which have been long

known to scholars. The composite theory of the authorship of the Book of Genesis was hinted at a couple of centuries ago by Richard Simon, and has been a common battle-ground for exegetes, since Eichhorn, in the fourth edition of his *Einleitung*, embodied and developed the suggestive views of Astruc, the French physician. So, too, many have attributed Deuteronomy to the days of Josiah, since the publication of Vater's Appendix to his *Commentar* and De Wette's dissertation *De Deuteronomio*. And as for the post-Exilic date of Leviticus, it was suggested by Poppe in 1862, put forth by Graf in 1865, elaborated by Kuenen, in his *History of the Religion of Israel*, published in 1869 and 1870, and has hence become, through its English translation, very common property. Nor can these views be said to be unknown even in popular circles since the publication of Colenso's broadsides. If they have awakened greater attention than Dr. Samuel Davidson's article on Adam, that publicity has been due to certain adventitious circumstances of place, manner, and exponent.

The *Encyclopædia Britannica* has a recognised position. To use the words of its latest editor, it aims at being at once a "register" and an "instrument" of scientific progress. It has won its way in the past by surveying in outline the existing field of knowledge, and at the same time by embodying the fruits of original observation and research; and this twofold object of summarising and suggesting is its present ideal. Further, the position it takes in relation to the active controversies of the time, religious as well as scientific and philosophical, is perfectly distinct. Let Professor Baynes speak for himself. "The prolific activity," says he, in his prefatory notice, "of modern science has naturally stimulated speculation, and given birth to a number of somewhat crude conjectures and hypotheses: the air is full of novel and extreme opinions arising often from a hasty or one-sided interpretation of the newer aspects and results of modern inquiry: the higher problems of philosophy and religion, too, are being investigated afresh from opposite sides in a thoroughly earnest spirit, as well as with a directness and intellectual power, which is certainly one of the striking signs of the times; this fresh outbreak of the inevitable contest between the old and new is a fruitful source of exaggerated hopes and fears and of excited denunciations and appeals;"

but Professor Baynes continues : " In this conflict a work like the *Encyclopædia* is not called upon to take any direct part ; it has to do with knowledge rather than opinion ; . . . its main duty is to give an accurate account of the facts and an impartial summary of results in every department of inquiry and research ;" and when the editor adds, "*It cannot be the organ of any sect, or party in Science, Religion, or Philosophy,*" pardon may be accorded if the wise words are emphasised by italics. Such being the deliberate purpose of the *Encyclopædia*, an aim admirably preserved by the large majority of its contributors, it was not surprising that the article upon the "Bible" should awaken attention. So far from giving "an impartial summary of results," a summary of the surmises of but one school of exegetes was given, a school whose most prominent advocates have expressly asserted their disbelief in Miracles, in predictive Prophecy, and in an Inspiration other than deistic or pantheistic. When this article did very distinctly become "the organ of a sect or party" in theological science, it was not astonishing that it evoked even passionate animadversion. Views which have scarcely been advocated by a score of respectable scholars were put forward absolutely as the commonly accepted and indisputable results of unbiassed research, as a true "register" of past inquiry and a sure "instrument" of future progress, as "knowledge rather than opinion."

So, too, there was something not a little extraordinary in the manner of the presentation of this composite theory. Of course no adequate summary of recent investigations into the authorship of the Pentateuch could ignore such eminent writers upon the subject as Eichhorn and Ilgen, Bleek and De Wette, Ewald and Davidson, Hupfeld and Dillmann, Fürst and Knobel, Nöldeke and Schrader, Graf, Kuenen, Kalisch, Kayser, Colenso, Wellhausen, and Reuss ; but it might well excite amazement when the views of but one sub-section of these writers were cited in a professedly adequate summary to the exclusion of related opinions, to say nothing of the complete silence as to the contentions of more conservative critics such as Sack, Hengstenberg, Hävernicks, Ranke, Drechsler, Baumgarten, Kurtz, Keil, and ninety-nine hundredths of the Biblical scholars of England, Scotland, and America. Just as a conservative critic would be amenable to a charge of one-sidedness who expounded

his own favourite hypothesis without a hint at any difference of opinion, so also the advanced critic (as he loves to call himself and as we may designate him by courtesy) is no less open to a similar charge, if he practically regards his own theory as alone deserving of citation. Professor Smith was by no means called upon to conceal his own tendency; he *was* called upon to give no countenance to that cant of some German writers which makes a sect in Biblical science alone scientific, and the self-styled "critical" school alone critical. Quite apart from doctrinal prepossessions, it is quite possible, as many eminent expositors have shown, to maintain the unity of the Pentateuch and its Mosaic authorship on purely philological, literary, and critical grounds, and no "summary of recent investigations" can be deserving of the name which does not present both sides of so unsettled a controversy. It was scarcely astonishing, therefore, that the manner in which Professor Smith wrote of the "Bible" should arouse irritation and some anger. When one theory of the composition of the Pentateuch,—to restrict ourselves to the subject actually before us,—was put forward as the only theory extant, or at least as the only theory deserving of mention, and a burning question of the day was treated as if one party to the controversy had become so completely victorious that the other party was too insignificant for notice, some causticity of protest was not inexplicable. Unhappily this just cause for complaint is not removed by the article upon "Hebrew Literature." Let Professor Donaldson's article upon the "Acts of the Apostles" be compared with either of Professor Smith's, and the difference between impartiality and partiality will become evident. The authorship and date of the Acts has been the subject of almost as prolonged and separative a controversy as the authorship and date of the Pentateuch. But, as a summary of results, Dr. Donaldson does not content himself with expressing his own views. Those views are perfectly clear; but fidelity to what he esteems the truth does not blind him to the claims of thinkers of opposite sentiments; he therefore gives an admirable and helpful analysis of the related questions, and of the arguments used by investigators of very different schools in settling the points in dispute. Or Professor Smith may be cited against Professor Smith. Why did he not accord to the Old Testament the same justice he has accorded

to the New,—in stating both sides of the questions to be answered? And, in his scholarly sketch of Hebrew philology, although all mention is excluded of such eminent and influential philologists as Delitzsch and Fleischer, we do not find him expounding one school only to the exclusion of all others. It was scarcely to be wondered at therefore that such partisan treatment should elicit disapproval. A judicial summing-up should hold an even balance between the counsel on both sides.

Let us add to these peculiarities of place and manner the further fact that the exponent of these opinions occupied a professorial chair in the Free Church of Scotland, and the unenviable notoriety is explained. The limitations under which Professor Smith wrote shall not be forgotten. He was not at liberty to convert the pages of the *Encyclopædia* into an instrument for *ex cathedra* dogmatic statement. It would have been a misapprehension of the task he had undertaken, if he had simply taken for granted the Confessional views of Inspiration to which he had given his adherence. To have assumed the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch without a reasoned exposition of the arguments for and against, to have given immediate credence to the direct Divine converse attributed to Moses without a clear statement of the grounds for such belief, or to have taken for granted that every word of the Old Testament was authentic and credible without a presentation of the data upon which such a conviction was based,—from all such modes of procedure he was debarred. But he was not debarred from stating much he has scrupulously omitted. A critical estimate of the writings of Shakespeare of necessity includes some comparison, however brief, of Shakespeare with other dramatists and poets, and some statement was at least to be expected of the supereminence of Holy Scripture and of the foundation upon which that supereminence is based. If the Koran cannot be scientifically studied without a definite inductive estimate of its claim to Divine inspiration, is there no such prerequisite for the Bible? In a review of the Old Testament, or of the course of Hebrew literature, was no reference legitimate to the Messianic elements, to the unusual prophetic phenomena, to miracles, to the exceptional morality, to the concatenated development of doctrine so manifestly super-

natural, to the subtle, and of course preordained, links of connection between the Old Testament and the New, to the blended aim of education and preparation in Judaism? Let us suppose an erudite Hindu, who has broken with the faith of his fathers and is in earnest search after truth in religion wherever he can find it, to have consulted the *Encyclopædia Britannica* upon such themes as Aeronautics, Anatomy, and Modern Gunnery; and having been struck with the fulness and manifest fairness everywhere apparent, let us suppose him to have determined to read with care the articles upon the "Bible" and "Hebrew Literature," written, as he is led to believe, by an eminent Christian specialist; what opinion would he form of the Book of Books, and what aid would he receive in passing a rational judgment upon the "Sacred Book of the Christians"? Moreover, should he happen to compare the Bible itself with Professor Smith's article thereupon, how could he avoid a somewhat pronounced view either upon Professor Smith's trustworthiness or the veracity of Scripture? It was, therefore, intelligibly enough matter for surprise when a Professor of Biblical literature, whose only pupils were candidates for the Christian ministry, was found to be associating himself with a school of thought which had hitherto consisted for the most part, if not wholly, of men of avowed rationalistic tendencies. It was intelligibly enough matter for surprise when a theological Professor in a Church famed for its loyalty to the Scriptures omitted all reference to those inductions which were to be legitimately drawn from the Bible. Or, to speak yet more precisely, it was intelligibly enough matter for surprise when, what is expressly stated times without number to be the word of the Lord to Moses (to refer to the frequent phrase in Leviticus, and elsewhere in the Five Books) was regarded by Professor Smith as the Word of God presumably, but given to prophets several centuries after Moses, and ascribed to Moses for a religious end. Were not the questions involved and ignored interwoven with the dearest religious convictions of many who were not necessarily unread, and whose rejection of the composite theory was deliberate? Professor Smith, it is true, speaks of the date of Leviticus as turning almost wholly on *archæological* inquiries. But he must use the word in a somewhat wide sense. "The Lord

spake unto Moses," says Leviticus, and when these words are expounded "The Lord spake unto prophets and priests who ascribed their own conclusions to Moses with a purpose," is the question at issue simply *archæological*? When Nehemiah presents to the assembled tribes the newly-completed legal code, if Professor Smith is to be believed, saying, "This is the Law of Moses the man of God," is the difference of view merely antiquarian and *archæological*? When Jesus is Himself asserted to have associated the Jewish law of marriage with Moses, to have expressly referred to the Exodus as part of the Book of Moses, and to have asked in so many words, "Did not Moses give you the Law," and that in a connection not satisfied by interpreting the "Law" to mean the "Ten Commandments," and when, consequently, Professor Smith must ascribe to Jesus either ignorance of the real state of the case, or accommodation to popular sentiments, is the question at stake merely *archæological*? Indeed, even Professor Smith acknowledges that if the problem turns upon *archæological* investigation, it has a more than archæological interest; for, as he admits, the solution of the problem "has issues of the greatest importance for the theology as well as the literary history of the Old Testament." It was not the singular omissions and concessions alone in the article before us which raised the recent storm, but the fact that these omissions and concessions were made by an official exponent to the rising ministry of views which were tenable in the Free Church of Scotland.

We would therefore undertake, it is trusted in no unscientific spirit, some brief investigation into the opinions advanced by Professor Smith. Happily in his case the task is somewhat simpler than it would be with most of the advocates of similar views. With them a lengthy preliminary examination would be indispensable into the possibility of such a revelation as is said to have been given to Moses at Sinai and from the Mercy-seat, into the possibility of miracles, and into the possibility of a Divine interference in human affairs for special ends. It is otherwise with Professor Smith. He has made no avowal of antipathy to the common Christian conceptions; and if he rejects the ordinary rendering of the authorship of the early Biblical books, it is not from any initial objection to their contents, but solely on the basis of evidence of a philological and

historical nature. This makes all the difference in the world in the ease with which his contention may be refuted. If the Biblical narratives are approached with a prior and irreversible opinion that the intercourse between the Deity and Moses could not possibly have been different from that between the Divine Spirit and Mahomet, Kakya-Mouni, or Zarathustra, as Dr. Kuenen does not hesitate to avow, no possible evidence from the Bible itself can change the opinion, for any narrative which describes miracles or speaks of an exceptional Divine revelation is *a priori* incredible. So also, if an exceptional revelation such as that at Sinai is supposed, as by Kalisch, to conflict with a fixed belief in evolution, whether that evolution be of the nature of a Hegelian or a Spencerian process, no mere reference to the Bible itself can possibly remove the antecedent opinion, and it is idle in such circumstances to attack philology or history till the philosophy in question has been overthrown. But in the case of Professor Smith such a preliminary philosophical investigation is unnecessary. He apparently believes in a miraculous prophecy, for he says, "the characteristic of a prophet is a faculty of spiritual intuition not gained by human reason, but coming to him as a word from God Himself;" and in another place he says, "the prophets generally spoke under the influence of the Spirit or 'the hand of Jehovah,'" and in yet another passage he seems to allow that the author of a prophetic book looks "in a supernatural way into the future." Undoubtedly his ideas upon development are open to misunderstanding. When, for example, he declares that the Book of Deuteronomy "cannot be placed at the beginning of the theocratic development without making the whole history unintelligible," everything depends upon the suppressed major premiss. The course of reasoning, expressed syllogistically, appears to run as follows:—"The only intelligible theocratic development is one which progresses little by little from lower spiritual views to higher; to accept the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy is to presuppose that the whole Divine code of Judaism was given virtually at once to Moses; therefore the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy is unintelligible." But such a major, whilst it comes perilously near to the pantheistic or deistic or agnostic idea of evolution so current just now, would, to put a crucial instance, deny the

claims of Christ as to His own exceptional position and work. Undoubtedly, too, Professor Smith speaks somewhat too freely of the "creative power of the prophets" as if it were a kind of natural genius. Nevertheless, when he speaks of the prophetic order as "leaders in a great development," we must not ignore his theory of the prophetic intuition "which came . . . as a word from God Himself." The singular thing is, that whilst accepting a view of inspiration which runs directly counter to the evolutionary theory of religion, he should regard Mosaism as unintelligible if spoken as a whole to Moses. The whole law, ceremonial, political, and moral, is unintelligible, he seems to think, if transmitted by one man as a Divine agent, but is intelligible if transmitted gradually by many who "spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." On the same rule, we repeat, Christianity may be supposed to be more explicable if Christ is left out, or His influence is reduced to a minimum.

Before proceeding to our main task, a few hurried glances may be bestowed upon the arguments adduced by Professor Smith as the adequate foundation for his revolutionary superstructure. They are three in number. *First*, it is alleged that "the law in Exod. xx. 24, etc., contemplates the worship of Jehovah on other altars than that of the central sanctuary (cf. Deut. xxxiii. 19). . . . But in the reign of Josiah . . . the principle of a single sanctuary can claim the support, not only of prophetic teaching, but of a written law-book found in the temple, and acknowledged by the high-priests (2 Kings xxii. xxiii.)." But what says Exod. xx, 24, etc.? Let the verses be transcribed: "An altar of earth thou shalt make Me, and shalt sacrifice thereon thy burnt-offerings, thy sheep and thine oxen: in all places where I record My name I will come unto thee and bless thee. And if thou wilt make an altar of stone, thou shalt not build it of hewn stone, for if thou lift up thy tool upon it, thou hast polluted it; neither shalt thou go up by steps unto Mine altar, that thy nakedness be not discovered thereon." So far, then, from contemplating the worship of Jehovah upon other altars than that of the central sanctuary, this passage speaks to as wide an audience as that which received the Ten Commandments of *one* altar only—"Mine Altar,"—the erection of which was to be preceded by a divine

revelation; and it is profoundly suggestive to observe how these primary injunctions were subsequently followed in the erection and removal of the great altars for public worship. Reference is made, it is true, to the practice of prophets like Samuel and Elijah. It would have been more relevant if instances had been given of sacrifices, at promiscuous spots and divinely approved, offered by those who were neither prophets nor acting under express divine commission. As for the prophets, they occupied an analogous position to that of the angel whose command legalised the sacrifice made by Gideon before his own door. From its direct intercourse with the Most High, the prophetic intuition was as authoritative as the Sinaitic injunctions. The *second* reason for the composite authorship advanced is that "the legislation (of the written law-book found in the Temple and acknowledged by the high-priest in the days of Josiah) corresponds, not with the old law in Exodus, but with the Book of Deuteronomy." It would have been instructive if the details upon which this assertion is based had been presented. For this is a new point made. No one had previously asserted upon the evidence afforded in the Book of the Kings alone, that the law-book of Josiah's Reformation not only was the Book of Deuteronomy, but that it came from a different hand than the one which penned the remaining legislation. Others have appealed to supposed prophecies after the event,—a line of argument not open to Professor Smith with his avowed views of inspiration; or they have endeavoured to prove that the legislation of Deuteronomy is of a less developed type than that of Leviticus, by comparing the laws of the priesthood, the sacrifices, the festal seasons, and the tithes; but they have not, whether inadvertently or intentionally, endeavoured to show that the statements in the Kings argue the existence of Deuteronomy, but not of Leviticus. Again, we can only say that if any reader will carefully compare Scripture with Scripture, he will find numerous references, both superficial and recondite, in the two chapters quoted, which absolutely demand the pre-existence of the law of Moses in its present form. *Thirdly*, as "the clearest proof that during the period of prophetic inspiration there was no doctrine of finality with regard to the ritual law," reliance is placed upon the diversity between Ezekiel and the

earlier and later codes—"the last chapters of Ezekiel sketch at the very era of the Captivity an outline of sacred ordinances for the future restoration" (different, it is of course assumed, in gross and in detail, from the previously existent laws). Upon the unsatisfactoriness of this point we shall have something to say presently. "From these and similar facts," writes Professor Smith, "it follows indisputably that the true and spiritual religion, which the prophets and like-minded priests maintained at once against heathenism and against unspiritual worship of Jehovah as a mere national deity without moral attributes, was not a finished, but a growing system, not finally embodied in authoritative documents, but propagated mainly by direct personal efforts." A most momentous conclusion, resting at any rate upon an insufficient presentation of evidence. And here the present writer cannot refrain from making a personal statement. Assertion cannot, of course, go for much; but he is, nevertheless, desirous of distinctly saying that, whilst he believes he is familiar with the whole of the voluminous and arid literature upon this controversy, from the suggestive essay of Astruc to the last contribution of Delitzsch to the *Zeitschrift für kirchlichen Wissenschaft und kirchlichen Leben*, of Valetton to the *Studien*, and of Bloch to the *Jüdische Literaturblatt*, he has never seen reason, on purely literary, philological, or historical grounds, for more than very slightly qualifying (and that mostly with regard to the Book of Genesis) the traditional view of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. What Professor Smith himself says upon the Tübingen School and their views upon the New Testament, the present writer would say respecting the Dutch School and their views upon the Pentateuch: "The theory has two bases, one philosophical or dogmatical, the other historical; and it cannot be pretended that the latter basis is adequate if the former is struck away."

There are many methods open for the criticism of such a scheme of composition as that before us. In perfect conversance with the various objections made by *rationalistic* and *critical* writers, a consistent history might be built up, which, in full harmony with the analogy of Scriptural revelation generally, and assuming the system of Mosaism to have been divinely given at the outset of the Jewish national life, might

display the creative period of the gift of the Law and the subsequent growth of that Law into the popular consciousness by common processes assisted by prophetic admonitions. Or the phenomena of language might be analysed, and solid arguments built either upon the existence of written records inferrible from the exceptional stability of the Hebrew language, or upon the peculiarities of philology discoverable from Genesis to Deuteronomy. The Samaritan Pentateuch is no mean witness. Further, a comparison of the Books of Moses with the Mishna (the latter of which must have commenced when the former, according to Professor Smith, was just closing) would afford as overwhelming a parallel as the juxtaposition of the Apocryphal and the Historical Gospels. So, too, the language of Christ and His apostles, accurately scrutinised, forms a most telling branch of inquiry. Bleek's series of minute touches, too exact, distinct, and faithful not to have been written by a contemporary, was but the sinking of a shaft into a most rich mine. Nor must we forget the undesigned coincidences innumerable between law and history, character and legislation, which would have delighted the acute author of the *Horæ Paulinæ*, had the so-called critical school been born in his day. Whilst possibly the most convincing evidence of all remains to be mentioned, the Five Books themselves, which afford a delineated religious system of marvellous unity and beneficial purpose, accurately and minutely adjusted to be a divine reply to immediate needs, and at the same time a divine prophecy of future blessedness. The Mosaic System of laws bears unmistakeable traces of having been given "at one casting," as the Germans say. Then, too, there is the wide and interesting field of Scriptural allusions in history, prophecy, and psalm to the Law given in the wilderness.

The one lode the writer of this article would now work a little is that of Scriptural references. Professor Smith says that there is "no quite conclusive reference to the Elohist record in the prophets before the Exile." Confining the attention to the code of laws which succeeds Exod. xxiii., all of which laws are traced by Professor Smith, with a few exceptions, to the writer he designates the Levitical Elohist, and who wrote in the Exile, an endeavour will be made to show

that references to the legal code may be found, first, in Ezekiel; second, prior to the Exile; third, prior to Josiah, the supposed date of Deuteronomy. No perplexing questions of chronology shall be entered into. Easy as it would be to criticise the dates assigned by Professor Smith to some of the Biblical writers, his views shall be provisionally accepted. Thus, according to Professor Smith, before and in the so-called Assyrian period of Jewish history, and therefore before the days of Josiah, we have the following writers—Amos, Hosea, the author of Zech. ix.-xxi., Isaiah, Micah, and Nahum; and in or just before the so-called Chaldean period, we have Zephaniah, Habakkuk, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, with whom we may certainly class the historical books of the *Prophetæ Priores*, and a large majority of the Psalms and Proverbs. And let the exact nature of this method be understood. One indubitable reference in any pre-Exilic writer to the legal system which is peculiar to those parts of the Pentateuch ascribed by our author to the Levitical Elohist, is sufficient to disprove his view. But not only can one such reference be given, but a whole series, from the entire course of writings from Joshua to Nehemiah. And if we had space we should like to strengthen this evidence by a comparison of the references in pre-Exilic writers with those which are to be found in writers manifestly post-Exilic. It would then further appear that the references in Ezra, Nehemiah, Daniel, the post-Exilic Psalms, the Chronicles, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, and the entire category of the Apocryphal writers, are neither more precise nor more numerous than the references we are about to adduce. As has been said elsewhere, “The fact is, criticism would undertake a very enlightening inquiry, if it would set itself to reconstruct from the Books of the Maccabees, for example, or from the New Testament, the ecclesiastical system current in those days; possibly critics would be astonished to see that the first and third centuries afford no more proof of the fifth, than the fifth does of the twelfth; possibly, also, another adjustment would take place, and the Levitical legislation be declared to be posterior to the completion of the Apocrypha!”

Special prominence has been given to the function of the prophet by the so-called “critical” school. It is the prophets who are supposed to have formed and formulated Mosaism.

Instead of regarding the Levitical Law as given once for all, and gradually assimilated by the energetic advocacy and pious zeal of generations of priests and prophets, the Levitical Law is itself esteemed a kind of earlier Talmud, the gradual product of rabbis, so to speak, learned and interested in law. By the harmonious action, as Professor Smith describes, of a "conservative" priesthood and "creative" prophets—"the leaders of a great development, in which the religious ordinances as well as the religious beliefs of the Old Covenant advanced from a relatively crude and imperfect to a relatively mature and adequate form,"—the compact code of Judaism was perfected. If we ask as to the nature of this development, or as to the motive which inspired these enthusiastic allies to construct so elaborate, beneficent, and predictive a religious system (for in this system political and sanitary arrangements are part of a religion), the replies vary. With respect to the former question, Dr. Kuenen and Dr. Kalisch speak of a merely natural development,—a natural evolution effected by a conflict of ecclesiastical Liberal and Tory, whereas Professor Smith seems to believe in a supernatural guidance imparted to the prophets. As far as the latter question is concerned, Dr. Kuenen regards *ecclesiastical ambition* as a sufficient motive-power, Professor Smith *religious ardour*. But the most fundamental question that suggests itself is, what evidence is advanced of such prophetic earnestness in imparting new laws? Instances innumerable there are of prophetic solicitude in upholding laws to which appeal is made as to the familiar rules for laity, priesthood, and government; but what evidence is given of the prophet's being, or being made, the channel for the impartation of new ceremonial observances! One conspicuous instance there is at any rate, it is said: Ezekiel gave injunctions which were the sole instructions for the temple of Zerubbabel, and which, minutely and skilfully elaborated by experts and statesmen, grew in the course of a few decades to be the highly-wrought code which became the permanent law of the land. Professor Smith, it will be remembered, alludes to "the systematisation of the ceremonial law on lines first drawn by Ezekiel." Upon Ezekiel, therefore, the whole hypothesis of the prophetic development of the legal system of the Old Testament is made to turn. The exact position of Ezekiel relatively to the Levitical

Law it is important for us to define. For the moment we assume that the hypothesis as to Lev. xxiii.-xxvi. being written by Ezekiel is not accepted by Professor Smith.

Let the data be first placed clearly before us. In exile, when the Solomonic temple had been for some years in ruins, when its sacrifices had therefore been discontinued, nay, its holy utensils desecrated by foreign hands, and when the Jewish polity had become wholly disorganised by the intrigues and arms of the great Oriental monarchy, Ezekiel, himself both priest and prophet, saw a vision which he has recorded in the closing chapters of his prophecy. The details of the vision, briefly put, are as follows. Ezekiel is transported into the smitten city, now however resuscitated in part in a greater than its former glory. The temple is rebuilt, and the palace for the Prince of David's line. Priests and Levites, worshippers and strangers, are soon to throng the courts, which will be long hallowed by sacrifice and song. A man with a rod in his hand surveys, in the prophet's company, the several measurements of the sanctuary, the temple, the courts, and the holy city, interspersing authoritative injunctions now and again upon matters both moral and ceremonial. Thus they visit the extensive environs of the restored Holy Places, and their four gates; they thread the colonnades and the porch; they note the structure and details of the more sacred shrine; they visit the chambers of the priests and the courts without, injunctions being conveyed upon the worship of the priests and the conduct of the prince; they minutely examine the various arrangements for sacrificial preparations; whilst, after Jehovah has possessed himself of this new and splendid house, the vision closes with the thrilling growth of the holy waters and the measurement of the Holy Land and the Holy City. So stands the vision in chapters xl.-xlviii. of Ezekiel. Upon the various views advanced upon the significance of this vision we do not enter. We simply assume what the "critical" school assumes. It being foreign to our purpose to discuss whether the interpretation should be literal, or spiritual, or both, we merely assume that, when the temple-builders subsequently employed this vision as an authoritative plan upon which to proceed, they were warranted in so doing. We merely assume that the dimensions and descriptions given by Ezekiel had at any rate

primary reference to the renovated religious cultus of Nehemiah and his compatriots. From an examination of these several chapters we shall have reason to doubt the truth of Professor Smith's dictum as to "the systematisation of the ceremonial law on *lines first drawn by Ezekiel*."

Four points will come under notice. *In the first place*, it is very evident that Ezekiel's vision *could not afford even the first lines of such a systematisation as we now possess*. This argument cannot, it is true, be appreciated by such cursory reference as is alone appropriate here; it requires all the adjuncts of tabular representation as well as of exact and detailed exegesis. Still many illustrations of this statement may be gained by the general reader. The Levitical system, as contained in Leviticus and the related portions of Exodus and Numbers, the composition of which or the committal of which to writing is traced by Professor Smith to the Levitical Elohist of the Exile, is a most connected, finished, and circumstantial legal code. It covers the whole of life and affords guidance in the wide political, social, and religious relations of the chosen people. Although not placed in a perfectly ordered classification, it is not difficult to arrange the whole series of injunctions which the scribes subsequently delighted to number, in a concatenated, symmetrical, and complete manner. And one characteristic of these laws is of especial importance. If such divisions as those of English law into the laws of property, contract, and crime afford some aid in disposing one section of the Levitical law, these injunctions have a wider sweep than is adapted to such a method of division; they refer to religion and morals as well as to society, to the affinity between God and man as well as between man and his neighbour. Of course it is impossible to do more here than briefly recapitulate the salient features of this code. To regulate the religious life of the Jew very numerous and circumstantial injunctions were given concerning the place for worship, its structure—to the least relevant details, its ministrants of various grades and diverse preparations, its ritual of many sacrifices, vows, purifications, feasts and fasts, prayers and benedictions, public and private: to regulate the social and political life of the Israelites, equally minute injunctions were given as to the places where they should dwell, the food they should eat, the

clothes they should wear, the rites of marriage, the education of children, the contingencies of friendship, illness, and death, the pursuits of agriculture and arboriculture, of stock-farming, hunting, and fishing, the rights of ownership and inheritance, the obligations of master and servant, the duties of father, judge, or ruler, the punishment of crime, and the conduct of war. In short, the Levitical system is at once a brilliant, efficacious, comprehensive, and plastic scheme of practical ethics, and a benignant, ennobling, peaceful, and sanctifying scheme of practical religion. Now let any one compare the details, circumstantial and diversified, of this code, either as they are presented in the Bible, or as they are systematised more or less scientifically in such a work as Keil's *Handbuch der Biblischen Archäologie* or Ewald's *Alterthümer des Volkes Israel*, and he will be able to judge a little whether Ezekiel drew the first lines of this systematisation. The curious additions, the singular deviations, the inexplicable omissions in Ezekiel's draft make Professor Smith's assertion simply incredible. In no single point, for example, are the dimensions of the Holy Places or of any piece of their furniture given by Ezekiel the same as those of Leviticus and Exodus. The entire description of the outer court, with its gates, chambers and boundary walls, has no parallel in Exodus. Mention is barely made of the burnt-offerings, the peace-offerings, the trespass-offerings, and the sin-offerings in the vision, and none of the exhaustive ritual of Leviticus, at once so impressive and so expressive, finds a place in Ezekiel's revelation. With all the minuteness of description given to the new Altar of Burnt-offering, its place and its purpose, its regulations and ministrations, are neither found so fully nor so intelligibly as in Leviticus. There is none of the legal exactness as to the age, the privileges, and the consecrations of the priests and Levites. One would scarcely know from Ezekiel there was such an office as the high-priesthood. Further, though the priests are bidden to teach the difference between the holy and the profane, the clean and the unclean, not a hint is given by Ezekiel as to the minute laws of uncleanness and physical holiness. As for the numerous social and political injunctions, they are not only not enumerated, they are not even alluded to in the scantiest phrase. The fact is that the vision of Ezekiel is solely expli-

cable, as we shall presently see yet more clearly, on the supposition of the pre-existence of the Levitical code. Only on such a supposition are the fragmentary and general references in the prophet intelligible.

Secondly, It is very manifest that the narrative of Ezekiel *really does presuppose the existence of the Levitical system*. The facts already mentioned suggest this; and the tenor of the whole vision only becomes clear on the assumption that Ezekiel, as a priest, was very familiar with the characteristics of a law anciently given and long practised. Indeed, it is absolutely questionable whether any consistent picture of Ezekiel's visionary temple and its cultus can be drawn without reference to the completer representation. Then, do not the words spoken to Ezekiel in the vision imply that the law was in existence, and that he was learned in all the provisions which were not reconveyed? For his orders run thus: "Thou son of man, shew the house to the house of Israel, that they may be ashamed of their iniquities; and let them measure the pattern," and the command continues: "And if they be ashamed of all that they have done, shew them the form of the house, and the fashion thereof, and the goings out thereof, and the comings in thereof, and all the forms thereof, and all the ordinances thereof, and all the forms thereof, and all the laws thereof; and write it in their sight, that they may keep the whole form thereof, and all the ordinances thereof, and do them." This showing and this writing were the very duties of a son of Levi; but if Ezekiel imparted no more than the contents of his vision, the forms and fashion of the sacred structure itself were very defective, whilst, as for the forms and ordinances of its services, it would be high praise to call them scanty. At any rate, such features as the following are conclusive, if cumulatively taken. The reference to the seed of Zadok implies a previous legal provision; the ordinance concerning the idolatrous Levites at once preserves and corrects what must have been the earlier law; when the priests are spoken of as eating the meat-offering, the sin-offering, and the trespass-offering, the first-fruits and the oblations, surely the words refer to long-established usage; and what could have been understood by feasts and new moons and Sabbaths, the feast of the first month and the feast of the seventh, so cursorily

alluded to by Ezekiel, if the words did not carry with them fixed ceremonial observances in priestly parlance? Nor can too much stress be laid upon the fact, in the face of the lengthy and symbolic notices of Leviticus, that there is little mention of the materials to be employed in the new temple, less of ornamentation, and none at all of colouring; omissions readily intelligible in so symbolic a religion, if the building of Zerubabel were preceded by the minute instructions of Exodus, but scarcely intelligible on any other hypothesis. In fact, it is with this vision as it is with Deuteronomy; it is a perplexing jumble of technicalities, regulations, practices and exhortations, except on the assumption of the previous existence of the Levitical law. This will, however, become yet more evident from the point which succeeds.

Thirdly. In close harmony with Scriptural analogy this prophecy of Ezekiel's is almost wholly concerned *with enjoining alterations in the Levitical system such as we have it in the Pentateuch*. This is an inference which even a hasty examination substantiates. Just as the Divine authority given to Samuel justified amendments in the Tabernacle worship and arrangements, and as the divine revelation to David and Solomon justified departures from the earlier plan in the construction of the Temple, so it was to be by the instrumentality of Ezekiel that the amelioration and resuscitation of the Mosaic polity was to be enjoined. Such is the Scriptural view of the case, and it is perfectly credible, if an exceptional divine revelation is credible. Further, accepting the Biblical narrative as it stands, there was a very special necessity for such an *ordonnance* as that made to Ezekiel. The one burden of prophetic admonition had been, that, if sin and idolatry continued, they would lead to the destruction of the revered temple and its polity. "Have ye offered unto me the whole round of sacrifices in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" asks Amos. "But ye have borne the tabernacle of your king, and the car of your images, the star of your god, which ye made to yourselves. *Therefore will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus, saith the Lord, whose name is the God of hosts.*" Strictly in accord with this reiterated threatening, the prophet historian had penned his matter-of-fact description: "Now in the fifth month, in the tenth day of the month, which

was the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, came Nebuzaradan, captain of the guard, which served the king of Babylon, into Jerusalem, and burned the house of the Lord and the king's house." The stroke of the divine anger, so long predicted, had fallen; the holy house was in ruins, its priests were carried captive. At such a time, what was the important thing, if there were any mercy and audience with God? Of what use was the bitter repentance of the Exile, if the temple of their fathers was never to have its fellow; and how could there be a hope of a restored sanctuary if God did not issue an express permission to rebuild? The vision of Ezekiel was the divine reply to the deeply-felt need. But like every other divine reply to human need, it was not a mere reiteration of the past, it was shaped in accordance with altered conditions. Therefore we find the new temple, with its ministrants, services and festivities, accommodated to the changed phase of the national life. Hence we find Ezekiel at once ratifying and adjusting the ancient religious constitution to the new forms of the post-Exilic polity. As surely as the Newfoundland dog, with his habits adapted to his changed environment, points back to the wild dog of the prairies, and not *vice versa*, so surely do the temple and cultus of Ezekiel refer to the tabernacle and cultus of the wilderness, and not conversely. There is a ground-plan which is largely identical in both the tabernacle and the post-Exilic temple. The laws of purification, sacrifices and feasts are the same very largely; there is the same fundamental division in the holy places themselves; there are almost the same regulations for the priesthood and sacred ministrants. Nevertheless there are many changes, having reference to the altered conditions of life; whilst it is manifest that the Levitical system provides for a much earlier stage of the national career, and that the changes made by Ezekiel belong to the more developed phase of the national existence. We may cite in testimony the tables and their appendages for the slaughter of the offerings as contrasted with the simpler and ruder methods of Leviticus, or the chambers for singers as well as priests. We may cite, too, the special prominence given in Ezekiel to the prince of the people, so foreign to the atmosphere of Leviticus. An important variety of witness to the same fact will be found

in such details as the amended measurements and construction of the Altar of Burnt-offering, and the somewhat diverse regulations as to the attire of the priests, when compared with the more rudimentary form of the relative laws in Exodus and Leviticus. Nor should we forget, in such a connection, the special instructions given for the solemn and protracted consecration of the new altar, for the setting apart of the temple itself, the redistribution of land, the worship of the prince, all of which are manifestly applicable to the post-Exilic times, just as the Levitical injunctions are applicable to the life in the wilderness. And two other points may well compel attention. The ark of the covenant was gone for ever; we therefore find Ezekiel supplying the vacant place in the Holy of Holies by a wooden altar, to be used of course in the solemn ceremonial of the Day of Atonement,—a manifest case of survival, and a latent reference to a ceremony claimed by the leading writers of the “critical” school as purely post-Exilic. Further, Ezekiel narrates that he saw in this ideal house of the Lord the revelation of the Divine glory in the form he had previously beheld by the river Chebar; are we to believe that this appearance of the Divine glory suggested the solemn scene at the consecration of the Tabernacle, or is the former announced because of its harmony with the latter? Again, therefore, we may be allowed to repeat that, only if Ezekiel’s vision is supplemental to the Levitical legislation, can its omissions, additions, and variations be explained.

Fourthly. So far from Ezekiel’s prophecy being the lines on which the systematisation of the ceremonial law proceeded, *many important features* of Ezekiel’s vision, if the testimony of the Mishna, Josephus, and the Books of the Maccabees is to be received, *were not subsequently adopted* by the builders of Zerubbabel’s temple. On this all expositors are agreed. To name one fact alone, the dimensions assigned by Ezekiel to the outer court and its boundary walls would have more than covered the area afterwards occupied by the entire city including the Temple!

Even after so general an examination, may we not negative Professor Smith’s dictum? In less than half a century after the date of the vision we have been considering, the entire ceremonial law was confessedly in the hands of Nehemiah,

having been developed, still in exile, from the rudimentary details afforded by Ezekiel. If so, it is not so very credulous, and much more in harmony with Scripture, always supposing no initial philosophical view of evolution to stand in the way, to believe that the ceremonial law, with the several developments found in the Pentateuch, was given during the last forty years of Moses's life. From Exodus and Leviticus to Deuteronomy is a much more easy step than from Ezekiel's vision to Exodus and Leviticus.

Somewhat lengthy criticism has been bestowed upon Ezekiel's famous prophecy on the new temple and the new state, because it is the key to the "critical" position. If this stone crumbles, the complete superposition of many courses will assuredly fall. It is impossible to attribute to Haggai and Zechariah what we may not attribute to Ezekiel; and what other prophets were there to "create" what priests might "conserve"? Ezekiel failing, there is scarce a vestige of proof for believing the prophets to have revealed as well as enforced the ritual injunctions of the Jewish faith, so intimately associated with thought and life in the family, the state, and the church. And this is the place where some mention should be made of a theory of the "critical" school as to the authorship of some chapters in Leviticus. Because certain expressions are found in Ezekiel which are also found in Leviticus xviii.-xxvi., the authorship of these chapters was actually attributed by Graf to Ezekiel. Ezekiel is thus represented as putting his own words into the mouth of the great Israelitish leader; nay, as ascribing to Jehovah's intercourse with Moses what came from his own intercourse with Jehovah. This hypothesis has been accepted and elaborated by Kayser, and has been accepted in substance by Kuenen, who regards these chapters as written by a priest who worked in the spirit of Ezekiel. We do not know whether Professor Smith has adopted this theory or not; some expressions would seem to imply that he has, whilst others seem to point to an opposite conclusion. If he does subscribe to this naked hypothesis, he should have at least avowed his belief, and we must suppose him to mean these chapters in addition to the vision we have examined, when he speaks of the first lines of systematisation. The only effect upon our argument would be that our first two points would be strength-

ened by considerable additional illustration. As for the hypothesis itself it is purely gratuitous. Besides the bias towards an evolutionary hypothesis, there is absolutely no evidence adduced but certain words and phrases common to the two portions of Scripture mentioned. The explanation of the use of these peculiarities of expression would occur to every one, and they have been well worked out by Dr. Curtiss in his able work on the *Levitical Priests*, pp. 69-78. By parity of reasoning to that employed by Graf and his followers, it would be possible to prove that Bunyan wrote the authorised version of the Scriptures. Without an express statement of adherence to so shallow a hypothesis, we may well be pardoned for not lingering longer thereupon.

We would now add a few distinct references in the pre-Exilic writings to characteristic features of the Levitical system. And, that we may observe the special conditions of the problem in addition to the classification before mentioned into Assyrian and Chaldean writers, let the latter be first considered. The problem is this: to show that writers prior to the Exile and posterior to Josiah distinctly refer to peculiarities of the Levitical system which are not contained either in Exodus xx.-xxiii. or in Deuteronomy. It is true that the Book of Psalms, which is confessedly very largely pre-Exilic, would afford a most telling series of instances, direct and incidental; the Psalms are full, for example, of such phrases as that in the third verse of the fifth Psalm, where the writer speaks of *laying his prayer in order* before Jehovah, an expression unquestionably drawn from the "laying in order" of priestly manipulation, whether of wood or of victims for sacrifice (comp. Lev. i. 8, vi. 12, etc.); but some suggestive passages from the Psalms having been already given in an article on the *Latest Phase of the Pentateuch Question*, in the April number of this Review, this liturgical testimony shall be passed over. The task before us is to find in such authors as Ezekiel or Zephaniah reason to believe that the legal portions of the Pentateuch, other than certain chapters in Exodus, were known to them. An attempt will be made to give such references as the reader of the authorised version may follow, of course with the proviso that occasional emendation will be necessary, and with the understanding that recurrence to the Hebrew will render the quotations yet more

conclusive. We will commence with Ezekiel himself. Without touching upon the reserved chapters, it is easy to show that laws attributed to the Levitical Elohist were well known to him, before the days of the vision of the new Temple. Indeed, it would be profitable to examine the source of many of his technicalities, for he speaks of "sanctuary," "brazen altar," "court," "tabernacle," etc., terms peculiarly attaching to the portion of the Pentateuch said to be Exilic. But we would draw attention to one or two manifest allusions not so apparent. In Ezekiel xvi. 18, there is a reference to the peculiar offerings of the priesthood in the Holy Place, the oil for the golden lamps, and the incense for the golden altar. A comparison of Ezekiel xviii. 6, the last clause, with Leviticus xv. will disclose another indisputable reference to the Levitical arrangements. Or possibly one of the most conclusive instances of exact and direct quotation will be found in Ezekiel xxii. 26, where the priests whose special duty it was, according to Leviticus x. 10, to "put a difference between the holy and profane, and the unclean and clean" are reprimanded just on that ground, that they have "put no difference between the holy and profane, and the unclean and the clean." Zephaniah and Habakkuk can scarcely be quoted by either side, so slight are the references to ritual, although the former seems to be using language quite Levitical when he speaks of "sanctuary," in Zeph. iii. 4, and of "festal-offering" in Zeph. i. 7. Jeremiah, however, is certainly no invaluable aid. In his case, also, one is tempted to delay upon such technicalities as "tabernacle," "cords," "sanctuary," but again it is possibly simpler and more satisfactory to quote instances of similarity in phrase or ordinance. In Jer. iii. 16, we have the words "acts of the covenant of the Lord," which are so thoroughly legal, and are certainly not found in the earlier draft of the Law in Exodus nor in Deuteronomy. It is by a legal formula that Jeremiah reminds the inhabitants of Jerusalem of their lamentable declension, for, says he, "Thus saith the Lord, I remember thee, the kindness of thine espousals, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness, in a land that was not sown. Israel was *holiness unto the Lord*," a form of words how exclusively legal let Exod. xxviii. 36, xxxix. 30, show. In cap. xvii. 26 (comp. Lev. vii. 13, etc.) and cap. xxxiii. 18 (comp. Lev. vi. 14), Jeremiah uses other

technicalities not to be found in Deuteronomy or in the earlier chapters of Exodus, for in the former he speaks of "praise-offering," and in the latter of "meal-offering," whilst the setting of both terms has a Levitical character. As for the historical books associated with the prophets in the Hebrew canon, if the Levitical law is not their perpetual background, they at least present an insoluble problem to the "critics" in the construction, ornamentation, consecration and ritual of the Temple of Solomon. True, Dr. Kuenen does not shrink from asserting that the entire detailed story of the instructions given and the labour expended upon the tabernacle is the invention of an Exilic priest, who wrought out the whole narrative from his own imagination, by the aid of one simple device, the halving the dimensions of the temple. But surely two things stand in the way of such a hypothesis, the construction of the temple itself, and the construction of the narrative. On such lines, the former is a series of inexplicable enigmas, the latter an unparalleled effort of literary realism and forgery.

Further, that the leading features of the Levitical ceremonial were popularly known, not only before the Exile, but also before the supposed date of the authorship of Deuteronomy, the writings of Amos are sufficient to prove. Amos, who lived early in the eighth century,—according to his own statement in the days of Jeroboam the second of Israel, the contemporary of Uzziah of Judah—that is to say, who flourished a century and a half before Josiah, and two centuries before the Exile, also indubitably knows the legal injunctions of Deuteronomy as well as of Exodus and Leviticus. Amos, for example, makes express allusion to the Nazarites, the ordinances concerning whom form part of that section of the Book of Numbers attributed to the Levitical Elohist. Again there is a whole string of semi-latent references to the legal portions of the Pentateuch in one of the declamations of Amos. "Come to Bethel," runs the passage in the authorised version, "and transgress; at Gilgal multiply transgressions; and bring your sacrifices every morning, your tithes after three years; and offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving with leaven, and proclaim and publish the free-offering; for this liketh you, O ye children of Israel, saith the Lord God." More accurately rendered, the passage runs thus: "Go to Bethel, sin at

Gilgal, multiply sin; and bring your festal offerings every morning, your tithes every three days (*not years*); and offer a thank-offering with leaven, and proclaim the freewill-offerings (you make), publish them abroad, for this are you fond of doing, O ye children of Israel." The passage is, of course, ironical; but the significant thing is—that the irony turns upon the contrast between the habitual worship of the northern kingdom and the provisions of the Law, which are assumed to be familiarly known. Indeed, if those Levitical provisions were not common knowledge, the edge of the reproof is blunt. If we read between the lines, the rebuke runs somehow thus:—"Go to Bethel, sin at Gilgal, multiply sin," *you who have received the Divine command to worship at that one altar alone where the Lord hath set His name*; "bring your festal offerings every morning" *to your unlawful shrine, and slay for your own festive enjoyment the beasts which should form the daily burnt-offering at the altar of Jehovah* (comp. *Exod. xxix. 38-43*; *Lev. vii. 1-4*; *Num. xxviii. 3-8*); "your tithes after three days"—*yes, bring your tithes in your unhallowed profusion of idolatrous reverence, bring them to this illegal Bethel in your eagerness, though Jehovah has bidden you give them every three years to the poor in His name at your own homes* (comp. *Deut. xxvi. 12*); "and offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving with leaven," *because Jehovah has expressly commanded you to put all leaven away* (comp. *Lev. ii. 11*; *vii. 12*); *and those voluntary offerings, which you need not give unless you like, but which should be given to God in holy remembrance, if not absolutely in secret, yet in the privacy of your families*, "publish them, proclaim them" (comp. *Lev. xxi. 18, 29*; *Deut. xii. 6*; *Lev. vii. 11, 17*), for "this you love to do, O House of Israel"—a passage in itself sufficient to overthrow the laboured structure of the "critics"! In *Amos v. 21, 22*, there is another comprehensive reference to the Levitical ritual, where at any rate the conjunction of "burnt-offering" and "meal-offering" is purely legal; whereas in *Amos v. 25*—"Have ye offered unto me the whole round of blood and bloodless offerings in the wilderness forty years?"—the necessity seems to have been already sometimes felt for a concise phrase (הַזִּבְחִים וּמִנְחָה), which might summarise the whole complicated series of blood and bloodless sacrificial observances ordained by the law, a phrase, too, if not framed

by David, at least primarily used by him (comp. Ps. xl. 7 ; Isa. xix. 21 ; Jer. xiv. 12, etc). At any rate, the whole usage shews the specialised significance of *tsewach* to be earlier.

That the prophets played a larger part than has been commonly suspected in the religious life of Israel and Judah, the "critical" school has made increasingly clearer. Hence there is a truth in what Professor Smith says about the prophets as "leaders in a great development," and about the necessity for the spiritual faith "to show constant powers of new development" during the long struggle "which began with the foundation of the theocracy in the work of Moses, and did not issue in conclusive victory until the time of Ezra." But when Professor Smith goes on to add that the prophets were leaders in a great development "in which the *religious ordinances . . . of the Old Testament* advanced from a relatively crude and imperfect to a relatively mature and adequate form," his opinion manifestly contradicts the statements of the Old Testament itself, even when studied by "the laws of grammatico-historical exegesis."

ALFRED CAVE.

ART. II.—*Scotch Sermons*.¹

IT can scarcely be doubted that a wave of Moderatism is beginning again to roll over the breadth of orthodox Scotland. There may be some people still, like Dean Stanley, who look upon that old eighteenth-century phenomenon as "a great philosophic virtue and evangelical grace," but most people who care for religion have long since assigned it "a certain rank in the abyss," and regard it as a stage on the way to corruption. It reared a body of preachers who were pleasant talkers at the lairds' dinners, but who "unfortunately lost the common people and the pious of all ranks without gaining the worldly or the unbelieving." It cannot be expected, however, that it will necessarily revive in our days in its old form, but it will be the old Moderatism still in its abandonment of all passionate belief in doctrine, in lowering the tone and abating the zeal of the Church, and in losing

¹ *Scotch Sermons*, 1880. London : Macmillan and Co.

its hold over serious-minded people of all classes. There is some reason to fear, however, that it will take an entirely new departure, which the old Moderates would rather have resented, by assuming the forms of an intellectual mysticism which will pick the body of Scripture to pieces, surrender the essential proofs of Christianity, and exclude Christianity itself, *as an authority*, from the field of thought. If a system of this sort should ever make way in Scotland, there would be an end of the Church, for what we ordinarily understand by that name would become what Döllinger describes as characteristic of Broad Churchism in England, a society of spiritually related savants rather than a Church, delighting in diversities of opinion, and placing much reliance on their connection with the State. This would, indeed, be a strange development of Scotch religion.

We cannot be mistaken in regarding the new volume of twenty-three sermons lately given to the world by thirteen ministers of the Church of Scotland as a manifestation, if not a manifesto, of this new Moderate party. The sermons are certainly Scotch, in so far as their writers are Scotchmen, but they are wanting in all the characteristics alike of Scotch theology and Scotch philosophy. We have no means of knowing how far they represent the opinions of the Established clergy. The very character of the undertaking seems to indicate that it would not have been hazarded unless the authors had seen reason to count upon an audience not inconsiderable in numbers, and not altogether without sympathy with their views. The Preface merely says that the volume "has originated in the wish to gather together a few specimens of a style of teaching which increasingly prevails amongst the clergy of the Scottish Church." It shows, at all events, as the editor significantly remarks, "the direction in which thought is moving." The Preface gives us no information concerning the extent of individual responsibility on the part of the writers for the opinions expressed in the volume. Perhaps they would not care to urge any plea of limited liability, for the work was evidently carried out in concert, with a perfect understanding as to the negative mode of treatment to be adopted in dealing with the doctrines of evangelical theology, and with Christianity itself. There has certainly been no such

deliberate affront given to Scotch orthodoxy in any part of its long and chequered history.

It is satisfactory to know, however, that though there is an ostentatious display of fresh theories and modes of thought, especially in the sermons of the younger men, there is really nothing new in the theology or principles of the book, nothing that may not be fairly classed under one or other of the varied phases which mental or metaphysical science is from time to time assuming in the schools of philosophy. The book in fact possesses no originality whatever. We are not even meeting old enemies in a new guise. We have simply the hollow spiritualism of the Pantheistic school, which destroys the groundwork of supernatural fact, while it claims to receive it in its more spiritual meaning, with a Pelagian or Socinian handling of the old doctrines of theology, and a set of Carlylese platitudes in the region of morals. The writers are, indeed, thirty years behind their time. Their fundamental theory as to the position of the Christian consciousness as supreme authority in religion, *regula regulans*, was borrowed from Schleiermacher, and popularised by Mr. J. D. Morell, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, a whole generation ago, and was then discussed on the merits by all our best writers on Christian philosophy. All the writers, with one or two exceptions, have likewise profited more or less largely by the pages of Strauss and De Wette, Theodore Parker, Francis W. Newman, Matthew Arnold, F. D. Maurice, W. R. Greg, and, though last, not least, Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, whom the *Spectator* describes as "father of all those who, within the last half-century, have been insurgent against the dismal Calvinistic decrees." It is through this very variety of inspiration or suggestion that the book has become such a curious mixture of hazy mysticism and hard rationalism, with a prevailing swerve toward Socinianism. But notwithstanding all their advantages, the writers have given us no fresh or independent treatment of the questions discussed, nor helped to raise a single one of them out of the ruts created by such masculine thinkers. It would be remarkable, indeed, if they had. Of the thirteen writers, only four, Principal Caird, Dr. Cunningham of Crieff, Dr. Story of Roseneath, and Professor Knight, are known to the world of authorship. The other nine

are almost, if not quite, unknown, and the majority are very young men,—two of them ordained only five years ago, two seven years ago, one eight years ago, one thirteen years ago, one nineteen, and another twenty-two. Most men would keep silence in theology—not to speak of philosophy and the sciences—for at least fifteen or twenty years, till at least they had had time to master the great theological disciplines; for not even original power of the highest order can compensate for the want of years of thought and reading in this immense field. But the sermons of the younger men show that they are mere theological amateurs, having neither the learning, the knowledge of opinions or forms of doctrine, nor the philosophical culture, much less the constructive intellect needed to project a consistent and comprehensive theory on the great themes of God and Redemption. They neither admire nor practise the logical discipline of the schools; there is nothing they dread so much as a definition, and scarcely ever do they lay down a position as a fulcrum to support an argument. Then the style of most of the sermons is decidedly inferior. They are wanting especially in the intellectual virtue of simplicity; they are full of tumid and misty verbiage, such as we expect to find in the essays of ambitious collegians; while there is nothing whatever of that admirable grace and dexterity, of that vividness and unction, which have given such a popularity and power to the writings of the Broad Church party in the Church of England. They are just as singularly wanting in the warmth, the tender humanity, the glowing sentiments of the same school of writers, not to speak of the hearty fervour of Schleiermacher himself: there being nothing in these sermons but the coldness and the hardness so characteristic of the Scotch nature when it takes up with principles which, in the name of religion, eat the heart out of all religion. The tone is, indeed, not better than that of Socinianism, which Mrs. Barbauld herself described as “the frozen zone of Christianity.” We should like to believe, though there is little evidence of it, that the writers really feel the gravity of the work to which they have put their hands, which is not, as some of their admiring apologists have discovered, to blunt the edge of Calvinism, or to abate the religious dogmatism of Scotch Christianity, but to destroy nearly all that has been most surely believed in Catholic Christen-

dom, all that men reckon most vital in Christian doctrine, and to leave in its stead nothing but a variable and evanescent sentimentalism which can never supply the wants of a sinful world. There is this remarkable peculiarity about the distribution of labour in the book, that Principal Caird and Dr. Cunningham, who may be regarded as the seniors in this enterprise, do not themselves attack orthodoxy, but stand gravely aside while their young pupils or friends are covering it with fatal stabs. There is a petulant alacrity in the style of this youthful attack which suggests a manifest anxiety to inflict as much pain as possible on Christian people, as well as, perhaps, an equally petulant resentment at the tyranny of truth, and at the persistency of simple-minded Christians in holding fast by doctrines which, in the opinion of the writers, ought to have been long since exploded.

The two sermons of Principal Caird, which open the volume, with all their high finish of thought and expression, are only remarkable for their silence upon points which an evangelical preacher would have linked inseparably with the two interesting texts which he has made the starting-points of very thoughtful dissertation. The sermon on "Corporate Immortality" is a strange one; Christian, no doubt, in its tone, for it is thoroughly Christian to rise above "the petty interests of our brief individual life" and to labour for the good of a generation we shall never see; but, after all, it is the immortality of the race on earth that the preacher is concerned with—an idea which is already familiar enough in the writings of Frederic Harrison, the Comtist, who offers us a substitute for Christianity, that is to rise above it, and dispel our narrow and selfish dreams for an individual immortality. The other sermon, on "Union with God," is what we would expect from the author of *The Philosophy of Religion*, lately published,—an attempt to import into religion that Hegelian philosophy which has had its day and gone out of sight in Germany, the land of its birth. The preacher uses pantheistic forms of speech in arguing against Pantheism—or at least that form of it which "reduces the world and men to illusions,"—but he pleads for "a Christian Pantheism, which is not only consistent with the individuality of man, but gives to our conception of it new significance and reality." The Rev. William L.

M'Farlan of Lenzie, evidently an enthusiastic disciple of the Principal, the most remarkable of all the writers for the energy of his destructive criticism, frankly avows his Pantheism, for he says: "To some such pantheistic conception of the universe intellects at once speculative and devout will be driven, they believe, as the only refuge which will afford them a secure shelter from the assaults of materialistic atheism." He asserts, but does not attempt to prove, that "Christian Pantheism does not destroy moral distinctions nor attribute moral indifference to the Being who is all in all," but he ought rather to show that there is, or can be, any Pantheism but that which sees in God only a necessary law, in man a passing phenomenon, and in sin a crude and imperfect transition to the Divine. His sermon on "Authority," as we shall see, denies all authority to the Bible, and makes the spiritual consciousness the supreme arbiter of truth. He deplors "the superstitious reverence for the Bible prevalent among Protestants," and follows the German rationalists in the contention that he can retain Christianity at the expense of the accuracy of its historical records. His other sermon, on "Things that cannot be Shaken" comforts us with the thought that there are at least three principles or truths of this unshakable character—the Being of God, the immortality of the soul, and the blessedness of righteousness,—a catalogue of truths so narrow as to suggest that there is no need for Christianity at all; as Tindal and Collins, the Deists, would have acknowledged all three. But after all he is not quite sure about the personal immortality of the soul, for he says: "A continued personal life of the soul is conceivable;" and again, "The soul . . . may outlive also the more sudden change which passes upon it at death." It is only a "perhaps" after all, and sceptics have boldly affirmed that personal immortality is at variance both with intellect and logic. Yet this is one of those things that cannot be shaken! The Rev. D. J. Ferguson of Strathblane, in his sermon on "Law and Miracle," depreciates, if he does not entirely repudiate, the evidential value of miracle, and seems indeed to question whether there is any evidence for miracle at all. The Rev. Thomas Rain of Hutton, in his sermon on "Individualism and the Church," teaches that "religion is its own evidence, and the ultimate court of appeal is the spiritual consciousness." The Rev. Dr. Story of Rose-

neath, in his sermon on "Christian Righteousness," tries to dispose of the doctrine of imputed righteousness. The Rev. Patrick Stevenson of Inverarity, and the Rev. Adam Semple of Huntly, discourse upon "Eternal Life," keeping strictly to the view of Maurice, that the idea of duration does not enter into this impressive term. The Rev. John Stevenson of Glamis discourses upon "Religion, Theology, and Ecclesiasticism," in a way which clearly manifests his dislike of dogma, his sympathy with honest scepticism, and his charity for materialists. He thinks honest scepticism "a healthy sign," and believes "there is often far more of living thought, and of real progress in the Divine life, in what theologians condemn as scepticism than can possibly exist in belief which claims to have exhausted revelation and to have attained the sum of all truth." It was not however, we should think, by scepticism, but by faith that the Church has made her vast strides of progress. Mr. Stevenson would even find room for the materialist in the Church, for he says: "He may not be a Theist in the sense in which you are a Theist. He may not accept as you accept the Christian doctrine of immortality, but does he thereby cease to be religious?" He finds that the two great truths of Christianity are the Divine Fatherhood of God, and the Human Brotherhood of Christ, and sees the sum of all religion "in the spirit of self-sacrifice." The Rev. James Nicoll of Murroes discourses on "The Assembling of Ourselves together" in a way that would be likely to send his hearers on the Sabbath to the green fields of Nature, and has discovered that the Church assembles not on the ground of Christ's presence with "the two or three," but "on the ground of our common human nature disclosed by religion," and much more to the same effect. The Rev. Allan Menzies of Abernyte, in his sermon on "The Christian Priesthood," is significantly silent upon the priesthood of Christ, and in his sermon on "The Successors of the Great Physician," that is, the members of the medical faculty, finds that their labours are as indispensable as those of preachers to the "realising of the kingdom of righteousness, peace, and joy on this earth," and that they labour to "bring to human life the blessings of light, peace, and freedom," whatever this may mean! The Rev. Dr. Mackintosh of Buchanan has a sermon on "The Law of Moral Continuity," in which he expounds that naturalistic Calvinism,

as the *Spectator* calls it, which ought to be tolerably familiar to all readers of the writings of Maurice and Young. He surrenders the Scripture idea of a day of judgment, and, indeed, moral government itself. His other sermon, on "The Renovating Power of Christianity," is one of the worst in the book, for he here bids "good-night" to evangelical theology. Professor Knight of St. Andrews has a sermon on "Conservation and Change," which is mainly an appeal—it can scarcely be called an argument—for civil establishments of religion, which are, of course, not to be touched so long as they afford a refuge for that latitudinarianism which is the necessary and appropriate virtue of a National Church. Creeds may be torn to pieces, but the revolutionary hand of violence must spare the Establishment. He pleads for our "institutions," of which "we are the guardians as well as the heirs"—"they should not be rashly touched or rudely dealt with." Of course the Confession of Faith is not entitled to such consideration. "Let criticism disclose to us more and more the origin of old beliefs, and explain the sources of illusion;" but "let no revolutionary hand be raised to destroy what has come down to us from the past, to remove the ancient landmarks of a nation's faith and piety, lest in rooting up the tares, which unquestionably exist, we root up the wheat along with them." We should think the Confession of Faith was a tolerably ancient landmark of faith and piety, and that as such it might be spared the onslaught of those liberal theologians who are so solicitous about any interference with their position or their incomes. His other sermon, on "Continuity and Development of Religion," is a plea for change in human belief, for the surrender of old Biblical ideas to the scientific spirit of the hour: and, as if to illustrate the facility with which the thing can be done by the Professor of a Christian University, he speaks familiarly of "our animal ancestors," and tries to reconcile us to the surrender of the idea of creation out of nothing. The Rev. Dr. Cunningham of Crieff has a sermon on "Home-spun Religion," which shows how completely the manufacture is in human hands. If it were not for a slight tincture of Broad Church sentiment, we should have been disposed to regard the author as a true son of the eighteenth century born out of due time.

We have thus a very strange collection of sermons, distinguished by some variety of opinion ; some nearing, and others reaching, the stage of a vapid Pantheism ; some unhinged on the fundamental principles of religious belief ; others opposed to the Catholic doctrines of the Church ; others remarkable only for mystic crudities and dry platitudes, little calculated to make any intellectual impression. But we shall soon see that the book represents, notwithstanding, a system of doctrine, with certain foregone conclusions and even traditional methods of treatment, which illustrate nothing so much as the curious periodicity of religious errors in the history of the Church. We shall now proceed to consider the attitude of these Scotch preachers towards the Inspired Records, and then their relation to Evangelical Christianity. These two questions are closely connected, for it has been truly remarked, that "it is the confirmed opposition of errorists to the substance of Christianity, that directs men for the most part to oppose the Scriptures."

It must be remembered that the Church has always held that the scheme of Christianity involves the direct intervention of God, and that the Scriptures which record that scheme are an authoritative external testimony from Him. The Church asserts the authority of Scripture. These writers, following a system of ideal rationalism, borrowed from Hegel, and elaborated by Schleiermacher, hold an entirely opposite view, and assign to reason, or the spiritual consciousness, the chair of authority, and summon Revelation to its bar, that its doctrines or statements may be accepted or rejected as they agree or disagree with its dictates. They expressly deny the authority of Scripture. Mr. M'Farlan denies that "the Scriptures as a whole are infallible, and therefore in all their utterances authoritative." He rejects, like many of the others, perhaps all, the theory of verbal inspiration, though he does not tell us his own view of the matter, and can therefore easily say that he "does not place Esther or Daniel on a level with the Psalter ;" that he cares less for "the theological disquisitions" of Paul than "for the more practical portions of his Epistles ;" and he associates himself with those "who claim the right to judge of their [the Scriptures'] utterances in the light of their own Christian consciousness, and deny Divine authority to any of them which fall beneath the ethical standards, which, as

men illuminated by the spirit of Christ, they have set up for their own guidance; they deny all Divine authority, I may add, to those portions of Scripture which treat of matters which belong more properly to science and history than to religion." He speaks of persons like himself having "their favourite books and portions of books, and these alone are to them Divine revelations." Indeed, he all but asserts that "the Gospels and Acts were not written, as is commonly imagined, before the close of the first century." Mr. Rain is equally positive in asserting the doctrine of Individualism, that "truth in its nature is subjective, a part of the spiritual consciousness, and necessarily involved in it;" and quotes Deut. xxx. 14, "The word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart,"¹ to justify the opinion that it is "that which springs up in the hidden depths of man's soul, and for which God has prepared no other place than this hidden depth." "Religion is by this passage placed on an internal and personal basis." He condemns ecclesiasticism, in which he includes Protestantism, for resorting to historical testimony and for using logic, and advises us to adopt the individualistic principle which is this: "That religious truth is its own evidence, and the ultimate court of appeal the spiritual consciousness." "Perhaps the best 'Evidences of Christianity' which in the meantime can be had are those inarticulate intuitions and feelings which dwell deep down in believing souls." "People should be taught, though with caution, to seek refuge from unbelief in their spiritual instincts. These at all events possess a much greater value than argumentative divinity." Yet the individualism which he advocates is not a lawless or profane individualism, but one which mind only can develop when quickened by God's Spirit. Professor Knight takes the same view, though he speaks more oracularly, as when he says, "Religious intuition never dies. Its activity is spontaneous and unceasing; while the labour of the understanding, working along with the spiritual instincts, invariably builds up some fresh scaffolding of dogma which posterity destroys." Mr.

¹ The "word" in question, as the context shows, was "the commandment which I [Moses] command thee this day,"—explained in previous verses, and as Paul explains in Rom. x. 8, "the word of faith which we preach"—that is, a word "in the mouth" to be confessed, and "in the heart" to be believed—not a word having its origin in either man's mouth or heart.

Ferguson disparages miracle in the interests of intuitionism, telling us that Christianity "makes light of physical portents," that "miracles have lost their apologetic value," that "miracle is not a guarantee for revelation, but revelation for miracle," that "no acts of power can prove a spiritual truth," and he claims the name of Christian for such as deny miracle, and reprobates that "Bibliolatry which refuses to distinguish between Christianity in itself and the New Testament, its historic record." He holds likewise to the authority of the spiritual consciousness.

We have already remarked that there is no originality in the fundamental theory of this book, and pointed to Schleiermacher as its true father. The outlines of the theory are well exhibited and exposed in the well-known work of Henry Rogers, *The Eclipse of Faith*, which was published almost a generation ago. These writers are the mere translators of German thought, and not even at first-hand. It has been our habit to laugh at the transcendentalism of the Continent, as if the solid practical understanding of Britons were secure against its fascinations; but it possesses in the hands of Schleiermacher, and we may add of his Anglican disciples, such a warmth of tone, and it throws such a beautiful significancy around the person of Christ, while it uses the language of the deepest piety, not discarding even the use of such words as sin, pardon, redemption, and holiness, that we do not at all wonder it should take temporary possession of some Scotch minds.¹ It only supplies another illustration of the facility with which methods in speculative philosophy are transferred and applied to the region of theology. Perhaps the Church has never known a philosophy so subtle and dangerous as that which under the forms of idealism now attacks the Christian faith.

Let us say then, once for all, that the transference of authority from the Bible to the spiritual faculty marks a turning-point in Protestantism, a departure from the old historic position, a surrender of the old distinctive foundations, which turns religion into that merely subjective thing which Roman Catholics reproach it with being. These writers talk

¹ It is not long since President M'Cosh of Princeton referred to the fact that, "not sustained in the land of its birth, Hegelianism has emigrated to the country of Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, and has there found a settlement for a little while."

of Protestants resting on the infallibility of the Bible, as Roman Catholics rest on the infallibility of the Pope, but the saying must be completed; the writers of *Scotch Sermons* rest on the infallibility of their own spiritual consciousness, that is, upon their own self-willed idea.¹ We have next to observe that these writers do not tell us what Christian consciousness is, or how or when it becomes Christian. Mr. M'Farlan says that "it has been developed chiefly by the Scriptures"—"it is a spiritual inheritance which belongs to them as men Christianly educated, as men who are descended from generations of the Christianly educated." But this does not touch the question of its origin. Mr. Ferguson seems to think it is innate, for he says, "Our Lord has taught us that what is good and true on earth is good and true in heaven, and that the moral and spiritual perceptions of the human mind are worthy of perfect trust;" but he carefully avoids quoting any words of our Lord to this effect, and then quotes some Anglican writer who says, "We do not become Christians, we are so from our birth." But, as to the validity of this innate faculty, does Mr. Ferguson recognise no impotency in it as to its power of grasping Divine truth? Is not the very variety of its results evidence of this impotency? How can the moral and spiritual perception be worthy of perfect trust when it leads to contradictory conclusions? Has the depravity of human nature had no effect upon man's thinking about God and redemption? Again, there is nothing in the observed phenomena of our nature to warrant the assumption that there exists such a spiritual organ as, standing alone, acts altogether apart from the logical faculty in relation to religious truth. This idea is based upon the pantheistic philosophy which distinguishes, just as these writers do, between the understanding and the reason,—the one a merely constructive faculty giving form or fashion to the materials of knowledge, the other not constructive but intuitive, the real organ of truth. But, as spiritual truth in its very nature holds logical as well as

¹ Dr. Chalmers once said of Thomas Erskine's speculations: "I don't like to narrow down the broad basis of the Gospel to the pin-point speculations of an individual brain." Was Theodore Parker's epigrammatic definition of Christianity borrowed from Germany much beside the mark—"That is Christianity which a man believes to be Christianity"? Does not this almost realise the saying of Luther, that "every man has a Pope in his belly"?

spiritual elements, it is impossible that the apprehension of it can be referred to the spiritual faculty apart from the understanding. This distinction of Schleiermacher, however, which accounts for his abhorrence of everything like evidence, accounts also for his misconception of religion as consisting not in a belief of the truth and in obedience to Divine command, but in sentiments, intuitions, and spiritual instincts. His object was, as we well know, to shelter Christianity from the attacks of philosophy by carrying it entirely off the field of argument into the region of feeling, which was exactly what David Hume wanted in order to secure its complete overthrow. "Our holy religion," said the great sceptic, "rests on faith, not on reason."¹ But the view of the great German divine, as well as of these Sermons, gives an entirely false view of Christianity, which is not the mere revelation of a life or of truth, but a great supernatural fact with a double aspect, one implying an inward relation to the mind and heart of man, the other implying a historical form in which it is embodied. Christianity is not an outcome of the religious consciousness, nor an idea of philosophy; it is a historical revelation, and it cannot be otherwise; existing at once in its system of doctrines and in the living body of the Christian Church. It carries in its bosom those spiritual truths which speak to our inward consciousness. But this external historical revelation, because it is communicated by God, must carry with it claims to authority over man. The Bible, in the sense of these writers, however, even when expressing truth and piety, has no power beyond the force of human truth to bind the intellect or constrain the faith of its believers. It is not because the revelation is external, that is, written in a book regarded as an outward standard of faith, that they object to it, but because of the absolute authority that it claims over conscience and life, because it claims to make a man responsible for his beliefs and his obedience. This is the true state of the matter. These writers deny inspiration, because they know that if there is no inspiration there can be no Divine authority in the Scriptures to bind us with the obedience that is due to God alone. Scripture commands have no power to lay the

¹ The true tendency of Schleiermacherism may be gathered from a sentence on p. 77 of the third volume of his *Collected Works* (Berlin, 1835): "Of every proof that Christianity is true or obligatory we wholly despair."

conscience under obligation. But if Christianity, though a historical fact, be essentially a spiritual revelation, it does address itself to the moral nature of man with all the authority of truth.

We have further to observe that if the spiritual consciousness of man is to dislodge Scripture from its position of authority, it ought to show parallel credentials. "If I do not the works, believe me not." If any man claims the right to correct an apostle when he is wrong, as Mr. M'Farlan does when he talks of "Paul rabbinising," he ought to show us the signs of an apostle. But this intuitionist school, true to its origin, depreciates, if it does not deny, miracle; yet revelation, being essentially supernatural, stands or falls with miracle. Mr. Ferguson says, "To make belief in Christ depend in any degree upon the fact that He wrought miracles is to build upon the sand." Does Mr. Ferguson abandon the essential truth of the New Testament,—the resurrection of our Lord from the dead? Was that not a miracle? Did not Paul argue in the Corinthian Epistle that there is no Christianity if Christ did not rise again? Did he not argue for a day of judgment from the fact of the resurrection, "whereof he hath given assurance to all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead"? The fact of Christ's resurrection is the crucial test to try the sincerity of any man who affirms the incredibility of miracle and yet remains in the Christian Church. Mr. Ferguson says that Christianity "rebukes the craving for physical portents," as if Jesus did not say, "If ye believe not me, yet believe my works;" "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me;"—as if He had never said, "That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power upon earth to forgive sins, (he said unto the sick of the palsy) Arise, and take up thy couch." He did rebuke the craving for physical portents in those to whom the most stupendous signs had been already given in vain, and He justly refused to grant them. If miracles are to be reduced to a subordinate position in the scheme of Christian evidences, the result will be that an external authoritative revelation will be discarded, and this was the very progress of criticism in Germany; those who objected to miracles objected to inspiration. But if we abandon miracles, it is impossible to retain any other Christianity than that which is kindled by

the sparks of our own inner consciousness. And what, let us ask, are the credentials of this Christian consciousness which is to supersede the authority of the Bible? What is the worth of it? Mr. Rain seems, after all, very doubtful about its value, for he says, "The moment you bring the reasons for your belief from the depths of the inner consciousness, and state them logically on paper, a thousand to one but they seem feeble to yourself." Mr. M'Farlan and others praise the "deep spiritual insight" of the writers of Scripture, but we should like them to explain how this "spiritual insight" led them to concoct such a mass of legendary miracles and misty dogmas as have so long misled the world. Then, as we have already said, what is the value of an insight that leads to such contradictory conclusions? One asserts that his insight leads him to believe in immortality, another stands in doubt, and another says the soul is not immortal. Where is the creed they could all subscribe? Yet they talk of "an absolute religion" as the offspring of Reason, of which history knows nothing whatever, while they ignore the various influences which mislead or corrupt the spiritual faculty, as if on very purpose to show the insufficiency and invalidity of an internal revelation. What a religion it is that has no criterion to test the inward revelations, and to determine whether they are of God, man, or the devil! Each man carries the court of appeal within himself, and though the courts may differ in different individuals, every man must accept the decision given by his own tribunal. Thus human intelligence comes to be the measure of all truth. Man is his own Bible.

It is very natural that those who follow the intuitional philosophy should depreciate dogma. The attitude of these writers toward it is indeed very suggestive. Several of them remind us very oracularly that Christianity is a life, and not a dogma. But so far as it is life at all, is it not as the result of certain dogmatic apprehensions? So far as any man is a Christian, is it not in virtue of Christian dogma? Is it not the denial of a fundamental law of our nature that religious life can be originated in us without the belief of religious truth? How can there be a foundation for moral character without the exercise of the understanding in dealing with the motives that are to operate upon conscience and will? What

a strange psychology these writers possess ! Yet Mr. J. Stevenson says, " Religion is in no sense dependent on any special phases of doctrinal belief ;" just as a Professor of his party has been saying for years that the Church does not rest on dogma or opinion. The objection, however, of some of these writers seems rather to be to the dogmatic form of Church doctrines. Mr. M'Farlan says, " While the modern theologians recognise a certain amount of truth in these scholastic dogmas concerning redemption, which are popularly known as the Gospel, they reject these dogmas when they are presented to them in scientific form and systematic completeness as constituting what is called the scheme of salvation." Surely truth does not cease to be truth because it is put into propositional shape ; and, after all, we do not understand by dogmatic what is systematised in logical order, but that which is held as an ultimate ground to support or influence Christian character.¹ Canon Liddon has remarked that people of this school usually mean by dogma something that is essentially untrue, and he sees in this temper of mind the voice of the philosophy of Hegel. Others of these writers object to the fixedness of dogma, as if change were a right and necessary thing in itself. Professor Knight says : " Were human belief irrevocably fixed, it would have some secret affinity to death and the grave"—say, the belief in the being of God ! Mr. Ferguson says : " Christianity is no rigid system of dogma, or of ecclesiastical forms, elaborated long ago, and incapable of growth or change." As he has not defined Christianity, we cannot say how far this is either true or false. But he evidently means that the Church ought to change her dogmas ; for he says at another place : " If we worship an infallible book, and conceive of revelation as the publication once for all of a definite scheme of dogma, we shall naturally cling to the past, and forget that there is anything divine in the world of to-day." This means that the Church still has revelations of the same kind as those given to apostles or prophets, or it means nothing. But is not

¹ Mr. M'Farlan speaks very contemptuously of "scholastic dogmas"—the term by which he describes that body of Westminster divinity he has himself subscribed ; but if it is their form he objects to, we submit they are not nearly so scholastic as these Sermons, with their endless philosophical jargon, and their talk of continuity, conservation, development, spiritual force, epicyclical contrivance.

Mr. Ferguson only repeating here the complaint of Theodore Parker, that the Christian Church "will consider itself a finality, looking back for its inspiration to a past age"? He tells us that "we must have a theology keeping pace with the other sciences." Well, if these writers will only conduct their inquiries in theology according to the spirit and method which have developed the success of the secular sciences—that is, follow the habit of scientists in accepting principles as immutable and fixed beyond all cavil—we should only welcome their reforming efforts. But they seem to imply that what is true to-day becomes false to-morrow, and that every age must have a new theology to displace that which preceded it.¹ We should have thought that any theology to be true at all must be older than the hills and outlast them. The principles that save the soul are as fixed and immutable as the laws of mechanical force or chemical affinity. If they are not so, they can furnish no proper or present foundation for us to rest on. They may be set in a clearer light, and the mode of stating them may change from age to age according to different habits of thought in each age, but the substance of truth can never alter. No one complains that the same sun shines in the heavens age after age, or that the laws of light and heat are so unchangeable. It is therefore pitiful folly or arrogance to talk of certain truths as suitable for the world's infancy but now as out-grown amidst the light of science and modern discovery. These writers are greatly in love with science, and they tell us we must loyally accept all its conclusions, amongst which they specify several which scientists themselves merely accept as "working hypotheses." But they would have us admire and follow still more the methods of those scientists who are doing all in their power to destroy science. When physiology begins to teach that voluntary action is a fable, and mind nothing but the conscious register of the molecular motions of the brain; when biology tells us that evolution is the weaving of nothings into somethings, and of matter into mind; when mathematics assures us that there may be worlds in which Euclid might find all his axioms at fault; when so many of the sciences are becoming mere manufactories of uncertainty, it is time for

¹ Mr. Rain says: "The faith of to-day becomes the superstition of to-morrow." Rather a dreary prospect!

us to look carefully to our ways and to work according to sounder methods. Let us have progress by all means, but not the progress of divines who are only returning back to ancient error. It is ridiculous to talk of progress in their sense, for the newest issues of modern thought in the region of abstract speculation are resolvable into the principles of Oriental Buddhism, and the philosophy of Herbert Spencer cannot boast a single particle of scientific evidence that was not known three thousand years ago.

It is now time that we should notice with all needful brevity the theological system of these *Scotch Sermons*, which, as we have said, is just as dogmatic as anything peculiar to orthodoxy, though it comes to us recommended by such names as "spiritual truth," "living truth," "higher truth," "deeper truth," and other terms peculiar to the spiritualistic school. We shall arrange the subject under the ordinary divisions of systematic theology.

It is not very easy to discover their doctrine of God, but some of them, like Mr. M'Farlan, are quite pantheistic in their conception of Him. He says: "The Infinite Being, the sum and substance of all things, is best known to men by the name of Father," language which reminds one of Spinoza with his doctrine of one substance which is self-existent, and of which all phenomena are but the manifestations. As pantheism carries with it of necessity the denial of personality, which marks the distinctness of God from his creatures, there can be no foundation for any intercourse in faith, love or obedience, and, therefore, no Fatherhood. But this pantheistic taint is not observable in the majority of the writers, though they, one and all, make the Divine Fatherhood the staple of their theology,—trying, in fact, to found a scientific theology on the name of Father, leaving Christ's mediation out of account, as if we needed no other connection with the Father than that which we naturally enjoy as His creatures. Mr. M'Farlan says: "The doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood is one of those things that cannot be shaken." Dr. Mackintosh says that Christ proclaimed "the paternal character of God," and others of them speak as if this revelation was never given till Christ's time. Oosterzee may well say:—"He then who characterises the presentation of God as Father as something

entirely new in the Gospel of Christ has assuredly read the Scriptures of the Old Testament with very strange eyes.”¹ The doctrine of these writers is that God is the Father of all men by creation, and thus differs entirely from that of Broad Church writers, who hold that God is our Father in virtue of the Incarnation. We certainly hold to a universal Fatherhood of all creatures—a relationship which rests upon a moral ground, that is, the creation of man in God’s image; but the Scriptures just as clearly teach a gracious Fatherhood in relation to those who have become “the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.” We cannot pursue this matter further, but it is a very remarkable fact that in all the four hundred pages of this book of sermons there is not the least allusion to the doctrine of the Trinity. We have no right to say that the writers do not believe in the doctrine, but when writer after writer denies those objective truths of salvation that are based on the Trinity, and when we remember how it is the great security against the bottomless abyss of Pantheism, of which we find manifest traces in some of these sermons, we are more than suspicious of the orthodoxy of this book on what Neander describes as an intuition of the faith, constituting from the first the fundamental consciousness of the Church. Perhaps they hold to the “modal Trinity” of Schleiermacher, but there is no trace of this conception anywhere; and if they do really reject that doctrine which Robertson has described as “the sum of all that knowledge which has yet been gained by man;” of which Coleridge says, “The article of Trinity is religion, is reason, and its universal formula;” and of which Bancroft, a nominal Unitarian, has said, “The truth of a Triune God dwells in every system of thought that can pretend to vitality;” their position is far more unsound than that of Broad Church divines, who are still professedly Trinitarian. The silence of these *Scotch Sermons* on this article is fearfully suggestive.

The writers have no doctrine of SIN to regulate their theology, or to impose a check upon their transcendental theories. Indeed, they do not seem to think it necessary to find one, though divines have always followed Augustine in thinking that a doctrine of sin is a postulate of all true

¹ He quotes Ps. ciii. 13, Hosea xi. 1, Isaiah lxiii. 16, lxiv. 8, as cases in point.

theology. Mr. M'Farlan maintains in the teeth of all logic that his Pantheism does not destroy moral distinctions, but we have never yet seen a system with pantheistic tendencies that could endure a doctrine of sin. He accordingly includes among "the discredited dogmas of the schoolmen" those in regard to "the origin and nature of human sinfulness," "the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity," and he ridicules the idea of "hereditary depravity." But surely he was bound to give some account of man's state by nature, which is at least a palpable fact of experience, if it is not a dogma learned from the Bible, a fact with which any theory—orthodox, Socinian, or rationalist—must deal, in facing the question, How it is to be reconciled with the rectitude and goodness of God that man should be born into a state which infallibly develops itself in sin and misery? Nothing but a shallow and flippant dilettantism would evade such a pregnant question; yet these writers do evade it. If there was no fall of man, as Mr. M'Farlan affirms, how is it possible to vindicate God's justice and goodness in bringing man into the world in such circumstances of grave moral disadvantage? The Reformed theology accepts the Scripture solution of it, not because it relieves the subject of all difficulty, or does not leave it still a profound and awful mystery, but because God gives this solution Himself, and because it accords with the analogy of faith in which the method of justification through the righteousness of the Second Adam corresponds to our condemnation on account of the sin of the first Adam. These writers regard God as purely and entirely love or benevolence, but this view does not accord with or account for the existence of sin and misery, the revealed facts of Christianity, and the punishment of the wicked. God is righteous as well as loving. Clouds and darkness, indeed, are round about Him, but righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne.

There is something ominous in the reticence of these sermons on the doctrine of the PERSON OF CHRIST, which is the great centre-point of Christianity. There is a remarkably Unitarian tone in all the references to Christ. It is difficult to know what is meant by such expressions as "the Divine Man," "the Divine Humanity," which are constantly occurring; whether they mean the identification of the two natures in Christ, or

the expression of His mere humanity. And the difficulty is increased by the fact that there is not in the whole volume a single hint or statement that Christ is true God as well as true man; neither is there any allusion to the Incarnation, nor does the word occur in the whole volume.¹ The Christ of these sermons is as much a mere man as the Christ of Schleiermacher, or Praxeas, or Socinus. There never was a volume of Scotch sermons before that ignored the doctrine of Christ's deity. It seems to us that Christ is here the perfect or ideal man, with a divine principle or influence dwelling in Him—"the pattern saint of the New Testament, the holy youth of the divine family, the perfect schoolmaster." One writer speaks of "God in Christ," but not to signify God through anything done by Christ, but only the divine character reflected in the events of Christ's life. Another speaks of Christ as Mediator, but not in the New Testament sense of the word; rather as Pelagius speaks of Him as Redeemer, though he denies the atonement. Most of the writers say He came "to reveal the Father," or "to manifest the name of God;"² and if this be all He came to do, there is no necessity for His being more than man. To make known the moral character of God, "an incarnation was no more needed than an atonement." If a Divine Person assumes our nature, there must be some work to be done for man that only God can do. Yet, if Christ is only a human teacher come to reveal the Father, Christianity might

¹ Principal Caird is the only writer of the thirteen who breaks silence upon the point, but the reference is not very decisive. He begins one of his sermons with the words, "By those who reject the doctrine of the divinity of Christ great stress is laid on—" a certain argument which he sets forth. This is the only passage which seems to recognise the divinity of Christ. Dr. Cunningham does use the word Incarnation, but not in the theological sense; as, when he says:—"To love Jesus is therefore to love the incarnation of all that is godlike or good." He also says:—"Love to Christ, as the highest ideal of human perfection, the point where the human and divine merge into one, is the basis of Christian morality." Is this a recognition of the Theanthropos? We can hardly think so.

² Dr. Cunningham refers to John xvii. 4: "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do," as pointing out that the work was done in "the manifestation of the Father's name" (verse 6) before He died, and altogether apart from His death. His death was no part of His finished work. Our Lord speaks of His work as past—"I finished the work"—(*aorist*), just as in the Lord's Supper He regards His blood as already shed for sin: "This cup is the new testament in my blood, shed for many for the remission of sin." Dying was part of the work he had received from His Father. "This command have I received from my Father" (John x. 18)—to lay down His life.

be at this moment all that it is though Christ had never appeared. There is no principle in the system taught in these sermons that requires Christ's presence in this world at all, for the Fatherhood of God was revealed in the Old Testament, and pardon and repentance and sanctification were all possible without Christ manifest in the flesh, for they were possible to the saints in Old Testament times. Besides, it has been well said that the manifestation of God's nature might have been made by an appearance without an incarnation, and if the exhibition of a perfect humanity were all that was contemplated in Christ's mission, that might be effected by a divine influence, and not by a Divine Person dwelling in man. If, however, Christ was nothing but a teacher, the apostles of atheism are quite as ready to make this concession as the authors of these sermons, for they regard Him as a real historical person, and recognise the splendour of His wisdom and virtues as beaming forth in the Gospels. If He was nothing but a teacher, then, as Mansel says, we can be no more Christians than we can be Platonists or Aristotelians, for He belongs to a past that cannot repeat itself; and these writers would do well to ponder the further words of Mansel: "No man has a right to say, I can receive Christ as I like and reject Him as I like; I will follow the holy example, I will turn away from the atoning sacrifice; I will listen to His teaching, I will have nothing to do with His mediation; I will believe Him when He tells me that He came from the Father, because I feel that His doctrine has a divine beauty and fitness, but I will not believe Him when He tells me that He is one with the Father, because I cannot conceive how this unity is possible." If Christ is not our Mediator, our life, then the religious system of these writers is a very different thing even from that of Broad Church divines who hold by a historical Christ as the present fountain of life, and thus stand within the threshold of historical Christianity. Men like Maurice and Kingsley and Robertson may be in error on the objective work of our Redeemer, and as to the ground of our acceptance with God, but the centre of their thought is still the living personal Redeemer. This accounts for the warmth of their sermons. But the authors of the *Scotch Sermons* seem to hold by Christ merely as representing a class of views concerning the Divine

Fatherhood and other related facts ; and if this be so, their system merits, quite as much as Socinianism, the designation applied to it by Coleridge—it is not a religion, but a speculation.¹

As to the WORK OF CHRIST, it follows from the positions already noticed that anything like an Atonement is unnecessary. “If the past has no claim upon us,” as Dr. Mackintosh boldly asserts, he is right in saying also that “no objective atonement is necessary.” He thinks it desirable to say that “we can in none but a figurative sense apply the term ‘expiation’ to that amendment, however painful and laborious, of which our faith in the divine good-will is the motive power.” What can be the meaning of this? These writers boldly deny the catholic doctrine of Atonement, that Christ died to satisfy Divine Justice, and to reconcile us to God. Mr. M’Farlan has some slight misgivings about Paul. “Modern theologians . . . admit that Paul does seem to countenance those doctrines of substitution and imputation which they reject,” but what of that? They appeal from “Paul rabbiniising” to “Paul speaking out of the depths of his profound spiritual instincts,” remarkable instincts truly to admit of such rabbinical maunderings!

The authors of these sermons are surely bound to give us some explanation of the sufferings and death of Christ. If the work of Christ, as Dr. Cunningham says, was merely to manifest the name of God, and if that work was accomplished, as he asserts, before He died, why should He have suffered and died at all? May we not in that case say with Dr. Smeaton in his admirable work on the Atonement, that “our Lord stands on the same footing with any of his apostles who also taught that God was love, and died martyr-deaths in confirmation of their testimony,” though, for the matter of that, the Scriptures never represent Christ’s death as intended merely or only to assure us of God’s love. If, however, we are to take Mr. M’Farlan’s view that “Christ died for you, but only that you might die with him to your lower and worser [*sic*] selves, and only that you might find joy in mortifying your members that are upon the

¹ Mr. P. Stevenson says:—“In Christ’s own day Christianity simply consisted in attachment to His person. In our day it may be said to consist simply in attachment to His teaching.” Can we not really still love His Person? Is He not still a living Saviour? This singular statement reminds us of Dr. Arnold’s remark about Unitarianism as having no vitality, because Jesus was virtually a dead man in its theology, representing nothing but a class of ideas, motives, and speculations!

earth," it was not necessary on his principles that Christ should have died at all, unless he means to contend that the Old Testament saints did not "die to their lower and worser selves" ages before Christ came into the world. We should like to ask these writers once for all, what Christ's mission accomplished for the millions who died before His Incarnation? If he came, as Dr. Cunningham says, only to manifest the name of God, and, as others say, to give us a noble example of self-sacrifice, how could the people in pre-Christian ages be benefited by His coming? And if the saints in those ages were not saved by Christ, let us ask, How were they saved?

In fact, these writers make Christ's life and death a mere pageant with a moral. They go back to the old Socinian theory which regards Christ's work as designed to produce a merely subjective effect, and to impress men with a sense of God's love; that is, they hold the moral influence theory—a theory which destroys itself, for there is no moral power in example done for the sake of example, and there is no beauty or force in self-sacrifice for the sake of self-sacrifice—a theory which, it has been said, makes Calvary more dreadful than Sinai, and destroys all our ideas of law, justice, and truth. The conclusion we draw from these sermons is that their doctrine, so far from being progressive, is only a return to ancient Socinian heresy, and, so far from being broad, is narrower than the orthodoxy it tries to displace; for the evangelical view, while holding that the satisfaction to Divine Justice is the central and fundamental effect of Christ's death, finds room for all that view of self-sacrificing love and moral power which alone these writers find in it. The true breadth belongs to orthodoxy, the narrowness to those who boast of their breadth with very much the same truth and reasonableness as they boast of their originality.

We now come to the department of subjective soteriology, and find as little originality here as in the department we have just traversed. We have simply the old heresy of salvation by works. Dr. Mackintosh summarises this side of theology very plainly: "The gospel deserves its name simply because it teaches and persuades us to cease from evil and to do well, to change the seed which we sow and thus to obtain a better harvest. It affords to us helps and encouragements to repent of the evil we have done and to enter upon a new course of life." This is the old Pelagianism revived. We can find no

doctrine of regeneration in these sermons, except it be found in the quotation that Mr. Ferguson makes from an Anglican writer—"We do not become Christians, we are so from our birth." Perhaps this will account for the origin of the "spiritual force" which Dr. Mackintosh finds to be in every man's possession, "a spiritual force in man, latent it may be, yet powerful enough to raise them above themselves, and all the help they need or can possibly obtain is to be encouraged to exert that power." He tells us again and again of the wonders of this spiritual force, though we do not find any mention of it in Scripture, and he reaches the highest point in his teaching when he assures us that, "if touched and brought into sympathy and *rapprochement* with the power of goodness 'not ourselves,'"—a slight touch of Matthew Arnold!—"it leaps forth into light and gathers strength." It is not wonderful that Dr. Mackintosh, holding such views of human nature and human powers, so different from those of the Scripture writers, should speak of "the Christian influences," which Paul regards as reinforcing "the better will," as anything but "an exertion of supernatural grace." But, if man needs so very little encouragement to exert "his spiritual force," it is a wonder that he is so little disposed to exert it. If nothing was needed on God's part but the exhibition of His love through Christ, how is it that all men have not become Christians? To teach that nothing more is needed by man does not make His love the greater, but makes the evil of men's hearts less. If men were not dead in trespasses and sins, and alienated from the life of God, they would immediately receive Christ. But they still reject Him.

When we turn aside from these Pelagian views of human ability to consider the way of JUSTIFICATION, or the ground of a sinner's acceptance in the sight of God, we find we are still on Pelagian ground. Dr. Story devotes a sermon, or a portion of it, to the misrepresentation of the Confessional doctrine of justification, with the view of building up in its place the doctrine of a personal righteousness on the sinner's part—the consciousness of which righteousness "must take its place beside my trust in God, as the true and necessary ground of confidence." He says: "I am never told that I am to trust in the righteousness of Christ in any sense which excludes the idea of my being required to have a righteousness of my own.

I must be righteous, as St. John says, even as He is righteous." Now Paul desired to be found not having his own righteousness, which was of the law,—that is, personal righteousness, as a ground of acceptance with God,—but "the righteousness which is of God by faith," which can only become ours by imputation. We do not hold, as Dr. Story says, that justification consists in God's declaring a man righteous who is in no sense righteous: it is His so accounting those who are "just in Christ but sinners in themselves," to use the words of an old Scotch catechism. But Dr. Story assures us that the consciousness of his own personal righteousness must take its place beside his trust in God as the ground of his hopes for eternity. Neither Pelagius nor Socinus excluded trust in God—side by side with their works—as a ground of hope, any more than Dr. Story. He evidently has but a slight understanding of Paul's doctrine when he makes "the deeper righteousness as it appears to Paul" as "comprehensively the Christian life." It is unnecessary to refer to the curious statement of Mr. Menzies that "Faith only makes a man half a Christian, and good works are needed to make up his full title to that name,"—or the statement by Mr. Stevenson about "the saving power of self-sacrifice." Their doctrine of forgiveness is quite Socinian—a bare amnesty on God's part, the death of Christ having no causal connection with it. Dr. Mackintosh however presents it under a somewhat different aspect, which eliminates the idea of grace altogether, for he makes it the result of law: "The sovereignty with which God dispenses forgiveness is just the sovereignty of law." In his sermon on "Moral Continuity" he says that God exercises judgment by a law of moral sequence: "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap;" "the order by which good action leads to greater good and evil action to greater evil: the principle that insures that it shall be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked;" "the judgment of God is only another name for the natural and inevitable consequence of our lives." He says: "There need be no element of uncertainty as to the forgiveness of the soul's sins. For no special acts of pardon need to be passed any more than, as we formerly remarked, there need be special acts of judgment. All happens according to the operation of unvarying law in the one case as in the other." This idea of "Moral Continuity" is borrowed from the Broad Church

divines, and is subject to all the objections that apply to this part of their theology. In the first place, it confounds moral law with natural law. The idea of law here presented is not Kant's categorical imperative, nor can any such conception of law ever generate the idea of duty. It can say—"It may be expedient or good for me to obey, for if I disobey I shall be destroyed;" but it does not say—"I ought, whatever may happen to me." In other words, it subverts the very idea of a moral government, substituting for the retributive wrath of an offended Lawgiver the mere reaction caused by our resisting the law itself. It puts consequences in the place of penalty. This theory would destroy morals, make Christianity impossible, and deprive us of all evidence for the personality of God. In the second place, there is no such uniform or unfailing dispensation in the present life as Dr. Mackintosh suggests, for life is full of inequalities and anomalies so great as to justify or furnish ground for the belief in a future state of rewards and punishments. In the third place, what becomes, on this theory, of God's forbearance and long-suffering, in the light of the testimony that "He hath not dealt with us after our sins, nor rewarded us according to our iniquities"? But, in the fourth place, where can there be room in this theory for forgiveness or grace at all? If a man has ceased to sin—that is, is sowing a different kind of seed—how can there be sin to forgive? All that God can do is to encourage him to destroy sin in his heart: that may argue Divine love—but there is no room for the operation of Divine mercy, for while God is thus represented as helping to save a man from his sin, He is not in any sense forgiving him.

These sermons find a place for both FAITH and REPENTANCE. Socinus says that nothing but repentance is required by God, and Mr. M'Farlan "believes in the omnipotence of repentance." We are not so sure that there is any room for Faith in a system which grounds itself on the Schleiermacher philosophy. The writers do certainly use the word occasionally in the Scripture sense, but they cannot justify this use on their principles. They destroy the distinction between faith and knowledge—faith saying, *credo quod non video*. If religion has its seat among the mere intuitions, a man is emancipated from the Word of God, and as "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God," it is an abuse of terms to apply the word *faith*, as Schleier-

macher does, to this intuitional experience or feeling. For in this case faith cometh *not* by hearing. Faith is not the belief of what man's own religious consciousness has discovered. It would in that case be a homage paid to his own religious consciousness or to the influence of the truth itself; the same, indeed, as God has revealed, but without any relation to God as having revealed it, and having no respect whatever to His authority. Such a faith is a belief in man's truth rather than God's, and rests on the influence of truth rather than on God's authority. It has nothing in common with that faith which "is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

We need say little concerning the eschatology of these writers. Dr. Mackintosh plainly asserts, and on his principles consistently enough, that there can be no future day of judgment such as the Scriptures represent as appointed for the end of the world. It is more difficult to know what Mr. M'Farlan believes about the future, or whether, indeed, he believes at all in the resurrection of the dead. We shall let him speak for himself:—

"The theologians of the present may find it, in the light of modern science, impossible to believe in the resuscitation of the material framework of the body. The belief in a material heaven into which the resuscitated bodies of the righteous shall pass has perished with the belief in the crystalline spheres. So likewise has the belief in a subterranean limbo in which the bodies of the wicked shall be grievously tormented. Discussions as to the nature of the general resurrection and the final judgment, as to the intermediate state and the condition of disembodied spirits during the period which intervenes between death and the end of the world, are grown somewhat out of date. The whole of the eschatology of the schoolmen, in fact, like their soteriology and their ontology, seems to the modern theologian to be in its details untenable."

It is a comfort, however, to think that we are not to lose our old purgatory, for though the Reformed Churches have long since parted company with the "schoolmen" at this point, it is the proud distinction of modern theologians like Dr. Mackintosh to save it out of the fire. Here it is: "The burden of sin will continue to oppress us and be the source of misery to us there [in the future life] as here, until, by a discipline of unknown severity, the cords which bind it on our souls are undone." The modern theologian can do without a Hell, but he cannot do without a Purgatory!

It would not be difficult to predict the effect of such teaching as this volume contains upon any community where it would be allowed to exercise its unchecked influence. Its natural tendency would be, through its emptiness as well as its audacity, to prepare the way for a Popish reaction. There is nothing in its mystical theology to satisfy the wants of a conscience labouring under a real conviction of guilt, or to meet the case of a soul that feels the nothingness of its bitterest penitence. It will drive men to Rome's refuge of lies just as so many rationalists of Germany, after undermining the authority of the Bible, had at last to fall back upon Church authority to sustain a faith which did not stand on the Bible. And if ever the world is to return to its bondage it will be by a path that leads through the wastes of unbelief. But we hope better things of Scotland. It has had its periods of reactionary thought, but it has always, through the good hand of the Lord, recovered itself on the lines of the old evangelism. But if the theology of these sermons should become widely prevalent—and we can hardly believe that mysticism, which is an alien growth in the Scotch mind, can be but a temporary phase of thought—it would soon empty the churches and paganise the masses. The experiment has been tried already in Germany, as well as in Ulster and in Scotland itself, during the eighteenth century, with results already known to us all. As regards church-going, Bible-reading, family religion, and other like symbols of a positive faith, there is in Germany a positive indifferentism hard to reconcile with the idea of a professedly Christian nation, and which has rather hardened than relaxed in the midst of the growing orthodoxy of the modern pulpit. The masses in our country may still hold to a nominal religion, but it will be a religion without love, without prayer, and without regenerating power. Individualism was never a church-building factor. It may gather adherents, promote æsthetic culture, and excite controversy, but it cannot extend or nourish a Church. What have been the great propagating periods of the Church? Not the ages of rationalistic or mystical speculation. Who have been the great propagators? Not Strauss, or Renan, or Schleiermacher, or Socinus, or Martineau, but the Calvins, Knoxes, Wesleys, and Whitfields, men who held by what Mr. M'Farlan contemptuously calls "the scholastic dogmas." Under the liberal theology the masses

are left uncared for. We have never heard of a liberal gospel for the poor. What definite message indeed has it to carry to a sin-stricken world? There is none such in this volume.¹ The world can never be conquered for Christ except through that gospel which is the power of God to salvation. The prevalence of this theology would likewise stop all Christian work. To judge by these sermons, the Church has much to learn from liberal divines on the duty of work and self-sacrifice. They talk of "the love which is always ready to sacrifice itself for the well-being of others," and advise every man to learn that "he must not be an idler in this busy hive, and it were better still if every man felt that his special work is assigned to him by God." This is all very well, but it is hardly so briskly or so well put as by Frederic Harrison and the Comtists when they are recommending their "altruism," which teaches a man to value his neighbour more than himself. It will be quite a new discovery if self-sacrificing love is found among liberal theologians. Their names are not to be found in the ranks of practical Christian philanthropy, especially in its more hopeless and uninviting fields.

In drawing this article to a close we cannot but remark upon the peculiar attitude of these writers to the Confession of Faith. There is a great demand for religious liberty in our days, and it is quite legitimate so far as it means the liberty to form and express religious opinions, whatever they may be, without check or hindrance; but it does not mean the liberty to form and avow two opposite opinions. This is the rather inconsistent liberty these writers enjoy, and which it would be extremely hard to reconcile with perfect intellectual sincerity, not to speak of something else that men of the world highly value. Perhaps they are adepts in that "chemistry of thought" by which Horace Bushnell was able to absorb as many creeds as were presented to his acceptance, without injury to his spiritual vitality. There is a better way. Exactly a hundred years ago some of the old Moderates drove Principal Robertson from the leadership of the Church by their persistent demand for a relaxation of the terms of subscription, but the heritors gave a quietus to the movement by hinting that there would

¹ The Rev. Mr. Haweis, a Broad Churchman, says in his *Speech in Season*: "The Broad Church has no congregations; all their churches are empty; there are only two or three such churches in London; and these are miserable failures." His own church, however, is a notable exception.

also be an end of stipends. Times, however, are changed. Tests that are but little burdensome need not be relaxed. Professor Knight pleads for "manifoldness of opinion" as the true characteristic of a National Church. But if a National Church is possible on this theory, this manifoldness of opinion would be a good reason for trying to alter the terms of subscription, or rather for abolishing them altogether. It is needless, however, to say that if a National Church is to include all varieties of opinion, it must cease to be a Church—"the communion of saints." It would become a religious monstrosity—a mere speculative club, or perhaps a mere organ of philosophy and culture. There is another question still, as to the duty of the Church of Scotland in present circumstances, with which we are not disposed to interfere, further than to say, that the Presbyterian Church everywhere is gravely compromised by the publication of these Sermons. We have been in the habit of boasting—perhaps too much—of our orthodoxy, as we watched the development of Anglo-Catholic and Rationalistic opinion inside the pale of the Church of England, and lamented while we censured that decay of all ecclesiastical life by which men who had abandoned her system of doctrines were allowed to continue in her ministry, and to use their position as a vantage-ground for the still further debasement of English Christianity. We had hoped that if heterodoxy should ever enter the Presbyterian fold, there would not be the same utter downfall of discipline, or the same disheartening spectacle of good men mourning over an evil which they had not the power or the resolution to shake off. Let us hope that the Church of Scotland will do her duty. When we remember how marvellously she revived after the shock of the Disruption, and consider what energy she has since thrown into all schemes of evangelistic and missionary work, what a theological literature she has been throwing off in the last thirty years, what a band of noble ministers she has, dispensing the Bread of Life through all her parishes, what a body of learned Professors, like Flint, Charteris, Milligan, Dickson, and Mitchell, she has for the training of her ministers, true to the old Westminster theology and to the traditions of evangelical Scotland, we cannot believe that she will meekly accept this latest affront to her orthodoxy and her order.

It is impossible to say whether or how far these sermons

represent any widespread revolt against Presbyterian orthodoxy. So far, however, as they embody any positive principles, we cannot think that the mystico-rationalism they attempt to popularise for Scottish use will find a permanent lodgment in these countries. An undogmatic position necessarily involves elements of instability, and is always in danger either of falling back into Romanism, or of going forward to Naturalism; but with a people like the Scotch, so distinguished by intellectual thoroughness as well as by intense convictions in religion, and by traditional veneration for the Bible, it is hard to believe in any approaching *débâcle* in the sphere of faith. Certainly, if the Bible loses its authority with Scotchmen, we may be prepared for a very thorough revolution in the dogmas of the Church, as well as for a most devitalising change in the national character. The words of Augustine are still true—“*Titubabit fides si vacillet S. scripturæ auctoritas.*” But we hope better things. There is at least one lesson to be learned from this latest outbreak of religious intuitionism. The Church must cherish a deeper faith in the universal need of the Spirit's influence in order to the saving reception of the truth. The letter is powerless without the Spirit. It is only when we receive the Spirit which is of God that we can know the things which are freely given us of God. The true Christian will find no rest except in the mutually supporting truths of an inspired Bible and an enlightening Spirit. He will thus be guarded against the false fascinations of a system which sends the soul trembling with its burden of anxieties from the Word of Truth to the many-voiced oracle which has sanctioned by its infallible response almost every form of fanaticism and wickedness which has ever scourged or vexed the world. There is no hope for Christianity but in a well-balanced theology, neither too objective nor too subjective, richly intellectual and profoundly spiritual, accepting the Bible, not as the mere shadowy expression of the subjective experience of man, but as God's own objective revelation, with a self-evidencing power to command alike the homage of intellect and heart. But, above all, the Church must realise the grand idea of Chrysostom by projecting herself more visibly upon the world as a present living body of evidence, a present and perpetual witness of the living Christ.

THOMAS CROSKERY.

ART. III.—*Ten Days in Strassbourg.*

WE reached Paris late on the evening of the 19th of May, and next morning we may be said to have begun our work. Our mission was one of inquiry into the religious condition of Alsace-Lorraine, with special reference to the state and prospects of the Jews there. It was thought that some among the French Evangelical ministers might be able to help us on our way, and with this in view we called first on Dr. Fisch and Dr. Pressensé. Dr. Fisch's house was easily found. He lives in the Rue de Rivoli, but unfortunately he had gone to England. To reach Dr. Pressensé we had to cross the Seine, to search about in a much less fashionable neighbourhood, and to mount at last I will not venture to say how many stairs. We were well accustomed to the "privations" of Scottish Free Church country manses, but we felt a little ashamed of our comforts when we found the greatest of French Protestant preachers writing in a study more unpretentious than our own, with apparently fewer books, and occupying a flat on the fourth or fifth story of a house which seemed as high as the ancient "lands" of the Lawnmarket.

Dr. Pressensé, to whom I had a letter of introduction, received us with great kindness, and at once said that if we wanted information about Strassbourg, he could commend us to one who knew all about it—his own son-in-law, M. Boegner, who lived in the adjoining street. After a little talk, therefore, in the course of which M. de Pressensé expressed himself as very hopeful both as to the political and the religious future of France, we sallied forth in search of our new authority. M. Boegner's residence was in an even less attractive locality than that which we now left, and in a still more elevated situation. But one must pay something for living in Paris. Besides, we could not but acknowledge that if the majority of our ministers are better housed, they are not the equals in outward culture of those who have the advantage of French civilisation. We discovered at once that M. Boegner was the man we needed. He is Sub-Director, or assistant-secretary as we would call it, of the French Evangelical Missionary Society, a Society which

is supported by the Free Church, Reformed (or State) Church, and the Lutherans alike, and which is doing good work among the Basutos of South Africa. But, what was more to the point, we found that M. Boegner is himself an Alsatian, and that he was able to give us a letter of commendation to his own father, who had laboured long as the Rector of the Gymnasium in Strassbourg, and who still lives there in the enjoyment of a green old age. We called afterwards upon the venerable Professor, when we had arrived at our destination, but he was from home. He came to our hotel, however, upon his return, and we spent more than an hour together with him in most interesting and edifying conversation. He belonged visibly to a well-known and characteristic type, that of the shrewd, dry, intelligent, and grimly humorous school of classical preceptors. It was doubtful whether he had much real interest in Pietism of any sort. Certainly he did not concern himself a great deal about the conversion of the Jews; but he had kept his eyes open in life, and his observations were often very pointed and suggestive. It was interesting to notice the difference between the strong but rugged trunk in Strassbourg, and the tall, graceful, cultured slip which has grown up in Paris. The son, in his contact with Pressensé and the Basutos, has encountered softening influences unknown to the father. However, we were greatly indebted to them both, and I am anxious to place our gratitude on record here.

But there was another Parisian minister to whom we were under as great obligations; this was M. Dumas of the Lutheran Church at Courbevoie. He had studied for a winter or two in Edinburgh, and had there made friends, through whom I had previously been brought into correspondence with him. We were therefore not absolute strangers when we met in his house under the tiles in the suburban village where he lives, on the western side of the Seine. In M. Dumas we found another Alsatian, and from him we received an introduction which proved of inestimable value to us when we arrived in Strassbourg. I would gladly linger at this point for a little, to rehearse some of the things which came out in the course of our conversation, as for example this, that there are not a few English residents in the neighbourhood of Courbevoie for whom no man cares, and who are in a very serious sense God-forsaken. They con-

sist of people attracted to the spot by the horse-races. Neuilly is the French Newmarket; and there is not much prospect of good-doing among men who earn their living by sport. But it is not of Paris that this paper is meant to treat, and we must hurry on. I have said so much merely to indicate the quarters whence help in our quest was afforded to us.

To reach Strassbourg in one journey from Paris implies continuous travelling for about fifteen hours, but by starting in the early afternoon there is time enough to see something of the country and dine (at Épernay) before the curtain of the night is drawn, and in May the daylight returns sufficiently soon to allow pleasant glimpses of the lands which lie beyond the darkness, and nearer the Rhine. We arrived at our destination on a Saturday, and the forenoon had not much advanced when we sallied forth from our hotel in search of the synagogue. This was found with some difficulty. The Jews form an important section of the community, there being three thousand of them in all; but, under the French, they do not seem to have been treated with such marked consideration as they are now receiving from the German authorities. At any rate, we were told that on a recent occasion, when the jubilee of the Chief Rabbi was being celebrated, and an immense crowd had gathered in the synagogue, the Burgo-meister, who was present by invitation, looked round with dissatisfaction on the kind of accommodation provided for such a large and respectable body of worshippers, and intimated that a new sanctuary must forthwith be erected at the cost of the municipality. The catholic-minded mayor has proved to be as good as his word. Whether he spoke under a sudden impulse, or under the influence of a policy which had been previously well considered, certain it is that plans for a more suitable synagogue are actually being prepared, and we may hear of the result being a kindlier feeling toward the imperial régime among the Alsatian Israelites. Germany has not, as a rule, been very friendly to the Jews of late, and among no class of the inhabitants has the change which has recently taken place been more unpopular than among the Jews of Alsace. The proposal, therefore, to build them a synagogue is a very politic one, and may prove well worth the considerable sum of money which the undertaking will cost.

The Strassbourg synagogue is a very plain structure indeed. Outside it can boast of no beauty, and internally it has obviously been arranged so as to hold as many people as possible. It is closely seated on the ground-floor, and it has two ranges of galleries, an upper and a lower, running round three of the walls. We were too late for the service, but from the sacristan, who showed us over the place, and whom we found to be a most intelligent person, we derived so much information that we found little needing to be added to it in the course of our subsequent inquiries. The last census shows that there are just 39,000 Jews in the combined province of Elsass-Lothringen. These are distributed as follows:—In Lower Alsace, which includes Strassbourg, there are 19,700 ; in Upper Alsace, which embraces Mühlhausen, are 11,250 ; and in Lothringen, the capital of which is Metz, there are a little over 8000. They are chiefly occupied with commerce of all sorts. A very few may be husbandmen, but the great majority are shopkeepers, cattle-dealers, or money-lenders. Very few of them live in a style suggesting the possession of riches, and the rich class is now smaller than it once was, for, as has been already said, the Jews of Alsace are strongly French in their sympathies, and after the war those of them who could afford to do so migrated to Paris or elsewhere. But the amount of their wealth is not to be estimated by appearances. The zeal with which they prosecute every sort of trade that seems to promise profit makes it more than likely that they are a good deal richer than they look, and this view is confirmed by the gay dresses which their young ladies especially wear on Sunday. One may traverse the streets of London for days without being compelled to think of the dispersion of Israel, but in the streets of the Alsatian towns the Hebrew cast of countenance presents itself so often that one cannot but remember the Jews there, and some strange thoughts are suggested, when on the Christian Sabbath, and in a Gentile city, we encounter Jewish girls attired as for a ball-room.

In Alsace, as everywhere, the Jews are divided into two great parties, the Orthodox or Traditional, and the Reformed. It is a curious use of the word "Reformed," which we find more and more coming in various connections into current use on the Continent. The Reformation under Luther was a *return* to

apostolic doctrine and practice, and reformation in general was in former times considered to mean *improvement* of some sort, whether that implied advance or retrogression! But it seems now-a-days to be taken for granted that the old is for certain the *untrue*, and he is without a doubt a reformer who in any direction is leaving it behind. A "Reformed" Jew is one who has practically got rid of Moses and the Old Testament, who follows not the Law and the Testimony, but his own rationalisings, and who cares for no other "Promised Land" than a country in which he can make money. The link which still connects such a person with the synagogue is very slight. Traditional feeling may continue to hold him in nominal communion, but when local associations cease to affect him, he is very apt to break with religion altogether, and the number is steadily increasing of those who are open and professed free-thinkers. It goes without saying that Jews who reach that position are the most hopeless of their class. The Christian missionary who has one to deal with who, like himself, believes in the divine legation of Moses, can find a fulcrum without much difficulty on which his lever of argument can rest. But a Jewish *infidel* has morally, intellectually, and emotionally gone beyond the sphere in which appeals to authority carry weight, and it is literally true that his restoration to the faith is usually a more difficult achievement than the conversion even of a French unbeliever. We were told that Traditionalism is steadily going to the wall in Strassbourg, and that the Reformed party has already secured the countenance of the Chief Rabbi himself, who, on the occasion of his jubilee, made a very "liberal" speech indeed. Perhaps he was moved, in part, to meet the courtesy of the Christian Burgomeister, but it was the distinct impression of those who read his address that it was of the nature of a manifesto. In the country the new currents have, of course, not yet begun to tell so sensibly, but the process of demoralisation has commenced there also. There is not much of missionary work going on among the Jews of Alsace. The London Society (Church of England) has an agent, a young, pleasant-mannered, and obviously sincere German Jewish convert, but in learning and position and personal weight of character, he makes much too slight a piece of artillery to tell effectively on such a

fortress. The Scottish Free Church is better represented in Dr. Fürst, a scholarly man and an earnest Christian, but he is too much occupied with the regular English service, which he has thought it wise to institute, to find time for the more direct aggressive work which is necessary to give any great chance of success in the way of conversions. It must be admitted, however, that the field is in itself a most discouraging one. The Jewish missionary must feel in Strassbourg a good deal like a small force which is set down before an obviously impregnable town. The besiegers may be satisfied that they have something to do in remaining at their post. They can keep an eye on the enemy and take advantage of any postern that happens to open. They can watch also, so as to report what is going on to their own headquarters. But they know that they cannot take the castle, and the disproportion between their own strength and what is in front of them is apt to demoralise. I know not any class of Christian labourers that more need sympathy and cheer and prayer than those who are addressing themselves to the business of gathering in the dispersed of Israel.

Both Alsace and Lorraine, as is well known, belonged originally to Germany. Metz, for example, was a free city of the German Empire, until it was taken by the French in 1552, and Strassbourg owned the same sovereignty till 1681, when Louis XIV., who had previously subdued the other parts of Alsace during the Thirty Years' War, suddenly attacked and took it in a time of peace. These conquests were ultimately sanctioned in a regular way by treaty. But when France lay at the feet of Germany in 1871 these old raids were remembered, and Prince Bismarck insisted that a restoration of the captured provinces behoved to be made, as a condition of peace. We all recollect the tears which were shed by poor M. Jules Favre when this, as he deemed it, monstrous proposition was submitted to him. The very bitterness of feeling, however, which the severance has caused promises hopefully for the future of German rule. Who can doubt that two hundred years ago there were Alsatians who resented as keenly their transference to France? Time has worked wonders. Strassbourg became in the course of a century or so more French in its sympathies than Paris. And we may fairly

expect that when the third generation has been reached its citizens will be singing the *Watch by the Rhine* as enthusiastically as the Berliners.

The astute Germans are doing their very best to hasten on the change of sentiment. No school, not even those conducted by private persons, is permitted to use the French language as the medium of communicating instruction. The ingenuous youth of the city have put into their hands, not those lying legends which tell of Gallic enterprise and bravery, but the truer stories which represent the Teutons as the heroes of every age. Nor is the newspaper press left unguided to meet the demands, whatever they are, of the locality. An accomplished editor has been brought all the way from the capital to explain daily to the people the nature and excellence of the imperial policy.

Hitherto the success of all this has not been conspicuous. The Strassbourgers see their city in the hands of invaders. Every second or third man on their side-walks is a German soldier. When they pass into the country they find rising around them fortifications more formidable than any which have been destroyed. And although they still cherish in their hearts the hope that a day of deliverance may come, they cannot lose sight of the fact that even deliverance must mean for them greater trouble than they have ever yet known.

"We submit," said one old lady to me, "because it seems the will of God. But *the joy has gone out of our lives.*" She had some cause to speak bitterly. Her house, which she had lived in through all the siege, was in an exposed situation, and was struck eighty times and set on fire twice. For five days and nights, while the bombardment preliminary to the final assault was proceeding, she and her sisters never went to bed. Happily she was well enough provided with food, but her cousin, one of the city clergy, who, with his family, was driven to take refuge in a cellar, suffered great privations, living chiefly on horse-flesh. Reminiscences like these are not easily forgotten. And although all open opposition has disappeared, there still slumbers an enmity which shows itself in ways that the Germans themselves keenly feel. "None of us likes the place," said one of the new Professors to me, "and we would most of us leave it if we could." He is a good, kindly

man, and he hungered for the social and religious intercourse which he used to have in his own country. But he is a symbol of the conquest. No Alsatian family of standing will offer him a welcome, and even the native Evangelicals would look askance upon him if he were to attempt to take a part in their conferences or meetings for prayer. Of course this irritation will in time die down ; but meanwhile it exists in a very palpable form, and requires to be considered both when you are trying to form an idea of the political state of Alsace, and when you are thinking of its religious future.

In Strassbourg, as in Germany generally, the State stands to the various Churches *in loco parentis*. What may be the character of the dogmas taught in any particular place it does not trouble itself to inquire. The people, it holds, have a right to whatever religion they prefer, and teachers to suit each sect are provided at the public expense. Thus there are three very different Confessions established in the city,—viz., the Jewish, the Roman Catholic, and the Protestant. If you visit the synagogue you meet one State-paid ecclesiastic there in the person of the Chief Rabbi. If you enter the magnificent Cathedral, and witness the ceremonies of the Mass, you may there too have the satisfaction of thinking that the priests have the material support of a broad-minded Government. Or if you are not altogether content to see the money of all so expended, you may experience a measure of relief when you seek a Lutheran place of worship, and learn that a share of what is going comes also with perfect impartiality to the clergy of that communion.

Nor is this system of concurrent endowment merely *submitted to*. One of the most curious features of Strassbourg society is what we may call an enthusiasm for State Churches. Even among the truly good and pious people there is an almost superstitious dread of any ecclesiastical organisation being set up which shall be independent of political control. Among the many residents whose acquaintance we made was M. Mouron. I had a note of introduction to him from a friend in Scotland, and in that note he was designated as "Pastor of the French Reformed Church." But, in point of fact, he is pastor of no *Church*, properly speaking. He is a Swiss preacher from the Canton de Vaud, and he was invited to Strassbourg to conduct evangelical services for the benefit of

those who were dissatisfied with the regular teaching in the city churches. But in coming he was taken expressly bound *not* to form a congregation. Those who called him had no intention of leaving the Established Church—no wish to set up a Free Church. And they insist that M. Mouron shall neither dispense the sacraments nor even visit in a ministerial way. I suspect that the strange feeling thus revealed, is not quite so strong as it once was. We did meet with one or two persons to whom the idea of a Free Church had ceased to be shocking. But the prejudice still operates in such a degree that even the independent services of Dr. Fürst *in English* are looked upon with evident jealousy.

There are causes in operation, however, which must ultimately issue either in the almost entire suppression of religious life, or in a breaking off from the existing ecclesiastical system.

At present the city clergy belong in a very marked way to different schools. One of them, who is greatly respected, is a High Churchman, with strong Sacramentarian views. Another is a Rationalist, of a type so pronounced, that he has not hesitated to speak, in the pulpit, of Christ and Buddha as occupying substantially the same platform. A third is an Evangelical, who bears an honoured name, and who invariably gathers a crowd around him to listen when it is announced that he is to preach. This last is M. Herter. His father holds in Alsace the same sort of place in the memories of the people that Chalmers does in the recollections of the people of Scotland. "Father Herter," as he is still affectionately called, was the founder of one of the noblest institutions which exist anywhere, that of the Deaconesses' House in Strassbourg, and his son, apart from his own individual merits, occupies a vantage-ground by reason of his connection with such a public benefactor. Now it so happens that the Ritualist, the Rationalist, and the Evangelical are all, if we are not mistaken, ministers of the same Church. The inhabitants do not make any mistake about them. Each Saturday the newspapers announce who is to officiate at the different hours. But it is quite conceivable that a stranger may, in the course of a single Sunday, hear in the same place, and from the same pulpit, doctrines which are mutually destructive. There is absolutely no control over the teaching of the Church. When a minister

is once inducted into a charge he may say literally *anything*. Indeed, a most intelligent Christian Strassbourger hesitates when asked if there would be no interference if a man blankly denied the existence of a personal God.

Of course, under a system like this there can be no congregational life. The various classes of worshippers naturally fall into the habit of attending the services which best suit them. And a church which is crowded at nine may be nearly empty at three. But worse days are threatening to come. The young men issuing from the Universities belong increasingly to the half-believing class, and, as has been already indicated, one or other of two alternative results must follow. Either under such teaching as that which already exists in Strassbourg, and which is certain to extend, the life will be crushed out altogether, or relief will be sought in Free Churches or in conventicles in nominal connection with the State Church. This last-mentioned refuge has already begun to be resorted to. One Sabbath evening we had the great pleasure of taking part in a service which has been organised in a suburban village as a relief from the rationalism of the parish church. The service was directed by M. Krüger, a licentiate of theology, and a most accomplished man, to whom we were indebted in innumerable ways during our stay in Strassbourg. The people who crowded that night into the upper room where we met for worship had no thought of setting up an independent congregation. Perhaps they had, most of them, been in the State church in the morning, but they could not be content with the Paganism which was proclaimed there, and in an irregular way they were seeking to supplement the service by hearing the gospel faithfully preached in the evening.

We have said that the chances are all in favour of the ministry in Alsace becoming increasingly unbelieving. It is not difficult to foresee this progress. Strassbourg boasts of a theological seminary, in which most of the young men who enter the Church of the province are (naturally) educated; and we may guess what the fruit must be from the kind of seed which is sown there.

The Faculty consists of eight Professors and one *Privat-Dozent*.

REUSS stands at the head of the list, at once in age and

reputation. He has been fifty years connected with the University, and his jubilee was recently celebrated. I had a note of introduction to him, but unfortunately he was not able at the time to perform the work of his class, and was rustivating in Baden-Baden. It is not necessary to say much by way of indicating his position. There can be little doubt that it was in his lecture-room that those views were first propounded which have since met with so much acceptance in Germany and in some quarters even at home. Reuss was the founder of the school of Graf and Kuenen and Wellhausen. As a lecturer he is said to be attractive and full of life. His subject is the Old Testament, but in his next course he proposes to treat of the times from before Christ to the destruction of Jerusalem. I tried to ascertain whether Reuss is standing still in his opinions or is still advancing, but I found that in regard to him, as well as others, a strong impression exists that he does not tell out all his mind. One of his own colleagues laughed when I put the question to him, and intimated that the shrewd old man is much too wise to take all the world prematurely into his confidence. Anyhow, it does not promise hopefully for the Alsatian ministry that their most popular teacher is the man who has done more than most to disenchant the Bible for many.

Of KUNITZ we happened to hear nothing at all in Strassbourg, but in answer to an inquiry addressed to one who knows, we have received the following account, which will be read with interest. "His subject is the exegesis of the New Testament, and in particular that of the Epistles of St. John. He is a man of eminent knowledge. Unfortunately, however, he has no facility in communicating it to others, either orally or by writing. He belongs to those of our Professors who are very reserved with regard to their convictions; yet there is no doubt that he inclines more or less to the doctrines of the school of Tübingen, and he seems to me to be an old sceptic. His lectures are exceedingly monotonous and fatiguing, and they are only frequented because no other Professor lectures on the same subject, and because he is the President of the Commission for the examinations. His next lectures will be on the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. Reuss and Kunitz are working together at a complete edition of Calvin's works."

KAYSER was, till five or six years ago, a working clergyman,

but his learning procured his appointment to a chair, and he reads on the Old Testament. He is a disciple of Reuss, inclining, however, even still more to the left than his teacher. He has published a critical work on the Pentateuch, in which he continues what Graf began. Possessing no oratorical gifts, he is not popular as a lecturer, and his class is very poorly attended. Next semester he proposes to take Old Testament Introduction and Isaiah i.-xl.

The *Church History* Professor is ZOEPFFEL. He is still a young man, and is believed to incline to positive theology, but a student tells me, who is not very strait-laced himself, that "*he is very careful in confessing, and scarcely shows his colours.*" Zoepffel was one of the Professors to whom we were commended as likely to be interested in our mission. Circumstances prevented our seeing him, but it was probably just as well. He has evidently come so far under the spell of the place that he might have felt embarrassed by being claimed as in any respect evangelical.

After REUSS, and now that Reuss's best days are over, *before* him perhaps in reputation is HOLTZMANN. His lecturing territory is the New Testament, particularly the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. He is a disciple of Baur, and a champion besides of the radical party and of the *Protestanten-Verein*. This is an Association composed of eighty societies and 26,000 members, whose professed object it is "to uphold the right of free inquiry and freedom of conscience in matters of faith, and to promote a healthy revival of popular religious life and harmony of all Churches in the unity of the Spirit." It is a finely-sounding programme, but the account, which appears in the July number of *The Modern Review*, of the twelfth meeting of the General Assembly of the Association, enables us to read between the lines. The men who are banding themselves together in the interests of free inquiry are men who are resolutely opposed to the old Lutheran doctrines, and who decidedly refuse to accept "the mediæval theology" as a means of solving the great problems of existence. In plain terms, one of the Professors in the Strassbourg theological faculty is a prominent member of a *Verein* which is openly and determinedly opposed to that Augsburg Confession on which the Church of the province is based. As a critic he is doing for the New Testament what Reuss and his followers have

done for the Old. By means of that infallible scent which enables scholars to detect what is original and what is foreign matter in a book, he has "pulled away" the accretions in, for example, the Epistle to the Colossians. A very small nucleus indeed of that letter is St. Paul's; and he has published a handy edition of it, in which by the help of large and small type he has made patent to the naked eye what portions are genuine or the reverse. Holtzmann is a great favourite with his students. He is described by those who know him as a man of deep religious feeling. But this is no recommendation in the eyes of those who view with concern his influence on the making of the future Alsatian Church. If he were a scoffer or a trifler, his criticism would not go for much. But a Professor who is at once religious and interesting, and destructive, is to be feared exceedingly; and who can wonder that cases should be constantly occurring of young men coming out of the country manse of Alsace, and speedily losing all faith in the inspiration of the Book which it is to be their life-work to expound?

KRAUSS is a Swiss by birth. He is described as, like Zoepffel, *inclining toward positive theology*, which means that he has not quite broken with the Augsburg Confession. He lectures on Systematic Divinity and Ethics, and is particularly liked when he deals with the practical aspects of his subject. His class is not numerous. We counted just seven young men in it on the one occasion when we were present. But personally he is very agreeable and accessible, and if we might draw an inference from the very familiar terms on which we saw him to be with his students (they formed a smoking group together on the pavement in front of the College before the lecture began), we should say that his direct influence could not but be good. We do not know particularly what dogmatic system Krauss teaches, but we know this, that in relation to such subjects as Inspiration, he is (judging from our point of view) very advanced and *still advancing*. He is a comparatively young man, with no such views of the authority of Scripture as to be restrained by it in his speculations, and, breathing continually the atmosphere he does, we should not be at all surprised to hear of his being *anywhere* ten years hence.

Of all the Professors, we heard no one spoken of with such warmth as COUNT BAUDISSLIN. He was brought up at Leipzig

at the feet of Delitzsch, and although he has now gone far beyond his master, he still cherishes for him the most affectionate regard. He lectures on the Old Testament; but he treats his subject in a large and comprehensive way. He has written a work on the Semitic Religions, and a favourite topic with him in his class is the history and philosophy of the religions to which the Old Testament refers. Personally he is a warm-hearted Christian, and impresses even his students with his being truly pious. Yet the Count told us without reserve or hesitation that he accepts the *Pious Fraud* theory of Deuteronomy. That book he thinks was not written by Moses, but by some anonymous person in the reign of Josiah. He admits that the author imposed upon his generation, that he *said* it was written by Moses, and that the people believed him. When I asked how God came into that plot, he answered that God has often chosen the weak things of this world to confound the mighty, nay, that He has sometimes allowed *lies* (as for example Jacob's) to be worked into the chain of His providential developments. The book, he held, was one which admirably served its purpose, and on that account the Israelitish nation was deliberately allowed to remain under a delusion about it, even when a fresh revelation was made in Christ. The calmness with which so good a man laid down this theory, as one which commended itself to him, was slightly confounding, and I asked his views about the inspiration of a book which had in his opinion such a history. As I expected, these views were of a kind which if generally adopted would deprive the Bible of any real authority. The spiritual illumination which the Scripture writers enjoyed differ, he thinks, in degree but not in kind from that which has been the heritage of saints in all ages. Luther and St. Paul were really, in this connection, substantially on a par. And we are not to be surprised if we find errors of various sorts in what we call the Word of God. Count Baudissin is of all the Strassbourg Professors the man who is most in sympathy with the orthodox Churches of England, and one may judge from the best specimen what kind of training is being given to the future ministry of Alsace.

There are two other men belonging to the Faculty who may be dismissed with a word. LOBSTEIN is a Professor-Extraordinary, who lectures on Systematic Divinity, and is considered dry but sound. LUCIUS, the *Privat-Docent*, is on the contrary *liberal*,

in the Holtzmann sense, and has lectured during the last semester on the ecclesiastical history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He is still assistant preacher in one of the city churches, and a very young man.

"All our Professors," writes a student, who himself accepts the teaching of the Faculty, "all our Professors do homage to Biblical criticism, and exercise it with the greatest acuteness. We have no adherents of the theory of inspiration or of orthodox dogmatik. Even those called positive theologians are more or less at variance with many doctrines of our Church. A great mistake at our University is the fact that we have to study theological science for the sake of science alone, and that little attention is paid to the fact that most of the students are to become clergymen, and not University Professors."

The Professors are paid and appointed by the State, the Church and the Faculty having no right beyond expressing their respective wishes, and, when once an appointment has been made, the holder of it is left free to teach whatever he pleases. The Church has thus no direct control over the University training of her students, theology being treated, like botany or natural history, as something on which learned men, as such, must be left free to prelect. Of course, in addition to an academic licence, which a young man may get by showing his knowledge of the teaching he has received, the Church may add other tests, by way of securing loyalty to her own standards; but what chance is there for evangelical doctrine of any sort long maintaining itself in Alsace against the overpowering influence of the currents which flow through the recognised Divinity Hall? A few here and there may be preserved to the faith, *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*, but the mass must go down with the stream, and the Lutheranism of the next generation must give place to the Protestanten-Verein. So disintegrating in its effects is the atmosphere which is being breathed in Strassbourg, that good men there freely express their alarm for the decadence of their own faith, and look wistfully to England as possessing a religious life strong enough to counteract the fatal currents of the time. Some others speak with absolute despair of what seems certain to come not many years hence; and even those who have no doubt that they are being really led out into the light are frank enough to acknowledge that they would not tell all they think to the people.

It is a happy circumstance that, in our own country, our theological faculties exist for other purposes than the merely scientific discussion of the problems of the hour. They are the training-schools of the Churches to which they belong, and as such they are useless, and worse than useless, if they are not preparing men to do the work of the Churches which are calling them to the ministry. In the present time it is especially important that the tone of all orthodox seminaries should be heartily believing. The general influence of a Professor's teaching, as has been well said by an American writer, must to a great extent determine his fitness. And no Professor whose influence on the whole promotes doubt should be allowed to remain in an evangelical institution. The whole tendency of Strassbourg teaching is to promote doubt; and however learned and estimable the Professors are, they bring no hope of blessing to the Lutheran Church of Alsace.

On our way home¹ we happened to be witnesses of a magnificent "function" of some sort in the Cathedral at Cologne. The building was filled with an immense crowd, and a great procession with gleaming lights filed in and out in the growing darkness among the pillars of the Sanctuary. In one aspect of it, what we saw seemed a mummary, and yet in another the spectacle filled us with respect. Here at any rate *faith* of some kind was lingering, and we could not help thinking, as it passed, that at a time, not perhaps very far remote, there might come to be parts of Germany in which the only appearance of a living religion among the people would be in the Church of Rome. Reuss has destroyed, for those who believe in him, the foundations of the Old Testament; Holtzmann is doing the same deadly work with the New; and in a land where worship is not much attended to at any rate, it will not require a very great deal more, as the *Spectator* once showed, to reduce the inhabitants to practical paganism. Happily there is another conceivable alternative—that God may revive His own work, and bring about another Reformation. Let us trust that this, and not the other, shall be the issue.

NORMAN L. WALKER.

¹ My fellow-deputy was the Rev. W. Affleck of Auchtermuchty; we were also joined by the Rev. P. Macainsh of Lochgelly.

ART. IV.—*Christ's Victory over Death.*

THE most scientifically accurate treatment of this question resolves itself ultimately into an exposition of that *locus insignis*, Heb. ii. 14, 15: "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." There are one or two passages, such as Hosea xiii. 14, "O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction;" and again, the well-remembered exultation of Paul in writing to the Corinthians, "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" But the value of these is chiefly rhetorical. It remains that the theology of this singularly interesting and indeed very glorious topic is laid up in the verses of Hebrews which we have quoted. And to these verses we propose devoting a somewhat careful consideration. Like the gold-dust merchant, with covetous eye and greedy hand, we would fain gather up the most minute particles and finest fibres of thought on a topic so immediately affecting the official glory of the Son of God, and so directly bearing on the eternal destinies of His holy universe. The Church flickers in her Divine life, and becomes shallow in her Divine knowledge, when she thinks she has ascertained all that is implied in the death of Christ. Not without its being the dictate of infinite wisdom did the Redeemer require His Church to "show forth his death until he shall come again." She ought to be filled with a habitual and holy astonishment in her daily believing contemplations of "that wondrous cross on which the Lord of glory died." And if we now seek to penetrate a little further than is usually attempted into one of the more immediate effects of the death of Christ, may it not be without somewhat of that light and reverence which He whose office it is to testify of Christ is so willing to supply!

In that remarkable theological utterance of Holy Scripture there are two effects ascribed to the death of Christ—or, more properly, there are two works which Christ, through His

death, is said to have accomplished. There is a work of destruction, and there is a work of deliverance. On the one hand, there is the destruction of him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; on the other hand, there is the deliverance of them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.

Here also there is a tyrant (that is, the devil); and his slaves (that is, the children, partakers of flesh and blood). The tyrant wields the power of death; the slaves tremble under the fear of death. All the power of the tyrant is included, substantially, in the power of death; all the subjection and misery of his slaves may be run up ultimately into their liability to death and their fear of death. It is clear, also, the death of which the one has the power and the other the dread is the self-same death. In either case it is that unknown and unfathomed abyss of misery of which God spake when He said: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

This death constitutes the whole power of the tyrant and the whole dread of his slaves. It is, in fact, the entire bond in virtue of which this relation subsists between them—this relation of tyranny on his part, of subjection and bondage on theirs. Against this bond—this death through which the tyrant triumphs, and through the dread of which his miserable subjects tremble—against this bond a Destroyer of the tyrant, a Deliverer of his victims, must manifestly direct his efforts. Against this bond—this death—Christ, in destroying the devil and delivering the children, does direct His efforts: and that in a most singular way. "Through *death* he destroyed him that had the power of death, that is, the devil, and delivered them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." He effectually destroys him that had the power of death, and He does so *through death*: He delivers them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage, and He does so *through death*. And as we have seen that the death of which the one has the power and the death of which the others have the dread are the same, it seems probable, even at first sight, that the death which Christ dies, the death of which the devil has the power, and the death to which (and to the fear of which) the children are subject, are all three the

same. It is, in fact, in their being all three the same that the unloosing of this awful knot is accomplished. By dying that selfsame death of which Satan had the power, and to which sinful men were liable, He destroyed him that had the power of it, and delivered them that had the dread of it.

Let us contemplate, then, this death of Christ as, first, a work of destruction ; and then, and therefore, a work of deliverance.

I. Through death Christ destroyed him that had the power of death.

Two preliminary explanations are here called for—*first*, When the “power of death” is thus assigned on Scriptural, that is Divine, authority to the devil, it is not meant to acknowledge that he possesses any lawful, judicial, and sovereign power of life and death. “God is judge himself.” God is supreme Sovereign. In His hands, as the blessed and only Potentate, are life and death. “I kill, and I make alive.” At His appointment, as the only Judge, are the sentences of life and death. It is He that saith, on the one hand, “Do this and live ;” on the other, “The soul that sinneth shall die.” Meantime, mankind having become, through their sin, liable to the sentence of death, are by that penal infliction cast out of the household and kingdom and care of God, into that domain of darkness and death of which Satan is the prince. Finding us, by complicity in his own revolt from God, lying under the guilt of death, Satan, the spirit of greatest subtlety and power in the ranks of the fallen—being allowed of God, for his greater punishment, and that of all who hold with him, to exercise dominion as the leading principality of the powers of darkness—malignantly, yet, alas ! effectually enough wields against us the liability to death, which the righteous curse of God’s law inflicts. The very righteousness of that penalty then becomes Satan’s strength and stronghold. In virtue of that penalty, he claims us as under the curse of God, abandoned of God, exposed helplessly and hopelessly to his power. As in the language of the Psalm (lxxi. 10, 11), “They that lay wait for my soul take counsel together, saying, God hath forsaken him : take and persecute him, for there is none to deliver him.” Thus much for the sense in which Satan has the power of death. The *second*

explanation refers to the sense in which the devil is, by Christ's death, "destroyed." It cannot, of course, be supposed that the substance of his being is annihilated, or that his supremacy, as within his own kingdom, is abolished. Personally, he still remains; and he still remains the prince of the devils and the lost. But as having the power of death (in the sense explained)—to that extent, and as one might say *officially and in that capacity*—he is destroyed. The guilt of death on the children's part is the sole ground of the "power of death" over them on Satan's part. Remove that guilt of death on their part, and the power of death on his part is destroyed; or he himself, *as wielding that power of death*, on his part, is destroyed. As for any influence, any interest, he can assert or maintain in that direction any longer, Satan is as good as annihilated.

Now this Christ achieves "through death." "Through death he destroyed him that had the power of death." And a careful examination of the facts of the history, and the implications of the doctrine, reveal these two truths—

(1.) That, *before* dying, Christ *defeated* him that has the power of death.

(2.) That *by* dying He *destroyed* him.

Before dying He conquered and routed him; *by* dying, He pursued and destroyed him. Before dying, Christ in the conflict and victory proved that Satan had no power over *Him*; and by dying for *others* He took away the power of death that Satan had over *them*. The *first* of these achievements was the *defeating* of him that had the power of death and driving him from the field. The *second* was pursuing and *destroying* him.

1. *First*, then, Christ *before He died* defeated him that had the power of death.

Our blessed Lord was not brought to death by him that had the power of death. Vanquishing and overthrowing Satan's power, He went voluntarily to death. Christ did not meet death passively—with any one overpoweringly pressing death upon Him as a doom which He could not evade—exercising over Him the power of death. But He met death voluntarily, actively, by His own positive deed. This great truth has of late almost lapsed out of our theology, insomuch that not a

few are quite conscious of the feeling of novelty and astonishment when it is vigorously put before their minds.

Jesus died *voluntarily*, not by being overpowered. Nay, that is not enough to bring out the doctrine of Scripture. He *actively* offered himself to God. He was not a slain Lamb only ; He was an active—the acting—Priest.

Thus when the hour appointed of His Father was near—the hour and the power of darkness—Jesus said, “Henceforth I will not talk much with you, for the prince of this world cometh, but hath nothing in me. But that the world may know that I love the Father, arise, let us go hence.” The prince of this world—the god of this world—that wicked one in whom the world lieth, and who wieldeth over the wicked world the power of death—he “cometh ;” cometh now as if he had never come before, cometh to his fullest, his fatal, his final assault. But he “hath nothing in me.” In what sense had Satan nothing in Christ? Manifestly in reference to that death which Jesus is now about to die. ‘He hath nothing in Me by means of which, or by reason of which, he might inflict death on Me, and make Me his victim. I shall indeed be a victim ; but it shall be the Father’s victim : an offering of a sweet-smelling savour unto God, all holy to the Lord ; no atom, no hair’s-breadth in me of that plague-spot by reason whereof Satan might insert his influence, or make good his claim, or wield his power of death.’ “By one man sin entered into the world, and *death by sin*.” “By sin” doth death enter, and the power of death. But in Jesus was no sin. He was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. “Such an high priest became us.” Mark that—an *high priest*. We needed a Lamb, and a holy Lamb no doubt. But this Lamb was in the moment of His offering up to be a Priest. He was to be offered by *Himself*. And as there must be no sin in the Lamb to be offered, there must also *a fortiori* be none in the Priest. For in the offering up of the dying Lamb the Priest must be living. But sin is death. By sin death entered. But sin had never entered the holy, holy, holy Person of Jesus. He had done no violence, neither was guile found in His mouth. Nothing by which death might enter, or by which the power of death might be fastened, could Satan find in Christ. “He hath *nothing* in me.” ‘He cannot lead or drive Me to death.

If he could—if he could drag Me as a victim to *his* altar—little proof would I then be able to afford of love to my Father, love to my Father's commandment, love to my Father's eternal covenant, love to my Father's covenant people. But I go to my Father's altar: I go to my cross freely. By my own choice, by my own act, I go. And I go out of love to my Father. Yea, "that the world may know that I love the Father, arise, let us go hence." And He went forth with the eleven across the brook Cedron.

But if Christ had no sin of His own, had He not the sins of His people? True; but still Satan had nothing in Christ. Surely it was nothing of *his* that Christ bare His people's sins in His own body on the tree! Surely it was nothing of the devil's that Christ died, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us unto God! It was not a sin in Christ to be made sin for us! It was at an infinite remove from all that is of Satan. It was holiness. It was the most brilliant holiness the world had ever seen. It was holiness burnished bright in the fires of a furnace seven times heated. Ay, it was holiness in Him to be made sin for us. It was love to us. It was love to the Father. It was love to the Father's government. It was love to the Father's law—in both tables of it in one. It was love to the Father's honour, and purpose, and sovereignty, and grace. It was love to the Father's will. "Lo, I come to do thy will:" "by the which will we are sanctified through the offering [not merely the sufferings] of the body of Christ once for all." It was love, love, love; infinite, eternal, and unchangeable love, which many waters could not quench, and the floods could not drown; and it was lovely in the Father's sight. "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life for the sheep. No one taketh it from me; I lay it down of myself."

Still, did not this commandment of the Father, and this position as Sin-bearer for the children, require that He should die? Yes indeed. But they required that He should die, in the way of "laying down His life," not of leaving it in the power of him that had the power of death. This substitution of Himself in the room of the guilty required that He should "offer himself without spot to *God*;" not that He should resign Himself to *Satan*. The price He should pay as our

ransom should be paid, not to Apollyon, the malignant and misanthropic enemy of God and man, saying, "God hath forsaken him, persecute and take him ;" but to the righteous judge, to the philanthropic God, saying, "Save from going down to the pit, for I have found a ransom."

If Jesus could not secure this—if He could not baffle, defeat, and put to flight him that hitherto had had the power of death, and, with the field thus clear, secure triumphantly the opportunity of freely, unembarrassedly, and by active and positive deed of His own giving Himself in death an offering and a sacrifice unto God,—it is clear He must have been baffled and defeated by him that had the power of death ; for Satan's whole aim was to prevent Him from securing this. But it was to secure exactly this that Christ offered up supplications with strong crying and tears. These supplications He offered up "unto him that was able to save him from death ;" and we are told, "he was heard"—and *was* saved therefore,—and saved "in that he feared." But in what sense was He saved from death except in this,—that in the conflict with him that had the power of death He was strengthened to defeat him,—that He was saved from the dominion and power of death,—that He was saved, not from dying, but *in* dying,—that though not saved from dying, He was saved from dying *per force*,—that though not saved from dying, He was saved from death, that is, from being passively overpowered by death,—that He was strengthened, through the Eternal Spirit, voluntarily, actively, powerfully to die—and so to die as in dying to offer Himself an infinitely acceptable and delightful offering unto God?

This voluntariness and activity in His death, Jesus, in the tenth chapter of John, asserts with great frequency and carefulness ; anxious, almost sensitively anxious, if one might say so, to put this truth in a clear and forcible light. "I am the good shepherd ; the good shepherd *giveth* his life for the sheep." "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father : and I *lay down* my life for the sheep." "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I *lay down* my life that I might take it again" (John x. 11, 15, 17). And then, stating the doctrine yet more powerfully, assiduous to prevent the very possibility of misunderstanding, He continues : "No one taketh it from

me, but I lay it down of myself: I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment received I of my Father" (John x. 18). Thus the very commandment which He received of the Father—that "will of God" of which He said, "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God,"—turns upon the voluntariness and activity of His death. He receives a commandment from the Father, not so much to die—not to die—but to lay down His life; to lay it down of Himself; to suffer no one to take it from Him; not for a moment to suffer it to lapse out of His own power, but so to retain supreme power over it in all circumstances, and so to lay it down at last of Himself, as to retain and exercise the power of taking it up again. And His Father's love to Him in the discharge of this work and office turns on this self-same aspect of it. "Therefore doth my Father love me;" not so much because I die; not at all because I die; but, very specially, "because I lay down my life for the sheep."

Satan had no objection to make to the proposal that Christ should die; but great objection to Christ laying down His life. Great was the difference between these two things; and, to the view of both the combatants, there clearly turned upon it the question of which of them should take command of the great transaction that was in progress. Satan had no objection to assume and exercise over Christ the power of death, and to see Christ die. For Christ thus to die would have been the proof of Christ's weakness and Satan's power. But for Christ, of His own accord, and of His own deed, "to lay down his life"—that was a *toto cœlo* different thing; that was a defiance and defeat of Satan—a demonstration of Satan's weakness and defeat, not His own; and on Christ's part, nailed as He was to the cross, an act of transcendent power and triumph. Satan's whole policy was to assume into his own hand the active and positive power of the Cross, and to take command of it himself. He would have been delighted to turn Christ into a passive sufferer; to make Christ, in the coarsest sense of the term, a victim—a mere victim. Christ's priesthood, in that case, would have been destroyed; for it is not the part of a priest passively to suffer, but actively to offer—to offer a sacrifice to God. No doubt Jesus suffered; deeply did He suffer. He suffered from the rage of men, from the

assaults of Satan, and from the wrath of God. But even under the wrath of God, which was unspeakably more for the blessed Son to bear than all the efforts of men and devils, He fell not a passive victim. Patiently, positively, powerfully, as a priest fulfilling his course, He presented Himself to all that it was appointed to Him to suffer; and having defeated all the assaults of Satan, and drunk all the cup of His Father's wrath, there was the triumph of a mighty conqueror in the cry that burst from His lips, "It is finished!" and there was the consciousness of voluntary action and mighty power in consummating the sacrifice when He exclaimed, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit." Manifestly He was master of His own life when He thus spake. No one was taking it from Him; He was laying it down of Himself: He was offering Himself to God, presenting His united soul and body to the sword of justice to separate them in death; and in testimony of this it is added that, having thus spoken, "he gave up the ghost"—He dismissed His spirit.

Evidently the dark cloud was gone before Jesus died, and He died in the light. The conflict was past, the enemy defeated, and He died in power and victory.

It lies at the root of all sound views of the sacrifice of Christ to keep clear sight of this element of active and positive triumph in the Saviour's death. Christ, in His death, was both the Lamb and the Priest—the Lamb of God, bearing away the sin of the world; and the Priest, acting with God in our name, offering a slain Lamb—the Lamb of God—Himself—for a sacrifice and an offering of a sweet-smelling savour. He by Himself purged our sins (Heb. i. 2), Himself Priest and Lamb in one. The Godhead and the humanity united in one person rendered this amazing combination in His own personality possible; for, as Scripture puts it, the Eternal Son, because the children were partakers of flesh and blood, Himself also likewise took part in the same, in order that by death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil. The natures were twofold; but the Christ, the person, was one. Having assumed human nature—that is to say, a united human soul and body—into union with His Godhead, He had power over the union of that soul and body with each other. He had power to maintain and prolong it. He had power to

abandon it if He chose ; though He never did, and never will. He had power to suspend it ; and, if suspended, He had power to restore it. While maintaining, suspending, or restoring this union of His soul and body with each other, He maintains unbroken, all throughout, the union of each of them with His Godhead. By His own priestly act He Himself offered up Himself : He, Himself, a Divine Person, a glorious, powerful, and acceptable Priest, offered up Himself—an infinitely worthy slain Lamb. An eternal, inviolable, omnipotent, Divine Person, having voluntarily taken our nature, having voluntarily taken our sin—holily acquiescing in and approving of the penalty of sin, which is death (that very death of which the children had the dread and the devil had the power), He goeth forward in love, reverence, and obedience unto death, to His Father, the righteous Judge ; and in virtue of his rights and power over the body which was prepared for Him, and in the spirit in which He assumed it (“ Lo, I come ; I delight to do thy will, () my God ”), He presents Himself to His Father’s sword, for the separation from each other, but of neither from His Godhead (*i.e.* of neither from Himself,—for in His Godhead is the eternal seat of His personality), of that soul and body, through which in death, in their separation from each other (His own power over each of them still abiding intact), He thus actively and livingly offers Himself to God.

This is the sacrifice for our sins. Not Christ’s life taken away by force, but laid down of Himself. Halleluiah ! *Gloria in excelsis !* This is the offering of the sweet-smelling savour unto God. Christ’s whole self, in the separation from each other of His soul and body, which is the death of His human nature (a rather incorrect expression by the way, for it is of a *person* that you predicate death ; but the expression is intelligible, and not fitted to mislead), in the separation from each other of His human soul and body, in which He was the slain Lamb—yet separated in His own sacrificial offering of Himself unto God, by His own act, in the performance of which He was while a slain Lamb a glorious Priest also—not dead even in death—not a dead Priest, but living—at once a slain Lamb and a living High Priest. This, *this* is the sacrifice for our sins. It was the whole person in the eternal life of the Godhead that was the Priest. It was the whole person, in the separation in

death of the parts of the humanity that was the Lamb. And the whole person abode undiminished, undivided, even in death. Neither His soul nor His body was separated from His Godhead, nor therefore from Himself; for it is in His eternal Godhead that the seat of His unchanged and eternal personality rests for evermore. Had either His soul or His body—still more, had both His soul and His body, that is, His humanity—been separated from His Godhead, *that* would have been His falling under the power of death. That would have been death reiving away His soul and body from Himself; asserting over them a greater power than His own, a power to seize and remove away from Him what He had not power to retain. They were separated from each other, and that was death; but not separated from *Him*. Jesus died according to the Scriptures. But neither His soul nor His body was separated from His Godhead, nor (of course therefore) from Himself. In virtue of His Godhead, and by the power thereof, He kept them, each of them, still in union with Himself, though he offered them (and, of course, Himself in them) to Divine justice. When He offered them to the Father's sword to separate them from each other, He so offered them, by His priestly act, to death, that He offered them therein, and Himself therein, in death, to God. He did not throw away His soul or His body; He did not suffer either of them to lapse out of His own power; for He did not suffer either of them to lapse out of union with His own person. He could not have offered them to God in death, if He had therein allowed them, or either of them, to fall out of union with Himself. How could He have been offering them unto God in death, if death had been removing either of them from Himself? or, if we should imagine death to have parted them, or either of them, from His person, and He had, simply by the power of His Godhead, laid hold of them in that state of separation from Himself, and offered them to God, as by His Divine power He might lay hold of and offer anything, yet how should that have been an offering up of Himself? But it is of the essence of His sacrifice that He offered *Himself* without spot to God.

See you not, then, how glorious was the triumph here achieved over him that had the power of death? Christ has evidently defeated him. Bearing the sin of the world, and

dying a vicarious death, weighted with the agony of the cross, with all its shame and woe; dying beneath the wrath of God and the curse of an all-holy law,—a Lamb against whom the Father has been saying, “Awake, O sword, against the Man that is my fellow; smite the Shepherd;” dying thus, He nevertheless prevails, though nailed to His cross, to defeat His foe. This Priest even in dying—yea, very specially in dying—is a Priest after the power of an endless life. This death of His is no victimising of Him. He is living in it, living through it, living more powerfully than ever while He is dying it. This death is the most livingly active work He has ever yet “accomplished” (Luke ix. 31). It is the grandest act of His priesthood, instinct with the most vital, and what will prove to ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, the most vitalising and quickening efficiency.

It would have been the death of His priesthood, it would have been the destruction of His priesthood’s life and energy, had He failed to defeat him that had the power of death. Like the priests under the law, He would not have been suffered to continue by reason of death. He would have died *out* of His priesthood. As it was, He died *in* His priesthood. He died, with His own will, in the very forth-putting and mightiest exercise of the endless life of His priesthood. Ay, He died *into* the perfection and reward and eternal life-giving glory of His priesthood. The word of the oath made the Divine Son a priest for ever; was, then, the fundamental act of His priesthood to destroy His priesthood’s chiefest glory—its ceaseless activity—its quenchless, endless life? That fundamental act was the laying down of His life, that life which was His in virtue of the vital union of His soul and body with each other. But in the very shrine and sanctuary of inviolable Godhead, into which Satan in vain sought access, the Divine Priest transacted, in the power of an endless life, this voluntary death-defeating death of His, this laying down of His life of Himself, this offering of Himself unto God! In the most secret, sacred shrine and inmost sanctuary of Godhead—in the bosom of the Father, into which His soul had been afresh committed—Satan standing without, baffled and afar off indeed—Christ Himself “accomplished his decease” at Jerusalem,—master of His life to the last moment, no man taking it from

Him, but laying it down of Himself; none able to help, none able to hinder; Himself offering to the devouring sword's judicial power of separation that soul and body which were His own, which were Himself, in virtue whereof He was the Son of Man, and in which He was the same one only person He had been from all eternity—the Son of God, and daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him, rejoicing also in the habitable parts of the earth, His delights being with the “sons of men.” Yet all the while He was retaining them in union with Himself, neither of them in the power of any other person, because neither of them beyond His own power, and neither of them disjoined from His own person; Himself offering them in their peculiar union with Himself—so peculiar, and yet still so perfect, that in offering *them* He was offering nothing less and nothing other than *Himself* unto God. “Christ through the Spirit offered himself without spot unto God.” (Heb. ix. 13, 14).

And as it was Himself that was offered, so it was Himself that was buried. When the lifeless body of the Son of God was carried to the grave, it was as much in union with the Godhead as when, by the word of His lips, He raised Lazarus from the dead. That body was not His mortal remains, as we speak. It was Himself. It was Christ. It was the Son of God. It was the Holy One of God. It was not separated from His person—His Divine person,—as in death our bodies are separated from our souls. It was not Christ's mortal remains that were buried. “*Christ was buried*; and rose again” —not merely *was raised*—“according to the scriptures.” What saith He Himself on this point? Addressing the Father, to whom He alike offered and committed Himself in death, in the hope of His resurrection, He saith, “Thou wilt not leave my soul in the state of the dead,”—this much concerning His soul. And what concerning His body?—Neither wilt Thou suffer my remains to see corruption? No. “Neither wilt Thou suffer thine Holy One—neither wilt Thou suffer myself—to see corruption.” The person was one and undivided (is Christ divided?—1 Cor. i. 13); the Priest was living, triumphantly discharging His office; He was a Divine, undivided, living Person and Priest; though as to His humanity He was dead. There was in this Person, this Priest, the power of an endless

life—a life never for a moment suspended—never more powerful and vigorous than in the epoch and instant of death on the cross; vigorous thereafter in maintaining in union with Himself both soul and body in their separation from each other—the soul in paradise, the body in the tomb—gloriously vigorous again in bringing them into mutual union once more when He rose from the dead. For not merely was He raised from the dead. But He raised Himself. “He rose again according to the scriptures.” Thus He had power to lay down His life, and He had power to take it again. The commandment He had received from the Father embraced the one as much as the other. Satan was manifestly defeated. He was obviously deprived of the power of death. In that respect Christ defied, baffled, and defeated him. Such was his defeat.

2. But Christ not only defeated him that had the power of death, but destroyed him.

Christ did more than defeat His adversary; *that* He evidently did before dying, and the *voluntariness* of His death proves it. He defeated him *before* He died; but *in* dying, He destroyed him. The *vicariousness* of His death proves that.

When Satan was defeated and repulsed, all that was proved was that he had no power of death over Christ; and this was proved before Christ died. But though Satan fled defied and defeated, he carried with him the power of death, which he held over the children, and it was only through death that Christ pursued his routed enemy into the depths of his own domains, and there spoiled and destroyed him—spoiled him and made a show of him openly. Christ died voluntarily; and hence the proof that Satan had no power over Him, but had fled and left both the victory and the field to Jesus. The life which Jesus was now about *victoriously* to lay down was hereby evidently seen to be *vicariously* laid down,—was seen to be laid down wholly and exclusively for the sheep—no one taking it from Him; He was laying it down of Himself, and laying it down for them. The bond of death under which they were subject to bondage Christ had taken on Himself, and now cancels by fulfilling it. That same bond formed the legal instrument by which alone Satan held the power of death. Founding on the righteousness and consequent certainty of

our deserved penalty, he wielded it to all effects as a charter granting him the power of death over his miserable slaves. In vain he essayed to wield the same over their great Deliverer. The prince of darkness and the king of terrors Christ repulsed *before* He died. They had no power over Him; but *by* dying, by filling up and thereby blotting out the handwriting of ordinances, the charter, the dark diploma of death, He pursued the enemy, mightily entered his peculiar dominions, pressed His triumphant way to the very heart and citadel of them, overthrew in reigning righteousness the foundations of his power; and when Satan looked upon the handwriting of ordinances which condemned the children to death, after Christ's death had been recorded there he saw that that once irrefragable document was clean obliterated,—that the death it had formerly denounced amidst thunder and lightning, and the tempest, and the voice of words, was all executed, endured, and gone; that the only plea on which he had been accustomed to rest his malignant power was thus torn from his grasp; that the whole and very death by the power whereof the tyrant tyrannised, and in the face whereof the children trembled, was annihilated, while the Conqueror, who had endured all that death, was in death itself living in the power of an endless life, traversing the realms of the dead in the power of the life everlasting.

O most blessed and glorious scene of triumph! To breathe the air of it is immortality. Before Christ died, death and he that had the power of death fled from the field to their own dark domains, leaving Christ's human nature still living on the cross. Thereafter, not subject to their power, and relieved even of their presence, free and unembarrassed, and of His own proper will and power, He offereth Himself in death to the Father. And thus by His own living energy offering up His soul and body in death, yet retaining them in union with Himself—as with His soul in one hand and His body in the other—master of all that was His own, of all that was *Himself*, by the gates of death He enters the realm of death; in the power of his unvanquished, undivided, undiminished, mediatorial Divine person, He traverses all its range from east to west, from north to south; tramples down all its power, carries its captivity captive, spoils and destroys its prince,—

through death destroying him that had the power of death,—through death lighting up with life and glory the region of the shadow of death—His victorious, majestic, Divine person being at once the dismay and destruction of the tyrant; “O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction”—and the joy and deliverer of the bond-slaves, “Rise up, my love, my fair one, and come away; I will ransom thee from the power of the grave, I will redeem thee from death: for lo! the winter is past, the rain is over and gone, the flowers appear on the earth, and the time of the singing of birds is come. Arise, my love, my fair one, and come away.”

II. Thus the train of thought merges into the second doctrine of our theme, namely, that Christ “*through death delivers them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.*”

And this follows at once from the great, all-pervading truth that Christ's people have union and communion with Him by faith. Bring in this principle of union with Christ in the matter and epoch and victory which we have been considering.—bring in the principle and import of your union by faith with Christ, as in the very instant of His voluntary, vicarious, victorious death,—you are entitled to realise yourself as having fellowship as in the very moment and in the whole import of that victory. Is it not said by the Spirit concerning the believer that he is dead with Christ, that he is crucified with Christ, that he is raised up together with Christ, watching with Christ in His temptations, sitting with Him in heavenly places? Come, then, and join yourself on with Christ in His peculiar act of, through death, destroying him that had the power of death. You may do this, and do it now, though that victorious act of His was completed so many centuries ago. It was a victory so complete as to be not transient, but perfect and permanent. Satan felt the full meaning of *despair*, the eternal impossibility of ever having a chance again, when he heard the conquering cry, “It is finished.” ’Tis a grand distinguishing peculiarity of the Messiah's work, this permanence. The present tense—the perpetual present—applies to it more appropriately than any other. “It is finished”—so finished, so perfected, as to be always fresh and new, and pre-

sently powerful, exactly as in the instant of its first transacting. His blood cleanseth now precisely as in the moment of its being shed. In like manner this victory of Christ over death was in the power of an endless life, and it liveth and abideth for ever. Christ adopts you into the participation of it now by faith, precisely as if in that very moment He had carried you with Him in His triumphal entry into the realms of death. Would you have been afraid *then*? There is no more reason for being afraid or subject to bondage *now*.

Jesus draws near to you in the preaching of the Cross and the call of the Gospel (both of which, to them that believe, are the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation). He sets Himself forth to you therein very specially, as manifestly crucified. Altogether unlike the "Scotch Pulpit" (so-called) of the current day, in which, to the indignation and astonishment of all Christian readers, Christ is *not* set forth—not to say "manifestly crucified," but not even perceptibly in that aspect at all. All Gospel divine dealings with your soul for its salvation point first of all, and last of all, and throughout all, to Christ and Him crucified. He deals with you, chiefest of all, exactly anent His crucifixion and His death. He will have you meet Him and strike hands with Him exactly here—at His Cross—or not at all. Precisely as if He were this moment about to "accomplish" that decease at Jerusalem, He draws near and says, 'O my brother, partaker of flesh and blood as I am, I am going to pursue yon routed host—death, and him that hath the power of death, and the principalities of darkness: wilt thou go with Me? Wilt thou cast in thy lot with Me, and die with Me? See how different a thing this dying is when you find it in Me—not falling under the power of death, but conquering death, destroying him that hath the power of it. I go not as the victim of death, but as the mighty Conqueror of death. Wilt thou seize the opportunity and go with Me? Thou mayst have thy physical pain, O my brother, O thou partaker of flesh and blood—thy pain, hard for flesh and blood to bear. But seest thou not how in this also *I* have fellowship in thy suffering, as thou hast in my victory? For because the children were partakers of flesh and blood, I also myself likewise took part in the same. And now, seeing I am death's plagues and

death's conqueror, do thou also thyself likewise take part with Me in the same—in the same victory and endless life. Behold, I descend as the life everlasting into the valley and shadow of death; and even there—there very specially—I am the light of life, shedding light and glory over all the realm; and even there, therefore—yea, very specially there—if thou go with thy Lord, even there thy Lord shall be thine everlasting light, and thy God thy glory. Seize this instant—the instant of my victorious descent into the realm of death—for examining what to thee, in fellowship with Me, the valley and the shadow of death will be. And as I go down into that dreaded realm, and pour the floods of light and glory round all its dark domains, and trample down all its boasted power and dominion; and as thou seest all shades of terror put to flight, all principalities of tyranny stripped of every shred of energy, and trembling in dismay and in fastly coming conscious rottenness; and as thou tracest to my person, standing here, all the light and glory and triumph and endless life that are quenching the power of death in death's own domain, bear in mind concerning the place where I now am, and concerning the just effect of my being there, that if any man will be my disciple let him follow Me, and *where* I am, and *as* I am, *there* and so shall my servant be. Very specially, concerning my descent into the realms of death, "Follow me!" To thee, in that case, these realms of death are the path of life, the gate of heaven, and the very vestibule of glory.' Just as for malicious apostates there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, so for humble believers there remaineth now no more death, but only a sleep in Jesus. It is enough. Halleluia! for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth, and reigneth to keep His people's souls alive even in famine. Where is thy sting, O death? Begone, thou helpless, stingless, toothless shade! We shall not die, but only sleep—

"Asleep in Jesus! blessed sleep,
From which no soul awakes to weep."

We shall be satisfied when we awake in thy likeness, O Lord our God. Even now our cup runneth over. Christ hath abolished death, and given us the morning star. Goodness and mercy shall follow us all the days of our life, and we shall dwell in the house of the Lord for ever.

ART. V.—*Missions and Missionaries*.*

PUBLISHED in the beginning of the month, the close of which saw the author Professor-elect of Missions, Dr. Thomas Smith's volume of lectures may be taken as his diploma picture, from which it can be gathered what sort of service he may be expected to render when he enters upon the duties of the chair which had Dr. Duff for its first occupant. The lectures themselves form an interesting contribution to the literature of missions, containing a series of sketches of persons prominent in the propagation of the gospel in the Western and Eastern world from A.D. 500 till A.D. 1500. Our only regret is that the learned lecturer confined himself within these limits. For the result has been that he is compelled, although with evident reluctance, to exclude from his picture-gallery one of the most interesting characters of the Middle Ages—Patrick, the apostle of the Irish, who was born close upon the end of the fourth or the beginning of the fifth century. Had Dr. Smith not been a born mathematician, he would probably have set aside what he rightly terms "the arbitrary line" that forms the boundary of his period, and in doing so would have offered no violence to historic propriety by including Patrick among his mediæval missionaries, only, in fact, following the example of Neander, to whose memory he pays a graceful tribute of respect, and who, in his *Sketches from the History of Missions in the Middle Ages*,

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- * 1. *Mediæval Missions*. By THOMAS SMITH, D.D., Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1880.
 - 2. *Protestant Foreign Missions: their Present State*. By THEODORE CHRISTLIEB, D.D., Ph.-D., Bonn. Second Edition. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1880.
 - 3. *Memoir of the Life and Episcopate of George Augustus Selwyn, D.D.* By the Rev. H. W. Tucker, M.A. Two vols. London: William Wells Gardner. 1879.
 - 4. *The Life of John Wilson, D.D., F.R.S.* By GEORGE SMITH, LL.D. Second Edition. London: John Murray. 1879.
 - 5. *The Life of Alexander Duff, D.D., LL.D.* By GEORGE SMITH, C.I.E., LL.D. In Two volumes. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1879.

assigns the first place to the Scotch preacher of the gospel to the Irish.

What was the radical and fatal defect in all mediæval missions? In what respect do modern missions differ from them? What features of resemblance can be detected in Protestant foreign missions to primitive missions which have their record in the books of the New Testament? These are inquiries which it would have been exceedingly interesting to have had handled by such a man as Dr. Thomas Smith. But as neither by Dr. Smith nor by Professor Christlieb, in his ably compiled and well stored survey, are the questions so much as raised, we shall, in a sentence or two, indicate the direction in which answers to them may be found. Even at the risk of disturbing the shade of Neander, and of incurring the resentment of Maclear and Smith, we venture to affirm that there were no such things as missions, and no such persons as missionaries in the Middle Ages. This seems very certain, that the so-called missions of these days were far from being according to the pattern shown us in the missionary record of the Church Apostolic. Here and there, now and again, an individual Christian, under the constraining of love to Christ and of compassion for the perishing, set out upon an evangelistic crusade, and having reached a foreign shore, unfurled the Red Cross Banner, built a cottage for himself, a college for his scholars, and there laboured till he died. But the man was not a delegate of any church, representing other Christians who, since they could not go themselves, sent him and accompanied him with their sympathies and their prayers. He went on his own responsibility, at his own charges, not relying for support upon, and not reporting progress to, those left behind. Such a man was not a missionary; he was a crusader or a knight-errant. Very different was the state of matters in the primitive Church. In the days of the apostles, work in the foreign field was the work of the home, Church—the Mother Church of Jerusalem or of Antioch. It was done by the Church in terms of her great commission, and not left to be done by any one who might think he had a call and capacity; done through men set apart and sent, who thus became what one of the first and greatest of them calls “messengers of the churches” (2 Cor. viii. 23). What took place

in the case of the missionary just referred to and his companion? It was not simply put into the hearts of these men to carry the gospel to regions beyond; it was said to the church at Antioch, of which they were members and office-bearers, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them." And when the command thus given was carried into effect, the two missionaries of the Mother Church of the Gentiles went forth upon their work under a double sending—"sent away" by those who had "fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them," "being sent forth by the Holy Ghost" (Acts xiii. 3, 4). They were not volunteers, they were not knights-errant; they were, in the fullest sense of the word, missionaries. And that distinctive feature of foreign mission-work in the Apostolic Church is never afterwards lost sight of in Scripture record, but comes up again and again in a variety of interesting details. Of these we shall only specify one—the frequency, namely, with which the missionary returned to head-quarters, and the fulness with which he reported what God had done with him and for him.¹ The reporting on such occasions was not the giving of an address, such as may be done in the present day by a missionary on furlough at an Exeter Hall May meeting; it was the reporting diligence and progress on the part of a deputy to those who were not only interested in the work, but who were for it responsible, and with it, in all its stages, identified. Now, it is the reappearance of this primitive feature in the missions of Protestantism that causes them to differ from missions mediæval so-called, and that brings them into close affinity with the work chronicled in the New Testament. The missionaries of the present day do not form a handful of men who have gone forth taking their lives in their hands, and leaving Fatherland and Mother Church, never it may be to see either one or other again, cut off from all sympathy and support, fighting the battle single-handed. They are representative men, delegates of the churches or societies under the auspices and instructions of which they go forth, having the interests and the prayers of all awakened Christendom to back them and to cheer them on. They come back, and they are ever welcomed as often as they so come, to tell the Home

¹ Compare Acts xiv. 26, 27; xv. 3, 4, 12; xviii. 22; xxi. 19.

Church how her operations are going on, what progress she is making, what opposition she is encountering, and what measures it behoves her to take for the more vigorous prosecution of her Master's enterprise. They can speak, and they ought always to speak, not of *our* work, but of *your* work, "and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake;" while on the part of the Church to whom they thus come and thus speak, it will always be felt that the most fitting terms in which to recognise their worth and nobleness are those employed in that sentence from a missionary's letter already quoted in part, "my partner and fellow-helper," "the messengers of the churches and the glory of Christ." Instead of prosecuting this line of remark further, we shall proceed to lay before our readers studies of the labours and services of three men of modern missions who, in our judgment, embodied the spirit of apostolic missions in a way and to an extent not surpassed or equalled by any of this generation whose lives have been given to the public. These three are George Selwyn, John Wilson, and Alexander Duff.

Advantages of birth and early training were not wanting in the career of Selwyn. He belonged to an ancient family which could count among its ancestors the witty friend of Horace Walpole, and he was trained at Eton, the most aristocratic school in England. As a student of St. John's he maintained at Cambridge the reputation he had won at school for proficiency in scholarship. Over and above educational advantages and scholastic acquirements, the physical training and the moral development of Selwyn when a pupil, and subsequently a tutor, at Eton, and when a student at Cambridge, were truly splendid when viewed in connection with his life work. From a boy he was an athlete, and in all muscular exercise and athletic sports he speedily became *facile princeps* of his set. He was wont to take prodigious walks, finding his way over the country with only a pocket compass; and often, in his daily constitutional, running across a ploughed field simply to improve his wind. In water Selwyn was as much at home as on dry land. A prominent place was assigned him in the first of the now long series of University boat races, and when tutor at Eton he was President of a swimming society, the advanced members of which bathed every day all

the year round, and the ruling spirit of which accomplished feats never before attempted. In his familiarity with all aquatic exercises, and his skill in the management of vessels and their crews, which came to him in youth, one can see the groundwork laid for the confidence which the seamanship of the future bishop inspired, an esteem to which the title "Skipper Bishop," often given him, bore its own testimony, and to which a sailor at Auckland gave emphatic expression when, being asked what captain he would prefer sailing under, he immediately replied, "Well, I had as lief go with the bishop as any man." Then George Selwyn was no mean draughtsman and artist. In the first volume of the *Life* there is given a facsimile of one of the many letters from abroad which were enriched with clever and effective pen-and-ink drawings done for the enjoyment of his father, so long as the exercise of the gift could to any extent solace that parent in his loneliness. In later years he never indulged in sketching or water-colour drawing, lest doing so should engross too much of his time. When to these muscular and manipulative adaptations for colonial life there are added such features of character as beautiful unselfishness, readiness to take the labouring oar, and grease the rowlocks, in any enterprise, love of co-operation—that being a favourite word with him, a habit of preparing himself for work in the future, although he might have no definite idea what it was to be, and a rare gift of gathering others around him, breathing into them his own enthusiasm, and making zealots of them, we feel justified in affirming that never was there a happier instance of the right man for the work than when, in October 1841, George Augustus Selwyn was consecrated Bishop of New Zealand. For seven-and-twenty years Bishop Selwyn was a name and a power in his see, the area of which was for upwards of fifteen years about the same as that of Great Britain and Ireland. Into details of strictly church work it will not be expected that we are to enter at any length. We shall only touch upon that work in so far as it has a bearing upon and helps to an understanding of mission work. The irrepressible activity and organising genius of the young prelate were speedily displayed and successfully employed in establishing a hierarchy in the islands of which he was the first Anglican bishop. When scarcely

two months landed he set out upon a visitation which extended over more than six months of the year, and in these months 2277 miles were measured, 762 of these on foot, 86 on horse-back, 249 in canoes or boats, and 1186 by ship. In one year from the date of his arrival there was to be seen at the Waimate a college called St. John's in full working order, with a boarding-house attached; and three years afterwards the college was transplanted to a site five miles from Auckland, with a cluster of kindred institutions gathered round it—Hospital, English School, Native Boys' and Girls' Schools, Half-Caste School, and English Primary School. Of the College the bishop was head, and heart, and soul, teaching everything from the rudiments of English and Latin Grammar to the Elements of Algebra and Theology, superintending everything from the cleaning of a knife upwards, setting agoing everything, including spinning-wheels, a number of which had been sent out years before by the Church Missionary Society and stowed away in a loft, but which the bishop got into working order, setting little brown-faced maidens to spin, and encouraging them to sing merrily at their work. In securing for the Episcopal Church in New Zealand a constitution that would render her independent of, while keeping her affiliated with, the Crown and the Church of England, Bishop Selwyn was indefatigable. He began his colonial work as the first and only bishop of the colony; by the time he left he was Primate of an ecclesiastical province with six sees, most of which were founded and endowed by himself. In what an unselfish and self-sacrificing spirit he dealt with the question of the extension of the episcopate, and how he exercised the office of a bishop, came out in a statement made by him when an English bishop:—

“With regard,” he said in Convocation, 1873, “to the question of income, that has been said to be a matter of great moment. Many bishops have spoken of their own experience, and I may speak of mine. I began with an income of £1200 a year. After thirteen years it was reduced to £600. After eighteen years it was reduced to £400. At the end of twenty-six years it was raised to £4500 [the income of the Bishop of Lichfield]. But amid all these changes I never found the slightest difference in position, in influence, or in my means of exercising hospitality. I carried out in my diocese abroad as much hospitality as I have been able to carry out in the diocese of Lichfield.”

In all that he did, whether as Churchman or as Missionary, there was not one particle of ostentation, not the slightest sympathy with ritualists in their love of ecclesiastical millinery and toys. In his first Charge he expressed the hope that the title of "a dignitary of the Church" would never be heard among them, and deprecated any office, whether that of bishop or archdeacon, being "a mere peacock's feather to distinguish one clergyman above his brethren." And the whole bearing of the man was in keeping with these sentiments. There was a grand simplicity of character and action that impressed all who came in contact with George Selwyn. It did so in the case of one who went out to be head of St. John's, and who records this as taking place when he reached Auckland harbour:—"I was busy with boxes, etc., getting them ready for the boat, when the bishop came up and said, 'Are these yours?' and he took a large box in each hand and carried it to the gangway, much to our astonishment and that of the captain, crew, and passengers. He looked grand when he was doing porter's work." Being taken about in grand carriages was the special aversion of Selwyn, both when a colonial and a home prelate; so, when intimating his coming for a confirmation, he would write:—"Don't send a carriage to meet me at the station; send your donkey for my bag, and I will walk."

The man that thought no earthly dignity either in Church or State can equal the moral grandeur of the leathern girdle and the raiment of camel's hair, or the going forth without purse or scrip, yet lacking nothing, was in no danger of being led astray by ritualistic appeals to the love of scenic decorations, sensuous display and sacerdotal domination. But while not a ritualist, Selwyn was undoubtedly a High Churchman. He was, to use an expression of his own, "an episcopally-minded man." Not so much so certainly as his biographer, who is episcopally-mad, and whose churchiness signally unfits him for the work intrusted to him, and has sadly spoiled what might have been one of the most interesting of modern biographies. Selwyn was far removed from the littleness and narrowness that refuse to give any clerical title to ministers not episcopally ordained. He corresponded with the venerable Presbyterian missionary of Aneityum, always addressing him

as the Rev. John Inglis, and he took Mr. and Mrs. Inglis, with stoves, house-frame, and other goods in his schooner from Auckland to Aneityum—an act of kindness so gratifying to the Church to which Mr. Inglis belongs, that a sum of £50 was voted to the bishop for the expense of his schooner. And yet Selwyn was a Churchman; essentially and all throughout he was an episcopal rather than a catholic-minded man. To establish a hierarchy in all its integrity was certainly a cherished object with him in accepting the bishopric of New Zealand, and in the carrying of that object into effect he was led to undertake work with, as he afterwards confessed, a very inefficient body of coadjutors, and which kept him in a state of continual uneasiness.

If his hierarchical tendencies exercised an injurious influence upon Selwyn as a minister of the Gospel, it may be that their influence was salutary when he is viewed as a missionary. No man could have a stronger sense of the correlatives of authority and obedience than the High Church bishop “G.A.N.Z.,” as he invariably signed himself after consecration, no matter whether he is writing to “dearest Mother,” “dearest Boys,” or “inexhaustible Friend.” It was a conviction of the right the Church has to choose the field of labour most suited to an individual that prevented him declining “an authoritative invitation to go abroad.” “I had no other reason for going than because I was sent;” and it was the same conviction that led him in 1867 to consent to become bishop of Lichfield—“It was easy to refuse it as a matter of patronage and promotion, but a call from the rulers of the Church is not lightly to be disregarded.” He ever regarded himself as a man under authority, and when anticipating the objection that he was no fit advocate of missionary work, seeing he had abandoned it, his answer was: “All I can say is, I have had nothing to do with the change, except to obey. Twenty-seven years ago I was told to go to New Zealand, and I went; I am now told to go to Lichfield, and I go.” This conviction of the sending power of the Church, and the truly missionary character of all her sons never left him, but rather grew upon him. In 1877, the year before his death, he conducted a service at Lichfield simultaneous with that which was going on at Nelson, 8000 miles in a direct line beneath his feet, consecrating the bishop’s

son to succeed to Bishop Patteson's post and work. On that occasion, "better suited for deep feeling than for much speaking," thinking no doubt of how he himself had been sent forth, the father said: "As we have already sent forth from this diocese Bishop Rawle to the West Indies, so let us now send forth our own dear son to take the Gospel not to a numerous, but to a widely-scattered race, in whom the curse of Babel seems to have reached its utmost climax. These are the isles that wait for Christ; and assuredly they will not wait in vain." Very fittingly did these words come from him, who, in the first and most fruitful part of his episcopate, had been the missionary bishop of Maoridom and of Melanesia. As one sent out, Selwyn went forth resolved to do more than represent the Church of England in the rising colony that constituted his vast diocese; he went forth with the deliberate resolve to take the Gospel to the native race of New Zealand, and to carry it throughout the Southern Pacific. Accordingly we find him on the voyage out busy at work compiling from the Raratonga, Tahitian, and New Zealand translations of the New Testament a comparative grammar of these three dialects, and by conversation with a Maori lad on board acquiring fluency in the Maori tongue. The result was that on the very first Sunday he spent in his diocese he said prayers and preached in the language of the natives. And from that day to the close of life his heart was with the Maori race. The *pakeh* (white man) might accuse him of opposing the interests of his own countrymen by supporting the claims of the natives, and might grumble about too many irons in the fire, too much time spent at sea and at a distance from his pro-cathedral establishment, but the man under authority was not to be turned from his mission to the brown-skinned sons and daughters of the soil; the Maoris themselves might misunderstand their friend, subject him to open insult and attack, placing him at times in peril of his life; but he never heeded, held on his way, and ceased not to pray and strive for the union of the two races, "by their growing up together as one people, upon the same common principle of faith in Jesus Christ, and obedience to the Queen." The most painful period in Selwyn's life must have been that of the Maori war, which broke out in 1863, when he acted as military chaplain with the British army, visited the wounded and buried

the dead of his own native flock. After the fierceness of the struggle was over, it seemed to him as if only one missionary idea was left him—that of watching over the remnant of his work for the natives, “the remnant of a decaying people and the remnant of a decaying faith.” A pleasant dream, once all bright with the light of hope, had melted away; all that remained was the prospect of a few more years of plodding labours to build up again the tabernacle which had fallen down. And yet to sit among his ruins, not moping, but tracing out the outlines of a new foundation—this to the dauntless worker was more congenial than another visit to England. From the first to the very last he regarded himself as called to the service of the native, and noble was the service rendered. He could work with all his heart in the home country if it were not that his heart is in New Zealand and Melanesia. That mention of another region of his wide see leads naturally up to a reference to the other department of Selwyn’s missionary work. When the letters-patent were made out at the Colonial Office, he was shocked to find in them what to his High Church views was nothing short of profanity, and he vainly endeavoured to get rid of the Erastianism implied in the Queen giving him power to ordain. Another peculiarity of his State Commission he accepted “with amused gravity.” By a clerical error he was invested with 68 degrees of latitude more than was intended, his diocese being made to stretch from the 50th degree of south latitude to the 34th degree of *north*, instead of, as was intended, south latitude. That blunder, it may be said, led to his becoming the pioneer and founder of episcopal missions in Melanesia. The first mention in his correspondence of regions beyond occurs in a letter of date December 1847, in which he announces that he is soon to sail for the Navigator’s Islands, and that he will endeavour to bring back some promising boys to associate with the native scholars as a beginning of the Polynesian branch of St. John’s College. That voyage was the first of many made in the subsequent years of his colonial life. By 1854 he could write that he had made seven voyages, visited about fifty islands, holding intercourse with the native people in about half that number, and from ten had received scholars to the number of forty, speaking ten different languages. The plan adopted was to select a few promising boys from all

the islands, to prove and test them first by observation of their habits on board the floating school, then to take them for further training to New Zealand, avoiding the severity of winter by sending them home in the autumn of every year, and lastly, when they were sufficiently advanced, to send them back as teachers to their own people. This method, an extension very much of what had already been done with Maori children, is generally associated with the name of the martyr bishop, J. C. Patteson, who, at Selwyn's call, dedicated himself to the work of Christ in the Pacific. But the merit of devising the method and of showing how practicable it was, belongs to him who regarded Patteson as a son, addressing him ever as "my dear Coley." How G. A. N. Z. went about the work of gathering seedlings from the scattered islands is worth telling. When his boat was ten or twenty yards from the reef of an island lagoon he would plunge into the water, arranging in a wonderful way upon his back numberless presents which he had been showing to the wondering eyes of some hundred people standing and shouting on land. He then called out the name of the chief, picked up from a stray canoe or a neighbouring island, and on the chief stepping forward he handed him a tomahawk, and held out his hand for the chief's bows and arrows. When the tomahawk had been sent to the rear, to show the stranger he is safe, the bishop would pat the children on the head, and give them fish-hooks and red-tape. If he had with him a tame elephant in the shape of a boy from another island, who had been a summer at St. John's, he would poke fun at him and with him, pulling out his cheeks to show how fat they were, and then, pointing to the skinny faces of the island children, endeavour to make the parents understand he wished to do the same thing with their boys. Establishing friendly relations by an exchange of calico or beads—never tobacco, for that, being in his estimate a "slow poison," was not carried by him, for yams or cocoa-nuts, and writing down as many names as he could get, he would then swim off to his boat to return next year, call out the names taken down, and induce two or three to take a trip with him to a neighbouring island, where the same process was repeated.

Such was the gathering of seedlings from the islands of the sea. With what loving care they were planted in the nursery

at Auckland may be gathered from such a scene as this:—A cruise, which resulted in five boys being picked off the islands ended by the party landing at midnight in the clear light of a full October moon. They were not expected, so walked the five miles out from Auckland to the cottage. Doors had been left unbolted in view of a possible return, and Mrs. Selwyn was roused out of her first sleep by hearing her husband joyfully exclaim, "I've got them," while he rubbed his hands with glee, and his five little islanders ran wild over their new home. For work of that sort Selwyn was singularly gifted. He was a lover of boys, and from the days of his Eton tutorship had been a student of physiognomy, forming opinions of character from those studies, and then watching the progress of the lads through the school and at the University. To the boys whom he picked up when cruising in the waters of the Pacific his soul became knit with the closeness and the tenderness of the affection that bound the soul of David to that of Jonathan. But we may not linger over this study of the career of the greatest of missionary bishops, though the temptation to do so is strong. We have pointed to what was probably the saddest period in Selwyn's colonial work. It would be out of place to speak of the proudest moment of the life in the case of one with such a grand simplicity of character that no place was found in it for the littleness of pride,—one who, during a perilous walk among excited natives, having been told by a fanatical prophet that all he could get for the night's shelter was a pigsty, accepted the accommodation, ejected the pigs, cleaned out the sty, and cutting some ferns, littered them down, and made of them his bed for the night. But if there were no proud moments in the life of Selwyn, there were doubtless some experiences bright and exultant, bringing with them ample compensation for all the disappointment and anxiety of years of harassing work. One such experience must have been his when he attended his last meeting of General Synod in October 1868. Six bishops were present; Coley Patteson coming from the distant Norfolk Island to look for the last time on the friend and leader at whose summons he had left everything behind. Several addresses were on that occasion presented to him, who was there to say a last good-bye. One, written by Patteson and signed by English

colonists, natives of New Zealand and Melanesian Islanders, all members of Synod, contained the touching inquiry—"How can we ever forget you? Every spot in New Zealand is identified with you. Each hill and valley, each river and bay and headland is full of memories of you; the busy town, the lonely settler's hut, the countless islands of the sea, all speak of you." Another address from the Maori people collectively contains such sentences as these—"Ours is a word of farewell to you from us, your Maori people who reside in this island. O Father, greetings. Go to your own country; go, the grace of God accompany you; go, on the face of the deep waters. Father, take hence with you the commandment of God, leaving the people here bewildered. Our love for you and our remembrance of you will never cease. Enough! This concludes our words of farewell to you. From your children." A third was from the natives of the Waimate, where for some years the Bishop had his headquarters, and it was perhaps the most touching of all. "Sire, the Bishop," it began, "salutations to you and to mother" (Mrs. Selwyn), and it was thus it closed:—

"This is our lament for you in few words:

Love to our friend who has disappeared abruptly from the ranks!

Is he a small man that was so beloved?

He has not his equal among the many.

The food he dispensed is longed for by me."

Very different from the social surroundings and early training of the Missionary Bishop of New Zealand were those of John Wilson, "for fifty years philanthropist and scholar in the East." With burgesses and portioners, and elders of the kirk for ancestors and connections, he was born in a Berwickshire burgh, December 1804, received his early education at the parish school of Lauder, and studied during eight sessions at the University of Edinburgh. There was nothing of the athlete in Wilson the schoolboy and the student. As a boy he went among his companions by the name of "the priest," and when twenty-three years of age close application to study necessitated the purchase of a pair of silver spectacles. At an early period in student life the missionary spirit was implanted, and by a variety of influences was it fostered. A tutorship in the manse of Stow, where he had for pupils Anglo-Indian boys speaking Hindustani; frequent visits to the manse on the part of General

Walker, who, in his official position in the State of Baroda, had done so much for the prevention of female infanticide; the hearing of a sermon by Dr. Waugh of London, and the reading of reports from Bible and Missionary Societies, along with the memoirs of Brainerd and Martyn—all these contributed to the decisive step being taken, the result being that in the twenty-first year of his age he offered himself to the Directors of the Scottish Missionary Society, and that on the 14th February 1829 he landed at Bombay, which was to be for half a century the sphere of his apostolic labours for the social, moral, and spiritual good of Western India. When one avails himself of the invaluable assistance rendered by Dr. George Smith, biographer both of the Apostle and the Prince of Scottish missions, and endeavours to seize upon the salient features of that long period of service, it is the Oriental learning of the Bombay missionary that makes the first impression. Wilson was emphatically the scholar among his brethren. In ordinary cases the missionary may regard himself as fairly equipped for his work if he has acquired the vernacular of the province or district to which he has been sent—the Marathi or Gujarati, the Tamil or Telugu, the Hindi or Hindustani, the Bengali or Oorya of India's polyglot speech, and he need not be ashamed to own that he has only a smattering, if so much, of the classical tongues of our Indian subjects. But the linguistic acquirements of the Bombay missionary were far beyond ordinary range in rapidity, extent, and thoroughness. In five months after his arrival he had so mastered Marathi as to be able to converse with Hindus and preach his first sermon. To that were speedily added the other vernacular tongues of the Presidency: and in course of time there followed proficiency in the Sanscrit language and literature that rendered him a pioneer and an authority in the deciphering of Buddhist edicts on the rocks of Girnar; a knowledge of the Zend language which Parsis respected; and of both Persian and Arabic, such as enabled him to write a refutation of Muhammadanism in the Persian language. Acquirements such as these justify the statement that there is no recorded instance in the life of any Oriental scholar, whether official or missionary, of such rapid and perfect acquisition of multifarious information regarding the literature and the customs as well


as the languages of the country, as marked the career of the Scottish missionary at Bombay. He speedily became known as Wilson the Orientalist. Recognitions of his scholarship flowed in upon him from all quarters. In 1835 he was unanimously elected President of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; in 1836 he received the degree of D.D. from his *alma mater*; in 1845 he became a Fellow of the Royal Society of Great Britain—"the Blue Riband of Science;" in 1847 he was enrolled as a founder and member of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries at Copenhagen, and the same year saw him Corresponding Member of the German Oriental Society. But the crowning recognition of this kind came from the University of Bombay, of which he may be regarded as the virtual founder. A member of Syndicate, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, and examiner in six languages, he was appointed first Vice-Chancellor, and as such, in the academic robes of office, took the prominent part in the ceremonial of laying the foundation-stone of the buildings. Another evidence of the regard in which Dr. Wilson was held as a scholar is furnished by his correspondence. Throughout the *Life* letters or portions of letters to and from European scholars are inserted, and the biographer gives us to understand he is only restrained from giving more extended specimens from the fear that the strange characters with which many are plentifully sprinkled would be unintelligible to the majority of readers. Among the correspondents of the missionary were such Orientals as Burnouf, Professor of Sanscrit in the Collège de France, the Danish scholar Westergaard, Professor Lassen of Bonn, greatest Orientalist of his day, and Professor Goldstücker, trainer of competition Wallahs and writer on the philosophies of India. These and suchlike scholars looked to Wilson for new facts and materials, and for Eastern manuscripts, of which he was a keen hunter and diligent collector, and for copies of sacred books and rare Sanscrit works, and they did not look in vain.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that John Wilson was only or even mainly an Eastern scholar, poring over Sanscrit alphabets and inscriptions, eagerly examining the library of old Goa, purchasing Parsi literature in the original Zend, Pahlavi, and Pazarel tongues, or rejoicing over the acquisition at Cairo

of a complete copy of the Hebrew Scriptures, written on 1386 leaves of parchment. He was more than an Oriental pundit, and we cannot better describe another salient feature of his life-work than by saying that for half a century he was recognised as the missionary Statesman of Bombay. In Dr. Wilson there were seen a breadth of view, a largeness of interest, and a catholicity of sympathy that prevented him being regarded as a specialist either in scholastic or evangelistic work. The tours which he made through different parts of the country were frequent and extensive. He surveyed the country of the Marathi-speaking people north-west to Nassik, and south-west to Poona, proceeding thence into the native state of the Muhammadan Nizam of Hyderabad; that was followed up by a tour through the southern Maratha country and the adjoining settlement of the Portuguese at Goa. Other cold weather seasons found him in the northern half of Bombay, the Gujerati country, with its great native states of Baroda, Kathiawar, and Kutch, in the delta of Sindh, and the deserts of Rajputana. These tours were neither missionary nor literary, evangelistic nor archæological exclusively; they were surveys of the country in every aspect interesting to the cultured Christian philanthropist, and in the course of them Dr. Wilson came into close contact with all classes of the people, and became the most prominent and most trusted public man in Western India. And so we find him at one time in conversation with a Portuguese padre at Ierveal, conversation being carried on in Latin; at another time visiting the representative of the house of Sivajee, founders of the Maratha power; or visited by native princes, Muhammadan and Hindu, who in passing through the capital would seek an interview with one who had been a welcome preacher in their durbars; and on a third occasion sitting in the country palace of Indore in the presence of the Maharaja and his prime minister, learned pundits and Brahmins assembled for discussion becoming frightened when the Scottish missionary of Bombay opened out upon them with Sanscrit quotations. Then by European residents and visitors, intercourse with, and assistance from, the missionary statesman were eagerly sought after. Lord Elphinstone, when Governor of Madras, invited Dr. Wilson to give him the benefit of his educational

experience, and after he became Governor of Bombay, that statesman was in constant communication with him on social and statistical as well as educational subjects. In the matter of Lord Ellenborough and the proclamation regarding the gates of Somnath, he was summoned to the councils at Bombay, and officially asked for information to enable the Government to criticise the blunder and the folly of that rash and flighty official, the serious and the ludicrous sides of whose proclamation were so mercilessly exposed by Lord Macaulay in 1843. By the Judges of the Supreme Court references were frequently made and queries submitted to the learned missionary, and the thanks of the Court conveyed to him by the Chief-Justice for the clearness and fulness of his answers. In the very year of his death (1875), Lord Northbrook requested him, as a competent interpreter of the Oriental to the European mind, and a trusted mediator between the races, to help the Government by giving his impressions as to the effect of the Baroda trial on the minds of the natives ; the propriety of publishing, as an appendix to the *Life*, the reply to an inquiry *confidentially* addressed by the Viceroy is open to question in view of its possible effects in Bombay, but the intrinsic value of the communication might well call forth the warm gratitude expressed in Lord Northbrook's acknowledgment, and create the desire for a similar expression of judgment upon other cognate subjects. The example thus set by Viceroys, Governors-General, and Judges, in availing themselves of the boundless stores of exact learning and multifarious information which Dr. Wilson seemed to have accumulated only to communicate was followed by others. After thirty years' residence among the natives, the state of his health forced him to reside in a cottage on Malabar Hill called The Cliff, and there, to the close of life, he kept open house for Europeans and natives. Bombay being, ever since the mutiny, the port of arrival and departure for Anglo-Indians, the flow of guests was an ever-increasing one, necessitating an addition to the cottage of guest-chamber accommodation. "No distinguished person," says Dr. Smith, "visited the Governor without seeking an interview with 'the King of Bombay ;'" and of the happy social coming and going that went on at The Cliff, notes of visitors to Bombay with whom Dr. Wilson had more or less intercourse from 1863 to

1870, and which extend over some five pages of the *Life*, afford delightful glimpses. As Dr. Smith was indulging in no exaggeration when at an earlier stage of his biography he affirmed that while yet under forty years Wilson of Bombay was "the most prominent public man in Western India," so he is chargeable with no overdrawn statement when, towards the close of his work, he states that for many years before his death the philosopher and philanthropist, ever ready to be the guide and informant, was "the best-known man in India as well as Bombay." It is possible that dwelling at such length upon the salient features of scholarship and statesmanship may lead readers unacquainted with the subject to suppose that the missionary element was a subordinate one in the Indian career of Wilson. The supposition, however, would be far from correct, would be the exact opposite of what was the real state of the case. All through his busy life Dr. Wilson never forgot, and never allowed others to forget, that he was a missionary of Christ, a messenger of the Churches. The great labours of his life were educational and evangelistic. He might, in what Edwin Arnold would call "the brief intervals of days without leisure," throw off learned articles for quarterlies, and erudite memoirs for scientific journals, and he might at times give forth popular books under the title of *India Three Thousand Years Ago*, and *The Lands of the Bible*, but his strength as a writer was given to such works as *Exposures of the Hindu Religion*, *Review of the Origin and Development of Caste* (the first volume of which only was published, death making the work a splendid fragment), and his *Parsi Religion, as contained in the Zend-Avesta, and propounded, and defended by the Zoroastrians of India and Persia, unfolded, refuted, and contrasted with Christianity*, which his biographer esteems his greatest work. As a man of research and culture, Dr. Wilson might interest himself in the transactions and discussions of literary and scientific societies, and he might co-operate with Lord Elphinstone in guiding the course of the young University of Bombay; but his first thoughts in the matter of founding were given on landing in India to the instituting of three female schools and two boys' schools, all under his superintendence, and one of the latter under his own roof, and to the forming of a native church in Bombay. His services were



ever at the disposal of British officials, who sought to benefit by his large experience of the country and peculiar opportunities of mixing with all classes; they were given, however, still more freely and constantly to Churches other than his own when these resolved, at his instigation, to plant missions in regions beyond, as the Synod of Ulster and the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland found and warmly acknowledged. He would do anything that seemed likely to promote the ends of good government and the intellectual advancement of the people whom he loved and sought to benefit—anything short of sinking the missionary in the man of letters, or the man of affairs; and so when the Bombay Government desired his services as President of the Committee for the examination of civilians and officers in the native languages, and thereafter as Oriental translator, he declined both appointments, wishing “to be quite free to give all his time and strength to missionary operations,” and to be “what I have been since the beginning—*only a missionary.*” The genial, sociable nature of one who was the least assuming and most unselfish of men found pleasure in having a Bishop or a Quaker at breakfast, a company of explorers at luncheon, an editor at dinner, Lady Franklin or Sir Bartle Frere spending an evening with him at The Cliff, and he was ever ready, in velvet skull-cap and with long wand, to lead a new Governor-General, a member of Council, or a traveller through the cave temples and monasteries of the province, pouring forth his stores of knowledge with unflagging courtesy, and charming all by the rare combination of goodness and grace, historical and Oriental lore, poetic quotation and scientific reference, genial remark and childlike humour, till visitors, like the accomplished Lady Canning, declared they “had never met such a man;” but it was a far greater joy to the good man’s heart when, in 1839, he baptized three Parsee converts, first-fruits of his labours among the followers of Zoroaster, or when Hindu children, not only in the capital, but in distant places, called him “Kaka”—Uncle Wilson. Following the example of a Paul, a Luther, a Calvin, and a Knox, who tried to get the world into position by turning it upside down, he challenged Hindus, Parsees, and Mussulmans, waging war with Hinduism by

public discussions, and with Parseeism and Muhammadanism through the native newspapers; but preaching in the bazaar, and so calling on men to flee from the wrath to come, and to take refuge in the grace of Jesus, was what most moved his soul, and formed "*the work*," as he told Professor Burnouf, "in which I seek to be engaged—the instruction of the Eastern mind in the glorious truths of Heaven's own revelation." Thus it is with a true appreciation of what after all formed the outstanding feature of the fifty-one years' labour of the missionary that Dr. Smith, who has chronicled these labours with the culture of the scholar and the enthusiasm of a true Indophile, takes us, when closing his labour of love, to the deathbed of his hero on Malabar Hill, and shows us it surrounded by those he loved and lived for—by Hindus kneeling before him for the blessing of the Christian patriarch, by Muhammadans who sought to retain their beloved friend in life by the skill of a hukeem who had healed the Shah of Persia, and by Parsees, in the persons of his first and latest sons in the faith. And there is more than the skilful touch of the literary artist. There is the insight of loving sympathy displayed by the biographer when he avails himself of the reminiscences of Mrs. Ballard, who, after giving us the emphatic testimony of Sir Bartle Frere, called forth by the universally regretted absence of the dying missionary from the reception of the Prince of Wales—"How I have missed Dr. Wilson from his place to-day!" furnishes Dr. Smith with this tribute of feminine beauty and tenderness for the closing paragraph of "the life of John Wilson:"—"I stole into the silent bungalow to lay a wreath on his coffin. The sun was rising over the distant hills and tinging the bay with gold. No sound broke the stillness but the rustle of the wind in the dry palm-leaves and the dash of the distant waves, until I entered the little study. There a voice of bitter weeping met my ear in the verandah—the native Christians, sorrowing most of all that they should see his face no more. 'We are so glad,' said a native Christian once to me, 'that Dr. Wilson will never go home. You all go and leave us; we know you are always looking longingly to England, but Dr. Wilson will never go home.' Ah! he had gone home now."

As it was the reading of a Bible Society's Report that

awakened John Wilson to the importance of missions, and led him to resolve to devote himself to the foreign field, so it was the mastering, when a St. Andrews student, of an encyclopædia article on India that moved Alexander Duff to respond to the call to proceed to that country as the first missionary sent forth by the Church of Scotland. But in the case of the youth from the Grampian highlands there were other influences at work to which his compeer from the border was a stranger. When only eight years old he had a vision in which a "magnificent chariot of gold, studded with gems, drawn by fiery horses" emerged from a great brightness that shone in the distance, and the voice of One in the chariot said to him, "Come up hither; I have work for thee to do." A fervid and susceptible nature like that of the young dreamer was certain to be influenced by what his after career invested with the significance of a prophecy. Then the time of Duff studying at St. Andrews was, happily for him, the time of Chalmers lecturing there on Moral Philosophy. That the tall, sinewy, and keen-strung youth of fifteen, fresh from successful contests for honours in Greek, Latin, Logic, and Natural Philosophy, should come under the spell of that mighty mover and leader of men, and be acted upon by the ferment to which his lecturing gave rise, was simply inevitable. Young Duff gave himself up to the sway of the Chalmers influence more perhaps than any man of his times, and on him more largely than in the case of any of his contemporaries the mantle of Chalmers may be said to have fallen. With characteristic generosity of estimate he declared, when tidings of the death of his loved professor and trusted friend reached him, that Chalmers was not only "the master mind of his own country if not of his own age," but also "for years the leading missionary of Christendom." Posterity will probably divide this double honour, bestowing the first part upon the professor, and the remaining upon the student; and it was doubtless a recognition of the justice of doing so that led to such a universal wish being expressed in 1849 that Duff should come home to be the successor of Chalmers—a wish which he met, as he met other movements of a similar nature, with the counter wish to be allowed "to retain in the view of all men the clearly marked and distinguishing character of a missionary to the heathen abroad, pleading their cause

among the Churches of Christendom." The time when Duff reached Calcutta—middle of 1830—was a critical one in the faith, philosophy, and science of Hinduism. If it be too much to apply to the movement going on the term *renaissance*, as is done by Dr. George Smith, it was certainly a time of transition. The Hindu mind had begun to awake from the sleep of centuries, and to question the teaching of the Shasters upon a variety of subjects. The result of inquiry was misgiving, doubt, a relaxed hold of what had hitherto been devoutly believed, and a perilous tendency towards Atheism in religion, Agnosticism in science, and licentiousness in morals. It was in India as it has been in Italy and in France; the clearing away of error and disabusing the mind of falsities and puerilities had left a space not only swept and garnished, but also empty; and it was a matter of grave concern with what this space was to be occupied—with Christianity or with secularism, with lawless lust and vice, or with regulated liberty and sobriety. The Hindu College of Bengal had not been wisely guided in the matter. Among other blunders committed by its managers was the fatal one of endeavouring to secularise the teaching communicated, teachers being threatened with immediate dismissal who did not "abstain from any communications on the subject of the Hindu religion with the boys." At this crisis Duff appeared upon the scene. And the first thing he did, after making himself master of the situation, was to open a school, afterwards to be developed into a college, different from any then in existence. From the outset of his career as an Indian educationist there were two principles which the founder of the Calcutta Institution never suffered to be departed from: the first being that all the instruction communicated in the Institution must be openly and pervadingly religious, some portion of the Bible being read daily by every class that could read it; and the second being that the medium of instruction must be the English language and not the classical languages of India. In giving effect to the former of these principles, the innovator met with opposition that came from such opposite quarters as those of European missionaries and native parents; but he never wavered, and was not long in living down all opposition. The battle was substantially fought when, on the opening day, the Scottish missionary

stood up in the small hall hired for the purpose, and in the presence of his scholars, uttered the Lord's Prayer slowly in Bengali, and then, putting a copy of the Gospels in Bengali and English into their hands, requested some of the older pupils to read what they called "the Christian Shasters." In carrying out the second principle, Duff anticipated a controversy, which was waged with great keenness shortly after his arrival in India between Orientalists and Anglicists. The contention of the Orientalists was that all public instruction of natives should be through the learned languages of India; the education of Muhammadans through Arabic and Persian, of Hindus through Sanscrit; the plea of the Anglicists was that the proper medium of instruction was that which the natives themselves most earnestly desired, viz., the English language, with the vernacular tongues for the elementary classes. When such men as Lord William Bentinck and Lord Macaulay and Sir Charles Trevelyan encountered the Orientalist party, they found a powerful ally in the Head Master of the General Assembly's Institution, to whose success they could point as the best proof in favour of their advocacy of the English language and literature. For a great success the school proved to be. Before twelve months had passed, the fame of school and teacher was in all the city; in the second year, hundreds were refused admittance to the school from lack of accommodation; elder pupils were employed as monitors, and the services of native assistants were secured, while larger premises were taken. By 1834 the school had developed into a complete college, the curriculum including the study of the Bible, with the evidences and doctrines of natural and revealed religion; the annual examination of the classes in the Town Hall had become one of the notable events of the year, and both school and college speedily became the first of normal training institutions in India. Such results were not achieved without strenuous labour on the part of one who, at the outset, did the work single-handed and shrank from no drudgery. Six hours a day were spent in teaching Bengali youth the English alphabet—*O X, ox* being always the starting point, and many an hour that might have been claimed for recreation or sleep was given up to the writing of primers and graduated school-books, which "held their place in every

Christian school in Bengal for the third of a century." In picturing to ourselves the teaching missionary as he threw himself into his work and projected his image upon the memories of hundreds of Hindu boys, we are greatly helped by this bright little sketch from the pen of an Institution boy who became a Christian, a missionary, and a professor :—

"He came into the class-room," writes the Rev. Lal Behari Day, "while we were engaged in reading the first page of the *First Instructor*. I cannot say he walked—he *rushed*—into it, his movements in those days being exceedingly rapid. He was dressed all in black and wore a beard. He scarcely stood still for a second, but kept his feet and hands moving incessantly like a horse of high mettle. He seemed to have more life in him than most men. He had his white pocket-handkerchief in his hand, which he was every now and then tying round his arm and twisting into a thousand shapes. He seemed to be a living personation of perpetual motion. In our lesson there occurred the word "ox;" he took hold of that word, and catechised us on it for about half an hour. He ended with a moral lesson. He knew that the word for a cow in Bengali was goru, and he asked whether we knew another Bengali word which was very like it in sound. A sharp class-fellow quickly said Guru, which means the Brahman spiritual guide. The doctor was quite delighted with the boy's discovery, and asked us of what use the Guru was, and whether on the whole the goru was not more useful. He then left our class and went into another, leaving in our minds seeds of future thought and reflection."¹

The intellectual and spiritual experience of Lal Behari Day from the memorable day on which he entered the Institution "a little trembling eager-eyed boy brought in from the jungles of Bengal," leads us to remark upon one fruit of Duff's educational labour to which he himself ever assigned the first place, namely, the conversion of large numbers of young men of marked ability, and high social, or caste, position. By the instruction he communicated to them in school and college, by the courses of lectures he delivered, and by taking part in their debating societies, Dr. Duff speedily gathered in converts from Brahmanism and Muhammadanism. From the baptism into Christ of Mohesh Chunder Ghose and of Krishna Mohun Banerjea—first-fruits gathered in 1831, to the reception of

¹ From *Recollections of Alexander Duff and of the Mission College which he founded in Calcutta*. By the Rev. Lal Behari Day, Fellow of Calcutta University, Professor in Government College, Hooghly. T. Nelson and Sons.—A little work of great value, not only because of its discriminating estimates of mission men, but also because of the information it supplies regarding the converts and their subsequent careers.

seven Hindus and five Jews into the ranks of Christianity in 1845, from the licensing in 1845 of four catechists, two being Brahmans, one a Rajput, and the fourth a middle-class Bengali, to the ordaining of three native licentiates as pastors of branch stations in 1855, the ingathering went steadily on, requiring the addition of a convert's home to the other educational and ecclesiastical buildings.

We do not overlook, neither do we undervalue, other departments of Dr. Duff's labours in India. With the Eurasians—offspring of English fathers and native mothers—warmly did he sympathise, and heartily did he co-operate in their struggle for toleration and education; and his services received due recognition at their hands when, in the day of his perplexity, they offered the Hall of their Doveton College to a man who had done so much for them. Through the press the missionary made his power to be felt in quarters which his voice could not reach. Thus his twenty-five letters chronicling the events of the Mutiny, afterwards published in collective form under the title of *The Indian Rebellion, its Causes and Results*, have a permanent value for the historian of the future; and good service was rendered to the serial literature of Bengal by the establishing of the *Calcutta Christian Observer*, a magazine to represent missionary and philanthropic operations, and by first contributing to, and thereafter for some years editing, the *Calcutta Review*. Over and above all this, work among soldiers, rural missions, vernacular education, Zenana instruction, sanitary measures and movements, missionary enterprise in Africa—these and suchlike Christian and philanthropic services found in Duff a ready helper, a powerful pleader, and an enthusiastic worker. Still, the one grand department of Indian work which bears his indelible stamp, to the creating and perfecting of which he bent all the energies of a gigantic mind and an enthusiasm unquenchable, was education. He was emphatically the educational missionary, and his two great instruments were the Bible and the English alphabet. Advisedly have we written *Indian work*, for we must not forget that there was another side to the work of this prince of modern missionaries. There was the home side, and if indirect results are to be counted in along with direct, it may be questioned if Dr. Duff did not accomplish as

much for missions when organising and kindling interest in Great Britain and America as when educating and evangelising natives abroad. Towards the close of 1863 the wearied wasted missionary said farewell to India, but he left the country in which his heart remained till death, "only to enter on fourteen years of ceaseless labour as well as prayer for the cause to which he had given his life." Prior to this, however, he had visited his native land twice—once in 1834, when beaten down and driven home by disease well-nigh fatal, and a second time in 1850, when his temporary return was urged upon him by the General Assembly of his Church. His absence from India on both occasions was longer than is generally the case with missionaries simply home on furlough; and if the years over which these visits extended be added to the fourteen spent as Convener of Foreign Missions and Professor of Evangelistic Theology, they give somewhere about the quarter of a century during which the missionary was labouring at home. And no one to any extent acquainted with the work at home would wish the period of foreign service had gained at the expense of these twenty-five years at home. For, to an extent equalled by few, surpassed by no one, did the missionary of temporary return or final retirement give noble service, and achieve great things. He visited Scotland twice, from the Solway Firth to the Mainland of Orkney, addressing Presbyteries by the score, hundreds of congregations, and public meetings uncounted. While England, Wales, and Ireland were included in both first and second campaign, the second embraced a lengthened and fatiguing visit to the United States and the Dominion of Canada. In 1864, on his way home for the last time, he visited Africa, carefully inspecting the missionary stations of his Church at Lovedale, Burnshill, Pirie, and King William's Town; while in 1870 he made for the second time a tour through Syria, the examining of the Lebanon schools being one of his principal objects. One of the results of these home campaigns was the attracting of young men and the influencing of them to give themselves to foreign service. When the work of the first visit was just beginning under the chilling influence of a frigid convener and a silent committee, the bitterness of the returned missionary's heart was assuaged by the visit of two theological students seeking information and

direction. The early ripe and soon called M'Cheyne was one of these, and Dr. A. N. Somerville, still spared, and not sparing himself in catholic evangelism of the true Duff type, was the other. Another student drawn to the cause of missions, about the same time and by the same magnet, was "the man who beat Tait," James Halley, the friend of James Hamilton and William Arnot, most accomplished student of Glasgow University in his day, and who, under the impulse of Duff's first Assembly appearance, returned to Glasgow and became the founder and first President of the College Missionary Society. Among licentiates and ordained ministers the influence of a burning zeal was no less powerful. An imperfect newspaper report of the speech to which Halley listened found its way to a quiet retreat on the banks of the Nith, and came under the notice of John Anderson, then a probationer off duty from sickness; and that resulted in his becoming Anderson of Madras, founder of the General Assembly Institution which has recently taken form in the catholic Christian College of Southern India. Before Duff at the request of the Presbytery of London visited the metropolis with a view to organising associations in each congregation, one minister within the bounds was cold on the subject, and hostile to the movement: after the visit, the one dissentient became the one volunteer, resigning his London charge, in order to be colleague with Mackay, and Ewart, and Duff. That was John Macdonald, whose rare spirituality and singleness of purpose might well be coveted for India, and to whose worth a fine tribute has been paid by the Hindu convert to whose recollections reference has already been made. And so with many others, with such men as Johnston and Braidwood of Madras, Dr. Murray Mitchell of Bombay, and Dr. Thomas Smith of Calcutta; it is not too strong a statement of the biographer when he affirms that the whole religious biography of the period covered by Duff's home work "is coloured by his influence or bears traces of his persuasive power." To one instrument which he wielded in the service of persuasion, we must refer before closing our estimate. There was much of the fighter in the temperament of Alexander Duff. Before he left Scotland the vow was made to kill Hinduism by striking at its brains: when he reached India, he devoted time and strength "to the preparing

of a mine and the setting of a train which shall one day explode and tear up the whole from its lowest depth ;” and from time to time thereafter he figures in Dr. Smith’s *Life* as “castigating” a Calcutta barrister, “fighting the Committee,” “fighting the Governor-General,” and had it been necessary, he would not have objected to encounter the natives in revolt, for when Lord Canning supplied the inmates of Cornwallis Square with muskets, a fellow-missionary was struck with “the gleam of glee that lighted up Duff’s face as he handled his musket.”¹ That this combative quality of the man and the Celt, acting along with extreme sensitiveness—“I have never seen any one so singularly sensitive as he” is the testimony of his successor in the convenership of the Foreign Missions Committee—should generate more or less of friction and heat both in committee and in class-room, was inevitable ; and had his biographer made more allowance for these intensifying as life advanced, and credited the Church with something higher than mere ecclesiastical partisanship, he might have given a less prejudiced version of a certain incident to which more explicit reference is, in the case of those who know, unnecessary, in that of those who do not, undesirable. But the fighting element in Dr. Duff’s nature contributed in no small degree to give him that power as a pulpit and platform orator, in the wielding of which he had few to equal, and none to surpass him. Destitute of, probably despising, the mere external and studied graces of oratory, ungainly in form and action—“his long right arm waving violently, and the left one hugging his coat against his breast,” but gifted with a splendid physique, the very voice of a pleader, now rising to a wail of plaintive sadness, now sinking to a whisper of vibrating intenseness, a copiousness of diction which fed the stream of speech for hour upon hour unbroken, unpausing, the Christian orator battled down prejudice, swept away apathy, and flooded the most apathetic of hearers with his own burning convictions, his own blazing enthusiasm. Dr. Duff’s first speech in the General Assembly of 1835, that of a fever-wasted youth of twenty-nine, which caused the

¹ One is often reminded, when reading *The Life of Dr. Duff*, of the grand lines of Browning in *Prospice*, beginning—

“ I was ever a fighter, so—one fight more,
The best and the last.”

pencil to drop from the hands of professional reporters, made Lords of Session, Parliament House lawyers, and grey-headed moderates weep like children, and dissolved half the Assembly in tears; his Exeter Hall speech in 1837, pronounced by English critics the most eloquent of its kind; his five orations in the Assembly of 1850, each of which filled the great Tanfield Hall with an overflowing crowd; his addresses in America and Canada in 1854—these take high place in the annals of modern oratory, and through them, in printed form, and still more in the impulse given when spoken forth to those whom they moved to self-surrender, he being dead yet speaketh.

In closing our study of the lifework of one who, regard being had to the splendid services he rendered in spreading the gospel abroad and stimulating the zeal of the Church at home, stands forth a prince of missionaries, we shall place side by side two testimonies, which, from the fact of their being taken from such different quarters, may do something like justice to the foreign and the home services of the one man. Eleven learned Brahmins, on hearing that it was contemplated to recall Dr. Duff in 1849, drew up a remonstrance, a translation of which is given by Dr. Smith, who bears testimony to “the dim reflection” to be found in it of the “impression produced by the fervid personality of Alexander Duff on the people of India.” “The Reverend Doctor,” say they, writing as ‘Sanskrit pundits,’ “has been greatly blessed by Almighty God. His name is in the mouth of every Hindu because of his transcendent eloquence, learning, and philanthropy. Such a man as the Reverend Doctor was never seen in this country before.” And it was thus the pleader for dying heathendom in India impressed an American, who records his experience of “two hours before Duff, most instructive hours, not soon to be forgotten:”—“Since Chalmers went home to heaven Scotland has heard no eloquence like Duff’s. As the orator drew near his close he seemed like one inspired. His face shone as it were the face of an angel! He had become the very embodiment of missions to us, and was lost in his transcendent theme. Never before did we so fully realise the overwhelming power of a man who is possessed with his theme. The concluding sentence was a swelling outburst of prophecy of the coming triumphs of the Cross.”

CHARLES G. M’CRIE.

ART. VI.—*Spinozism and Old Testament Criticism.*¹

“THE Law and the Prophets.”—This conjunction, always occurring in the New Testament in this order (with the single exception of Matt. xi. 13, where “the prophets” stands first), has hitherto been regarded as chronologically accurate. Doubts as to the fact of the historical antecedence of the Law did not appear in the Church till the last quarter of the seventeenth century, and the doubts then originating did not spring up among Christian theologians, but were first advanced by a Jewish philosopher, who, with his whole manner of thought, stood outside the Church.

Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-politicus* (1670) attributed, for the first time, the origin of the Pentateuch to Ezra, the post-exilian reformer of Mosaism, who, it was alleged, first composed the book of Deuteronomy and then the other four books, but left the whole work in an incomplete state. The father of modern pantheism thus became also the author of the most radical theory of Biblical criticism, the Ezra-hypothesis which has of late acquired so much popularity. When Richard Simon (1678) gave up the doctrine of the authenticity and unity of the Pentateuch, while maintaining that a certain legislative kernel of it might be Mosaic, he took up an apologetic position against Spinoza. When Clericus in his *Sentiments de quelques théologiens de Hollande* (1685), which was occasioned by Simon’s *Hist. Critique du Vieux Testament*, set forth an hypothesis far surpassing that work in the rash boldness of its assertions—and maintained that the Pentateuch was wholly post-Mosaic, and that it owed its origin to an Israelitish

¹ [The following paper we translate from the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* of 24th July last. This journal, as to its church politics, is distinctively Lutheran, and is the recognised organ of the Evangelical Lutheran party in Germany. Its influence in that country has been very great during the long conflict that has been waged there against Rationalism. It was founded by Hengstenberg in 1827, who, for forty-two years, was its editor. It is now carried on in the same spirit by Tauscher of Berlin. We gladly present to our readers this paper as an able historical exposition from the writer’s point of view of the *status questionis*. It will furnish abundant material for arriving at a correct knowledge of the nature and importance of the subject which is now forcing itself on the attention of theologians in this country, and particularly in one of the branches of the Church of Scotland.]

priest of the time immediately following the overthrow of the kingdom of the Ten Tribes by the Assyrians (2 Kings xvii.),—the impulse which led to this strange theory (which he, however, recalled in his *Commentary on Genesis*, 1693, substituting in its place the admission of an essentially Mosaic origin of the Law) was without doubt derived by the rationalising Arminian from Spinoza. The same may be said of the theory of the Mennonite physician and preacher at Haarlem, Anton van Dale, presented in his work on the Origin of Idolatry (*Vom Ursprung des Götzendiensts*, 1696), and afterwards in an epistle to Steph. Morinus, viz., that the Pentateuch was compiled by Ezra from the genuine book of the Mosaic laws, together with certain other historical and prophetic works. This, too, is evidently but a modification of Spinoza's Ezra-hypothesis.¹

During almost the whole of the last century this critical theory was discredited equally with Spinoza's pantheistic speculation. When, however, his pantheism rose again into acceptance through the writings of Lessing and Goethe, and other leaders of our national literature, some attempts were also made (by Hasse, Fulda, Vater) timidly, and at first in a manner that was very destitute of scientific acuteness and precision, towards a reproduction of the hypothesis of a post-exilian origin of the Pentateuch. The greatest number of theological critics, including those that were most distinguished during the first half of the present century, adopted the opinion of De Wette (1806), who regarded the age of Josiah, that is to say, the last decennium before the Exile, as the probable date of the origin of Deuteronomy, the supposed last portion of the Pentateuch. Only two writers, both of them Hegelians, W. Vatke in Berlin (*Bibl. Theologie*, Thl. i, 1835) and Leopold George (*Die älteren jüdischen Feste*, u.s.w. 1835), gave utterance to more distinctively radical views. They taught that the whole legislation of the Pentateuch was post-Mosaic, and in its chief parts also post-prophetic; that Deuteronomy, composed towards the time of the Exile, was not the most recent but the oldest book of the Thora; and that the narratives of the other four books originating after Deuteronomy, and dating in part so late as the post-exilian period, are wholly mythical. There is wanting here only the adoption of the idea of a composition of the whole by Ezra, but in all other respects

¹ Regarding these *hypercritical* theories, cf. *Acta Eruditorum*, 1696, p. 447 seq.

all that is characteristic of Spinoza's theory is revived. Certain theses, also, concerning the origin of the book of the Law which the Strasburg theologian Édouard Reuss drew up (1833) but had not published, two years before the above-named Berlin publications, contained noteworthy approximations to the radical hypothesis of a post-exilian origin of the principal parts of the Thora.

K. H. Graf, a pupil of the Strasburg critic just named, and Professor at the Gymnasium of Meissen, propounded in 1860 the negative-critical theory of the Pentateuch of most recent date, now generally known as "Graf's theory," although its completed form is due to certain critics occupying his standpoint who survive him. Graf died in 1860. Abraham Kuenen in Leyden, August Kayser in Strasburg, and particularly Julius Wellhausen in Greifswald, have built up that which he left incomplete, and given to the theory the form in which it is now current. In the first volume of his *Geschichte Israels* (Berlin, 1878), the last-named author has advanced the idea of an essentially post-prophetic origin of the Law, and a post-exilian composition of the Book of the Law.¹ According to him, the Books of Moses together with Joshua, or the Hexateuch, consist of three component parts, none of which goes further back than the age of the prophets of the eighth or ninth century B.C., or the Assyrian epoch. These component parts are—(1.) The "Jehovist," a prophetic historical book, compiled from two sources, a Jehovah and an Elohim record; (2.) The "Deuteronomium," a book of law, originally consisting of nothing but law, the historical parts being a subsequent addition. The intention was the bringing about of a united theocratic order of cultus; (3.) The "Priest Codex," previously called the "Fundamental Document," or, on account of the frequent

¹ Wellhausen's *History of Israel* was preceded by his discussion of "The Composition of the Hexateuch" in the *Jahrb. f. d. Theologie*, 1876 and 1877, as also by sections referring to the Pentateuch in his new edition of Bleek's *Einleitung ins A. T.*, Berlin, 1878 (pp. 1-178). Graf's views are particularly brought out in the monograph *Die geschichtlichen Bücher d. A. T.* (the Historical Books of the Old Testament), Leipzig, 1866, those of Kuenen in his works (written in Dutch), *The Religious Worship of Israel* (1872) and *The Prophets and Prophecy of Israel* (1875); also in a literary historico-critical contribution to the *Theol. Tijdschrift*, 1870 (given in an abridged form by Wellhausen in Bleek's *Einleitung*, etc., p. 153 f.); those of Aug. Kayser in *Das vorexil. Buch der Urgesch. Israels und seine Erweiterungen*, Strasburg, 1874. Cf. also Duhm's *Die Theologie der Propheten*, Bonn, 1875, and De Lagarde's *Symmicta*, 1877, p. 116 f.

use of the name Elohim, "the Elohist," consisting of certain portions of Genesis, of Exodus xxv.-xxxi., and xxxv.-xl., of almost the whole of Leviticus, as also of Numbers i.-x., xv.-xix., and xx.-xxxvi.; thus a mixed work, made up of historical narratives and legislative texts, presenting the laws for the most part in a historical costume. This "Priest Codex," a work concocted with a view to hierocratic interests, through which there glimmers more or less distinctly an older and somewhat more simple fundamental work, the so-called Book of the Four Covenants, proves itself with obvious distinctness, by its endeavour after the representation of the theocratic cultus of the Temple and of sacrifice as a directly Mosaic institute, to be the most recent of all the Pentateuchal records. That "the Jehovist *knew nothing* of unity of cultus, that the Deuteronomist *postulates* this unity as something not previously existing, while the Priest Codex, on the contrary, *presupposes* it as a matter of course, and as having prevailed all along in a developed form, with all its consequences"—in these things there is found, according to Wellhausen, an incontrovertible evidence of the posteriority of this Codex, of its being the product of Jewish priests of the Persian era, cunningly writing for a purpose; in brief, an evidence that it was Ezra, supported by certain priests, who first drew up these documents, and brought about their public recognition. About 458 B.C. this great Scribe came from Persia to Jerusalem, but only in 444 B.C., after he had kept the law for fourteen years in his own "private possession," did he take the step of "publishing and establishing" the Codex, now prepared and completed, "as the authoritative legislation of the Pentateuch" (*Ges. Israels*, p. 421),—a distinct proof, as Wellhausen alleges, of the circumspection and deliberation with which the crafty hierarch carried out and gave effect to his fiction of a fundamentally new primitive history and a religio-ethical tradition for his nation. The ancient history and the system of cultus thus invented for Israel had their culminating point in the tabernacle, with its sacrificial offerings. While in truth, according to the Books of Kings and Samuel, as well as no less according to the older prophets and the Jehovistic historical work, unity of cultus existed neither in the patriarchal age nor from the age of Moses and Joshua down to the building of Solomon's temple—while, on the contrary, there had all along existed contemporaneously

many different places for religious worship, and "of one exclusively authorised sanctuary not a single trace was to be found;" Ezra's Priest Codex propounded the law of a central sanctuary, pretending that it had already been established by Moses. The tabernacle was, in truth, nothing else than a copy, purposely contrived, of the Temple at Jerusalem of the time of the Kings: it was Solomon's Temple made portable, and furnished with an altar of wood instead of brass! Thus all that is characteristic of the law of Moses as to sacrifices and the priesthood and the ritual worship, is to be regarded, according to Wellhausen, as a post-exilian fiction without historical validity; thus also the Day of Atonement, the law of the Sabbath, the gradation of high priest, priest, and Levite, the tithes, the Levitical cities, etc., are all fictions. Of all the recorded cultus legislation, there therefore remains absolutely nothing that is Mosaic; it is not even quite certain that the Decalogue was written by Moses. In any case the entire theocratic institutions of Israel are decidedly post-Mosaic; Moses was, so to speak, "the founder of the Mosaic constitution in the same sense in which our Lord Jesus Christ is the founder of the church order existing in Lower Hesse" (*Gesch. Israels*, p. 427). There was, in fact, no written law in ancient Israel. The cultus of Jahve, the covenant God, was practised; but not on the ground of any written legislation, but merely by virtue of oral tradition, or "from nature," just as the heathen, not having the law, "yet by nature do the work of the law" (Bleek's *Eint.* 4 Ed. p. 178).

The naturalistic character of the theory, as advanced by Wellhausen, appears in the last-quoted sentence. The law is to be regarded not as the product of revelation, but as the product of development, and as pertaining not to the beginning but to the end of Israel's history. Equally with the prophetic literature, and essentially on the ground of that literature, it organically grew up in the course of the later centuries. By a grand effort of fraudulent art, a system of purely natural origin was post-dated from the age of Moses, and set forth as having been a direct revelation of the will of God. Even a learned author noted for the reckless *abandon* of his Old Testament critical operations, who cordially approves of the "organic" quality of the Graf-Kuenen outline of the progress

of the development of the Israelitish religion, feels himself constrained to make express mention¹ of the danger of a "degeneracy into the naturalistic," which this "organic" or "historico-critical" school seems to threaten. The analogy of the theory with F. Ch. Baur's construction of primitive Christian history is quite palpable. In the latter as in the former there is mutual conflict of diverse tendencies, pure unbroken naturalness in the beginning of the development, which in its last unfolding brings forth the product of "Catholicity," cultus-dogmatic unity; in the latter as in the former, there is the glorification of the middle stage of the laborious and struggling process of the development, as of that which is alone ingenious, evangelically deep and true (Prophetism in the Old Testament, Paulinism in the New Testament); in the latter as in the former, the assertion that unworthy arts of deception and falsehood played a great part in the last stage of the development—generally the intensification of the impulse and influence of a pseudo-logical tendency-authorship, even to the degree of the wildest extravagance and incomprehensibility. The coincidence of this attempt at a retrogression of the tendency-critical hypothesis from the sphere of the New Testament to that of the Old Testament, with the cult-conflict which has raged since 1870, constrains one involuntarily to observe a struggle not unlike the war of culture, a specific anti-clerical and anti-hierarchical tendency, in the teaching of the modern critical school. And indeed this impression is well-founded. Things of such a kind as one reproaches the Romish clericalism and ultramontaniam with, are being freely laid to the charge of the Jewish "hierocracy." It is perhaps scarcely accidental that the component part of the Pentateuch, formerly designated by the harmless name of the "Grundschrift" (*i.e.* the original writing = the fundamental document), is now called the "Priest Codex," and must become the bearer of a very strong quantum of ambitious and cunning priestcraft in the form of inventions, partly historical and partly legislative. The processes of invention here fabricated appear indeed to be very much contrived after the pattern of the origin of such documents of the early middle ages as the *Donatio Constanti*, the *Pseudo-Isidor*, etc. Ambitious intrigues and usurpations are here also presupposed.

¹ Adalb. Merx, in the *Jenaer Literaturztg.* 1876, p. 18.

As with every complicated hypothetical system, so also with reference to this Graf-Kuenen history-construction, the bringing forward of a complete and convincing counter proof is not a matter which can be carried out within the space of a few pages. As the literature called forth by the new Tübingen tendency includes many stately volumes, so, in like manner, comprehensive investigations would require to be entered into, in order to meet and finally to dispose of the attacks of opponents moving in so many and so diverse fields of research. Indeed, everything almost which has hitherto been brought forward in apologetic opposition to this tendency, has borne the character of special research, now here, now there. And in the one case in which a longer course of such special researches has been undertaken, with the view of meeting the adversary along the whole line—we refer to the series of articles which have been appearing in Luthardt's new journal, the *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben* (since January of the present year)—one sees a whole book grow up under the writer's hand, and indeed, as the name of Delitzsch, the author of these "Pentateuchal Criticisms," sufficiently guarantees, a book of special worth, rich in its varied contents, as to the state of the controversy.

All that we can here attempt is only to offer brief remarks on the most prominent weaknesses and defects of the modern theory of the origin of the Law, with references at the same time to that which has been done, or at least attempted, hitherto on the positive side.

1. Important difficulties of a linguistic kind present themselves in the way of the Graf-Kuenen hypothesis as to the origin of the Pentateuch. The stock of words and the diction of the post-exilian historical books, such as the books of Ezra, Nehemiah, Chronicles, etc., differ in many respects from those of the Elohist component parts of the Thora, and in such a way that the latter appear decidedly as the older. Also the priority which it is supposed must be ascribed to Deuteronomy in its relation to the Pentateuchal Priest Codex stands in direct opposition to the reciprocal linguistic peculiarities by virtue of which the Elohist elements of that codex appear as the older documents. The same argument holds with reference to the prophet Ezekiel, to whom the modern Penta-

teuchal criticism delights to ascribe a share in the legislation of the Priest Codex, particularly Lev. xvii.-xxvi. To an unprejudiced mind his work appears as the representative of a much more recent stage of the language than that which we find in the Pentateuch.¹

2. Among the actual instances by which the Graf-Kuenen school support their hypothesis, a principal place is given to the alleged post-exilian origin of the Aaronic priesthood, as also to the supposed absence of pre-exilian evidence for the separation of the tribe of Levi to the priestly office in the temple service. In bringing forward their proofs in support of their position, our opponents are abundantly guilty of the logical error of founding on a *petitio principii*, and unjustifiably depreciate the force of the evidence from notoriously pre-exilian sources for the existence of a priesthood of different orders in the tribe of Levi, such evidence *e.g.* as 1 Sam. ii. 28 ; 1 Kings viii. 4 ; Deut. x. 6 ; xviii. 1 f. ; xxxiii. 8-10, to which may be added numerous statements of the Books of the Chronicles, the independent historical value of which, accordingly, is denied by the modern critical school. Cf. the apologetical dissertation of Samuel Ives Curtiss, Professor in Chicago, relating to the subject of the Levites and Priests, entitled *The Levitical Priests* (Edin. 1877), and *De Aaronitici Sacerdotii et Thorae Elohisticae Origine* (Leipzig, 1878), as also Delitzsch's *Critical Studies on the Pentateuch* already referred to, No. 5, "The High Priest," and No. 6, "The Levites in Ezekiel."

3. The historical testimonies in the older books, as Judges, Samuel, and Kings, pointing to the Tabernacle as the pre-Solomonic central sanctuary, are yet more arbitrarily treated by this critical school. That the concluding section of the Book of Judges (Jud. xviii. 31 ; xxi. 19), as also the introductory section of the First Book of Samuel (1 Sam. i. 9 f. ; ii. 11, 22 f. ; iii. 21 ; iv. 3 f.), make emphatic mention of the tabernacle at Shiloh as the central sanctuary of the Israelites during the

¹ For the discussion of this point see Klostermann's *Beiträge zur Entstehungsgesch. d. Pentateuch's* in the *Zeitschrift für d. gesam. Luth. Theol.*, 1877, p. 401 f. ; C. Vict. Ryssel's *De Elohistae Pentateuchici sermone*, Lipsiae, 1878 ; S. J. Curtiss' *The Levitical Priests*, Edin. 1877. R. Smend, in his *Comm. zu Ezechiel*, Leipzig, 1880, shows that this prophet could not have written Lev. xvii.-xxvi. since many linguistic phenomena in these chapters are quite foreign to his style of expression.

time of the last of the Judges ; that further, Nob (1 Sam. xxi. 1 f. ; xxii. 6) and Gibeon (1 Kings iii. 4 ; cf. 1 Chron. xvi. 39, xxi. 29 ; 2 Chron. i. 3-13) are mentioned as the seats of the sanctuary during the time of Saul and David ; that in connection with the consecration of Solomon's temple, mention is made of the bringing up of the old tabernacle, and of its holy vessels, which had now become sacred relics, to the new temple-sanctuary, and that this is done not merely by the Chronicler, but by the author of the Book of Kings (1 Kings viii. 4) ; that, besides, the prophet Nathan, looking back to the period that had elapsed since the departure out of Egypt, says expressly to David in the name of the Lord : " I have walked in a tent (*ohel*), and a tabernacle (*mishcan*)," 2 Sam. vii. 6,—all these facts combined make it quite impossible to think of the tabernacle as a mere imagination of post-exilian origin. Only violent acts of hypercritical arbitrariness can seek to impugn the weight of such sections as those which record the history of Samuel's youth, the history of the ark of the covenant stolen away by the Philistines, the reception by David of the shewbread from Abimelech in Nob, etc., in the force of the proofs they furnish for the existence of a pre-Solomonic tabernacle of the covenant. There remains now as the last expedient available for setting aside such evidences, only the supposition of manifold interpolations introduced into these historical Books of Judges, Samuel, etc., by priestly hands in the post-exilian period. Wellhausen has no hesitation whatever in affirming that there are numerous instances of such priestly interference in Ezra's time. On the contrary, he thinks that it is " very important to discover these re-touches, and to remove them," and he thinks that " the whole old tradition is covered over with such additions as with a Judaistic slime."¹ Precisely in such expressions however does the peculiar tendency-prejudice of the representatives of the modern standpoint show itself most distinctly. These tactics for the removal of inconvenient historical statements, by alleging that they are interpolations cunningly smuggled in, reminds us of the work of expurgation often resorted to in the authorship of the Romish Church, after the example of Rufinus (who declared the most heterodox statements found in the writings of his master Origen to be the

¹ *Gesch. Israel's*, p. 290.

production of heretics), by virtue of which, for instance, Cardinals Borromeo and Montalto once purged the writings of the Latin Church fathers Cyprian, Ambrosius, and Gregory "from all the defilements with which heretics had polluted them." Where such shifts as these are resorted to there obviously cannot be a sound faculty of historical perception. And in proportion to the frequent use made of such expedients in the modern polemics regarding the Tabernacle, the representatives of the conservative cause find it just so far an easy matter to maintain their ground; thus, formerly, Riegenbach, Kamphausen, etc., on good grounds vindicated the historicity of the Biblical statements regarding the Tabernacle against Graf (1855), and Popper (1862), and more recently, P. Gerhard¹ and Delitzsch against Wellhausen. Delitzsch, in No. 2 of his *Pentateuchal Studies*, makes greater concessions to the antagonists' standpoint than are necessary, still there may be partial truth in the supposition that for the time of Israel's thirty-eight years' wanderings in the wilderness immediately after the giving of the law, the Tabernacle, described in Exodus xxv.-xxxi., may have remained only as a project without being actually constructed, and that only after the Israelites were settled in Canaan under Joshua may the Mosaic conception of the cultus of the Tabernacle have been actually realised. That the altar of incense of the Tabernacle—according to the most recent Pentateuchal critics a mere figment of Ezra's—rested on a Mosaic ordinance, and was an actual integral part both of the pre-Solomonic and of the post-Solomonic cultus, is shown most convincingly by Delitzsch in the conclusion to his apologetical dissertation on the Sanctuary of the Mosaic legislation.

4. Our opponents fundamentally mistake when they see in the centralising cultus-statutes of the middle books of the Pentateuch, as also of the Chronicles, an irreconcilable contradiction of the fact that there existed "high places" and other multiplications of the places of cultus during the times of the Judges and the oldest Kings. They shut their eyes to *that historical or psychological law of the development of nations*, by virtue of which iniquity brings about of necessity a falling away of religious communities from the original height and

¹ "Is the Tabernacle a Fiction or a Mosaic Institution?" in *Beweis des Glaubens*, 1879, pp. 515-538.

purity of their spiritual life, so that during centuries the sharpest contrast may exist between what they were, as to dogma and manner of life at the beginning, and their subsequent degeneracy. The depositaries of revealed religion are just they who are subjected to this law of development in a special degree. Let one reflect on the wide aberrations of the Christian nations of the middle ages from the pure primitive forms of our religion, as it existed in apostolic times and for the most part in the times immediately subsequent to the Apostles! The period of the Judges together with that of Saul and David has been frequently compared to the warlike, unquiet, and, in spite of many brilliant exceptions, barbarous centuries of the middle age before and during the Crusades. That much truth lies in this comparison, in particular that the extravagant excesses of the worship of saints, pictures, and relics, of these centuries find a significant parallel in the corruption of Mosaism by the idolatrous tendencies of Israel under the Judges and the first Kings, cannot certainly be denied. The modern critics of the Israelitish history had special reason to keep this parallel duly before their eyes. If they had done this, many one-sided and unpsychological views with which they are rightly charged would have been avoided by them.

5. Several of the alleged fabrications of laws, under the pretence that they were Mosaic institutions, with which Ezra is charged, appear to be very doubtful, because there is wanting any apparent motive for their invention in the post-exilian period generally, and specially in the time of Ezra. Delitzsch (*Pent. Studies*, No. 1) has shown this particularly with reference to the law of leprosy, Lev. xiii. 14. For the Mosaic period, during which the Israelites came into frequent contact with the Egyptians, there was abundant reason for the appointment of prophylactic rules of such a character against the loathsome and dangerous malady; on the other hand, for the post-exilian centuries, during which this disease appears altogether unknown among the Jews, at all events is not once mentioned in history, there was not the least call for such legislation. The same may be said of the Great Day of Atonement (Delitzsch, *Studies*, etc., No. 4) for the appointment of which no event or occasion known to us in the Ezra-Nehemiah period could

furnish any motive, the absence of the mention of which in several pre-exilian historical records and prophetic books may be reasonably presumed to have been only accidental, so that the *argumentum e silentio* on the side of the opponent deduced from this fact can scarcely lay claim to any particular weight.

6. A fabrication of laws under Ezra on so great a scale as the Priest-Codex hypothesis supposes *accords very badly with Ezra's time*. Neither the Ezra of the canonical historical books, nor the Ezra of Talmudic tradition of a later time, appears as a person in any way given to the originating and promulgating of a system of laws; he is essentially only a sopher (scribe), author and collector, not an originator of laws. As tradition describes him, he is a man of intelligence, in the highest degree capable of the work of codifying and editing, but in no degree capable of the independent production of considerable portions of the Law. The Talmud makes express mention of certain legal ordinances as originating from him; but these are partly of a wholly external and unimportant kind, and partly in the spirit of Rabbinism seeking to hedge about the Mosaic Law with all kind of subtle additions. Judged by these, Ezra appears as standing far beneath Moses; and such Rabbinical utterances as we find, *e.g.*, in the Midrash Koheleth, where he is raised above Aaron, or in the Tract Sanhedrin, where he is designated as worthy of the honour of having been Israel's Lawgiver, are only to be regarded as extravagant exaggerations.¹

The books of Ezra and Nehemiah also give no information which points to the introduction of new comprehensive institutions of cultus. The reading of the Book of the Law with the services connected therewith, as recorded in Neh. viii.-x., does not bear the character of the setting up of something altogether new, but is rather the bringing to the remembrance of the people of that which had existed from of old and had been forgotten. That the weeping of the people at the reading of the Law (Neh. viii. 9) scarcely expresses a state of mind suitable to the beginning of new ordinances, but rather indicates penitential

¹ *Vid.* Delitzsch in the Art. "Talm. Studien," No. 16, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. gesam. luth. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1877, pp. 445-450, where he describes "the Ezra of Tradition and the Ezra of the modern Pentateuchal critics."

sorrow on account of national guilt and neglect during a century.¹ The post-exilian Jews would scarcely have given to the laws relating to sacrifices and festivals, if these had been for the most part new, such ready obedience as is described in both of the historical books of that period. And even supposing that they had exhibited to their sopher Ezra such a submissive and obedient spirit, even to the extent of slavish subjection, it would yet have been astonishing that the learned ruler should have so inadequately made use of this situation, so favourable to him, as to have suffered the Priest-Codex to retain arrangements and regulations agreeing so ill for the most part with the post-exilian relations of things.²

7. In addition to this incompatibility of Ezra's personality and times with those which the hypothesis supposes, there is finally this further important consideration to be stated, viz. the many-sidedness of the points of contact of the Pentateuch, and that too in its Elohist portions, with the religious culture-life of the old Egyptians and Babylonians. These *correspondences between the Thora and the Egyptian and Babylonian religious systems* (illustrated by Hengstenberg in his *Books of Moses and Egypt*, and since his time confirmed, and in many respects more fully exhibited, by the labours of more recent Egyptologists, as by Ebers in his *Egypt and the Books of Moses*, Brugsch in his *History of Egypt under the Pharaohs*, and the varied researches of Mariette, Lauth, Lenormant, and others) do not by any means harmonise with the theory of the origin of the Pentateuch which supposes that great portions of this historical and legislative work, and markedly those laying claim to the most considerable antiquity, were only composed after the exile. If a Babylonian Jewish sopher of the Persian period, such as Ezra, had been the author of Genesis in its present form; had such a man composed for the first time the history of the patriarchs and of their relations to the ancient Egyptians, we must ascribe to him a learned acquaintance with the whole circumstances of the five hundred years lying behind him, which far surpasses in the certainty of its results, and in the fulness of its scientific worth, the united labours of all the

¹ Delitzsch's *Studies*, No. 4 (p. 176 of Luthardt's *Zeitschrift für Kirch. Wissensch.* etc.).

² Cf. Baudissin's criticism of Merx's *Joel commentar* in Schürer's *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1880, No. 3.

Egyptologists of our century, from Champollion down to those we have mentioned above. And scarcely less monstrous than such a supposition would be the attempt to see in the Elohist records of the creation as found in Genesis a post-exilian monotheistic copy of the Persian cosmogonistic doctrine where much rather, as the fruit of the most recent Assyriological research, there is presented a view of the process of creation distributed according to the hebdomadal scheme, as the ancient Babylonian parallel to the Biblical hexaemeron, the relation of which to this is scarcely any other than that of a sister-record, having the same common origin with it, only modified by heathen and polytheistic influence.¹

In the absurdities of such suppositions as those we have last named—the fabrication of the whole history of the creation, Gen. i., by a Jew in the Persian era; the artistic adaptation of the Pentateuchal history and legislation to the old Egyptian condition of things, etc.—the utter untenableness of the modern critical doctrine of the origin of the Pentateuch comes clearly enough to light. In spite of this there appears quite a number of hypercritical writers in the German, French, and English languages who are not yet satisfied. They first adopt that view which places the centre of Old Testament spiritual life and literary productiveness altogether on this side of the exile,—a view which the Jewish writers Zunz, Grätz, Bernstein, and others, sought to build up before Graf's hypothesis came into vogue. According to this view the narrative contents of the Pentateuch are regarded as purely mythical; the Histories, and for the most part also the Prophetic books of the Hebrew Canon, are taken as the product of the post-exilian centuries, and many of the books of the Hagiographa are also said to owe their origin to the age of the Herods. Thus Leopold Einstein, the author of a series of noteworthy "Prehistoric discoveries in the sphere of the Hebrew language" (in the *Ausland*, 1880, No. 16 f.), calls the history of the primitive ages in Genesis ("Darwinically expressed"), a "transmutation," which has changed the natural history of the heavens according to the *fantaisie* of those times "into a terrestrial history of man, and, from the time of Abraham, the history of a special people and nation." Dr.

¹ Cf. Gustav Hicckell in the *Innsbrucken Vierteljahrschrift f. Kathol. Theol.*, 1879, ii. p. 394, f.

Jul. Popper, already mentioned above as a critic of the Tabernacle, regards the patriarchal history as a chain of Nature-myths wholly appertaining to the heathen period of the Hebrews; Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are neither separate historical persons nor reflections of old traditions, but simply nature-potencies, "the old stars which always shine in the heavens of the Asiatic world of faith" (Abraham = Dyauspitar, father of the heavens or god of light; Isaac = Arisch Az-dahak, *i.e.* the dark god of clouds; Jacob = Melkart or Hercules, *i.e.* the conquering god of the sun, etc.). Moses also, the first who proclaimed Monotheistic doctrine, together with the Judges and David, are mythical figures.¹ Dr. Martin Schulze, author of a *Handbook of Hebrew Mythology* (1876), and Dr. Ignatius Goldziher, in his monograph entitled *The Myth among the Hebrews and its Historical Development* (1876), mythologise in a similarly wild fantastic manner, everywhere smelling out personifications of the sun, clouds, lightning, etc., and treating not merely the history of Samson, but also the whole history of the patriarchs, as myths of the sun. On the other hand, L. Seineke, in his *History of the People of Israel* (1876), regards the whole of Genesis as a fiction of a prophetic-political tendency of the post-exilian period, Abraham's history particularly as a "chronologically arranged compendium of Israel's history during, and subsequent to, the Babylonian exile in a prophetic transposition;" for example, the putting away of Hagar is only "a reflex of the putting away of strange wives in the time of Nehemiah," etc. Emulating these *enfants terribles* of the German school of critical tendency, there are kindred spirits in France and England engaged in the same occupation. M. Jules Soury's *Études historiques sur les religions, les arts, les civilisations de l'Asie antérieure et de la Grèce* (Paris, 1877), are in part a revival of the notorious Moloch-fancy of Daumer; Jehovah is the atmosphere deified, "the god of the atmosphere" of the Hebrews; perhaps there was deposited an aerolite, or some other old fetish, as his symbol in the ark of the covenant! According to the *Origines du Christianisme* of the Oriental scholar Ernest Havet (vol. iii, le Judaïsme; Paris, 1878), the Pentateuch originated in the time of Ezra; the

¹ Cf. Popper's *Der Ursprung des Monotheismus*, Berlin, 1880; also his earlier work, *Der bibl. Bericht über die Stiftshütte*, etc., Berlin, 1862.

prophetic books, the Book of Daniel, together with numerous psalms, originated in the age of the Herods. The Rev. Dr. Giles, Rector of Sutton, in Surrey, a short time ago published a work in two volumes on the *Hebrew and Christian Records* (London, 1877), wherein he endeavours to show that the whole Old Testament literature and history as they now exist are to be traced to Ezra and his times, and that the Old Testament religion as a whole, instead of being essentially Mosaism, is rather Ezraism, and that the New Testament writings for the most part were first composed about the middle of the second century of the Christian era, and the entire canon of the Bible received its present form in the Church at Antioch since the third century !

Many students of Scripture of a more judicious spirit scarcely need the spectacle of such wild outbursts as these, by which the modern Pentateuchal criticism is overwhelmed with the unwelcome condemnation of a *reductio ad absurdum*, in order to their being filled with thorough disgust of all that is called criticism of the Pentateuch, the distinguishing of Elohist and Jehovistic records, etc. A reaction in favour of the supposition of a direct Mosaic origin, or of the Mosaic-Joshua age, of the entire Thora can scarcely fail to set in after such wild excesses as those we have just described. Attempts in this direction are here and there seen ; thus, in an essay by Cave in the May number of the *Princeton Review* for last year, as also in the article cited by us above from the *Innsbruck Katholisch-Theol. Quartalschrift*, the author of which, the well-known Orientalist Bickell, declares with reference to the wanton variations and changes resorted to by the modern Pentateuchal critics :—

“This most recent difference of opinion among the advocates of the criticisms which pretend to be wholly without prepossession appears to us to be a valuable indirect proof for the *genuineness and unity of the Pentateuch*. For such a variation in their designation of time as 600 years shows at once that the critical analysis generally cannot be so evident as they profess that it is. Moreover one is compelled, if he agrees with the theory of the purely natural development of the history of Israel, to regard the religio-historical arguments adduced by Wellhausen, etc., as valid. But since, on the other side, distinct allusions of pre-exilian prophets to the Pentateuch are found (Bickell here cites Hab. iii. 9, ‘Thy bow was made quite naked,’ as an undoubted reference to Gen. ix. 8-17), *the document-hypothesis in every form is placed in a dilemma between two impossibilities.*”

We, on our part, regard it as unnecessary to go so far. Since the Pentateuch, as a whole, scarcely *professes* to be the work of Moses, and since there are many traces found in the text of the work of redaction pointing to the time of the kings, the document-hypothesis may in some form be justified. In no case is there need, supposing one were willing to stretch the conclusion of that work of editing even down to the exilian or the post-exilian times, to give up anything of the history or of the substance of his revelation by the Thora; the editing, arranging, completing, can have touched only old authentic material. There are a number of temperate critical voices which have made themselves heard in this sense in recent times, especially since the publication of Wellhausen's *History of Israel*. Certain German and other scholars, in consequence of the expositions of this work, may have passed from a sceptical position hitherto held by them to that of complete adherence to the Graf-Kuenen theory, as *e.g.* Kautzsch of Basel (now of Tübingen), Maurice Vernes of Paris, more or less also Reuss in Strasburg, to whom besides, as has already been shown above, a kind of intellectual paternity in reference to this theory belongs;¹ the majority of competent Old Testament critics, however, are related to it only in the way of but very partially agreeing with it, or in a preponderating measure leaning to it. In this altogether reserved sense Delitzsch's *Studies*, frequently referred to, are written. Of a like character are the frequent utterances of the Strasburg theologian, Baudissin, who confesses that "it is to him the longer the more incomprehensible, how that great work (the Priest-Codex) can at all find a place in the exilian or post-exilian period even though one admit in any case that its most ritualistic decrees were in practice before."² Yet more cautiously the formerly very liberal Swiss theologian K. Marti expresses himself regarding the acceptance of the modern Pentateuchal criticism. He maintains that a

¹ Ed. Reuss, *Introd. Critique au Pentateuch et au livre de Josué*, Paris, 1879 (vol. iii. of Reuss's *Bibelwerk*). Cf. Kautzsch in the *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1879, No. 2; also Vernes in the *Revue critique*, 1880, No. 9, also the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, No 1.

² *Theol. Literaturztg.*, 1880, No. 3; cf. also the same author's article "Höhendienst" in the new ed. of Herzog's *Real-Encycl.*, where he, besides, propounds partly very radical views, particularly as to what relates to the supposed unhistoricity of the Tabernacle.

pre-exilian existence of the principal component part of the so-called Priest-Codex is rendered in the highest degree probable from all the results of literary criticism, and he blames the modern critic as wanting in earnestness when he passes lightly over certain older prophets, *e.g.* Hosea and Amos, who show an acquaintance with the contents of that codex.¹ Similarly Hermann Schulz in the second edition of his *Theologie des A. T.* (1879), where he strongly asserts the origin of a great number of the legal enactments, as belonging to the earlier pre-exilian times, and declares it to be "very questionable whether the temporal sequence must be regarded as corresponding to the *logical* sequence of the legislative codices, the Book of the Covenant, Deuteronomy, Ezekiel xl. ff., Lev. xvii.-xxi., the Priest Codex." Of the same kind are the views of Bishop Colenso severely condemned on account of his free-thinking literalism, whose heterodoxy appears to be concentrated in his opinions regarding the Pentateuch, in their most recent form; they stand distinctly nearer to those of Ewald or Hupfeld than to those of Graf and Kuenen.² The Scotch professor W. Robertson Smith in Aberdeen, so much referred to of late, stands on similar ground. His heterodoxy appears to be concentrated chiefly in the maintenance of the composition of Deuteronomy at a period subsequent to Moses and immediately preceding the Exile, while he has by no means identified himself with the radical views of Kuenen, etc., in regard to the time and manner of the origin of the other component parts of the Pentateuch.³

In such a state of things, a retiring from their position on the part of the radical Pentateuchal critics may not be expected; still less however may a great number be expected probably to pass over to their standpoint. Spinozism in the sphere of the Old Testament is one of those errors which exercises a powerful

¹ K. Marti, "Die Spuren der" u.s.w. (The traces of the so-called fundamental part of the Hexateuch in the pre-exilian prophets of the Old Testament), in Lipsius' *Jahrb. für protest. Theol.* 1880, 1 and 2.

² In the concluding volume of his work entitled *The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua critically examined* (London, 1879), Colenso says, "I place the age of the author of Deuteronomy" (and he identifies him with the prophet Jeremiah) "in the first year of the reign of King Josiah."

³ W. Robertson Smith's *Answer to the Form of Libel*, etc., Edinburgh, 1879; *Academy*, May 17, 1878, where he criticises Wellhausen's *Geschichte Israels*. [V.B.—The above remarks were written before the appearance of the article "Hebrew Literature" in the *Encycl. Brit.*]

influence, by whose epidemic outbreak the distinguishing of spirits expected in accordance with Biblical prophecy in the last times is mightily advanced, but at the same time also the unconquerable power of faith in the truth of God is gloriously made manifest. With the violence of the assault the energy of the defender also increases, and the fulness and clearness of the means used in defence of revealed truth. Moses and the prophets as announcing beforehand the grace and truth of the new covenant, disclosed by Christ in all their fulness, remain in honour to the end of the days. The very attempt to change the view of their historical relation which has prevailed in the Church for thousands of years, into that which is the direct opposite,—to change “Moses and the prophets” into “the prophets and a Pseudo-Moses,” or into “the prophets and Ezra,” will issue in a new glorification of the greatest of all religious legislators of pre-exilian antiquity.

ART. VII.—*On the Church Crisis in England from a German point of view.*

THE public mind of England is, at the present time,¹ not wholly occupied with political questions; whilst the voice of the nation may be heard expressing both its satisfaction at, or disapproval of, Disraeli's policy, other voices are mixing with these public acclamations and lamentations,—the voices of Churchmen and Nonconformists alike calling attention to the crisis of the English Church.

For confirmation of the fact that such a crisis does exist, we have not simply to turn to the journals and the press of the land itself—the published discussions in the French and German Catholic papers also confirm it.

In England, Church and Dissent are arming themselves for the coming struggle by a revival of party spirit, by the formation of new and the reconstruction of old associations; and the all-absorbing subject is week after week providing the press with new matter for discussion.

¹ This was written in December 1878.

The *Dissenters* speak of the "unrest, profound dissatisfaction, and vague fears" which exists everywhere throughout the ranks of Churchmen; of impending great organic changes in the administration of the Church's affairs, and of the awakened sense of the manifold troubles of the Church,¹ and they aver that the fate of the Establishment is sealed.² *Bishops and Prelates* of the Established Church themselves acknowledge the crisis;³ and the "present crisis in the Church" has for the last two years become a much quoted and favourite heading in the English reviews. A struggle is spoken of, which must continue till either the State has granted the liberty desired, or until the Church has freed herself from its control.⁴

The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, in an easy and genial paper, says that there are "few sober and cultivated persons at the present time, who do not regard the Present and Future of the Church with a deep and sympathetic interest,"⁵ and that even the most sanguine are not without great fears.

The Ultra High Church Party speak of antiquated institutions which have withstood many storms, and which, now artificially strengthened, raise their weary heads for the time being; a crisis is coming on, they say, which has been culminating for fifty years, and which has driven out of the Church "some of the greatest men the Church of England has seen for centuries;" "at every step it has been thwarted by the authorities of the Establishment, but still, at each step, it has been victorious."⁶ The *English Romanist* rubs his hands quietly and joyfully, and thinks he can already see the fruit of this crisis falling into his lap.⁷

These witnesses for the existence of a Church crisis show at the same time its nature. The danger which is threatening the English State or National Church (to which the majority of the people belong, *i.e.* about two-thirds or three-fifths), is a twofold one: *Disestablishment*, and the *advancing Roman Catholicism*.

¹ See *British Quarterly Review*, July 1877, p. 205.

² See *ibid.*, October 1876, p. 386.

³ *Nineteenth Century*, May 1877, p. 437.

⁴ See *ibid.* p. 434.

⁵ See *ibid.* vol. i. p. 50.

⁶ See *ibid.* vol. i. p. 699.

⁷ See Ritchie's *Religious Life of London*, p. 75.

The agitation for Disestablishment or Disendowment, in other words, for separation of the Church from the State, has been going on for so many years, that I may suppose the main facts of it are known to most people. This agitation, it is true, is supported by a number of members of the Church itself, but it finds its principal and strongest support in Dissent; and since the spring of 1869, when the excited hopes, resulting from the agitation, were confirmed and strengthened by Gladstone's Irish Church Bill, the Nonconformists imagine that the realisation of their hopes with regard to both England and Scotland has made decided progress.¹ Both parties agree in their principal ideas upon the subject: that the Establishment opposes all religious, political and social equality; that it is, therefore, a national wrong which robs a great percentage of the people of their spiritual and social privileges; that on the one side, through the influence of a rich and beneficed clergy through empty and decayed forms, the life-giving streams of the Gospel have become stagnant; that Churchism and Sectarianism have been reduced to an odious state of opposition; and that, on the other side, sacerdotalism, cultivated by a great branch of the State Church, is building a bridge toward Rome.

So there is no one, with the exception of perhaps the so-called "High and Dry Churchman," who is satisfied with the present state of the English Church. Convocation, the Primate, prominent members of the Episcopate, the Ritualists, the Broad and Low Church parties, even the moderate High Churchmen (such as Beresford Hope), finally, the whole party of Dissent, call loudly for a reform of some kind. From all points of the compass the storm is gathering against the stately edifice, which is already beginning to lose its equilibrium but does not yet know in which direction it should fall.

It is acknowledged on every side that the Act of Disestablishment, come when it may, is to be carried out with full maintenance of the principles of religious equality, and as impartially as possible. Also, it is not to be regarded as the triumph of one party; it is not designed for the humiliation of the Episcopal Church and her clergy, but, on the contrary, it is to be the expression of justice, and the representation of

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, March 1878, p. 475 *seq.*; April 1878, p. 734.

true religious freedom, through the removal of those hindrances which result from individual ecclesiastical feeling and position. It is a misfortune, say the Presbyterians,¹ that this cannot be done without depriving one class of privileges they have enjoyed so long, that they have come to regard them as inalienable. But it must be granted that this misfortune is not the fault of the hitherto suffering party. In solving this difficult question, one must, at the same time, take the "Summum jus, summa injuria" into the bargain.

But even though the opposition may agree thus far theoretically, yet each party takes a separate direction in its action. On the whole, the termini of Conservative, Liberal, and Radical reform appears to me correct, and to correspond to the situation; the epithets being taken in their literal, not in their political sense. The Conservative reformers seek to accommodate the legislature to the actual facts of the Church in life, culture, and opinion as they exist at the present day, endeavouring thereby to re-unite the divided members of the Establishment, and to consolidate the distracted Anglican communion by assuring them of the continuation of their former socio-political privileges. The Liberals, by their system of comprehension, aim at the idea of realising a National Church by removing such legal hindrances as prevent the unity of Church and Dissent; they are ready to embrace within as yet undetermined extremes all possible varieties of theological opinions, providing there be a more equal distribution of Church rights. The Radicals say, Church and State have no relationship whatever with each other: the Government ought to maintain strict neutrality towards all forms of belief or unbelief, and to leave the interests of religion to the voluntary piety and devotion of religious men. Church dogmas and Church laws, they say, are so manifold and so different, that the State must avoid even the appearance of judging that a unity exists, and must thus reconcile the ecclesiastical laws not with the demands of a sect, or of ideal dreamers, but with the actual facts of national life. The guarantee of a future religious triumph does not lie in the benevolence and the patronage of the Government, but in the

¹ See *British Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1876, pp. 388, 389.

energy of voluntary piety and devotion of the people.¹ As we shall see further on, the Radicals, whose ideas are mainly supported and upheld by Dissent, cherish the strongest hopes of success. But this triumph will not take place immediately. Nearly every one is fully aware of the difficulty of carrying out the measure in question, and every one acknowledges the deep-rooted influence the Church still possesses amongst the people at large. Time is needed to "make opinion." In the *Contemporary Review* Mr. Hopgood has made, therefore, the proposition of a "painless extinction" in order to avoid the disadvantages of an abrupt transition, or a violent wrench from the past. He says, Bishops and clergy are to retain their positions during life, but at their death no successors are to be appointed. By this means, with an aggregate annual death-rate of 250, in about forty years the work of Disestablishment would be complete.

The Presbyterians, on the contrary,² resist with all their might a measure which will bring the blessing of Disestablishment upon, perhaps, quite a different-minded generation, and see in the Irish Bill the panacea for the present needs.

The measure has succeeded in Ireland, why should it not in England? That it has involved a great many difficulties in the pecuniary arrangement is no proof that the Act is a wrong one. If the State can thereby secure a perfect unity, it must be willing to make this sacrifice. On the other side, the experience acquired in Ireland is a guarantee for more careful and cautious measures. And, indeed, the practical Englishman has already made his calculations upon this subject, as may be seen from the Liberation Society's "Practical Suggestions relating to Disestablishment and Disendowment," and in the paper of Arnold upon the "Business Aspect of Disestablishment."³ Ireland has, within the last ten years, obtained her religious freedom, and has gone through the crisis in such a manner as to be fully justified in anticipating a thriving future.⁴

The Radical reformers go further, and maintain that one should not even adduce the abnormities of the Irish Church as a necessity for Gladstone's Bill; rather does the main idea of

¹ See *Brit. Quart. Rev.*, April 1876, pp. 510-517.

² *Brit. Quart. Rev.*, October 1876, p. 393.

³ See *Nineteenth Century*, vol. ii.

⁴ See *ibid.*, April 1878, pp. 733, 734.

the Irish Bill affect the Church policy of the whole of the British possessions. The colonies have given a precedent to the mother country: the clergy reserves in Canada have for years become secularised; in the Australian Colonies, at the Cape, in Jamaica, and the West Indies, the support granted by the State for religious purposes has been abolished either by the action of the Colonial Assemblies or by the Home Government. "Voluntaryism," said the *Times* upon one occasion, "seems to prevail everywhere except at home."

Of course, one cannot expect to see the Establishment voluntarily beginning the work of Disestablishment. Still, its representatives see that a reform is necessary, and for some months they have been trying to bring it about in a so-called "Readjustment of Church and State," as the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol prefers to call it.¹ But this Conservative crumb satisfies the hunger of the Radicals, particularly the Nonconformists, as little as the Public Worship Regulation Act, with its determination of ritual, has succeeded in doing. Even during the ministry of Disraeli (who was pleased to call Disendowment "Confiscation") the weighty question will hardly be touched upon. In his speech of March 18, 1869, in opposition to Gladstone's Bill, he certainly has too much committed himself; I only recall his passing word: "If Government be not divine, it is nothing. But, like Banquo's ghost, the spectre of Disestablishment rises at every ecclesiastical gathering, and haunts the prelates in their official activity." The charges of the Bishops and the speeches of Deans, at Church Congresses and Diocesan Synods—even the very sermons of the curates—show that there are grave apprehensions of an impending revolution; whilst, at the same time, a great percentage of the English public make up their minds to a separation of Church and State.

In the meantime, the opposition, both in its ecclesiastical and its political branch, is working steadily onwards. Amongst all the Societies, none has done more towards upsetting the equilibrium of the State Church defenders than the "Liberation Society." This Society, which first made its appearance in 1844, under the patronage of Miall, Pye Smith, Howell, etc., and which bore the aggressive title of British Anti-State-Church

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, June 1878, p. 1098.

Association, has for its express purpose to cause a rupture between Church and State. On May 1, 1877, this Society, now known by the less offensive title of "Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Patronage and Control," held its eleventh triennial conference. It is open to members of all denominations, and, in the first conference in 1844, the founders formed their war tactics, which, since Miall's address in 1865 up to the present time, have remained as models.

A great machinery is in action. Thirty-five men, whose work extends through the whole kingdom, take the lead. Since the foundation of the Society the greatest sympathy of the public has been shown during the last two years, in which 2600 meetings have been held. Political clubs, Young Men's Christian Associations, and other societies which have made the Disestablishment question part of their programme, are the strong outposts of the Society. The platform throughout the whole of the land has been fully occupied, and during the last three years the press has distributed no less than five and a half millions of publications, helping more or less the agitation. Above £42,000 have been collected by voluntary contribution, and the committee express with the greatest confidence their belief that "when further resources are needed they will be cheerfully supplied."¹ The Society has gone from victory to victory, so that its opponents now speak of it with a mixture of fear and admiration. "It is impossible," says Howels Davies, a late Secretary of the Church Institution, "to tell you the enormous power wielded by the Liberation Society. Its organisation is almost as perfect as organisation can be." Mr. Masheder, in his *Dissent and Democracy*, affirms that the Liberation Society will never be beaten; checked it may be, but not stopped. Its organisation is brought to bear upon any single question with all the promptitude and precision of a veteran battalion, and the Council of the Church Defence Institution acknowledges that "such an agitation left to pursue its own way unresisted and unchecked, must soon produce considerable effect upon the mind of the nation."²

How has it acquired this alarming reputation? The action

¹ See *British Quarterly Review*, July 1877, pp. 187, 188.

² See *Report of the Ch. D. I.*, February 1876.

of the Society has been perfectly loyal and legal. It is not by the simple votes of an accidental majority, or as the result of a political convulsion, that it has gained its end, but by influencing public opinion, which is the expressed conviction of the nation. In the country, as in the manufacturing districts, in the obscure village as in the over-peopled town, this agitation has, by means of numerous publications, worked so thoroughly as to secure an energetic Parliamentary movement. The laws of the last twenty-five years may be regarded, both in a political and in an ecclesiastical point of view, as the Legislature of Emancipation. The abolition of the *Regium Donum*, of the Compulsory Church Rates in England, the Ministers' Money in Ireland, the Maynooth Grant, the Edinburgh Annuity-Tax, a number of oaths and declarations in the Statute-Book which excluded Protestant and Roman Catholic Dissenters from legal and municipal offices, the admission of Jews to Parliament, the Burial Bill, Oxford University Bill, the Irish Church Bill, the University Test Abolition Act, 1871—all these belong to the legislation of the last twenty-five years. Of all these emancipatory Acts, the Oxford University Bill of 1854, with the clauses admitting Dissenters to the University, is due to the exertions of the Liberation Society, and is still considered as one of the most glorious pages of its history. Molesworth, in his *History of England*, says that this result was in a great measure due to the efforts of the Dissenters in the constituencies under the guidance of the Liberation Society. And how much the Society has influenced the Irish Church Bill may be seen from Lord Derby's speech on the second reading of the Bill in the Lords:—

“This Bill in a great measure proceeds from a measure prepared under the auspices of the Liberation Society. . . . This Bill has been carried in the Commons by the combination of a variety of interests. The Liberation Society I place in the first rank, . . . for I think that the Government cannot be ignorant of this, that to the unceasing efforts of the Liberation Society is owing a considerable portion of the very large amount of support they received throughout the country during the recent elections.”¹

After this victory the members of the Society felt that they could not lay down their arms; and after it was proved by the Irish Bill that separation of Church from State was

¹ See Derby's Speech in the House of Lords, Session of 1869.

really possible, and that too without tumult or disadvantage to either, the Liberators with renewed energy threw themselves into the new conflict—the Disestablishment of the Episcopal Church of England.

Before the decisive blow falls there is still time to avert it. At least the Bishops hope so, by assuring us that within the Church new religious life and feeling is showing itself, that the Church was never so deeply and firmly rooted in the heart of the nation as at présent, and that the agitation is merely beating the air. But so to misunderstand and despise the energy and strength of the Dissenters, who, for the most part, take their weapons out of the Gospel itself, is, as I venture to think, wrong. There is no one who believes that no danger exists. If the episcopate, now on the line of defence, does not understand how to effectually bind the tendency of the High Church system—*i.e.*, to free the Gospel truths from outward ceremonies,—the stately edifice will soon arrive at the crisis of destruction.

At a conference in Manchester (1875) the question was raised as to the legal alterations likely to result from Disestablishment, particularly as to the principles of Disendowment. The conference of 1877 has responded to it, and laid before its members two works which thoroughly discuss the Disendowment question. In his book entitled *The Property and Revenues of the English Establishment*, Fr. Martin has touched upon the pecuniary side of the question, the incomes of the bishops and clergy, the revenues and expenditure of cathedral establishments, the number and income of the parochial clergy, the extent and worth of the Church estates, the history and working of Queen Anne's Bounty, and the Ecclesiastical Commission. It is a book of statistics. Near a million of acres of land, for the most part rich and fertile, are owned by the Church: 16,000 stately edifices, with a score and a half of majestic cathedrals amongst them, are dotted all over the kingdom, and attached to them are 10,000 glebe houses, for the exclusive use of the ministers of the Established Church. Their total incomes amount to, at least, seven millions. All these figures, arranged for the purpose, tend to exhibit in a marked manner the present anomalies of the State Church.

In the Practical Suggestions relative to the Disestablish-

ment and Disendowment of the Church of England, these revenues and the colossal wealth of the Church, are fully considered, and the question put forth as to whether it be not possible to create a more equal distribution without affecting personal interests, and causing new difficulties. The experiences of the Irish Church Bill have been taken as rules for these proposals; in the Disestablishment question, accordance is proposed, in the Disendowment question propositions are suggested for the attainment of better pecuniary results, which have lately been analysed and supplemented by A. Arnold in the *Nineteenth Century*, iii. pp. 733 *seq.* These proposals, too, are based upon such careful reflections, upon such impartial judgment, and upon such great experience in all legal Church questions, that even the Church members themselves are beginning to give them due attention.

And so the Liberation Society, never neglectful of its purpose, steps energetically onward in its work of preparing the mind of the English public for the coming crisis. It wishes to allay the fears entertained by many, by adopting the cheerful words of the late Dean Alford with regard to the Act of Disestablishment :—

“There can be no doubt that the carrying out of Disestablishment will be accompanied by enormous difficulties; difficulties of which only mature consideration and ample discussion can possibly bring about the solution. But the course of English history has shown that every step in our advancing series has been more for good and less for evil than any of us anticipated; that when we seemed beset with difficulties, and our way hopelessly intricate, the national conscience struck a clear course, and our apprehended loss became our undeniable gain. Therefore I believe we may set our minds perfectly at ease with regard to any fear of injustice towards the Anglican Church. The nation is not capable of committing it. If we generously advance into the forefront of the change, and show ourselves worthy to guide the English Church in this crisis of her fortunes, I know of no Church in the world that might win for herself a prouder position.”¹

Finally, we have to notice those who, being members of the Church itself, have joined the agitation of Dissent, and look also for fulfilment of those ardent wishes which stimulate the action of the Liberation Society. It has already been shown that the main difficulty of the impending change does not lie so much in Disestablishment as in Disendowment. The

¹ See Alford's *Speeches and Addresses*, 1869.

greatest differences of opinion prevail, for instance, as to the distribution of the eventual surplus funds. But whilst the Dissenting agitators are still searching for an arrangement of the Estates question, the dissatisfied members of the Church have already separated the question, and singled out one part of it. They take only Disestablishment into consideration, and putting aside the Disendowment question, allow the full strength of their High-Church logic to play upon this one point, in order to be able with their united strength all the more energetically to dissolve the union with the State.

This agitation is all the more threatening, because thus in the Church itself an eager propagandism is continuously increasing in power; whilst formerly those members of the Church who were dissatisfied with her arrangements and condition seceded to Rome or Dissent.

So, now, these two rivals, the New High Church Party and Dissent are working in unity for the overthrow of the present condition, whilst the party-conflict within the Church itself is absorbing the strength of the minority; for each of the three parties has taken a decided stand upon the question of Church and State.

The High Church Party comes first under consideration. This party is suffering just now from a deep rupture. On one side stands the New High Church Party (Ritualists, Puseyites, and Tractarians), with their opposition to all royal supremacy, their contempt of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, their desire for a revision of the Prayer-Book of Edward VI., and their "cordial sympathy with each one resisting what he believes to be the unconstitutional aggression of the civil power."¹ And whilst this small but energetic party is nourishing the germ of conflict in the midst of the Church, the Old High Church and Low Church Parties are, on the other hand, maintaining a thoroughly loyal position in all these questions, cultivating between themselves, in the meantime, the heritage of old historical antagonism. The one defends the historical position of the Church, and places organisation and constitution in the foreground; whilst its rival asserts a pure scriptural doctrine, and endeavours, with all energy and strength of mind, to give a true impression of Christianity by leading a peaceful

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, March 1878, p. 62.

and God-fearing life. The third, *i.e.*, the Broad Church Party, may be regarded as the neutral one. The members of this division do not concern themselves at all about the ritual question. They quietly acknowledge the justice of the present union between Church and State, because, to use the language of one of its members, "the religious expression of the community can thus better be guided by the State; in other words, because a greater amount of doctrinal freedom is thus more effectually secured."¹ It forms the most comprehensive division, an English "Protestanten-verein," through whose influence German criticism is about to make good its entrance into the Church of England. The members of the Broad Church party will, therefore, have to fight their battle with the Intransigents of the High Church. For the present this party are content with sharpening their weapons, whilst the High and Low Church parties are fighting each other, and are waging a "war to the knife" as to State supremacy or Disestablishment.

In the meantime, they both indulge in a language which outsteps all bounds of decorum. From the right the ritualistic hatred manifests itself, for example, in regarding all reformers as "miscreants," and their work as "scoundrelism,"² by calling Edward VI. a tiger, etc. Church and State, they say in their pamphlets, are now in a state of conflict as to which of the two is to direct the consciences of the people, and enforce obedience in spiritual things. A "Church" Society refuses to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the highest court of justice in religious matters. Clergymen of the same Church object to common prayer and service within the same holy precincts; and Mackonochie, quite recently, "respectfully, but firmly" declined to acknowledge the decision of his bishop. In answer to a second summons, he (on November 27, 1877) persisted in his rebellion, by putting aside the episcopal decision. If the leaders thus compromise their cause, one should not wonder that the party, following this open disobedience, dares to offer in public worship prayers for a minister who willingly despises the laws of the State.³

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 63.

² See Dr. Littledale's lecture on Innovations.

³ See *Neue Evangel. Kirchenzeitg.* ed. by Messner (Berl.), 2 Feb. 1878, p. 72.

At the same time, it is this party of Intransigents which, with considerable success, has taken into its service the privilege of association for attaining the end of its agitation. It has brought several Church Unions into activity, in order to remove the control of the State over the Church, without however consenting, as in fairness should be done, to give up the equivalent advantage of State support. These various bodies or unions are—The Layman's Association for the Restoration of Church Rights, The Church of England's Working Men's Society, The Order of Corporate Union,¹ and others, which go still further and demand the full radical cure, *i.e.* Disestablishment and Disendowment, as the League for the Separation of Church and State, and the whole advanced ritualistic party.

The meaning of this opposition party and their speech is, at least, plain enough. In "A Plea for the Separation of Church and State," which appears under the auspices of the League mentioned above, they say, that owing to the present state of things the dignity of the Church of Christ, and our faith towards the Lord, is in danger. "Our demand for Disestablishment must be a demand, at least, as earnest for Disendowment." "The Church has been tempted to settle in Egypt by the richness of the land of Goshen; if she seeks for freedom, she must seek it in the desert, and bravely leave behind her the flesh-pots, the onions, and the garlic."² These are the ideas of the Rev. Mr. Mackonochie upon the question; yea, he goes "beyond his objectors," who disavow the endowments, and thinks "the endowments the *origo mali*, the principle of evil."³ And I myself, one evening in St. Albans, Holborn, heard a curate of Mackonochie's indulge in such invectives against the Government, as according to my German ideas simply profaned the pulpit. His text was taken from the apostle's words, "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap;" and I found these words form an exceedingly happy and well-chosen subject for the Demosthenical outburst of the excited and furious curate.

¹ See *Germania*, *Berlin Sonntagsblatt*, 1878, Nos. 9-14.

² See *Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 701.

³ See *ibid.* p. 700.

Thus the rock of the Established Church is surrounded by the mighty and vehement waves of both Church and Nonconformist opposition, while the ritualistic aggression, increasing in depth and breadth, hastens on the crisis if we look at it from another point of view. This ritualistic question touches the quick of English religious life, and therefore goes deeper than the more general question of Disestablishment, from which it does not emanate, but with which it is connected. It wins for the future of the National Church a prominent place with regard to the present Roman Propaganda. *Within* the Church a violent struggle is going on as to the supremacy of the State and the doctrine of Roman sacerdotalism; from *without* she has to endure the assaults of Dissent, which has inwardly and outwardly won new strength. And while this battle is going on, the Church of Rome as a bitter-sweet enchantress stands by: "Duobus litigantibus tertius gaudet." Protestantism in England is dead, says Cardinal Manning (who has stept from Ritualism to Rome); we may save the time spent in controversy, and instead of marching to the battle-field, we may rather march to the harvest-field and bring home our sheaves. We are in our time witnessing the intellectual annihilation of Protestantism. In France and Germany the work has been done, in England it is stepping boldly onwards. The (ritualistic) movement has taken an excellent direction, and Protestantism is moving with hasty strides towards Rome, Abbé Martin ventures to make us believe.¹ In a recently published book by a "Domcapitular" of Basle, called *Pictures from South England*, the author compares English Protestantism to the sleeping daughter of Jairus, and Roman Catholicism to the risen youth of Nain; and, with more imagination than truth, he sees the many ruins, strewn over the whole of England, compose themselves to the prophecy, which is engraved in letters of brass on the front of St. Paul's: *Resurgam*.² "England recovers herself more and more; her noblest and best educated children are returning to the Church, and thus she replies to the bad example given by Germany with a good one by the return to the one fold."³

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, February 1878, p. 251.

² See Zardetti, *Bilder aus Süd England*, 1877, 10 Pict.

³ See *Germania*, *Sonntagsblatt*, 3d March 1878, p. 71.

And, indeed, these exulting voices from Rome are not raised without reason. The political emancipation granted by Parliament to the Roman Catholics for the last fifty years; the great support the "English Propaganda" in Rome has met with; the sly, expectant policy of Cardinal Wiseman; the restless energy of Manning, along with his thorough knowledge of the faults and weaknesses of the English Church; the eminent result of the latest propaganda; the founding of new bishoprics;¹ and the many newly consecrated churches which are announced every month in the papers—all these tend to show that England is ripe for Rome. A few weeks ago German papers told us that the Duke of Northumberland, whose splendid palace with its far-seeing lion has fallen a sacrifice to street improvements, recently had followed the example of his brother peers Norfolk, Bute, etc., and become a convert to the Romish Church. "The lion of Northumberland has fallen," somebody wittily said, "and his four brothers (on Nelson's Monument) have got the gout in their paws."

A great excitement has seized Churchmen and Nonconformists with respect to the progressive success of this secret Romish work, and everywhere in Protestant countries the danger is felt. The creation in 1851 of a Roman Archbishopric of Westminster did not cause more repugnance than is now shown towards the Tractarians, who, as is now openly acknowledged, work openly and secretly into the hands of the Romish Church, though they themselves of course do not confess to what Church, Dissent, and Rome charge them with. "It is not true," said an excellent minister of this party in St. Leonard's-on-Sea to me some years ago, when I ventured to reproach his party with this Romish inclination, "It is not true," he said; "give me the names of my church-people who have stepped over to Rome. You can't find any, whilst Trinity and St. Mary's (the pastors of which were then belonging to the Evangelical party) have lost six converts this year." But in contradiction to this, Monsignor Capel, in his reply to Gladstone's Political Expostulation, says that a constant and ever-growing

¹ Scotland has just come under the jurisdiction of the Roman Church, with Glasgow and St. Andrews as Archdioceses, but without a Primate, whom the Government would in all probability oppose.—See *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 6th April 1878, p. 220.

stream is flowing from the ritualistic party into the Roman Catholic Church, and that such men as Pusey, Liddon, and Mackonochie clearly point out the way to Rome, though they may do it "unintentionally." They sow the doctrine of the Romish Church. Seventeen out of every twenty persons who embrace this faith have been prepared for it by the teachings of the ritualistic pulpit; and in another place,¹ in accord with Abbé Martin, he says that the High Church party prepares thousands for a submission which even Rome herself could never accomplish. Rev. Mr. Bowden, the confessor of Lord Nelson's son, says, in the correspondence which in 1876 resulted from the conversion of that young man, that as long as certain members of the English Church persist in imitating the service of the Romish Church, in celebrating mass, praying to saints, hearing auricular confession, and in counting their beads; as long as they do these things conversions will take place, and although they may not appear at all connected, they are the necessary results of such proceedings.² Abbé Martin, in the February number of the *Nineteenth Century*, 1878, p. 254, goes further: "Ritualism," he says, "is a stronger opponent of Protestantism than Catholicism could be. It finds more ready acceptance, is less apt to be the object of prejudice and dislike, while it insensibly prepares the way for the fair unity of Catholic dogma and worship. Ritualism destroys the prejudices and angry enmities which Protestantism has planted in the hearts of Englishmen during the last three centuries, and through this means we already see the dawn of a day in which peace shall be restored, and the voice of the Church shall be heard with calmness." In the August number of the same Review he already ventilates the question, What prevents the Ritualists from becoming Roman Catholics? and answers that, in the convulsions of Anglicanism, there is such a thorough recognition of Catholicism, that all intellectual difficulties (Papal Infallibility, of course, is meant) must, as a necessity, quickly be subdued. Soon the day will come when the united choirs of the Romish Church will sing the old hymn, "*Quam bonum et quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum!*" Happily, this surmise is too confident, as well as too precipitate and rash. It is well known that the tactics of Romish authors lead them always to

¹ See *Rock*, Aug. 4, 1876.

² See *ibid.*, July 14, 1876.

speak of a "vegetative existence," and of the "death convulsions of Protestantism." But there is, on the other hand, no denying the fact that Rome entertains great hopes with regard to England, and that, in imagination, Manning already sees himself seated in Lambeth Palace as Primate. It is this Ritualistic aggression which is the cause of the retrograde movement of the Established Church; for Ritualism is not to be judged by its formal questions; the agitation for Disestablishment is only one side of its character, based essentially upon the attitude of the party towards the supremacy of the State. Its cardinal question is, as it appears to me, the re-pristination of the Sacerdotalism of the Middle Ages.

The principal features of this movement, which has been going on for about forty years, are, as I may suppose, well known. But I cannot avoid drawing some characteristic lines in order to prove as clearly as possible my assertion of the central position of a priestly mediation in the ritualistic system and of its retrograde tendency.

The English Reformation was, as is universally acknowledged, not a religious, but a political, parliamentary act. It proceeded from the throne, and took, therefore, a downward, instead of an upward direction, as happened in Luther's country. Thus it is to be explained that the true religious revival, which followed later on, found its adequate expression in the forms of dissent in Knox, Puritanism, Wesley, etc. Cranmer's and Henry's new form of religious conviction, in consequence of adopting the doctrine of a visible Church, did not discountenance the idea of a Romano-Popish Hierarchy. It only changed the name of Pope into Archbishop, of Rome into Canterbury. Under the Stuarts, this idea led to the system of so-called Erastianism, which soon sought to bind the fresh and unfettered powers of Dissent in chains.¹ Rome offered the mighty Laud reunion and the Cardinal's hat. But according to Gardiner's recently published *Personal Government of Charles I.*, the Primate had only one answer to give: "Something dwells in me which will not suffer me to accept that until Rome be other than it is." This Erastian Anglicanism, which was embodied in Laud, was, particularly after it had been increased by a broad stream of Arminianism flowing from Dordrecht, from its

¹ See Tayler's *Retrospect of the Religious Life of England*, p. 65.

very beginning, the most servile and ready helper of tyranny.¹ Thus, it exerted influence, particularly against the powerful and ever-increasing Puritanism, which formed such a strong contrast to the pretentious Neo-Romish Church of Canterbury, whose spiritual authority, thoroughly permeated by the most intense Erastianism, had been called into life by means of a court intrigue. The "Century of Evidences" also did not succeed to bring into the Church the vital powers, which Wesleyanism possessed and propagated. And when Europe, after the disturbances of the Napoleonic era, looked back with longing to the splendour of the Middle Ages; when an earnest philosophy opposed the offences which an insipid and shallow rationalism was guilty of in handling the weightiest religious questions; when the studies of history and literature resulted in new life even in England: then Laud appeared to the fainting Church of the nineteenth century as the representative of a mighty and glorious past.

In the nineteenth century the religious development took the form of Ritualism, which has a decided reactionary tendency to Catholicism, whereas the religious development of the eighteenth century, Methodism, stepped onwards in the path of Protestantism, openly and consciously defying the antiquated High and Dry Church forms.² From this side a new impulse was given to the Church, which from the time of Laud had been in a state of stagnation. The newly awakened life of Methodism affected several small circles which had their centre in Cambridge, and later became known under the name of the "Evangelical Party." Here the power of a personal Christianity stepped forward in opposition to the outward forms of an emptied and unenergetic Churchism, as faith active in love opposes inactive orthodoxy. The ban of the formula was destroyed; each one felt himself welcomed, at least those who agreed earnestly with the gospel; even the Articles, which form such a barrier between Church and Dissent, were falling down one after the other; and the historical worth of the Confessions was found slowly decreasing, while active personal Christianity was in the ascendant. Then reaction set in and strongly

¹ See Lecky's *Hist. of Rationalism*, vol. ii. p. 193.

² For clearer and better information upon this subject I refer my readers to Mettgenberg's *Ritualism and Romanism in England*: Bonn, 1877, Hochgürtel.

opposed the modern Liberalism, when Lord John Russell inaugurated a new era of religious emancipation; when Parliament, University, and the Synodal representation of the Church, were reformed by the "spirit of the times;" when the people demanded reasonable alterations in the liturgy and the Premier advised the Bishops to put their house in order; when the mob of Bristol burned down the Bishop's palace; and when in 1833 an Irish Church Act confiscated half of the Church possessions: then to some Oxford men the realisation of Laud's ecclesiastical ideas appeared the only escape out of the shallowness and misery of the times.¹

Oriel College, Oxford, became the nursery for this reaction, and the names of Keble, Pusey, Hurrell Froude, Palmer, Oakeley, and Newman became associated with the movement. The latter was looked upon as the governing spirit, and from 1833 to 1843 his influence upon the whole religious life of Oxford was greater than had ever been attained by any University man over his University since the thirteenth century.²

It was thought necessary by these men to oppose the Liberalism of the Evangelical party, and thus to effect a realisation of the old Apostolic Church, in which alone the grand principle of Catholicity, the "*Quod semper, Quod ubique*," could find expression. The Church of the Reformers is a nonentity; she has surrendered the *jus divinum* of the Church; she has put the pulpit in the place of the altar, and regards it as a means of divine grace; in consequence she has stripped the Lord's Supper of its principal moment, the idea of sacrifice: so spake the leaders of the new movement, which from its very beginning took an anti-reformatory direction. Froude says that he hates the Reformation and the Reformers more and more. The Reformation is like a broken leg which has been badly set, where the leg has to be broken again before it can be properly set. He will have no communion with those who in irreverential manner speak of the Holy Eucharist as the Lord's Supper, of the priests of God as servants of the Word, and who call the altar the Lord's Table.³

¹ See C. Schöll's excellent essay in Herzog's *Real-Encyclop.* 1st edit., vol. xvi. p. 213.

² See Gladstone's address at the consecration of Keble Hall, Oxford, *Times*, April 26, 1878.

³ See Schöll, *l.c.* p. 215.

This first speaker in the new movement carried his ultra-primitive principles so far as to practically repristinate celibacy, fasting, and, "for a revival of the care of souls, at least in great towns," also convents, but, at the same time, he sacrificed theoretically his Laudism to his Primitivism by demanding, like the Nonjurors of 1689, the independence of the Church in relation to the State. And all this he did that he might realise his idea of the Church as a divine institution. In this Froudian repristination of primitive principles lie the good and bad germs of the movement, which from that time has become in the main a conflict as to the dignity of the Sacraments and Sacerdotalism.

I should be far outstepping the limits of the space allowed to me if I were to touch upon all the phases of the struggle waged by this enthusiastic and active party. The great importance of Newman's Tracts, and their influence upon a movement which was already drifting towards Rome, is well known. I shall only refer to one of them, which is characteristic of the aim of the New High-Churchism. This tract, "put forth to meet the exigencies of the times," contains *in nuce* the idea of the Church as the one Catholic Church; it considers the Sacraments to be means of grace in an objective manner; it teaches apostolic succession, the episcopate, and priesthood; it maintains for the Church an exclusive privilege of teaching; it finds in the English Church all qualifications showing her to be the right one; and therefore opposes Protestant Dissenters for their having no "priests" as strongly as it opposes Roman Catholicism, "that unhealthy and corrupt branch of the Catholic Church," which it accuses of nine heresies. The *Christian Observer* (the principal paper of the Evangelical party) of March 1834 was the first to raise its voice against this "Catechism" of the Neologists, and against the following tracts, particularly when the third tract tried to prove the Romish doctrine of the Confessional. But the controversy which now followed, and which drew the most characteristic points into discussion, could not hinder the progress of the movement. A great number of conversions to Rome took place; in the first twelve years upwards of 200 ministers went over. And, while the discussion as to the right of this step became more and more

vehement and bitter,¹ the public at large anticipated every moment a thorough unconditional surrender to Rome. The crisis reached its height when in 1852 Cardinal Wiseman was made Archbishop of Westminster, and the new Church province divided into twelve Catholic bishoprics.

The hopes of Rome, hinted at by these defiant measures, have, however, not been realised. The conversions did not increase in the same proportion, and only now and then England is thrown into consternation and a kind of awe for a day or two upon hearing that the bearer of one of her aristocratic Protestant names has passed over to the Church of Rome.

In the meantime, the forces which were in action in the beginning of the movement have not been consumed. They have been working, both openly and secretly, in various circles, creating as it were two divisions, the one leading to an energetic manifestation of a true pastoral care, informed by brotherly love; the other leading to an unevangelical sacerdotalism, and, therefore, close to the doors of Rome.

At present the new party have help and assistance at their disposal which is not to be despised. The ministry is recruited chiefly by young members of the Oxford school, who place the whole of their energy and eloquence at the service of their party. In all the principal parishes churches are in their hands, and the practical duties of their sacred calling are in general being discharged by them in such an excellent unselfish manner that the Church of England has to thank them for a new epoch with regard to home-missions (*Seelsorge*). In London, Brighton, Hastings, for example, the ritual, as well as the eloquence of the ministers themselves, attract large congregations,—congregations very different from our German ones. For the majority of those present is composed of young men, varying in age from twenty to forty years, and, in some cases,—*e.g.* St. Alban's, Holborn, London,—men belonging to the trading and the working classes. In this respect the revival of the religious

¹ Conversion was from the first looked upon as a necessary consequence. "The secession of Newman," says Gladstone—see *Times*, 26th April 1878,—“threw a great part of Oxford into thorough disorganisation,” and “it is said that the effect of that secession, and what was justly called, perhaps, the failure of the movement connected with it, threw all the brightest and noblest intellects of the University as wrecks upon every shore.”

or rather ecclesiastical spirit has gained its greatest victories, and shows anew what great power it still retains over the mind of the people.

The same may be said as to the great results of their missions (*Seelsorge*). The members of the party are rich in works of Christian love; much wealth is placed at their disposal; they hold the daily service, ordained in the Book of Common Prayer, without regarding the empty pews; and lately tea-meetings have become fashionable, where gentlemen with stars and ladies in diamonds listen to the edifying discourse of some half-Romish Reverend of the Church.

A similar energy and activity has been exhibited by them in the press. Mr. Littledale, H. Dugmore, and others, pour over the land tracts both in prose and verse; books of edification, breviaries for priests, missionaries, and laymen, catechisms and collections of sermons appear yearly in increasing numbers. The principal works pass through new editions nearly every year, and besides some smaller papers, influential weekly magazines, such as the *Church Times*, *Church News*, *Church Review*, etc., handle the religious and social questions of the day from a ritualistic point of view, and send forth into the world many a fascinating idea upon the subject of New Anglicanism. Thus the party increases from year to year in courage, power, and numbers. Among the "upper ten thousand" the "English Church Union" maintains very successfully a clerical and lay propaganda to defend and maintain the doctrine of the Church towards "every one, whosoever he be;"¹ and among the lower classes, in August 1876, the "Working Men's Church Association" had already reached the sixty-fifth branch society, with the open and outspoken purpose of opposing the Public Worship Regulation Act. It must be put on account of this great success that on the July meeting (1876) of the party very strong language could be indulged in, for one speaker declared that if Parliament should not be willing to recall the Public Worship Regulation Act, two millions of the laity and four thousand ministers were prepared to leave the Church and go over to Rome.²

And with this threat of a fanatic speaker we have touched the danger of the whole movement for English Protestantism.

¹ See *Church Times*, July 1876.

² See Mettgenberg, *l.c.*, p. 73.

A glance at the doctrine of the party, which, during the last few years, has been more and more successfully systematised, will prove that in some important tenets the teaching has become thoroughly impregnated with unevangelical ideas of the Sacraments and the priestly mediation, and is, thus far at least, on the high road to Rome. It is true, the last step has not been taken, but the consequences are leading to it, as Abbé Martin so plainly says.¹ "Ritualism, like Anglicanism, is deficient in logic." "And it is just this which must prevent Ritualism from being dangerous [to Rome, of course, is meant] in the future, since the time must come when the people will begin to think and reason for themselves, and when that day comes in England, Ritualism will cease to exist—it must either advance as far as Catholicism or relapse into Protestantism—that is, into Rationalism or incredulity." How exceedingly "progressive," in the sense of the Catholic Abbé, the present movement is, is clearly shown by its own doctrine, which, in the first place, must be examined if a just estimation of the movement is looked for; only after this having been done, the striking ritual, as the living and adequate expression of the doctrine, is to be brought forward. For the form of divine worship is here in perfect unison with the teaching, and because the doctrine tends to Catholicism, the ritual also must be a Roman Catholic one. It is wrong to seize upon the ritual without at the same time taking the doctrine into consideration. And it is for this reason that the name Ritualism is to be considered an incorrect one, inasmuch as this term implies the tendency which lays a great and unintentional weight upon form, or which, according to Gladstone's explanation,² uses more and different ritual than the religious ideas demand, which are to be expressed by the former. But here no other ritual is brought into action than that which answers to the fundamental idea, and which, both formally and materially, exhibits itself as Roman Catholic. For the worship of the Saints and the Virgin Mary, celibacy, monasteries, auricular confession, the intercession of the priest, transubstantiation, all these are Romish doctrines, and he who teaches them is about to build a bridge over the chasm which,

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, vol. iii. p. 260.

² See "Ritualism and Ritual," *Cont. Rev.*, Oct. 1874.

for the last three hundred years, because of these very doctrines, has gaped between the two Churches.

Whether the Ritualist denies this retrograde tendency or not, the doctrine clearly proves that the New High Churchman, consciously or unconsciously, stands firmly on Romish ground.

In the narrow space allowed to me I shall not be able to do more than touch upon a few principal points. In looking through the very prolific literature of the party, we meet with enthusiastic hymns to the saints : Mary, "the spotless mother," the "mediator of sinners," is to be prayed to ; she has ascended into heaven, and there with Joseph proves a mighty intercessor for us ; Mary is the Holy Mother of God ; she is sung to—

" Lily fair among the thorns,
Burning bush, but not consumed,
Garden closed and Aaron's rod,
O pray for us !"

And in another place :—

" Portal of the Prince of Peace ;
Mystic Rose, Rain on the Fleece ;
Tower of David, Golden House ;
Queen of Heaven, Queen of Earth ;
Mistress of the Church of Christ ;
Mother of our second birth,
O pray for us !"

Relics are carried with great pomp through the churches. The *Union Review* of 1867, in support of this practice, says, that the honour which we owe to the saints, their images and relics, is part of the honour we owe to God Almighty. The *Church News* of April 7, 1869, declares the perfection of the Church to be a one-sided one, until a single life amongst the men (!!), particularly amongst the priests, be brought into practice ; and on the 29th of October of the same year it demands a strict canon which will make, at least, the ordination of the priest a barrier preventing subsequent marriage. In following out this idea the well-known Father Ignatius has already begun the founding of monasteries ; and Loraine, in his *Church and Liberties of England*, has already published¹ a breviary "for all those fighting under the rule of our most holy Father Benedict." The doctrine of the Confessional

¹ See p. 50.

represents absolution not as a declaratory act, but as a judicial decision, not as a matter belonging to God, but to the priest. According to Dr. Neale, it is dependent on the judgment of the priest. In his *Catechetical Notes* this gentleman goes so far as to say: "The man who confesses to God *may* be forgiven, he who confesses to a priest *must* be forgiven."¹ He continues, that a priest cannot absolve that of which he has no knowledge; therefore mortal sins must be confessed. This is the theory on which auricular confession rests, and confession follows as a necessity, and, in many cases, it is practised and regarded as necessary for salvation.²

Thus the priest becomes the necessary medium between God and men; without him there is no sacrifice, no sacrament, no religion. There can be no valid eucharist without a regular priest. Priesthood and sacrifice are correlative ideas. Where there is a sacrifice, there must also be a priest who sacrifices.³ "The priest is virtually Christ himself;"⁴ "so that to despise the clergy is to despise Christ himself."⁵ This is, if words have any meaning, the adoption by Protestant Anglicanism of Romish sacerdotalism. The Apostolic Succession is closely connected with it in the system. The Established Church, they say, has secured this in contradistinction to Dissent; an unbroken line of bishops, as spiritual sons of the apostles, reaches down to the clergy of the present time.⁶ Therefore great weight is attached to the attempted historical proof of the integrity of the succession, although only a probability of 8000 to 1 can be attained.⁷ In this apostolic authorisation of the priests is further embraced the only guarantee for the proper administration of the sacraments. These are "the only way to salvation," and it is only the apostolic succession which authorises to administer them. Further, as the Church alone has the privilege of dispensing them beneficially, it seems to me perfectly correct to maintain, that *the Ritualists have for their material principle Justification by the Sacraments, and for*

¹ See *Tracts for the Day*, ed. Orby Shipley, No. 1.

² See *Plain Words on Confession*, p. 6.

³ See *Tracts for the Day*, No. 5.

⁴ See *Catech. of Theol.*, 1873, p. 58.

⁵ See Ritchie, *Rel. Life*, etc., p. 76.

⁶ See *Tracts*, etc., No. 10.

⁷ See Schöll, *l.c.*

their formal one the authority of the Anglo-Catholic Church, instead of Luther's Justification by Faith alone, and the single supreme authority of Holy Writ. Ritualists are, therefore, a party of innovators; for they have, in their doctrine, put aside the foundations of historical Protestantism.

But the priest is not only privileged to administer the Sacrament, he also has the power, by means of the consecration, of effecting the mystery of it, or, in other words, the Transubstantiation. We must believe, says the *Companion to the Book of Common Prayer*, 1864, that the body that was born of the blessed Virgin suffered, died, is "really, truly, substantially, and locally" present. Can Transubstantiation be more clearly expressed? It is true, the *Companion* timidly adds, "without any transformation of the elements;" but I am not able to see how this mysterious assertion can be maintained, if compared with the plain words which precede. But the term itself is at hand. There are some who do not recoil from using the word. In the *Kiss of Peace, or, England and Rome at one in the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, by a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, the author says that the Holy Ghost effects the conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ, which "conversion I call Transubstantiation." Therefore, as the Church of England teaches the real objective presence, she must also teach the Transubstantiation.¹ "By the real presence," say the *Tracts for the Day*, "is not meant a presence by Divine power or spiritual grace, but the presence of His very true body—not anything to which the name or properties of His body are merely ascribed in a sacramental sense, but that very body which He took of the substance of the Virgin Mary, which was crucified," etc.

With this doctrine the forms of worship are in full correspondence. In their gorgeousness we find the adequate expression for the Divine mystery. While there is being sung—

"Bread into His flesh is turned,
Into precious blood the wine,"

the people, according to the directions of the *Little Prayer-Book*, are expected to bow their hearts and their bodies in deep

¹ See also Jelf, *Ritualism, Romanism, and the English Reformation*, p. 28 seq.; Loraine, *l.c.* p. 12 seq.; Mettgenberg, *l.c.* p. 20.

reverence when the priest speaks these "awful" words, and worship their Saviour, who "verily and indeed" is present on the altar. "Kneel down with thy hands folded upon thy breast; follow the priest in silent awe, for Jesus, thy God, is very near thee."¹ So far goes the doctrine theoretically; practically the Romanising tendency is followed out by Dr. Lee, who in his *Directorium Anglicanum* gives some very practical directions in case of any accident happening to the elements, instructions which are rather surprising, if not for a Romish priest, at least for a minister of the Protestant English Church. Dr. Lee says that—

"If a fly or spider should happen to fall into the chalice, the fly or spider shall be taken carefully out, several times carefully washed between the fingers, and then burnt. That which has been washed and the ashes shall be put into the piscina. Should the Eucharist fall to the ground, the place must be scratched up and fire burnt upon the spot. Should a drop fall from the chalice upon the altar, the drop must be sucked up, and the priest must do penance for three days; but should this drop penetrate the second, third, or fourth altar-cloth, then he shall do penance four, nine, and twenty days respectively," etc. etc.²

These few quotations may suffice in order to show which direction the doctrine of this party is taking. There is no trace of a Protestant or Evangelical spirit; there is with regard to the Sacraments or the position of the clergy even more than mere Catholic *tendency*,—here is *pure Romish doctrine with all its consequences*.

Certainly, we German Protestants are not charmed with it. It is true, a number of the Ritualists themselves condemn these proceedings in theory as well as in practice. They will not acknowledge the individual opinion of a few. They are dismayed at the consequences, and renounce the "solidarity" and responsibility.³ Jelf divides, therefore, the party into two

¹ See *Manual of Devotion* in Loraine, *l.c.* p. 20.

² See Mettgenberg, *l.c.* p. 21.

³ Of great interest and highly characteristic of this appears to me the discussion between Liddon and Capel on the Transubstantiation, which began Dec. 24, 1874, and was carried on in the daily papers, particularly in the *Times*. Liddon, while making his timorous retreat, confesses that so many men of the party act and speak in a manner which can only be defended on the standpoint of Rome; some might have used too strong expressions and too violent language, which he feels he could not defend. (See *Times*, Jan. 12, 1875.) The whole discussion is printed by Jelf, *Ritualism, Romanism, and the English Reformation*, 1876.

divisions—the Doctrinal and the semi-Ritualistic. The latter are only united in the fundamental ideas with the former, whose extravagances they do not approve of, while they have the ritualistic formalities in common with them.

But this will prove a deceptive division, which is already beginning to give way before the power of facts and the determination of the Intransigents. For the *halves* (“*halben*”) are tottering already, and are daily forced more and more out of their position of reserve into the camp of the *wholes* (“*ganzen*”). I venture to believe that in this faint-hearted opposition, this indecisive attitude, the timid concessions, and this fear of responsibility, lie the weakness and the fault of the anti-Romish division of the party. At the same time it is this lukewarmness and want of decision which establish the danger of the English Protestant Church.

For, notwithstanding the great progress Rome has made in Britain, and notwithstanding the activity of the Ritualistic fanatics, there still exists a most powerful sense and consciousness of Protestantism amongst the English people. The semi-Ritualists should, therefore, take energetically upon themselves to create a clear situation. They should consider it their task to declare themselves openly against all Romanising tendencies, to separate from the “Anglo-Catholics” by increasing energy in their “care of souls,” and through a new and healing reaction against the new outgrowths, to protect the Church from a crisis. But, as far as I can see from this side of the Channel, there does not seem to exist sufficient strength to bring this about; at least a good many of the men known for their clear-sightedness and energy seem to lie under the fascinating ban of the brilliant ritual, to which the movement owes so much of its success. There are, no doubt, many minds attracted by the many beauties of this form of worship. The richly ornamented altar, with its clothes and flowers, the burning candles, the clouds of incense, the rolling waves of the tuneful hymns, carried forward by the deep notes of the organ, and breaking forth upon the Gothic vaults and roof: all this is the magic spell which dazzles the mind and puts the reasonings of common sense to silence.

Yet, on the other hand, we need not refuse to acknowledge that Ritualism has had marked practical results. It has been

the means of calling forth a more energetic religious life within the Church. Inasmuch as it fostered æsthetical taste, it helped to retain some of the higher class within the Church, who were on the eve of deserting her; and as it put aside the distinction between rich and poor, particularly because it worked so unselfishly amongst the lowest of the low, may have in some measure aided in the recovery of the fallen. It is true, it has led a number of ministers to Rome, but it has also led some to a deeper understanding of their duty, and to a better care of the souls of their congregations. The erection of churches and schools, the founding of mission-houses and colonial bishoprics, the institution of sisterhoods of charity, etc., are proofs of the power, energy, and the life of the party. "It was a ferment which brought new life into the High Church."¹

Thus this party increases daily in strength, and proves its claim to existence by pointing to the great results of the ministerial activity of its members. It is to be regarded as the natural reaction of the nineteenth century against the religious stagnation and shallowness of the Church. There were in like manner reactions in the seventeenth century under Laud, and in the eighteenth century under Wesley and Whitefield; but none of these movements, however, possessed the energy, or commanded the outward success by which this one is characterised. The progress of Ritualism is a matter of fact. Vehemently attacked by Evangelical Protestantism, regarded for the present by Rome with distrustful eyes, it is gaining ground in Scotland, America, and the Colonies; even the Dissenters, the Methodists, are said to be becoming affected by it.² And according to a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Winchester, "on the position of parties," etc., it has succeeded in gaining a more favourable estimation and peaceful position in the Episcopate. The *Record* and the *Rock*, two influential papers of the Established Church, discover its traces everywhere; under a thousand different forms, by thousands of channels, it creeps in; in the doctrine, in the form of worship, in the hymns, in the works of love, in the literature, in brotherhoods, in schools, in hospitals, etc., everywhere one can trace its progress.

The future of the English Church belongs to Ritualism,

¹ See Schöll's essay in Herzog's *Real Encyclop.*, vol. xvi. p. 270.

² See Abbé Martin in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1878, p. 241.

according to Abbé Martin.¹ The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol also confesses, that if there really does exist a leaning towards sacerdotalism, a tendency to caste, and to the maintaining of various orders among High Churchmen, then the National Church may entertain apprehensions for her existence.²

This is the state of things. How far there is cause for this fear I have endeavoured to show above. Secretly Rome rejoices over these Ritualistic preparations; publicly she still refuses to accept the outstretched hand.³ The dogma of Infallibility seems now to be the great stumbling-block. The hopes of the patriots (for this Romish issue would be a *national* misfortune) must be directed, I think, towards the success which the Evangelical Party in their exertions for the increase of religious life will have to show.

RUDOLF BUDDENSIEG.

ART. VIII.—*The Faith of Islám.*

FAITH is defined by Muslim theologians as "Confession with the tongue and belief with the heart."⁴ It is subdivided into Imán-í-mujmal and Imán-í-mufassal. The former is an expression of the following faith:—"I believe in God, His names and attributes, and accept all His commands."⁵ The latter is the acceptance of the following dogmas:—"I believe in God, Angels, Books, Prophets, the Last Day, the Predestination by the Most High God of Good and Evil, and the Resurrection after death."⁶ These form the articles of faith which every Muslim must believe, to which belief, in order to render it perfect, he must add the performance of the

¹ See *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1878, p. 243.

² See *ibid.*, March 1877. p. 60.

³ See *ibid.*, Feb. 1878, p. 253, and *Germania, Sonntagsblatt*, 1878, No. 14, p. 1089.

⁴ Iqrárun bil-lisáni wa tasdîqun bil janáni.

⁵ Amantu billáhi kama hua bismáhi wa sifátihi wa qabiltu jamí'a ahkámihí.

⁶ Amantu billáhi wa maláikatihi wa kutubihi wa rusulihi wal-youm-il-ákhiri wal-qadri khairihi wa sharrihi min alláhi ta'álá wal-ba'si ba'd al-mouti.

“acts of practice,” viz., (1.) “The recital of the Kalima or creed:—‘There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is the Apostle of God.’ (2.) Sulát. The five daily prayers. (3.) Roza. The thirty days’ fast of Ramazán. (4.) Zakát. The legal alms. (5.) Hajj. The pilgrimage to Mecca.” In this paper we shall deal only with the articles of faith, reserving the acts of practice for a future Number.

I. GOD.

This article of the faith includes a belief in the existence of God, His unity and attributes, and has given rise to a large number of sects. Some knowledge of the various controversies which have thus arisen is necessary to a correct knowledge of Islám. We commence the consideration of this subject by giving the substance of a Sunni or orthodox treatise known as the *Risala-i-Berkevi*. The learned orientalist M. Garcin de Tassy considered it to be of such authority that in his *L'Islamisme d'après le Coran* he has inserted a translation of the *Risala*.¹ Muhammad Al-Berkevi, speaking of the Divine attributes, says:—

(1.) *Life* (Hyát). God Most High is alone to be adored. He has neither associate nor equal. He is free from the imperfections of humanity. He is neither begotten nor does He beget. He is invisible. He is without figure, form, colour, or parts. His existence has neither beginning nor end. He is immutable. If He so wills He can annihilate the world in a moment of time and, if it seem good to Him, recreate it in an instant. Nothing is difficult to Him, whether it be the creation of a fly or that of the seven heavens. He receives neither profit nor loss from whatever may happen. If all the Infidels became Believers and all the irreligious pious, He would gain no advantage. On the other hand, if all Believers became Infidels, He would suffer no loss.

(2.) *Knowledge* ('Ilm). He has knowledge of all things, hidden or manifest, whether in heaven or on earth. He knows the number of the leaves of the trees, of the grains of wheat and of sand. Events past and future are known to Him. He knows what enters into the heart of man and what he utters with his mouth. He alone, except those to whom He has revealed them, knows the invisible things. He is free from forgetfulness, negligence, and error. His knowledge is eternal: it is not posterior to His essence.

(3.) *Power* (Qudrat). He is Almighty. If He wills, He can raise the dead, make stones talk, trees walk, annihilate the heavens and the earth,

¹ He speaks of it thus, “L'ouvrage élémentaire de la religion Musulmane le plus estimé et le plus répandu en Turquie” (p. 154).

and recreate of gold or of silver thousands similar to those destroyed. He can transport a man in a moment of time from the east to the west, or from the west to the east, or to the seventh heaven. His power is eternal *à priori* and *à posteriori*. It is not posterior to His essence.

(4.) *Will* (Irádah). He can do what He wills, and whatever He wills comes to pass. He is not obliged to act. Everything, good or evil, in this world exists by His will. He wills the faith of the believer and the piety of the religious. If He were to change His will there would be neither a true believer nor a pious man. He willeth also the unbelief of the unbeliever and the irreligion of the wicked, and without that will there would neither be unbelief nor irreligion. All we do we do by His will : what He willeth not does not come to pass. If one should ask why God does not will that all men should believe, we answer, "We have no right to inquire about what God wills and does. He is perfectly free to will and to do what He pleases." In creating unbelievers, in willing that they should remain in that state ; in making serpents, scorpions, and pigs : in willing, in short, all that is evil, God has wise ends in view which it is not necessary that we should know. We must acknowledge that the will of God is eternal and that it is not posterior to His essence.

(5.) *Hearing* (Sama'). He hears all sounds, whether low or loud. He hears without an ear, for His attributes are not like those of men.

(6.) *Seeing* (Basr). He sees all things, even the steps of a black ant on a black stone in a dark night ; yet He has no eye as men have.

(7.) *Speech* (Kalám). He speaks, but not with a tongue as men do. He speaks to some of His servants without the intervention of another, even as He spoke to Moses, and to Muhammad on the night of the ascension to heaven. He speaks to others by the instrumentality of Gabriel, and this is the usual way in which He communicates His will to the prophets. It follows from this that the Qurán is the word of God and is eternal and uncreated.

These are the "haft sífát," or seven attributes of God. There is unanimity of opinion as to the number of attributes, but not as regards their nature and the extent of the knowledge concerning them to which men can attain. Thus some say that the knowledge of God is the first thing to acquire ; but Imám Sháfa'i and the Mutazilites say that a man must first attain to the *idea* of the knowledge of God. The meaning of the expression "knowledge of God" is the ascertaining the truth of His existence and of His positive and privative attributes as far as the human understanding can enter into these matters. The unity is not a mere numerical unity, but absolute, for the number one is the first of a series, and implies a second, but God has not a second. He is "singular, without anything like Him ; separate, having no equal :" for, "had there been either in heaven or earth Gods beside God, both surely had gone to

ruin" (Súra xxi. 22). God is not a substance, for substance has accidents, but God has none : otherwise His nature would be that of "dependent existence." God is without parts, for otherwise he would not exist till all the parts were formed, and His existence would depend on the parts, that is, on something beside Himself.

The orthodox strictly prohibit the discussion of minute particulars, for, say they, "just as the eye turning to the brightness of the sun finds darkness intervene to prevent all observation, so the understanding finds itself bewildered if it attempts to pry into the nature of God." The Prophet said, "We did not know the reality of the knowledge of Thee;" and to his followers he gave this advice—"Think of God's gifts, not of His nature : certainly you have no power for that."¹ The Khalíf Akbar is reported to have said, "To be helpless in the search of knowledge is knowledge, and to inquire into the nature of God is shirk (infidelity)."² A moderate acquaintance with Muslim theology shows that neither the injunction of the Prophet nor the warning of the Khalíf has been heeded.

According to the early Muslims, the Companions and their followers, inquiries into the nature of God and His attributes were not lawful. The Prophet, knowing what was good for men, had plainly revealed the way of salvation, and had taught them—

"Say : He is God alone :
God the eternal !
He begetteth not, and He is not begotten ;
And there is none like unto Him."—(Súra cxii.)

This was sufficient for them to know of the mystery of the Godhead. God is far beyond the reach of the human understanding. He alone embraces all in His comprehension. Men should therefore distrust their own perceptive faculties and notions, and should obey the inspired legislator Muhammad, who, loving them better than they love themselves, and knowing better than they do what is truly useful, has revealed both what they ought to believe and what they ought to do. It is true that men must exercise their reason, but they must not do so with regard to the divine attributes.³

¹ *Sharh-i-'Aqá'id-i-Jámi*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.* p. 28.

³ The above statements form the substance of several pages in the *Prolegomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun*, in which also occurs the following : "Cela n'est pas toutefois un motif pour déprécier notre intelligence et nos facultés per-

Dogma is divided into two portions, Usúl and Farú'—*i.e.* roots and branches. The former include the doctrine about God; the latter, as the name implies, consist of truths which result from the acceptance of the former. The orthodox belief is that reason has only to do with the "farú'," for the usúl, being founded on the Qurán and Sunnat, have an objective basis.

Differences of opinion about various branches of the "farú'" led to discussions which did not stop there, but went on to the "usúl," and so paved the way for the rise of scholastic theology ('Ilm-i-kalám). We have already,¹ in an article on the exegesis of the Qurán, explained the difference in meaning between Muhkam (obvious) verses and Mutashábih (intricate) ones. This difference lies at the very foundation of our present subject. It is therefore necessary to enter a little into detail.

The question turns very much on the interpretation of the 5th verse of the 3d Súra: "He it is who hath sent down to thee 'the Book.' Some of its signs are of themselves perspicuous (Muhkam): these are the basis of the Book—and others are figurative (Mutashábih). But they whose hearts are given to err, follow its figures, craving discord, craving an interpretation; yet none knoweth its interpretation but God. And the stable in knowledge say, 'We believe in it: it is all from our Lord.' But none will bear this in mind, save men endued with understanding." Here it is clearly stated (1) that no one except God can know the interpretation of Mutashábih verses, and (2) that wise men, though they know not their interpretation, yet believe them all. Many learned men, however, say that the full stop should not be placed after the word "God" but after "knowledge," and so this portion of the verse would read thus: "None knoweth its interpretation but God and the stable in knowledge. They say: We believe, etc. On this slight change in punctuation opposite schools of theology have arisen in Islám.

ceptives: l'intelligence est une balance parfaitement juste: elle nous fournit des résultats certains sans nous tromper. Mais on ne doit pas employer cette balance pour peser les choses qui se rattachent à l'unité de Dieu, à la vie future, à la nature du prophétisme, au véritable caractère des attributs divins et à tout ce qui est au delà de sa portée. Vouloir le faire, ce serait une absurdité."—Vol. iii. p. 45.

¹ *Vide ante*, vol. xxviii. pp. 745-7.

The latter reading opens the way to a fearless investigation of subjects which all the early Muslims avoided as beyond their province. In the early days of Islám it was held that all parts of the Qurán, except the Muhkam verses and the purely narrative portions, were Mutashábih; that is, all verses which related to the attributes of God, to the existence of Angels and Genii, to the appearance of Antichrist, the period and signs of the day of judgment, and generally all matters which are beyond our daily experience. It was strongly felt that not only must there be no discussion on them, but that no attempt should be made to understand or act on them. Ibn Abbás, a Companion, says:—"One must believe the Mutashábih verses, but not take them for a rule of conduct." Ibn Jubair was once asked to put the meaning of the Qurán into writing. He became angry and said: "I should rather be palsied in one-half of my body than do so."¹

The first reading is the one adopted by the Asháb, the Tábi'in and the Taba-i-Tábi'in, and the great majority of Commentators. The Sunnis generally, and, according to the testimony of Fakr-ud-dín Razi (544-606 A.H.), the Sháfa'í sect are of the same opinion.

Those who take the opposite view are the Commentators Mujáhid (died 101 A.H.), Rabi' bin Ans, and others. The scholastic theologians² (Mutakallimán) generally adopt the latter reading.³ They argued thus: How could men believe what they did not know? To which their opponents answered, that the act of belief in the unknown is the very thing here praised by God. The scholastics then inquired why, since the Qurán was sent to be a guide and direction to men, were not all its verses Muhkam? The answer was, that the Arabs acknowledged two kinds of eloquence. One kind was to arrange words and ideas in a plain and simple style, so that the meaning might be at once apparent; the other was to speak in figurative language. Now, if the Qurán had not contained

¹ Ibn Khallikan, vol. i. p. 565.

² "The Musulmán authors distinguish between the earlier and later Mutakallimán. The former (of whom we here treat) were occupied with purely religious questions; the latter, who arose after the introduction of the Greek philosophy amongst Muslims, embraced many philosophic notions, though they tried to make them fit with their religious opinions."—*Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, p. 320.

³ *Tafsír-i-Faiz-ul-Karím*, p. 250.

both these styles of composition, it could not have claimed the position it does as a book absolutely perfect in form as well as in matter.¹

Bearing in mind this fundamental difference of opinion, we can now pass on to the consideration of the attributes. The essential attributes are Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, for without these the others could not exist. Then the attributes of Hearing, Seeing, Speech, give us a further idea of perfection. These are the "*Sifât-i-Sabutiah*," or affirmative attributes, the privation of which would imply loss; there are also *Sifât-i-Salbiah*, or privative attributes, such as—God has no form, is not limited by place, has no equal, etc. The acts of sitting, rising, descending, the possession of face, hands, eyes, etc., being connected with the idea of corporeal existences, imply imperfection, and apparently contradict the doctrine of "exemption" (*tenzih*), according to which God is, in virtue of His essence, in no way like the creatures He has made. This was a difficulty, but the four great Imáms all taught that it was impious to inquire into these matters, for all such allusions were *Mutashábih*. "The Imám Hanbal and other early divines followed in the path of the early Muslims and said, 'We believe in the Book and the Sunnat, and do not desire explanations. We know that the High God is not to be compared to any created object, nor any creature with Him.'"² Imám As-Sháfa'i said that a man who inquired into such matters should be tied to a stake and carried about, and that the following proclamation should be made before him :—"This is the reward of him who left the Qurán and the Traditions for the study of scholastic theology." Imám Hanbal says :—"Whosoever moves his hand when he reads in the Qurán the words, 'I have created with my hand,' ought to have his hand cut off; and whoever stretches forth his finger in repeating the saying of Muhammad, 'The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Merciful,' deserves to have his finger cut off." At-Tirmízí, when consulted about the statement of the Prophet that God had descended to the lowest of the seven heavens, said, "The descent is intelligible, the manner how is unknown. The belief therein is obligatory, and the asking about it is a blame-

¹ *Tafstr-i-Faiz-ul-Karím*, p. 250.

² *Dabistan*, p. 218.

able innovation." But all such attempts to restrain discussion and investigation failed.

The two main points in the discussion of this question are—(1) Whether the attributes of God are internal or external, whether they are part of His essence or not; and (2) Whether they are eternal or not?

The two leading sects were the Sifátians (or Attributists) and the Mutazilites. The Sifátians, whom the early orthodox Muslims follow, taught that the attributes of God are eternally inherent in His essence, without separation or change. Every attribute is conjoined with Him, as life with knowledge, or knowledge with power. They also taught that the Mutashábih verses were not to be explained, and such were those which seemed to show a resemblance between God and His creatures. So at first they did not attempt to give the meaning of the terms "hands, eyes, face," etc., when applied to God. They simply accepted them as they stood. In course of time, as we shall see, differences of opinion on this point led to some subdivisions of this sect.

The Mutazilites were the great opponents of the Sifátians. They rejected the idea of eternal attributes, saying that eternity was the formal attribute of the essence of God. "If," said they, "we admit the eternal existence of an attribute, then we must recognise the multiplicity of eternal existences." They also rejected the attributes of hearing, seeing, and speech, as these were accidents proper to corporeal existences. They looked upon the divine attributes as mental abstractions, and not as having a real existence in the divine essence. The Mutazilites were emphatically the Free Thinkers of Islám. The origin of the sect was as follows:—Al Hasan, a famous divine, was one day seated in the mosque at Basra when a discussion arose on the question whether a believer who committed a mortal sin became thereby an unbeliever. The Khárigites¹ affirmed that it was so. The orthodox denied this, saying that, though guilty of sin, yet that, as he believed rightly, he was not an infidel.² One of the scholars, Wasil Ibn Atá (who was born at Medína, A.H. 80), then rose up and said, "I maintain that a Muslim who has committed a mortal sin should be

¹ *Vide* "Sects of Islám," *ante*, vol. xxviii. p. 585.

² Ibn Khallikan, vol. iii. p. 343.

regarded neither as a believer nor an unbeliever, but as occupying a middle station between the two." He then retired to another part of the mosque, where he was joined by his friend 'Umar Ibn Obaid and others. They resumed the discussion. A learned man named Katáda, entering the mosque, went up to them, but on finding that they were not the party in which Al Hasan was, said, "These are the Seceders (Al-Mutazila)." Al Hasan soon expelled them from his school. Wasil then founded a school of his own, of which, after the death of his master, Amr Ibn Obaid became the head.

Wasil felt that a believer, though sinful, did not merit the same degree of punishment as an infidel, and thus starting off on the question of *degrees* of punishment, he soon opened up the whole subject of man's responsibility and the question of free-will. This soon brought him into conflict with the orthodox on the subject of predestination, and that again to the subject of the interpretation and eternity of the Qurán and the divine attributes. The principles of logic and the teaching of philosophy were brought to bear on the precepts of religion. According to Shahrastání the Mutazilites hold :—

"That God is eternal ; and that eternity is the peculiar property of His essence ; but they deny the existence of any eternal attributes (as distinct from His nature). For they say, He is Omniscient as to His nature ; Living as to His nature ; Almighty as to His nature ; but not through any knowledge, power, or life existing in Him as eternal attributes ; for knowledge, power, and life are part of His essence, otherwise, if they are to be looked upon as eternal attributes of the Deity, it will give rise to a multiplicity of eternal entities.

"They maintain that the knowledge of God is as much within the province of reason as that of any other entity ; that He cannot be beheld with the corporeal sight ; and with the exception of Himself everything else is liable to change or to suffer extinction. They also maintain that Justice is the animating principle of human actions ; Justice according to them being the dictates of Reason and the concordance of the ultimate results of this conduct of man with such dictates."

"Again, they hold that there is no eternal law as regards human actions ; that the divine ordinances which regulate the conduct of men are the results of growth and development ; that God has commanded and forbidden, promised and threatened by a law which grew gradually. At the same time, say they, he who works righteousness merits rewards, and he who works evil deserves punishment. They also say, that all knowledge is attained through reason, and must necessarily be so obtained. They hold that the cognition of good and evil is also within the province of reason ; that nothing is known to be right or wrong until reason has enlightened

us as to the distinction ; and that thankfulness for the blessings of the Benefactor is made obligatory by reason, even before the promulgation of any law upon the subject. They also maintain that man has perfect freedom ; is the author of his actions, both good and evil, and deserves reward or punishment hereafter accordingly.”¹

During the reigns of the Khalífs Mamoun, Mutasim, and Wathik (198-232 A.H.) the Mutazilites were in high favour at Court, whilst the orthodox suffered bitter persecution. The story of that persecution will be told later on. The Khalíf Wathik at length relented. An old man, heavily chained, was one day brought into his presence. The prisoner obtained permission to put a few questions to Ahmad Ibn Abu Douad, a Mutazilite, and the President of the Court of Inquisition. The following dialogue took place. “Ahmad,” said the prisoner, “what is the dogma which you desire to have established?” “That the Qurán is created,” replied Ahmad. “This dogma, then, is without doubt an essential part of the religion, insomuch that the latter cannot without it be said to be complete?” “Certainly.” “Has the Apostle of God taught this to men, or has he left them free?” “He has left them free.” “Was the Apostle of God acquainted with this dogma or not?” “He was acquainted with it.” “Wherefore, then, do you desire to impose a belief regarding which the Apostle of God has left men free to think as they please?” Ahmad remaining silent, the old man turned to Wathik and said, “O Prince of Believers, here is my first position made good.” Then turning to Ahmad, he said, “God has said, ‘This day have I perfected religion for you, and have filled up the measures of my favours upon you ; and it is my pleasure that Islám be your religion’ (Súra v. 5). But according to you Islám is not perfected unless we adopt this doctrine that the Qurán is created. Which now is most worthy of credence—God, when He declares Islám to be complete and perfect, or you when you announce the contrary?” Ahmad was still silent. “Prince of Believers,” said the old man, “there is my second point made good.” He continued, “Ahmad, how do you explain the following words of God in His Holy Book?—‘O Apostle ! proclaim all that hath been sent down to thee

¹ Shahrastání, quoted in *Life of Muhammad* by Syed Amír 'Alí, pp. 303, 304.

from thy Lord ; for if thou dost not, thou hast not proclaimed His message at all.' Now this doctrine that you desire to spread among the Faithful, has the Apostle taught it, or has he abstained from doing so?" Ahmad remained silent. The old man resumed, "Prince of Believers, such is my third argument." Then turning to Ahmad he said, "If the Prophet was acquainted with the doctrine which you desire to impose upon us, had he the right to pass by it in silence?" "He had the right." "And did the same right appertain to Abu Bakr, 'Umar, Osmán, and 'Alí?" "It did." "Prince of Believers," said the prisoner, "God will, in truth, be severe on us if He deprives us of a liberty which He accorded to the Prophet and his Companions." The Khalíf assented, and at once restored the old man to liberty.¹ So ended one of the fiercest persecutions the orthodox have ever had to endure, but so also ended the attempt to break through the barriers of traditionalism. The next Khalíf, Al Mutawakhil, a ferocious and cruel man, restored the orthodox party to place and power. He issued a fatva (decree) declaring that the dogma that the Qurán was created was an utter falsehood. He instituted severe measures against Christians, Jews, Shí'ahs, and Mutazilites. Ahmad Ibn Abu Douad was one of the first to be disgraced. Heresy and latitudinarianism were banished.

The final blow to the Mutazilites, however, came not from the Khalíf but a little later on from Abu Hasan-al-Ash'ari (270-340 A.H.)

The Mutazilites, expelled from power in Baghdád, still flourished at Basra, where one day the following incident occurred. Abu 'Ali Al-Jubbai, a Mutazilite doctor, was lecturing to his students when Al-Ash'ari propounded the following case to his master : "There were three brothers, one of whom was a true believer, virtuous, and pious ; the second an infidel, a debauchee, and a reprobate ; and the third an infant : they all died. What became of them ?" Al-Jubbai answered : "The virtuous brother holds a high station in Paradise ; the infidel is in the depths of hell, and the child is among those who have obtained salvation." "Suppose now," said Al-Ash'ari, "that the child should wish to ascend to the place occupied by his virtuous brother, would he be allowed to

¹ Osborn's *Islám under the Khalífs*, p. 263.

do so?" "No," replied Al-Jubbai, "it would be said to him: 'Thy brother arrived at this place through his numerous works of obedience to God, and thou hast no such works to set forward.'" "Suppose then," said Al-Ash'ari, "that the child should say: 'This is not my fault; you did not let me live long enough, neither did you give me the means of proving my obedience.'" "In that case," said Al-Jubbai, "the Almighty would say: 'I knew that if I allowed thee to live, thou wouldest have been disobedient, and have incurred the punishment of hell: I acted, therefore, for thy advantage.'" "Well," said Al-Ash'ari, "and suppose the infidel brother were here to say: 'O God of the Universe! since Thou knewest what awaited him, Thou must have known what awaited me; why then didst Thou act for his advantage and not for mine?'"¹ Al-Jubbai was silent, though very angry with his pupil, who was now convinced that the Mutazilite dogma of man's free-will was false, and that God elects some for mercy and some for punishment without any motive whatever. Disagreeing with his teacher on this point, he soon began to find other points of difference, and renounced his belief of the opinion that the Qurán was created. This occurred on Friday in the Great Mosque at Basra. Seated in his chair he cried out in a loud voice: "They who know me know who I am; as for those who do not know me I shall tell them: I am 'Alí Ibn Ismá'íl Al-Ash'ari, and I used to hold that the Qurán was created, that the eyes (of men) shall not see God, and that we ourselves are the authors of our evil deeds; now, I have returned to the truth: I renounce these opinions, and I take the engagement to refute the Mutazilites, and expose their infamy and turpitude."²

He then, adopting scholastic methods, started a school of thought of his own, which was in the main a return to orthodoxy. The Ash'arian doctrines differ slightly from the tenets of the Sifátians, of which sect Al-Ash'ari's disciples form a branch. The Ash'arians hold—

(i.) That the attributes of God are distinct from His essence, yet in such a way as to forbid any comparison being made between God and His creatures. They say they are not "*'ain*

¹ Ibn Khallikan, vol. ii. p. 669.

² *Ibid.* p. 228.

nor *ghair* ;" not of His essence, nor distinct from it : *i.e.* they cannot be compared with any other things.

(ii.) That God has one eternal will from which proceed all things, the good and the evil, the useful and the hurtful. The destiny of man was written on the eternal table before the world was created. So far they go with the Sifátians, but in order to preserve the moral responsibility of man they say that he has power to convert will into action. But this power cannot create anything new, for then God's sovereignty would be impaired ; so they say that God in His providence so orders matters that whenever "a man desires to do a certain thing, good or bad, the action corresponding to the desire is, there and then, created by God, and, as it were, fitted on to the desire." Thus it seems as if it came naturally from the will of the man, whereas it does not. This action is called *Kasb* (acquisition), because it is acquired by a special creative act of God. It is an act directed to the obtaining of profit, or the removing of injury : the term is, therefore, inapplicable to the Deity. Abu Bakr-al-Bakillani, a disciple of Al-Ash'ari, says : "The essence or substance of the action is the effect of the power of God, but its being an action of obedience, such as prayer ; or an action of disobedience, such as fornication, are qualities of the action, which proceed from the power of man." The Imám al-Haramein (419-478 A.H.) held "that the actions of men were effected by the power which God has created in man." Abu Ishaq al Isfarayein says : "That which maketh impression, or hath influence on action, is a compound of the power of God and the power of man."

(iii.) They say that the Word of God is eternal, though they acknowledge that the vocal sounds used in the Qurán, which is the manifestation of that word, are created. They say, in short, that the Qurán contains (1) the eternal word which existed in the essence of God before time was ; and (2) the word which consists of sounds and combinations of letters. This last they call the created word.

Thus Al-Ash'ari traversed the main positions of the Mutazilites, denying that man can by the aid of his reason alone rise to the knowledge of good and evil. He must exercise no judgment, but accept all that is revealed. He has no right to

apply to the actions of God the moral laws which affect men. It cannot be asserted by the human reason that the good will be rewarded, or the bad punished in a future world. Man must always approach God as a slave, in whom there is no light or knowledge to judge of the actions of the Supreme. Whether God will accept the penitent sinner or not cannot be asserted, for He is an absolute Sovereign, above all law.¹

Into a discussion of the opinions of the more irrational subdivisions of the Sifátians we need not enter at any length.

The Mushábihites (or Assimilators), interpreting some of the Mutashábih verses literally, held that there is a resemblance between God and His creatures; and that the Deity is capable of local motion, of ascending, descending, etc. These they called "declarative attributes." The Mujassimians (or Corporealists) declared God to be corporeal, by which some of them meant, a self-subsisting body, whilst others declared the Deity to be finite. They are acknowledged to be heretics.

The Jabarians gave great prominence to the denial of free agency in man, and thus opposed the Mutazilites, who in this respect are Kadarians, that is, they deny "Al-Kadr," God's absolute sovereignty, and recognise free-will in man.

These and various other subdivisions are not now of much importance. The Sunnis follow the teaching of Al-Ash'ari, whilst the Shí'ahs incline to that of the Mutazilites.

Connected with the subject of the attributes of God is that of the names to be used when speaking of Him. All sects agree in this, that the names "The Living, the Wise, the Powerful, the Hearer, the Seer, the Speaker," etc., are to be applied to God; but the orthodox belief is that all such names must be "tauqifi," that is, dependent on some revelation. Thus it is not lawful to apply a name to God expressive of one of His attributes unless there is some statement made, or order given by Muhammad to legalise it. God is rightly called

¹ Ibn Khaldoun says: "L'établissement des preuves (fondées sur la raison) fut adopté par les (premiers) scolastiques pour le sujet de leur traités, mais il ne fut pas, comme chez les philosophes, une tentative pour arriver à la découverte de la vérité et pour obtenir, au moyen de la démonstration, la connaissance de ce qui était ignoré jusqu'alors. Ses scolastiques recherchaient des preuves intellectuelles dans le but de confirmer la vérité des dogmes, de justifier les opinions des premiers Musalmans et de repousser les doctrines trompeuses que les novateurs avaient émises."—*Prolegomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun*, vol. iii. p. 169.

Sháfi (Healer), but He cannot be called Tabíb, which means much the same thing, for the simple reason that Tabíb never occurs in the Qurán or the Traditions. In like manner the term 'Álim (Knower) is lawful, but not so the expression 'Áqil (Wise). The Mutazilites say that if in the Qurán or Traditions there is any praise of an attribute, then the adjective formed from the name of that attribute can be applied to God even though the actual word does not occur in any revelation.

The orthodox divine Al-Ghazzáli (450-505 A.H.), who gave in the East the death-blow to the Muslim Philosophers,¹ says: "The names of God not given in the Law, if expressive of His glory, may be used of Him, but only as expressive of His attributes, not of His nature."

On the ground that it does not occur in the Law, the Persian word "Khuda" has been objected to, an objection which also holds good with regard to the use of such terms as God, Dieu, Gott, etc. To this it is answered, that as "Khuda" means "One who comes by Himself," it is equivalent to the term Wájib-ul-Wajúd, "one who has necessary existence," and therefore so long as it is not considered as the "Ism i-Zát (name of His nature) it may with propriety be used."²

The current belief now seems to be that the proper name equal to the term Alláh current in a language can be used, provided always that such a name is not taken from the language of the Infidels; so God, Dieu, etc., still remain unlawful.

The names of God authorised by the Qurán and Traditions are, exclusive of the term Allah, ninety-nine in number. They are called the Asmá-i-Hasaná³ (noble names); but in addition to these there are many synonyms used on the authority of Ijma'. Such are Hanán, equal to Rahím (Merciful), and Manán, "one who puts another under an obligation." In the *Tafsír-i-Bahr* it is stated that there are three thousand names of God; one thousand of which are known to Angels; one thousand to Prophets; whilst one thousand are thus distributed, viz., in the Pentateuch there are three hundred, in the Psalms three hundred, in the Gospels three hundred, in the Qurán ninety-nine, and one still hidden.

¹ *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, par S. Munk, p. 382.

² *Sharh-i-Aqáid-i-Jámi*, p. 63.

³ "Most excellent titles has God: by these call ye on Him, and stand aloof from those who pervert His titles" (Súra vii. 179).

iviii. 5). "With him are the keys of
knoweth them but He : He knoweth
and in the sea ; and no leaf falleth but
is there a grain in the darknesses or
green or sere, but it is noted in a
vi. 59).

(3.) *Power*. "If God pleased, of them
would He surely deprive them. Verily
(Súra ii. 19). "Is He not powerful
dead?" (Súra lxxv. 40). "God hath
(Súra iii. 159).

(4.) *Will*. "God is worker of all things
lxxxv. 16). "But if God pleased, He
one and all, to the guidance" (Súra v. 104).
whom He will, and whom He will
His pleasure" (Súra xiv. 4, 32).

As this attribute is closely connected
the Creed which refers to Predestination
regarding it will be stated under that

There has never been any difference
existence of these four attributes so
Qurán : the difference is with regard to
existence and their operation. The
Sifátian doctrine that the attributes are
essence of God ; secondly, the Mutaz

The use of the terms sitting, rising, etc., hands, face, eyes, and so on, gave rise, as we have seen, to several subdivisions of the Sifátians.

Al-Ghazzáli says, "He sits upon His throne after that manner which He has Himself described, and in that sense which He Himself means, which is a sitting far remote from any notion of contact or resting upon, or local situation." This is the Ash'arian idea, but between the Ash'arians and those who fell into the error of the Mujassimians, there was another school. The followers of Imám Ibn Hanbal say that such words represent the attributes existing in God. The words "God sits on His throne" mean that He has the power of sitting. Thus, they say, "We keep the literal meaning of the words, we allow no figurative interpretation. To do so is to introduce a dangerous principle of interpretation, for the negation of the apparent sense of a passage may tend to weaken the authority of revelation. At the same time we do not pretend to explain the act, for it is written: 'There is none like unto Him' (Súra cxii.). 'Nobody is there like Thee' (Súra xlii. 9). 'Far from the glory of God be what they affirm of Him'" (Súra xxii. 93). To prove that God occupies a place they produce the following tradition: "Ibn-al-Hakim wished to give liberty to a female slave Saouda and consulted the Prophet about it. Muhammad said to her, 'Where is God?' 'In heaven,' she replied. 'Set her at liberty, she is a true believer.'" Not, say the Commentators, because she believed that God occupied a place, but because she took the words in their literal signification.

The Shí'ahs consider it wrong to attribute to God movement, quiescence, etc., for these imply the possession of a body. They hold, too, in opposition to the orthodox, that God will never be seen, for that which is seen is limited by space.

The seventh attribute—speech—has been fruitful of a very long and important controversy connected with the nature of the Qurán, for the word "Kalám" means not mere speech, but revelation and every other mode of communicating intelligence. Al-Ghazzáli says:—

"He doth speak, command, forbid, promise, and threaten by an eternal ancient word, subsisting in His essence. Neither is it like to the word of the creatures, nor doth it consist in a voice arising from the commotion of

the air and the collision of bodies, nor letters which are separated by the joining together of the lips or the motion of the tongue. The Qurán, the Law, the Gospel, and the Psalter are books sent down by Him to His Apostles, and the Qurán, indeed, is read with tongues written in books, and is kept in hearts ; yet as subsisting in the essence of God it doth not become liable to separation and division whilst it is transferred into the hearts and on to paper. Thus Moses also heard the word of God without voice or letter, even as the Saints behold the essence of God without substance or accident."

The orthodox believe that God is really a speaker : the Mutazilites deny this, and say that He is only called a speaker because He is the originator of words and sounds.

They also bring the following objections to bear against the doctrine of the eternity of the Qurán. (1.) It is written in Arabic, it descended, is read, is heard, and is written. It was the subject of a miracle. It is divided into parts, and some verses are abrogated by others. (2.) Events are described in the past tense, but if the Qurán had been eternal the future tense would have been used. (3.) The Qurán contains commands and prohibitions ; if it is eternal, who were commanded and who were admonished ? (4.) If it has existed from eternity it must exist to eternity, and so even in the last day, and in the next world, men will be under the obligation of performing the same religious duties as they do now, and of keeping all the outward precepts of the law. (5.) If the Qurán is eternal, then there are two eternals.

The position thus assailed was not at first a hard-and-fast dogma of Islám. It was more a speculative opinion than anything else, but the opposition of the Mutazilites soon led all who wished to be considered orthodox to become not only stout assertors of the eternity of the Qurán, but to give up their lives in defence of what they believed to be true. The Mutazilites, by asserting the subjective nature of the Quránic inspiration, brought the book itself within the reach of criticism. This was too much for orthodox Islám to bear, even though the Khalíf Mámoun in the year 212 A.H. issued a fatva declaring that all who asserted the eternity of the Qurán were guilty of heresy. Some six years after this the Imám Ahmad Ibn Hanbal was severely beaten and then imprisoned because he refused to assent to the truth of the decree issued by the Khalíf. Al Buwaiti, a famous disciple of As-Sháfa'í, used an

ingenious argument to fortify his own mind when being punished by the order of the Khalíf. He was taken all the way from Cairo to Baghdád, and told to confess that the Qurán was created. On his refusal, he was imprisoned at Baghdád, and there remained in chains till the day of his death. As Ar-Rabi Ibn Sulaiman says: "I saw Al Buwaiti mounted on a mule: round his neck was a wooden collar; on his legs were fetters; from these to the collar extended an iron chain, to which was attached a clog weighing fifty pounds. Whilst they led him on he continued repeating these words, 'Almighty God created the world by means of the word *Be*! Now, if that word was created, one created thing would have created another.'¹ Al Buwaiti here refers to the verse, "Verily our speech unto a thing when we will the same, is that we only say to it, 'Be,' and it is,—Kun fayakúna" (Súra xxxvi. 82). This, in the way Al Buwaiti applied it, is a standing argument of the orthodox to prove the eternity of the Qurán.

When times changed men were put to death for holding the opposite opinion. The Imám As-Sháfa'í held a public disputation in Baghdád with Hafs, a Mutazilite preacher, on this very point. Sháfa'í quoted the verse, "God said *Be, and it was*," and asked, "Did not God create all things by the word *be*?" Hafs assented. "If then the Qurán was created, must not the word *be* have been created with it?" Hafs could not deny so plain a proposition. "Then," said Sháfa'í, "all things, according to you, were created by a created being, which is a gross inconsistency and manifest impiety." Hafs was reduced to silence, and such an effect had Sháfa'í's logic on the audience that they put Hafs to death as a pestilent heretic. Thus did the Ash'arian opinions on the subject of the Divine attributes again gain the mastery.²


II. ANGELS.

Of this article of the creed Muhammad Al-Berkevi says:—

"We must confess that God has Angels who act according to His order, and who do not rebel against Him. They neither eat nor drink, nor is there

¹ Ibn Khallikan, vol. iv. p. 394.

² "The Free-thinkers (Mutazilites) left no traces of themselves except in the controversial treatises which they had written. These were destroyed, and with their destruction the last vestiges of the conflict between Free-thought and the spirit of Islám were obliterated."—Osborn's *Khalífs of Baghdád*, p. 148.



trumpet he has actually in his hand and place when God gives the order. When he receives a terrible blast that all living things will die.¹ the last day. The world will remain in this. Then God Most High will revive Israfil, who will sound of which all the dead will rise to life."²

This confession of faith makes no fourth of the Archangels. His special created beings have what is needful for of the rain-fall, plants, grain, and all sustenance of men, beasts, fishes, etc. is the communication of God's will to "one terrible in power" (Súra liii. 5) him. He is honoured with the privilege. Tradition says that on the night of the that Gabriel had six hundred wings, a large that from one shoulder to the other great that a swift-flying bird would years to pass over it.

Nine-tenths of all created beings are are formed of light. Their rank is content with the position he occupies to love and to know God. Whatever do. "All beings in the heaven and and they who are in His presence do neither are they wearied: they praise

to the Angels, 'Verily, I am about to place one in my stead on earth,' they said, 'Wilt Thou place there one who will do ill therein, and shed blood when we celebrate Thy praise and extol Thy holiness?' God said, 'Verily I know what you know not.'"

It is true that Eblis was disobedient, but then he belonged not to the angelic order but to that of the Jinn. "When we said to the Angels, 'Prostrate yourselves before Adam,' they all prostrated themselves save Eblis, who was of the Jinn, and revolted from his Lord's behest" (Súra xviii. 48; see also Súra ii. 33).

The Angels intercede for men: "The Angels celebrate the praise of their Lord, and ask forgiveness for the dwellers on earth" (Súra xlii. 3). They also act as guardian Angels: "Each hath a succession of Angels before him and behind him, who watch over him by God's behest" (Súra xiii. 12). "Is it not enough for you that your Lord aideth you with three thousand Angels sent down from on high?" (Súra iii. 120.) "Supreme over His servants He sendeth for the guardians who watch over you, until when death overtaketh any one of you our messengers take his soul and fail not" (Súra vi. 61).

In the Traditions it is said that God has appointed for every man two Angels to watch over him by day, and two by night. The one stands on the right-hand side of the man, the other on his left. Some, however, say that they reside in the teeth, and that the tongue of the man is the pen, and the saliva of the mouth the ink.¹ They protect the actions of men, and record them all, whether good or bad. They are called the *Mua'qqibát*, i.e. those who succeed one another. They also bear the name of *Kirám-ul-Kátibín*, the exalted writers. They are referred to in the Qurán. "Think they that we hear not their secrets and their private talk? Yes, and our Angels who are at their sides write them down" (Súra xliii. 80).

There are eight Angels who support the throne of God. "And the Angels shall be on its sides, and over them on that day eight shall bear up the throne of thy Lord" (Súra lxix. 17). Nineteen have charge of hell. "Over it are nineteen. None but Angels have we made guardians of the fire" (Súra lxxiv. 20).

The story of Harut and Marut is of some interest from its

¹ *Sharh-i-'Aqáid-i-Jámi*, p. 187.

we are only a temptation. be
(Súra ii. 96). Here it is quite clear
sorcery, which is generally allowed
planation has to be given. Commen-
reticent on this subject. The story
the prophet Enoch, when the Angels
men they said: "O Lord! Adam &
Thou hast appointed as Thy vice-
obediently." To which the Lord re-
you on earth and to give you lust
you too would sin." The Angels
told them to select two of their nu-
this ordeal. They selected two, re-
piety. God having implanted in the
anger said, "All day go to and fro
the quarrels of men, ascribe no equi-
adultery, drink no wine, and every-
'Azam, the exalted name (of God).
This they did for some time, but at-
named Zuhra (Venus) led them ast-
them a cup of wine. One said, "I
other, "God is merciful and forgiv-
wine, killed the husband of Zuhra, &
"exalted name," and fell into grievous
they found that the "Name" had

yond the reach of their parched lips. The woman was changed to a star. Some assert that it was a shooting star, which has now passed out of existence. Others say that she is the star Venus.

It is only right to state that the Qázi 'Ayáz, Imám Fakhr-ud-din Rázi (544-606 A.H.), Qázi Násir-ud-dín Baidavi (620-691 A.H.), and most scholastic divines, deny the truth of this story. They say that Angels are immaculate, but it is plain that this does not meet the difficulty which the Qurán itself raises in connection with Hárút and Márút. They want to know how beings in such a state can teach, and whether it is likely that men would have the courage to go near such a horrible scene. As to the woman, they think the whole story absurd, not only because the star Venus was created before the time of Adam, but also because it is inconceivable that one who was so wicked should have the honour of shining in heaven for ever. A solution, however, they are bound to give, and it is this:—Magic is a great art which God must allow mankind to know. The dignity of the order of prophets is so great that they cannot teach men what is confessedly hurtful. Two Angels were therefore sent, and so men can now distinguish between the miracles of prophets, the signs of saints, the wonders of magicians and others. Then Hárút and Márút always discouraged men from learning magic. They said to those who came to them, "We are only a temptation. Be not thou an unbeliever." Others assert that it is a Jewish allegory, in which the two Angels represent Reason and Benevolence, the woman the evil appetites. The woman's ascent to heaven represents death.

To this solution of the difficulty, however, the great body of the Traditionists do not agree. They declare that the story is a Hadís-i-Sahíh, and that the Isnád is sound and good. We can name only a few of the great divines who hold this view. They are Imám Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Ma'súd, Ibn Umar, Ibn Abbas, Háfiz 'Asqalláni,¹ and others. Jelál-ud-din Syúti, in his commentary the *Dur-i-Mashúr*, has given all the traditions in order, and, though there is some variety in the details, the general purport accords with the narrative as we have related it. The Traditionists answer the objections of the Scholastics

¹ *Tafsír-i-Faiz-ul-Karím*, p. 58.

bright star is of the nature of desire to learn the "exalted man" that the good she desired outweighs regard to the date of the creation that all our astronomical knowledge made since the Flood, whereas of Enoch, who lived before the deluge goes on, and men of great reputation believe in the story.

Munkar and Nakir are two fierce blue eyes, who visit every man with regard to his faith in God and are supposed to dwell in 'Ālam al-Mawt intervening between the present and after the resurrection.¹ This is "grave" when used in this context. Wicked Muslims suffer trouble who can give a good answer to them. I suppose that a body of Angels is sent and that some of them bear the name of Nakir, and that, just as Angels during his lifetime, two come to examine him after death. I suppose with regard to children. The gates of believers will be questioned, I

Distinct from the Angels there is another order of beings, made of fire, called Jinn (Genii). It is said that they were created thousands of years before Adam came into existence. "We created man of dried clay, of dark loam moulded, and the Jinn had been before created of subtle fire" (Súra xv. 26, 27). They eat, drink, propagate their species, and are subject to death, though they generally live many centuries. They dwell chiefly in the Koh-i-Káf, a chain of mountains supposed to encompass the world:¹ some are believers in Islám; some are infidels, and will be punished. "I will wholly fill hell with Jinn and men" (Súra xi. 120). The Súra called Jinn (lxxii.) refers to their belief in Islám. The passage is too long to quote. They try to hear² what is going on in heaven. "We guard them (*i.e.* men) from every stoned Satan, save such as steal a hearing" (Súra xv. 19). They were under the power of Solomon,³ and served him. An 'Ifrit of the Jinn said, "I will bring it thee (Solomon) ere thou risest from thy place: I have power for this, and am trusty" (Súra xxvii. 39). At the last day the Jinn also will be questioned. Imám Hanífa doubted whether the Jinn who are Muslims will be rewarded. The unbelieving Jinn will assuredly be punished. Tradition classifies them in the following order: (1) Jánn, (2) Jinn, (3) Shaitán, (4) 'Ifrit, (5) Márid. Many fables have been invented concerning these beings, and though intelligent Muslims may doubt these wonderful accounts, yet a belief in the order of Jinn is imperative, at least, as long as there is belief in the Qurán. Those who wish to know more of this subject will find a very interesting chapter on it in Lane's *Modern Egyptians*.

EDWARD SELL.

¹ "From the beginning of history the Caucasus is to civilised nations, both Greek and Oriental, the boundary of geographical knowledge—indeed, the boundary of the world itself."—Bryce's *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, p. 48.

² Súra xxxviii. 7, 89.

³ *Ibid.* xxxviii. 36.

ART. IX.—*The Moral Basis of Faith.*

THE masters of theology in all ages have generally taught that a living faith, as contrasted with an intellectual assent to propositions whether of fact or of doctrine, springs out of the heart; that the existence or non-existence of such faith is contingent on the state of the affections and the will; and that, in many instances, the only remedy for scepticism of the intellect is to be found in a change of the moral temper, or in an altered bent of the will.

This is the philosophy of Augustine. But in his case, as in the Schoolmen afterwards, the treatment of the subject of faith is somewhat confused by the view taken of the authority of the Visible Church. Faith is partly the loyal acceptance of the Church as the authorised and qualified guide, and partly that immediate sense of the truth and excellence of the Gospel, and of its adaptedness to the wants of the soul, which avails to triumph over all doubts. Augustine began with a restless seeking after God; and in this craving for a supernal good, in his view, the religious life in sinful men must take its rise. This is a distinctively moral feeling, not mere intellectual curiosity. But tossed as he had been from one opinion to another, he felt the need of a present, authoritative voice to still the tumult within; and this he recognised in the Catholic Church. Here, again, it was not external criteria alone, such as miracles, the succession of bishops in the Apostolic sees, and the like, which satisfied him that the Church could be trusted; but it was the victory which he saw that Christianity, as preserved and transmitted in the Church, had gained, in spite of all obstacles, in the Roman world, and the ennobling, purifying influence which had gone forth from the Gospel and the Church upon individual souls and upon society. Here, once more, was a moral source of conviction. "Christianity and the Church," to quote from Neander, "and, indeed, the Church under this particular form of constitution, were confounded in his view. What he might justly regard as a witness for the divine, world-transforming power of the Gospel, appeared to him as a witness for the divine

authority of the visible, universal Church ; and he did not consider that the Gospel truth would have been able to bring about effects equally great, by its inherent divine power, in some other vessel in which it could have been diffused among mankind ; nay, that it would have been able to produce still purer and mightier effects, had it not been in many ways disturbed and checked in its operation by the impure and confining vehicle of its transmission.”¹ The maxims, Faith precedes knowledge ; Believe that you may understand—“*Fides præcedit intellectum* ;” “*Crede, ut intelligas*”—which were adopted by the Schoolmen, are found, in these very words, in Augustine. I believe that I may understand—“*Credo, ut intelligam*”—the noted saying of Anselm, is thus almost verbally identical with sentences of the father of Latin theology. Although the authority of the Church, and, on that ground, the truth of the complex system of doctrines which the Church inculcated, were held to deserve immediate acknowledgment, yet, as we have said above, the intrinsic excellence of the Gospel itself, and the love immediately evoked by it in the soul, were made prominent as the sources of a living faith. The truth, it was held, shines in its own light. The practical experience of the Gospel, in its enlightening and saving power, was held to be the pre-requisite of the intellectual comprehension of it. Experience was put first ; science afterwards. It was Anselm, the first of the eminent mediæval expounders of the relation of faith to reason, who said : “He who has not believed, has not experienced, and he who has not experienced, will not understand.”

“Faith,” says St. Bernard, “is a certain voluntary and assured prelibation of the truth,” not yet made explicit or reduced to science. The heart anticipates the understanding, not waiting for intellectual analysis. Alexander of Hales says that in religion the relation of knowledge and believing is the reverse of that which exists in other sciences, because in religion faith creates the reason ; it is the argument which makes the reason ; it is the light of the soul—*lumen animarum*—which makes it perspicacious to find out the reasons by which the things of faith are proved. There is an inward certitude, founded on love, or the surrender of the heart to the truth, which is distinct from con-

¹ *Church History*, vol. ii. p. 241.

viction on purely intellectual grounds. Bonaventura, the great doctor of the Franciscans, founds the conviction that is in faith, not on logical demonstrations, but on love to that which is presented as the object of faith. It is the contents of the truth, not external verifications, that carry the assent of the soul. Albert the Great makes religious faith, as distinguished from theoretical certainty, to be an immediate persuasion of the truth, where we are attracted by the object of faith, in the same manner that the will is determined by the moral law.

"The merit of faith," says Hugo of St. Victor, "consists in the fact that our conviction is determined by the affections, when no adequate knowledge is yet present. By faith we render ourselves worthy of knowledge, as perfect knowledge is the final reward of faith in the life eternal." William of Paris separates that faith which springs from a rational knowledge of the object, an intellectual comprehension, from that which springs from the virtue of the believer, or his temper of heart. He speaks of a "fortitude which overcomes the darkness of incoming doubt, and by its own light scatters the clouds of unbelief."¹

The Reformers, while discarding the Scholastic doctrine of the authority of the Church, were penetrated with the conviction that a living faith has an immediate source deeper than the understanding. As to the existence of God, Calvin says: "We lay it down as a position not to be controverted, that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a Deity." "The minds of men are fully possessed with this common principle"—the sense of religion—"which is closely interwoven with their original composition." He speaks of our "propensity to religion," of the "innate persuasion" which men have of the divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution; a perception which sin has never wholly extinguished. "No man can take a survey of himself but he must immediately turn to the contemplation of God, in whom he 'lives and moves;' since it is evident that the talents which we possess are not from ourselves, and that our very existence is nothing else but a subsistence in God alone."²

¹ On the Religious Philosophy of the Schoolmen, see Neander, *Church History*, vol. iv. p. 367 *seq.*

² *Institutes*, B. i. i. 1; iii. 1, 2, 3.

Melanchthon, the author of the principal doctrinal treatise in the Lutheran Church, says on the same subject: "God desires to be known and worshipped; and the clear and sure knowledge of God would have flashed upon the mind of men had human nature remained sound." Now the minds of men wander "in a great and gloomy mist, inquiring whether there be a God, whether there be a Providence, and what is the will of God."¹

Faith, as is well known, is a great theme with Luther. That the source of inward certitude with respect to religious truth, does not lie in the understanding, but in the relation of that truth to the appetencies of the soul, is asserted in every variety of form. Take out this general idea from Luther's discussions of the subject, and no Luther would be left. He plants himself upon the Word of God, but it is to the conscience and heart that the Word comes home with power. The understanding, left to itself, is a blind and false guide. No words are too strong for Luther to express his scorn for reason, taken in this sense. The Protestant theology taught that the truth of the Scriptures is apprehended in a penetrating, living way, only through "the testimony of the Holy Spirit," who gave it. The Spirit that inspired the sacred writers must move on the heart of the reader. Otherwise, he stands on the outside, and will never get beyond an intellectual assent to the facts and propositions which they record. It may be that he will not even reach that.

Pascal's philosophy of religion turns on the distinction between the functions of the heart and of the understanding. The understanding by itself leads to Pyrrhonism, because the understanding goes out of its province. If there is to be religious knowledge, God must not only reveal or communicate Himself, but, also, that in man which is related to God must be open to the reception of Him. This holds good of the revelation of God in the creation, as truly as of the disclosure of Himself in the Scriptures. There is no coercive revelation, no light to which the eyes cannot be closed, no demonstrated truth. There is a mingling of light and shade in the revelation which God makes of Himself, to the end that the effect of it may not be irresistible. If it is true that

¹ *Loci Theol.*, de Deo.

He reveals Himself, it is also true that He hides Himself. He will be found of those who seek Him. "I wonder at the boldness with which men speak of God, in addresses to the irreligious. Their first undertaking is to prove the Deity by the works of nature. I should not be astonished at their undertaking, if they were addressing their discourses to believers ; for it is certain that all those who have a living faith in their hearts see at once that there is nothing which is not the work of God whom they worship. But it is otherwise with those in whom this light is quenched, and in whom it is desired to revive it, persons destitute of faith and of grace, who seeking, with all the light they have, for everything in nature which can lead to this knowledge, find only obscurity and darkness : to say to these that they have only to look at the least thing in the world, and they will see God unveiled, and to give them, as the whole proof of this great and important subject, the course of the moon or of the planets, and to pretend to have completed the proof by such a discourse,—this is only to furnish them occasion to think that the proofs of our religion are very feeble ; and I perceive, both by reason and experience, that nothing is better adapted to make them despise it. It is not in this way that the Scripture, which is better acquainted with the things of God, speaks. On the contrary, it says that He is a hidden God ; and that, since the corruption of nature, He has left men in a blindness from which they can only escape by Jesus Christ, without whom all communication with God is closed : ' No one knoweth the Father but the Son, and him to whom the Son shall reveal Him.' It is this which is signified by the Scripture when it says, in so many places, that those who seek God find Him. No one speaks in this way of a light which shines as bright as mid-day. We do not say that those who seek for the daylight at noon, or for water in the sea, will find them. And so it cannot be that such is the evidence of God in nature."¹ Elsewhere he says : " There is light enough for those who desire to see, and darkness enough for those of an opposite temper." " God would rather make the will than the mind susceptible. Perfect clearness would aid the mind and be harmful to the will." The difficulties in the evidences of Christianity and

¹ *Pensées*, c. xxii.

theology are to be frankly admitted : they are a part of the discipline of faith. The deep meaning of an Epistle of Paul is opened up only in the heart of a believer. With him the acquaintance with it is not a mere act of memory. A man must, so to speak, live himself into religion. He must feel his way. The consideration of outward nature, at the best, could only make one a Deist. But "the God of the Christians is a God who makes the soul feel that He is its only good ; that all its rest is in Him, and that it will have no joy except in loving Him ; and who, at the same time, makes him hate the obstacles which hold him back, and prevent him from loving God with all his strength."¹ Christianity, Pascal teaches, accomplishes two things : it makes a man know that there is a God for whom men are susceptible, and that in their nature there is a corruption which makes them unworthy of Him. The consideration of himself and of the world should bring man to Christ as his Redeemer, and through Christ he will learn to find God everywhere and to understand Him. Such is the religious philosophy which satisfied the genius of Pascal.

That faith includes a sense, or spiritual recognition, of the excellence of its objects, is fundamental in the religious and ethical philosophy of President Edwards. I quote but one out of numberless passages where it is asserted. "If the evidence of the gospel depended only on history, and such reasonings as learned men only are capable of, it would be above the reach of far the greatest part of mankind. But persons with but an ordinary degree of knowledge are capable, without a long and subtile train of reasoning, to see the Divine excellency of the things of religion : they are capable of being taught by the Spirit of God as well as learned men. The evidence that is this way obtained is vastly better and more satisfying than all that can be obtained by the arguings of those that are most learned, and greatest masters of reason. And babes are as capable of knowing these things as the wise and prudent ; and they are often hid from these when they are revealed to those."²

The modern evangelical theology of Germany, as a reaction against Rationalism, started first from Schleiermacher, who had

¹ *Pensées*, c. xxii.

² *Works*, vol. iv. p. 449 (Sermon on Spiritual Light).

been preceded to some extent by Jacobi. In very important particulars, Schleiermacher's conception of religion has been modified by the eminent theologians who have come after, and who have known how to unite a genuine scientific spirit with evangelical belief. But in the radical idea of faith as having roots of its own in the moral and religious nature, they agree with one another, and with the great genius to whom, however much they may differ from him, they consciously owe so much. This remark is true of such men as Twisten, Nitzsch, Neander, Tholuck, Julius Müller, Rothe, Dorner. The conflict with Rationalism in Germany led to a deeper appreciation of the nature of religion, and to views more in consonance with the thoughts of Luther, and of profound thinkers in the Church from the beginning.

In England, it is Coleridge, more than any other writer, who, by calling up the old divines, and by his own teaching, has done much to promote a like regeneration of theology. The two characteristic points in Coleridge's philosophy of religion are the distinction between Nature and Spirit, and the distinction between Understanding and Reason. The doctrine of the free, self-determining power of the spirit, itself involves an immediate recognition of a fact of consciousness, a fact *su*per* generis*; the will, in its very idea, presupposing an exemption from the law of cause and effect which extends over Nature. Coleridge's idea of Reason mingles in it elements suggested by Kant and Jacobi. It is defined as "the mind's eye," of which realities, not creatures of fancy, are the objects. It is the organ of the supersensuous, by which truths are beheld which neither the senses, nor the understanding which deals with the materials provided by sense, furnish. Faith is defined generally as "fidelity to our own being—so far as such being is not and can not become an object of the senses," together with its concomitants. The first recognition of conscience by ourselves partakes of the nature of an act. Through conscience, which commands and dictates, we know ourselves to be agents. "We take upon ourselves an allegiance, and consequently the obligation of fealty; and this fealty, or fidelity, implying the power of being unfaithful, is the first and fundamental sense of Faith." The preservation of our loyalty and fealty amid the seductions of sense and of sin constitutes the second sense of

Faith. And the third is what is presupposed in the human conscience, the acknowledgment of God, the rightful Superior whose will conscience reveals, duty to whom imparts their obligatory force to all other duties.¹ We believe in God because it is our duty to believe in Him. "The wonderful works of God in the sensible world are a perpetual discourse, reminding me of His existence, and shadowing out to me His perfections. But as all language presupposes in the intelligent hearer or reader those primary notions which it symbolises; as well as the power of making those combinations of these primary notions which it represents, and excites us to combine; even so I believe that the notion of God is essential to the human mind; that it is called forth into distinct consciousness principally by the conscience, and auxiliarily by the manifest adaptation of means to ends in the outward creation. It is, therefore, evident to my reason, that the existence of God is absolutely and necessarily insusceptible of a scientific demonstration, and that Scripture has so represented it. For it commands us to believe in one God. *I am the Lord thy God; thou shalt have none other gods than me.* Now all commandment necessarily relates to the will; whereas all scientific demonstration is independent of the will, and is apodictic or demonstrative only as far as it is compulsory on the mind, *volentem, nolentem.*" With Coleridge, it is the intrinsic character of Christianity, not the external proof, which leads the way in inspiring a conviction that God is its author. As "to matters of faith, to the verities of religion," in the belief of these "there must always be somewhat of moral election, 'an act of will in it as well as of the understanding, as much love in it as discursive power. True Christian faith must have in it something of inevidence, something that must be made up by duty and obedience.'" The quotation included is from Jeremy Taylor. In another place, Coleridge exclaims: "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence; remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself: 'No man cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him.'" Of the principles which underlie all specific

¹ Coleridge's *Essay on Faith*.

precepts of the Bible, Coleridge writes: "From the very nature of those principles, as taught in the Bible, they are understood in exact proportion as they are believed and felt. The regulator is never separated from the mainspring. For the words of the Apostle are literally and philosophically true: *We* (that is, the human race) *live by faith*. Whatever we do or know that in kind is different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith and trust in itself. This is the first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being."

Among living theologians no one has set forth the moral basis of faith with more philosophical depth than Dr. John Henry Newman. Faith, a living faith, "lives in, and from, a desire after those things which it accepts and confesses." "Philosophers, ancient and modern, who have been eminent in physical science, have not unfrequently shown a tendency to infidelity." "Unless there be a pre-existent and independent interest in the inquirer's mind, leading him to dwell on the phenomena which betoken an Intelligent Creator, he will certainly follow out those which terminate in the hypothesis of a settled order of nature and self-sustained laws." "The practical safeguard against Atheism in the case of scientific inquirers is the inward need and desire, the inward experience of that Power, existing in the mind before and independently of their examination of His material world." "Faith is a process of the Reason, in which so much of the grounds of inference cannot be exhibited, so much lies in the character of the mind itself, in its general view of things, its estimate of the probable and the improbable, its impressions concerning God's will, and its anticipations derived from its own inbred wishes, that it will ever seem to the world irrational and despicable;—till, that is, the event confirms it." "Can it, indeed, be doubted that the great majority of those who have sincerely and deliberately given themselves to religion, who take it for their portion, and stake their happiness upon it, have done so, not on an examination of evidence, but from a spontaneous movement of their hearts towards it?" Faith "is said, and rightly, to be a venture, to involve a risk." "*We believe because we love*. How plain a truth!" "The safeguard of Faith is a right state of heart. This it is that gives it birth; it also disciplines it." "Why

does he"—the believer—"feel the message to be probable? Because he has a love for it. . . . He has a keen sense of the excellence of the message, of its desirableness, of its likeness to what it seems to him Divine Goodness would vouchsafe, did He vouchsafe any, of the need of a Revelation, and its probability." God, "for whatever reason, exercises us with the less evidence when He might give us the greater:" . . . "perchance by the defects of the evidence He is trying our love of its matter." Faith "rests on the evidence of testimony, weak in proportion to the excellence of the blessing attested."¹ These quotations, after what I have said on preceding pages, need no comment.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ART. X.—*Current Literature.*

THE publication of Dr. Dorner's great work upon Dogmatics² moves on quickly. About two-thirds of the whole have now appeared, and it is possible to estimate with some accuracy its position among recent works upon systematic theology. It is a most valuable addition. The former volume, a notice of which will be found in the April number of this Review, opened up the great theme in a novel manner, and by its profound analysis of the genesis of Faith, by its astonishing deduction of the Doctrine of God, and by its original construction of the Doctrine of the Trinity from the ethical idea of love, suggested to all readers, what a few pupils of the famous Berlin Professor had incessantly declared, that the reasoned treatment of Christian truth had received the accession of another name to its higher ranks. That impression this second volume deepens. The apologetic branch of the subject is now left behind, and, the foundation having been thus laid, the specific doctrines of Christianity are entered upon. In the pages before us there pass under a most logically conceived

¹ *University Sermons*, pp. 193, 194, 203, 216, 225, 234, 236.

² *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, von Dr. J. A. DORNER. Zweiter band, specielle Glaubenslehre, erste Hälfte. 1880, Berlin. (System of Christian Doctrine, by Dr. J. A. Dorner. Second vol., first half.)

survey the Doctrine of Sin and the Doctrine of Christ. That Dr. Dorner's historical and dogmatic consideration of Christology would be lucid, thorough, biblical, and philosophical, every student of his now classic treatise upon the Person of Christ would anticipate. For our part, we should nevertheless give the palm to his consideration of the Doctrine of Evil, which is steadily and progressively tracked through its biblical, ecclesiastical, and dogmatic phases,—the postulates and the nature of sin, its generic and its habitual character, all coming in for careful and vigorous location and regard. The appendices upon the Devil and Death are especially interesting. The fact is, that, despite the numerous works which have been given to the world in response to the impulse initiated by Schleiermacher, this System of Dr. Dorner's seems the final word along this line, however disputable the line itself. Certainly the doctrinal method created by Schleiermacher has not before received so judicious, so sympathetic, so national, and so discriminating a prosecution. Further, from the very distinct recognition by its author that he is the successor of a long series of religious thinkers, Christian and un-Christian, this work might be called a Handbook to Modern German Theology, by one of its most eminent exponents. It is at once a manual and an original treatise.

It was well that the proceedings of the noteworthy assembly of the Evangelical Alliance at Basle should be embodied in a form adapted to the British public.¹ A report of these proceedings had, it is true, been already published at Basle itself, but naturally enough the papers were written in French or German. In this edition every foreign paper is translated, and in many cases condensed, and if, in the task of translation and condensation, some freshness is lost, the force of this wide testimony to the "One Lord," the "One Faith," and the "One Baptism," afforded by eminent men of various nationalities and communions, is scarcely diminished. Some of the papers here collected have much more than a fleeting importance. It is,

¹ *The Religious Condition of Christendom*, described in a Series of Papers presented to the Seventh General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance, held in Basle, 1879. Edited by the Rev. J. MURRAY MITCHELL, and published by authority of the Council of the British Organisation of the Alliance. Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.

of course, impossible to give any adequate summary of what is thus presented, for this volume is itself a summary, compact and loaded; but so authoritative and catholic a collection of wise and stimulating utterances upon some of the most pressing matters of theoretical and practical import should surely be often referred to with advantage. If particularisation is not invidious, we would call especial attention to the addresses of Orelli, Godet, and Gess upon "The Unchangeableness of the Apostolic Gospel," and to the several descriptive notices upon Evangelical Religion—in Switzerland, by Güder; in Germany, by Cremer; in France, by Babut; in Holland, by Oosterzee; in America, by Schaff; in Austria, by von Tardy; and in Scandinavia, by von Scheele. The report of the conference upon the Training of Ministers of the Word of God, as led by such men as Gess, Baur, and Riehm, is of much present interest. Altogether, this closely printed volume deserves careful reading and frequent reference.

A new book from the pen of Dr. Dawson, the accomplished Principal of M'Gill College, Montreal,¹ is sure to meet with a ready welcome. The volume before us is entitled *The Chain of Life in Geological Time*, and it may be regarded as a pendant to the two admirable works which have recently attracted no small share of attention—*The Story of the Earth and of Man*, and *Fossil Man*. Its purpose is to show the beautiful sequence in which the various forms of life have been linked together from age to age; and the importance of illustrating this law of sequence can only be understood by those who are familiar with the assumption, or rather chain of assumptions, according to which sequence becomes development, development evolution, and evolution finally automatic generation. Principal Dawson's position is practically this: that sequence must be written down as sequence and nothing more, until something more is really proved. He maintains that "the introduction of new species of animals and plants has been a continuous process, not necessarily in the sense of derivation of one species from another, but in the higher sense of the continued operation of the cause or causes which introduced life at first."

¹ *The Chain of Life in Geological Time.* By J. W. DAWSON, LL.D., F.R.S., etc. London: Religious Tract Society.

He sets aside the argument for evolution which is found in the fact that such vast changes have come over certain types of life in the course of time, by showing that "many so-called species are nothing more than varietal forms." In short, "transmutation" of species is not necessarily anything beyond natural modification. We must refer our readers to the book itself for the illustration of these very important *dicta*; and the most non-scientific reader may rest assured that Dr. Dawson will at least make his position intelligible to him. His style is almost unique, even in popular scientific literature, for its clearness and freedom from those technicalities of language which make many of our science hand-books closed books, save to the few. Let us add that Principal Dawson writes as a believer in revelation, who has as yet found nothing in the records of geology to destroy his faith.

Mr. H. B. Baildon, a young Scotch poet of no small promise, has recently given utterance to some of his thoughts on present-day science in a volume entitled *The Spirit of Nature*.¹ The book is controversial in its character, and its aim is to show the weakness of the materialistic position: with its main idea, therefore, we are in perfect accord, only demurring to the credence which Mr. Baildon seems to give to the still unproved doctrine of evolution. In the course of his argument he covers much ground, first treating of chemistry, then, and at much greater length, of botany, as these are affected by a materialising science, and finally dealing with the relations of poetry and science, and with the charge of "cruelty" which has been so often preferred against nature. To our mind the great value of such a book as this is that it shows how thoroughly any doctrine of materialism or semi-materialism fails to give account of the world save to those who look at it from the eye outwards. The soul which has in it an echo of poetry, however faint—and in Mr. Baildon it is not faint—is simply shocked by this skeleton which these teachers set up and call "nature." When they talk of "life," indeed, we can scarce help thinking of what George Herbert describes death to be, "an uncouth, hideous thing,—nothing but bones." Our

¹ *The Spirit of Nature*. By HENRY BELLVSE BAILDON, B.A. Cantab. London: J. and A. Churchill.

space forbids quotation from Mr. Baildon's book ; had it been otherwise, we could have culled from it sentences full of elevated sentiment, and marked by a rich poetic taste. Those who go to the book for weapons to fight the scientific giants withal, may be disappointed ; but it will call out the genuine sympathy of those who have ever felt nature to be throbbing with a Divine presence.

A new edition—the third—of Dr. Rigg's *Modern Anglican Theology*¹ deserves more than the mere mention of its appearance. The special feature of the present edition is the memoir of Charles Kingsley, which occupies the first hundred pages. This is written in a very tender and sympathetic strain, and may be taken as evidence of the high esteem in which his memory is held by evangelical theologians who yet by no means indorse all his teachings. To those who have not time to read the full and wonderfully interesting biography of Kingsley which his widow has given to the world, this brief sketch will supply a faithful and striking outline portrait. Apart from this, the present edition does not differ much from those which preceded ; but it is much to be able to say that the essays on Maurice, Kingsley, Hare, and Jowett, of which the volume mainly consists, will bear reading to-day as well as when they were first published more than a quarter of a century ago. To us, and we dare say to most, the interest draws most around the two first-named of these, and we think that Dr. Rigg has succeeded wonderfully in placing before the reader the peculiarities of their teaching. In regard to Maurice, he probes to its depths the Maurician doctrine of Sin, and shows its inadequacy ; and he enters, naturally even with more fulness, into his teaching with regard to "Atonement." With regard to this latter he is careful to trace it to Maurice's central idea of Christ as the "true Root of Humanity," the archetypal man ; and the main-spring of Kingsley's theological system, he considers, is to be found in an idea of kindred nature. Both he regards as Neo-Platonists, which is to say, Alexandrine mystics. For ourselves we are inclined to hold, with regard to Kingsley at least, that his mind was not theological, and that broadly human studies

¹ *Modern Anglican Theology.* By JAMES H. RIGG, D.D. Third Edition, London : Wesleyan Conference Office.

formed the sphere in which his powers found most natural exercise ; and when we set his sermons and his novels together, and with these compare his life, we pass from the comparison with the feeling that, after all his free denunciations of evangelicalism, he was much more evangelical than he knew.

The notice which Dr. Rigg gives of Coleridge is somewhat too meagre, but, on the other hand, he shows fine discrimination by the prominence which he gives in this volume to the teaching of that singularly-gifted but now half-forgotten man, Archdeacon Hare. To sum up, any one who wishes to understand the forces which have been making and moulding "Broad Church" during the last half-century should turn to Dr. Rigg's admirable volume.

Mr. Comper Gray's *Biblical Museum*,¹ as it proceeds, must be found by many a real help in the study of the Scriptures. The volume on Isaiah has recently been issued, and it is a remarkable repository of notes on that book. Anecdotes, incidents, meditative thoughts, and verses of poetry, are drawn from all sources, and what strikes us most, in view of the immense stores of literature on Isaiah, is the judgment with which Mr. Gray has made his choice, and the avoidance of that over-fulness to which he must have been tempted. Even those who have dug deep in this mine before will be sure to find a few more nuggets.

We call our readers' attention to an excellent little book by Mr. Gordon Calthrop, entitled *Christian Certainties*.² It consists of brief addresses delivered in St. Paul's during Lent 1880. There is in them an elevated spiritual tone, an evangelical directness, and a charming simplicity.

¹ *The Biblical Museum* Book of Isaiah. By JAMES COMPER GRAY. London: Elliot Stock.

² *Christian Certainties*. By the Rev. GORDON CALTHROP. London: Elliot Stock.





